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ABSTRACT 
In the period between the World Wars the developed 
world experienced immense technological" changes, based 
primarily on electricity and oil, and a severe 'economic 
crisis. The two are in fact strongly interrelated. 
Unfortunately the depression has tended to overshadow the 
effects of the "Second Industrial Revolution" in the 
historiography of New Zealand. Yet an examination of 
several areas of economic, social and political develop-
ment, concentrating on the city of Christchurch, reveals 
that technological change was frequently exerting a very 
powerful influence either in the same direction, or 
contrary to that of the depression. 
The decline in the comparative economic status of 
Christchurch and Canterbury in this period owes at least 
as much to the way in which new technology permitted the 
exploitation of resources and markets elsewhere as it does 
to the effects of the economic crisis. Similarly, there 
was a strong undercurrent of technological unemployment 
locally and nationally, which would have necessitated changes 
in social welfare and employment policies even without the 
depression. The massive unemployment caused by that crisis 
compelled central government to make permanent provision 
for the unemployed. However, the provision of relief work 
rapidly developed into the extension of the welfare state 
on a very wide front in order to reduce the numbers of 
unemployed. Meanwhile the opportunities for paid employment 
for women were being extended by technological change at 
least as much as by the depression. New technology was also 
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reducing the burden of their domestic work. 
Forms of entertainment based on innovations such as 
radio, motion pictures and motor vehicles competed strongly 
with more traditional recreations, while the greater personal 
mobility encouraged the growth of existing forms of enter-
tainment such as dancing, golf and informal social contacts. 
Arguably, this competition had a deeper effect on formal 
sports than the depression. 
The impact of new technology coincided with those of 
the Great War and climatic variations to give the false 
impression that the depression had led to an improvement 
in health. In reality, it produced a significant deteriora-
tion in several areas, particularly those of psychological 
illness and preventive treatment. On the other hand, a 
reduction in alcohol-related disorders, and the horrendous 
road toll which motor technology had created, must be 
weighed in the balance. 
New technology also posed immense new problems for 
local government. Roads had to be remade,electricity 
networks installed, vast amounts of new machinery purchased, 
and new permanent staff employed, particularly in salaried 
positions. Such expenditure limited the financial and 
political capacity of local government to support meaning-
ful relief work during the depression. This was particularly 
true of Christchurch, where a majority of ratepayers were 
working people. The Labour-dominated City Council restricted 
spending to keep their support but could not match the rate-
cutting promises of the Citizens' Association or satisfy 
many of the unemployed. Consequently, the most strongly 
Labour city rejected the party in local government at a time 
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when it was sweeping to power in the country as a whole. 
Despite Christchurch's reputation for peacefulness during 
the depression there was significant disorder in the city -
on a scale certainly exceeding that in Dunedin, and possibly 
that in Wellington. At least two persons died as a result 
of violence associated with industrial unrest. Nevertheless, 
Christchurch was not on the verge of a revolution: the 
balance of force was too uneven and had been tipped further 
in favour of the authorities by motor transport. 
Finally, technological change was rapidly shifting 
dominance from the capitalist to the professional class. 
The depression seemed to reinforce this existing movement 
in favour of "the rule of the expert" by demonstrating the 
limits of capitalism and sharply dividing the capitalist 
class and its supporters. Amongst the dominated classes, 
new technology was moving the weight of numbers, income and 
prestige away from the independent working class and towards 
the white collar class. It did this by de-skilling many 
occupations and encouraging the growth of large-scale public 
and private enterprises. The labouring class and much of 
the independent working class tended to coalesce into a 
semi-skilled working class. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Two themes may be said to dominate the economic and 
social historiography of the interwar period in the western 
world. They are the rapid adoption of new technology on a 
large scale and the prolonged and deep international 
depression. British historians have been frequently 
fascinated by this combination, particularly in the way in 
which it was revealed in regional contrasts within their 
own country. The broad division between the fast-developing 
11 I 
new technology areas of south-eastern England and the stagnant 
older industries of the North-east and Wales has been a 
constant theme of their work, as it was a major concern of 
contemporaries. In the United States the popular division has 
seemed to be chronological - rapid technological change 
during the "roaring 'twenties" versus stagnation in the 
depressed 'thirties. The writings of New Zealand and 
Australian historians have tended to be more dominated by 
the effects of the depression, followed in the case of New 
1 Zealand by a rapid moqernisation under ,the Labour government. 
The 'twenties have generally been dealt with as a rather 
pale imitation of the American experience, but with the 
emphasis on insecurity. One Australian writer has gone so 
far as to describe the new technology as "the shadow" and 
1. There is, however, a school text-book containing a remarkably d~tailed 
description of technological change in New Zealand during the 'twenties: 
R. Chapman and E. Malone, New Zealand in the 'Twenties: Social Change' 
and Material Progress, Auckland, 1969. A lively, well-illustrated 
Australian study also devotes much space to changing technology: 
B. Carroll, Sydney, 1980. 
depression as "the substance" of the 'twenties, let alone 
the 'thirties. 2 
2 
This study sets out to examine the impacts of techno-
logical change and the international economic crisis in a 
decade which encompassed the worst of the depression in New 
Zealand. It is particularly concerned with the interaction 
between the two influences. 
To this end, the two chapters of Part I define the 
forces of new technology and the depression, and relate 
them to New Zealand. Chapter One also examines why techno-
.1,1 I' . 
logical change was so rapid and widespread between the ~a+s. 
Such change was profound, and not limited just to "the motor 
car, radio, and talkie-pictures".3 An economic historian 
has plenty of material with which to argue that 
while the rate of technical progress is difficult 
to measure, it seems safe to say that in the inter-
war years the consumer was offered more new products 
and the industrialist more new machines and materials, 
than at, any comparab~~ period in history.4 
The emphasis in Chapter Two is on the links between the 
new technology and the development of the depression itself. 
It also stresses the failure of New Zealand's decision-
makers to introduce policies which might have reduced the 
disruptive effects of the international crisis internally, 
a failure which unnecessarily increased the suffering in an 
urban centre like Christchurch. 
Part II goes on to trace the impact of the forces 
identified in Part I on various areas of economic, social and 
2. R. Broomhi1l, Unemployed Workers, St. Lucia, 1978, p.1-2. 
3. Ibid., p.2. 
4. S. Pollard, The Development of the British Economy, 1914-50, London, 
1962, p.93. 
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political life in Christchurch. Chapter Three investigates 
the reasons why Christchurch and Canterbury underwent a 
particularly severe economic decline and slow recovery 
between 1926 and 1936. Chapter Four deals with the 
changing patterns of employment as well as the problem of 
large-scale unemployment during this period. There is then 
a chapter devoted to the ways in which new technology and 
the depression were together altering patterns of recreation. 
The chapter on health seeks to explain the apparent paradox 
of improving public health statistics in a community hard-hit 
by economic depression. Aspects of politics are explored 
in the next two chapters. The first describes the policies 
adopted by the Christchurch City Council, the only large 
municipal authority dominated by the Labour Party throughout 
most of the depression years. Chapter eight examines 
Christchurch's reputation as the most peaceful of the main 
centres during the depression. It also assesses the 
significance of the outbursts that did occur. The final 
chapter looks at how both technological change and the 
depression affected the balance between social classes. Rather 
than a two-class division into bourgeoisie and working class, 
or "rich and poor", this thesis uses throughout a fivefold 
categorisation based on the correlation between economic 
functions and interests, and social values. The classes 
described are labelled as capitalist, professional, white-
collar, independent working-class and unskilled working-
class. 
The terminal years of this study, 1926 and 1936, are 
intended to act as boundary markers rather than enclosing 
walls; they are not allowed to obscure the view forward or 
back. These years were originally chosen partly for 
convenience, marking either end of an intercensal period 
which government economies during the depression had 
lengthened to ten years from the normal five. Given the 
inevitable lack of precision as to the depression's 
"beginning" and its "end", it appeared reasonable to cast 
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the net wide in the certainty of capturing at least the 
worst of the crisis years. Above all, it seems likely 
that the full impact of technological change in particular 
is normally only felt some time after its adoption becomes 
widespread. It would th~s be distorting to examine for 
example the effects of such technological change in 1926 
without mentioning the rapid spread of factory electri-
fication in the early 'twenties. 
Nor has the geographical scope of this study been 
limited strictly to the Christchurch Urban Area, or even to 
New Zealand itself. After all, the origins of most of the 
technological changes lay overseas. Furthermore, there 
were many important statistical series which were compiled 
on a national basis and not divided according to urban areas. 
Where local figures exist, they are given. It should be 
noted, however, that such figures frequently refer to 
Christchurch City or have been compiled by adding together 
returns from the city and suburban authorities. The boundaries 
of those authorities did not match those of the urban area. 
Yet the use of a local point of focus has its advant~ges, 
permitting a closer examination of a number of aspects, 
particularly the actions of local authorities. Furthermore, 
there are special attractions in focussing on Christc~urch, 
a city which has been frequently singled out for the alleged 
uniqueness of its depression experience. 
, 
PART I 
6 
CHAPTER ONE 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
Technological advance, the increase in the capacity of 
humanity to alter its environment,l has been a constant 
feature of life in the western world for several hundred 
years. This process underwent a considerable acceleration 
during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
a development so dramatic in its social as well as economic 
implications that it has been justly termed the Industrial 
Revolution. 2 Towards the end of the nineteenth century 
and early in the twentieth there was a renewed speeding up 
of the pace of significant technological change. This "cluster 
of innovations,,3 has in turn been described as a "Second 
Industrial Revolution,,4 because of its profound effects both 
on modes of production and social life. 
1. E.Mansfield, The Economics of Technological Change, New York, 1968, 
p.lO-ll, gives a more detailed definition. 
2. Leading social historians have few qualms about this term: " ••• although 
the concept of an industrial revolution has been queried by certain 
recent economic historians, during these years the beginnings of a 
total change in English society can be traced, to which the label 
'revolution'still deserves to be attached". A.Briggs, The Age of 
Improvement, 1783-1867, London, 1959, p.17. See also D. Landes, 
The Unbound Prometheus, Cambridge, 1969, Ch.21 and H. Perkin, 
The Structured Crowd, Brighton, 1981, p.28. One economic historian 
has captured the process with an effective if mixed metaphor:, "There 
is an everlasting stream of invention, but the stream runs sometimes 
more strongly, sometimes less, and particularly there is bunching in 
the widespread application of new techniques". R.Sayers, A History 
of Economic Change in England, 1880-1939, London, 1967, p.28. 
3. Landes, op.cit., p.4, 235. 
4. Ibid, loc.cit.1 and A.Musson, The Growth of British Industry, London, 
1978, Ch.16. 
? 
The new wave of industrial change was to a very large 
extent based on the use of electricity and oil fuels, much 
as its predecessor had rested heavily on steam engines and 
coal. There was, however, a considerable overlap. For 
example, coal-gas powered the prototypes of the internal 
combustion engine, only later to be driven by fuels derived 
from oil. More importantly, coal-heated steam was and still 
remains the prime mover for a large proportion of the world's 
electricity. Even such apparently old-fashioned devices as 
steam boilers and gasworks improved their efficiency signi-
ficantly up to the Ithirties, albeit with the help of alloys 
containing elements extracted by electricity. The development 
of molybdenum steel, for instance, permitted a sixfold 
increase in boiler pressure after 1911. 5 Largely due to 
such innovations, the amount of coal required to produce a 
kilowatt hour of electricity in the United States fell from 
approximately 3.2 lb. in 1913 to 1.3 lb. in 1928. 6 The use 
of superheaters in steam locomotives - simply passing the 
steam through the fire-box again - greatly improved their 
efficiency at the same time.? There were also important 
areas of advance in this wave of change which might well have 
proceeded without the new forms of energy, notably the develop-
ment of synthetic materials such as bakelite and rayon. 
Nevertheless, electricity or oil were to be found at the basis 
of most of the technical innovations adopted during this period. 
5. C. Goodeve, "Iron and Steel", in P. Dunsheath (Ed.), A century of 
Technology, 1851-1951, London, 1951, p.28. 
6.L. Mumford, Technics and Civilisation, London, 1947, p.235. 
7. There were a number of other developments which also contributed to 
large increases in "tractive effort". E.Williams, "Rail and Water 
Transport", in M. Kranzberg and C.Pursell, Technology in Western 
Civilisation: Vol.2, Techno109Y in the Twentieth Century, New York, 
1967, p.137-9. 
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Much of the theoretical and experimental work for the new 
technology ,had been carried out by 1900, but its wider applica-
tion was generally delayed until after 1918. Then amenities 
such as the motor car, electric lighting, and radio spread 
rapidly and ceased to be regarded as the curiosities of the 
rich or eccentric. Simultaneously commercial production 
witnessed a great acceleration in the replacement of steam, 
gas, animal and human energy by electricity and oil fuels. 
Total world production of electricity increased approximately 
fourfold between 1920 and 1939,8 and the production of crude 
oil grew roughly threefold over the same period. 9 
There were a large number of reasons for the rapid 
diffusion of new technology between the wars. The Great War 
itself contributed greatly by speeding the development of 
some technical innovations, showing the value of scientific 
research, encouraging mass production, creating a large number 
of surplus motor vehicles, ~nd acting simultaneously as a 
show-case and a testing-ground for much new technology. In 
some cases, civilians serving in armed forces acquired new 
skills such as lorry-driving and many may well have come to 
appreciate the value of motor transport to their own 
businesses. 
At a more fundamental level, the attractions of the new 
electrical and oil technology can be divided usefully, if 
somewhat arbitrarily, into two broad categories: the advan-
tages it offered those who provided goods and services, and 
8. Landes, op.cit., p.431. 
9. G. Jenkins, Oil Economists' Handbook, London, 1977, p.85. 
the manner in which it met the social demands which 
industrial~sation was creating. 
One of the greatest attractions of the new technology 
to business and public authorities was the prospect of a 
sUbstantial saving on labour. Although the industrialist 
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might have to pay electricians at comparatively high wage-
rates, the machines they serviced more than made up for this 
by displacing large numbers of unskilled labourers. In 
particular, electricity demanded no labour for delivering 
coal, trimming, stoking, removing clinker or cleaning 
boilers. yet it could also be used to simplify many opera-
tions. Many more single machines appeared with the capacity 
to perform a series of tasks either automatically or with 
the minimum of resetting. This was largely because electric 
power could be switched from one process, plane, speed or 
direction to another far more readily than power transferred 
by line-shaft. As a resul ~., factory-owners were able to 
employ women, youths, and adult male workers with non-
industrial backgrounds in jobs which had previously been the 
preserve of higher-paid, skilled men. 
In building and construction, electric and oil motors 
similarly provided power sources for a variety of machine-
tools, including cranes, pneyfuatic drills, saw-benches, 
./ 
welders and cement-mixers. The latter two were especially 
important because of the growing use of reinforced concrete 
in building, an innovation which itself displaced large 
numbers of bricklayers and stonemasons, along with many of 
the labourers who had assisted them. Lorries increasingly 
replaced more labour-intensive forms of transport on road-
works and other major construction projects, working along-
side tractors drawing implements such as graders and bitumen 
sprayers. Graders, bulldozers and carry-aIls driven by 
their own engines appeared around 1930. Over most of the 
, 
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western world the interwar period saw the pick and shovel, 
wheelbarrows, horse-scoops and drays, steam-shovels and 
steam-rollers largely replaced by much less labour-intensive 
machinery powered by oil. Internal-combustion engines were 
also used to power cement-mixers and pneumatic drills on 
public works. 
The labour-saving technology of the second wave of 
industrialisation spilled over into agriculture, as had that 
of the first. It contributed greatly to the substantial 
increase in agricultural production in developed countries 
between the wars, an increase achieved with the employment 
of a decreasing proportion of the work-force. Output per 
man-hour in agriculture increased by 56% in the United States 
between 1909-11 and 1939-41. In Britain, where mechanisation 
was less widespread, the in~rease was 38% between 1904-10 
and 1937.10 Electricity and the internal combustion engine 
were often to be found in competition in pastoral farming 
as both could supply power for farm butter churns, cream 
separators, and milking and shearing machines. Electric 
motors also found uses in the small-scale processing of some 
crops on farms - in chaff-cutting and threshing, for instance. 
In Europe electricity was even used for drawing ploughs. 
However, the internal' combustion engine had the greater 
effect on arable farming between the wars, mainly through 
the use of the tractor. This machine was vastly improved 
10. s. Clough, The Economic Development of Western Civilisation, New York, 
1959, p.421. 
11 
during the 'twenties and early 'thirties with the adoption 
of caterpillar tracks, large pneumatic tyres, power take-offs 
d t · 1 f' . 11 an r1angu ar con 19urat10n. Specialist motorised 
harvesters began to gain popularity during the I twenties, 
particularly in the United States and there were 61,000 
combines in use there by the end of the decade. 12 Tractors 
and stationary oil-fueled engines were increasingly used for 
threshing, and other forms of on-farm processing. From less 
than a hundred thousand in 1919 the number of tractors in use 
in North America grew to over a million in 1930 and almost 
1.6 million in 1939. In Europe the comparable figure was 
negligible at the time of the Great War but 130,000 by 1930 
and over 270,000 in 1939. 13 The motor-lorry also proved a 
great labour-saver on many farms, both for bringing in the 
harvest and for carrying produce to factory, rail-head or 
market. There were 139,000 such vehicles on United States 
farms in 1920; 890,000 in 1935. 14 
This benefit extended throughout the road transport 
industries to the extent that motor lorries, taxis and buses 
replaced horse-drawn and steam-powered vehicles. The same 
had earlier applied to the electric tram and the underground 
railway, a service almost universally driven by electricity. 
Electric, and later diesel, locomotives saved some rail 
services the labour costs associated with stoking, cleaning 
and watering steam engines. 
11. R. Wik, "Mechanization of the American Farm", in Kranzberg and 
Pursell, op.cit., p.360-l. 
12. N. Rosenberg, Technology and American Economic Growth, New York, 
1972, p.135. 
13. Clough, op.cit., p.428. 
14. Rosenberg, 
-"'---
, p.135. 
12 
A dramatic saving on labour was also rendered possible 
by the application of new technology to water-borne transport. 
In 1914 2.6% of ships were oil-burning; in the mid-'twenties 
15 
over a quarter. Such ships required approximately a tenth 
of the number of stokers to be found on coal-burners. 16 
There was also a considerable growth in the number of ships 
powered by internal combustion engines between the wars, a 
method of propulsion requiring even less labour. By 1939 
roughly a quarter of the world's ocean-going tonnage was 
d ' 'th' 17 h '1 r~ven ~n ~s way. Between t em, o~ -burners and motor 
ships accounted for 53% of such tonnage in 1938 compared 
with 18% in 1918. l8 Whether on ships, or in ports, rail-
yards or loading-bays, electricity and oil-power increasingly 
saved labour by providing motorised cranes, winches and 
conveyor belts. These replaced steam-engines, horses and, 
above all, manpower. 
Labour-saving new technology was less evident in commerce 
during this period. Nevertheless, electrical adding-machines 
and cash-registers began to appear, while the long-established 
telephone and telegraph were'further automated. Teleprinters 
entered use, and the number of telephone connections grew 
significantly. However, it was the typewriter which brought 
about the most profound changes, particularly 'in the employ-
ment of women. Few typewriters were electrically powered 
during the interwar period, but dictaphones were widely used. 
15. Sayers, op.cit., p.96~ 
16. W. Johnson, "Transport", in Dunsheath, op.cit., p.248. 
17. Sayers, op.cit., p.96. 
18. D. Aldcroft, British Transport since 1914, Newton Abbot, 1975, 
p.64. 
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Furthermore, electrically-purified elements improved the 
wearing qu~lity of type-metal, now being subjected to heavier 
use. within the retail industry the van and the light lorry 
largely ousted the horse-drawn cart for heavy or distant 
deliveries. 
Electricity also reduced a substantial amount of the 
manual labour in homes, a traditionally unpaid or lowly paid 
area. Its impact should not be exaggerated, however, in the 
face of other changes in technology. In Britain, for example, 
the home tended to remain -
A machine heated by coal, coke and gas, and powered 
by women ••• For most families the reduction in labour 
made possible by stainless cutlery and ready-made 
clothes, the reduction in family size through birth 
control, and the rehousing schemes bringing with 
them inside lavatories, fixed baths and running 
water - if they were lucky, running hot water 
supplied by gas or coal - were of much wider19 significance than the electrical revolution. 
Nevertheless, by 1939 the majority of British homes enjoyed 
electric lighting~Oa form Qf illumination which necessitated 
less cleaning and servicing than gas, kerosene or candle. 
Moreover, the production of stainless steel and cheaper 
factory-made clothing owed much to the use of electric power 
in industry. In countries where domestic electricity proved 
more competitive than in Britain, electric vacuum cleaners, 
water-heaters, cookers and radiators were more successful in 
reducing the work of the housewife or lessening the need to 
employ full-time servants. 21 By the mid-'thirties electric 
refrigerators and washing machines were making some impact, 
19. L. Hannah, Electricity Before Nationalisation, London, 1979, p.208. 
20. ., loc.cit. 
21. Landes, op.cit., p.439-40. 
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particularly in the United States. Even in Britain the 
electric i~on was very widely used, and hundreds of 
thousands of middle-class households were enjoying the labour-
. d t fIt . 't 22 sav1ng a van ages 0 e ec r1C1 y. 
The attraction of this labour-saving aspect of so much 
of the new technology was enhanced for employers, including 
domestic employers, by the fact that wages had generally risen 
more than interest rates since 1914. Throughout the developed 
world pay-rates had tended to rise in pursuit of prices 
during the Great War and the short-lived post-war boom. Even 
when prices fell during the early 'twenties, attempts to 
reduce wages met strong and partially effective resistance 
from organised labour. 23 Trade unionism had been growing 
in power before 1914 as the reserve army of unorganised and 
low-paid rural labour shrank, as literacy increased and as 
workers gained experience of their strength in the industrial 
setting. Wartime inflatio~.had then further swelled the 
support for trade unions by providing the economic conditions 
in which they could best demonstrate their value to workers. 
In Britain, for example, average wage rates increased by 96% 
between 1914 and 1923. In 1921 the average had been up 190% 
on 1914 and in 1928 it was still 94% up.24 In comparison, 
the mean annual Bank Rate was 4.15% between 1922 and 1932, as 
against 3.75% between 1904 and 1913. 25 This represented an 
22. Hannah, op.cit., p.193-208. 
23. G. Routh, Occgpation and Pay in Great Britain, 1906-79, London, 1980, 
p.107, 114# D.A1dcroft, The Inter-war Economy: Britain, 1919-39,London, 
1970, p. 361-62# P.Renshaw, The General Strike, London, 1975, 
p.94-5. 
24. Routh, -L~~ , p.134. 
25. Aldcroft, Inter-war Economy ••• , p.333. 
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average increase of less than eleven per cent. The situation 
in the united States and other technically advanced nations 
appears to have been broadly similar, with rises in wage-
t t t · . th .. t 26 ra es ou s r1pp1ng ose 1n 1n erest-rates. This tended 
to make investment in labour-saving technology more attractive. 
Furthermore, in Britain at least, the unskilled and those 
employed in coalmining, gasworks, shipping and railways were 
amongst the most successful in advancing their wage rates 
d · l' d t' 27 an 1n s oW1ng re uc 10ns. These were precisely the areas 
on which the old technology depended so heavily. 
Versatility was a strong feature of the new technology 
which helped employers to take advantage of its labour-saving 
potential and therefore encouraged its purchase. Speaking 
of the use of electric motors by ship-builders, C.H. Merz, 
a pioneer electrical entrepreneur, claimed that 
the really important point about adopting electricity 
was that it made available for their operations a 
much more easily adaptable form of power; so much 
did this prove. the cas~ that within a very few years 
the different firms we connected up to the system 
were spending two or three times as much on 
electric power as they had ever spent on steam power -
not because electric power was more expensive, but 
because they had applied it to so many uses for which, 
before, they had not used power at all. 28 . 
I 
Electric power could simultaneously supply heat for welders, 
high-speed turning for drills and grinders, intense illumina-
tion over large areas and power for a variety of tools. Part 
26. E. Phelps Brown and M. Browne, A Century of Pay: The Course of Pay 
and Production in France, Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, 
and the United states, 1860-1960, London, 1968, p.106, 432-52; 
M.Friedman and A.Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 
Princeton, 1963, p.640. 
27. Routh, op.cit., p.124. 
28. Quoted in Hannah, op.cit., p.18. 
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of this versatility derived from the nature of the electrical 
form of energy with its ready conversion into heat, light or 
power. Part also came from the fact that electricity could 
be supplied down flexible cables rather than inflexible 
shafts or gaspipes. Above all, however, there was the 
capacity for electric power to be "fractionated" - readily 
divided up into a number of smaller units. 
Within factories, the flexibility of electricity 
permitted an escape from the line-shaft and its associated 
wheels and belts. Although many industrialists initially 
persevered with this type of transmission after electrification, 
the use of electric motors at individual machines gradually 
became standard. This allowed far greater freedom in factory 
layout and speeded the introduction of flow methods of 
production, particularly in engineering. For example, the 
mechanical movement of materials, was now much easier in the 
absence of "the jun~le of shafts and belts"29 which had marked 
the stearn-powered factory. Furthermore, an additional power 
take-off did not necessitate another network of wheels and 
belts, and significant increases in output could be achieved 
without the expense of a new boiler or larger underground 
gaspipes. Electricity was therefore particularly attractive 
to small entrepreneurs, as both the capital and labour costs 
of beginning machine production were considerably reduced 
without limiting the potential for substantial further growth. 
Flexibility was also a major aspect of the appeal of 
motor transport. On long hauls, carrying heavy tonnages, the 
railway maintained its economic edge. But it lacked the 
29. Landes, op.cit., p.288. 
capacity to deliver to retail outlets or the factories 
which electricity had set free from dependence on coal. 
The motor-lorry also had the advantage of serving farming 
districts, permitting the collection or delivery of 
~7 
relatively small quantities of goods at the gate. To some 
degree the lorry was able to benefit from the popularity of 
its prolific cousin, the motor-car. Authorities were pressed 
to provide better roads for the one and the other soon 
followed. From a relatively insignificant level in 1913, 
\ 
the estimated number of ton-miles travelled by motor lorries 
in the United States rose to 48.5 thousand million in 1940. 30 
In Britain it was estimated that road hauliers were carrying 
a hundred million tons by 1936, compared with virtually nil 
. 1913 d . t 281 . 11 . t th' 1 31 ~n , an as aga~ns m~ ~on ons on e ra~ ways. 
The electric lorry also had some effect, especially on 
deliveries in urban areas. 
Between them, electri~.power and the motor-lorry made 
the location of many industries more flexible. It was now not 
so important to establish a factory on land handy to a 
railway line or a canal which could bring coal in and 
provide rapid transport out for products. It had also become 
more economic to site component factories away from the site 
of assembly. Likewise, greater automation and less dependence 
on established industrial regions around coalfields allowed 
entrepreneurs to take advantage of less skilled labour and 
lower-wage regions. For example, the shift in the American 
30. Clough, op.cit., p.425. 
31. Aldcroft, Inter-war Economy ••• , p.218. 
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textile industry between the wars from the north-east to the 
south has been traced partly to the simpler operation of the 
new el t ' 1 t t' t ' h' 32 ec r~ca au oma ~c warp- y~ng mac ~nes. 
Greater flexibility of location brought many savings, 
including the opportunity to purchase cheaper land further 
afield. A similar saving in land costs can be seen in 
agriculture as rapid lorry transport to market or railhead 
permitted the exploitation for horticulture of pockets of 
good soil and favourable climate which had previously been 
too isolated. Within cities, electric trams, buses and the 
motor-car enabled residential areas to be located on cheaper 
land in much the same way. In many cases, transport arid 
industrial firms were able to reduce their holdings of land 
which had previously been used to feed the horses. The paper-
mill at Mataura furnishes a New Zealand example of this 
33 development. 
A substantial element in the versatility of electrical 
and motor technology was the saving it offered on the weight 
and volume of fuel and engine. In the transport industries 
such a saving also meant a reduction in energy usage and an 
increase in the proportion of payload to deadweight. Steam 
locomotives needed to carry much larger quantities of fuel 
and water than vehicles driven by internal-combustion engines. 
This was partly because water was needed to carry the power as 
steam, partly because the heat-value of coal by weight was 
roughly a third lower than that of diesel oil, and partly 
32. L. Fishel, "The Problem of Social Control", in Kranzberg and pursell, 
op.cit., p.500. 
33. J. Angus, Papermaking Pioneers, Mataura, 1976, p.104. 
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because even the most efficient steam-turbine utilised a 
lower proportion of the energy in its fuel than an internal-
combustion engine. Boilers, fire-boxes and a platform for 
the stoker all added to the heaviness of the mobile steam-
engine. It has been estimated that for some railway operations, 
such as shunting, a ton of diesel fuel could save up to seven 
tons of coal. 34 Th' d 1 . t e ma~ns-powere e ectr~c ram, trolley-bus 
or train was even more attractive, carrying no fuel dead-
weight at all. However, this advantage had to be off-set 
against the substantial cost of installing many miles of 
wire and the loss of freedom of movement. Horses were more 
manoeuvrable but their power out-put was much lower. More-
over, the bulkiness of their "fuel", straw for bedding and 
removal of dung posed considerable problems in metropolitan 
areas. The advent of caterpillar tracks and the "pneumatic-
tyred revolution" 35 during the 'twenties and "thirties helped 
oil-fueled motors to take over from horse-power and manpower 
even on much soft or steep ground. Similar considerations 
operated in the case of the construction industries. Small-
horsepower electric and diesel motors could be transported, 
with their fuel, much more readily than stearn-engines and 
this encouraged their use on more and smaller jobs. Compara-
tive lightness was also an attraction in agriculture, where 
the smallest stearn-engine was likely to be too clumsy, and 
probably disproportionately powerful, for many tasks around the 
farm which could be mechanised by electrical or oil-fueled 
34. P. Odell, An Economic Geography of Oil, London, 1963, p.70-71. 
35. Andrews and Beaven Ltd. 100 years, 1878-1978, Christchurch, 1978, 
p.lO. 
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motors. Finally, it was in large part the reduced volume 
and weight of fuel which promoted the adoption of oil-burning 
steam-engines and then diesel motors in ships. Diesels 
carried only half the weight of fuel as oil-burners and a 
third that of coal-burners, and they required no boiler-
36 
room. 
Reduced weight of fuel and engine was not the only reason 
why electricity and oil were more efficient in their use of 
fuel. Internal combustion engines extracted more of the 
potential energy than their external-combustion competitors. 
At its most efficient, the steam engine extracted around a 
fifth of the energy in its fuel, gas engines used around a 
quarter and diesel motors took out about a quarter in the 
case of small units to over a third for large ones. Elec-
tricity had to rest on its other advantages, as even in 1940 
in the united States it utilised only a fifth of the energy 
theoretically available at ~ower-stations.37 However, in 
the case of hydro-electricity, the "fuel" was extremely 
cheap. 
Where the supply of current was largely dependent on 
thermal power-stations a.conversion to electricity in effect 
allowed the consumer to utilise economies of scale. One vast 
steam-turbine could supply power to numerous factories at a 
cheaper rate than they could produce it themselves, even 
allowing for losses in transmission. Further, large savings 
could be effected within the workplace because it was possible 
to have electric motors consuming energy only when actually 
36. Aldcroft, British Transport, p.64. 
37. Landes, op.cit., p.434. 
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doing productive work. In this the "fractionalisation" 
capacity of electric power assisted greatly. Similarly, the 
use of line-shafts and belts had entailed considerable losses 
of power and the amount of energy used up by a steam-engine 
could not be lowered quickly to meet a drop in demand for 
power. In addition, neither oil-engines nor electric motors 
required a long period of stoking up in which large amounts 
of energy were lost. 
The capacity to deliver power instantly to a machine 
draws attention to another major advantage of the new 
technology - the saving on time which it offered. The 
importance of increased speed could be seen in areas as 
diverse as road transport, harvesting, food-processing, 
communications and shipping. It permitted savings in some 
costs - such as insurance on freight - and increased output 
at the same cost in the case of expenditure on buildings and 
much plant. As the number and size of multi-storey buildings 
grew, lorries reduced the danger of total congestion in 
central-city areas by speeding the delivery of materials onto 
sites and the removal of spoil. The rapidity of motor trans-
port also allowed bitumen and concrete to be delivered from 
central plants in greater quantities and over a much wider 
area. 
In some areas - emphatically not that of road transport38 • 
increased safety was another advantage of the new technology. 
38. The death-rate from motor vehicle accidents in the United states per 
standardised hundred thousand population per year increased from 
seven between 1913 and 1917 to 26.4 between 1928 and 1932. United 
States Bureau of the Census (USBC), Historical Statistics of the 
United States, Colonial Times to 1970, Part 2, Washington, 1975, 
p.719. 
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For example, the removal of line-shafts and drive-belts took 
away a frequent cause of accidents. Even where a factory-
owner was not greatly concerned for the health of his 
employees, such accidents held up production, attracted the 
attention of the authorities and could lead to court action 
and higher insurance premiums. The dangers of poisoning or 
explosion from leakages of gas were also reduced by the 
changeover to electricity. Enlightened employers appreciated 
the improvement in safety and concentration which accompanied 
the reduction in noise-levels with electric power. In under-
ground mines electricity provided a safe and efficient 
alternative to compressed air for the introduction of drills, 
railways and conveyor belts. To a large extent as a result 
of this, the proportion of British coal production cut by 
machine increased from 8% to 61% between 1913 and 1939. Over 
the same period the proportion conveyed by machine rose 
from 1.5% to 54%.39 ElectFicity presented similar attractions 
in the construction of tunnels and their use. by railways. 
Electricity also introduced into general use a large 
number of new materials and processes. These in turn brought 
advantages such as savings on labour, lightness and versatil-
ity, along with other special properties. 
Plentiful supplies of cheaper electric current led to 
the use of electrolysis on an industrial scale, most notably 
in the production of aluminium and magnesium. The availability 
of cheaper aluminium not only introduced cheap non-corrosive 
kitchen utensils, it also rendered economic the large-scale 
39. Aldcroft, Inter-war Economy ••• , p.lS3. 
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extraction of metals such as chromium, molybdenum, vanadium, 
manganese, and titanium by the thermite process. These 
elements in turn provided important new alloys. Chromium, 
for example, was an essehtial component of stainless steel, 
discovered in 1913 and soon a major saver of labour in the 
home through its use in cutlery. Because of its resistance 
to corrosion by acid, this alloy also rapidly replaced more 
expensive metals in chemical and food-processing industries. 
Electroplating with nickel, and later chromium, was used 
even more widely for protection from corrosion. With the 
addition of other elements, chromium produced stellite, and 
chrome-tungsten steel, alloys which retained their hardness 
at high temperatures. These discoveries were timely as 
electric power increased the cutting speeds of drills and 
lathes tenfold between 1875 and 1915. 40 Without new 
materials the resulting gain in efficiency would have been 
greatly reduced. Electrol~~is also supplied elements with a 
high degree of purity. Such very pure zinc was necessary 
for pressure die-castings, which found increasing use in 
the production of motor cars and home appliances. High-
purity electrolytic copper was similarly important for 
electric wires and contacts. On a larger scale, electrolysis 
largely. superseded previous methods of producing chlorine 
and augmented the manufacture of caustic soda. The former 
was used in the development of new bleaches, the latter in 
soaps, papermaking, and the viscose method of making yarn. 
The electric arc furnace was equally productive of new 
materials. The most important of these, calcium carbide, 
40. "Alloys", in Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol.2, London, 1929, p.55!. 
led to the production of acetylene. Thus electricity was 
essential ~o the three main forms of welding developed by 
the 'twenties; thermit, electric arc, and oxy-acetylene. 
Other derivatives of calcium carbide had "opened the way 
24 
for the transition from inorganic to organic chemistry,,41 
were as vital to the acetate process of manufacturing rayon. 
Electric furnaces also provided carborundum for grinding and 
refractory surfaces, chrome steel from chromite, silicon 
for highly conductive alloys, phosphorous for cheaper matches, 
graphite to improve lubricating oil, and carbon disulphide 
for dry-cleaning. In addition, the furnace permitted the 
recycling of scrap in areas without an iron and steel industry. 
Electricity also contributed significantly to the 
production of artificial nitrogen fertiliser, partly through 
the electric arc process in countries well-endowed with hydro-
electricity but mainly through the manufacture of alloys needed 
for the high-pressure vesse.l.s employed in the Haber process. 
Along with the replacement of crops previously grown for 
horse fodder and the fall in population growth, such fertili-
sers gave the lie to pre-war suggestions of an impending food 
crisis in the western world. 
The advantages presented by electrical and oil technology 
would almost certainly have promoted its gradual diffusion, 
even at 1914 price-levels. However, the attraction of these 
innovations was greatly enhanced between the wars by the 
strong tendency for both their capital and fuel costs to 
fall, particularly in comparison with their competitors. This 
fall must be seen against a background of wartime inflation 
41. E.Farber, "Man Makes His Materia1s ll , in Kranzberg and Pursell, 
op.cit., p.184. 
which was unequalled in living memory in most countries. 
A form of ~echnology that could actually reduce.its pre-
war costs was an attractive exception. The fall in price 
was particularly evident in ,the case of electricity. In 
Britain the average cost of a unit of electricity dropped 
from 2.07d in 1923 to 1.00d in 1938. 42 In the United 
States the average charge in cents per kilowatt-hour on 
all services dropped from 2.83 in 1922 to 2.46 in 1935 and 
2.06 in ~940.43 It had been 2.70 in 1907. World crude 
oil prices showed a less favourable trend, soaring to 
$U53.07 a barrel in 1920 from $USO.95 in 1913. By 1930 
the price was down to $U51.19 and in 1935 it touched 
$U50.97. Petrol prices, on the other hand, showed an 
25 
absolute as well as a real decline from pre-war levels. In 
Britain the average retail price of a gallon of petrol fell 
from 8.8d. in ~914 to 7.5d.in 1930, with a slight rise to 
7.9d. in 1938. 44 This was ~espite a rise in tax from 1.3d. 
to 3.6d. a gallon between 1914 and 1938. In comparison the 
total British retail price index was almost a quarter higher 
in 1938 than it had been in 1914. More significantly, the 
price of coal was roughly 21% higher in Britain and 50% 
higher in the United states. 45 In 1925, it was possible to 
buy 41 Kwh of electricity at industrial rates in Britain for 
the price of a ton of coal. By 1938 162'Kwh could be 
purchased for the by then much lower cost of that ton. 46 . 
42. Aldcroft, Inter-war Economy •••• , p.192-3. 
43. USBC, op.cit., p.827. 
44. Jenkins, op.cit., p.133. 
45. B.Mitchell and P.Deane, Abstract of British Historical Statistics, 
Cambridge, 1962, p.483-4; USBC, o~.cit., p.2l4. 
46. Landes, op.cit., p.434. 
Declines in the average ex-factory prices of motor 
vehicles was also striking. In Britain this figure fell 
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from £308 in 1912 to £259 in 1924, £206 in 1930 and £130 
in 1935-36. 47 Even more dramatic was the fall in the ex-
factory price of the Model T Ford, from£1000 in 1908 to 
£300 in 1924. 48 Such reductions in prices were also 
reflected in the cost of parts, so that in Britain the 
estimated total costs per hundred miles of private motoring 
(excluding depreciation) dropped from around 3l/4d. to 22/-
between 1928 and 1938. 49 In the United States the index 
of prices for motor vehicles and equipment dropped by over 
a quarter between 1926 and 1936. 50 Electrical appliances 
also showed a rapid decrease in price. Perhaps most dramatic 
was the fall in the average cost of running a thirty candle-
power bulb for eight hours in Britain - from £.10 in 1900 to 
7/- in the mid-'thirties. 5l Similarly, the cost of 
installing a small househol? lighting system fell from £11-20 
in 1919 to ~7-8 in the late 'twenties and £5-6 in the mid-
'thirties. 
Economies of scale due to growing sales were certainly 
an important aspect of this dramatic improvement in the 
price-competitiveness of electrical and oil-fueled technology. 
However, there were a number of other factors operating, 
particularly the application of new technical methods. 
This was very evident in the electrical supply industry. 
There was a rapid increase in the size of generating stations 
47. A1dcroft, Inter-war Economy ••• , p.184. 
48. Landes, op.cit., p.442. 
49. A1dcroft, Inter-War Economy .•• , p.184. 
50. USBe, op.cit., p.199. 
51. Hannah, o~.cit., p.187. 
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following the discovery of alternating current and the 
development of long-distance, high-voltage power cables in 
the late nineteenth century. These innovations made it 
possible to supply much larger numbers of consumers, if 
necessary from a remote power-station. 52 The development 
of high-speed turbines at around the same time provided 
the generating capacity. Initially this was largely limited 
to hydro-stations such as Niagara Falls, opened in 1886 and 
extended repeatedly. Despite the high cost of construction, 
especially where dams had to be built, hydro-generation was 
extremely cheap. But most developed countries were obliged 
to depend on thermal generation and the size of their 
power-stations only grew rapidly after 1900, when improved 
alloys permitted higher boiler pressures and turbine capacity. 
As these improvements were adopted, extensive grids could 
be constructed. These were supplied from vast power-stations 
on coalfields, or near port~ to which the large quantities 
of fuel necessary could be transported economically. From 
around 25,000 Kw in 1910, the size of the largest thermal 
stations reached a plateau of 208,000 Kw in 1930, a level 
not exceeded until 1956. Between 1908 and the early 'thirties 
the maximum voltage of transmission lines and the distance 
53 they carried power roughly doubled. 
Oil fuels were also greatly reduced in price by the 
application of new techniques. The development of the rotary 
hydraulic drill led to a doubling,of maximum well-depth between 
1900 and 1925,54 while new alloys improved the strength of 
52. T.Williams, A Short History of Twentieth century Technology, 
c.1900-c.1950, Oxford, 1982, p.64. 
53. B.Netschert, "Developing the Energy Inheritance", in Kranzberg and 
Pursell, op.cit., p.249. 
54. , p.242. 
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drilling equipment. In addition, motorised transport 
assisted in its own provisioning by providing transport in 
oil-bearing regions at the periphery of western exploration 
in the Middle East, Latin America, and South-East Asia. 
Aircraft also began to make a contribution to surveying 
while welding and electric pumps permitted the economic 
transportation of vast quantities of crude oil by pipeline 
from remote areas. Simultaneously, the application of 
thermal "cracking" to oil-refining after 1913 greatly 
reduced the unit cost of petrol. Thermal cracker efficiency 
was gradually improved throughout the 'twenties, with the 
result that the quantity of petrol which could be derived 
from a gallon of crude oil doubled between 1919 and 1935. 55 
After 1924 that petrol was increasingly converted to 
"premium-grade" spirit with the addition of tetra-ethyl lead. 
This led to greater energy efficiency through higher consump-
tion ratios. Between 1927 ~nd 1936 the average ratio in 
56 American cars went from 4.55 to 6.15. At the same time, 
the further development of the diesel motor and its application 
to road transport from the late 'twenties onwards permitted 
the efficient use of a much cheaper oil-fuel. 
Mass production was the most famous of the techniques 
used to reduce the cost of motor and electric equipment. Its 
two basic elements, the precise standardisation of components 
and the assembly-line, were already well-established in some 
55. C.Russell, "Petroleum", in Open University, The New Chemical 
Industries, Milton Keynes, 1970, p.89. 
56. W.Hamilton,The Dairy Industry in New Zealand, Wellington, 1944, 
p.39. 
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branches of American industry by 1900. 57 However, while 
the former element was quickly adapted to automobile produc-
tion in the United States, the assembly-line appears to have 
been introduced to engineering only in 1913, by Henry Ford. 
By 1920 it was saving up to ninety per cent of the time 
previously required to construct a motor car. 58 The demands 
created by the Great War, and the need to compete with 
American producers hastened the spread of mass production 
methods to other countries. By the mid-'twenties British car 
manufacturers were emulating and sometimes even improving on 
American techniques. 59 Assembly-lines also proved useful 
in the production of electrical appliances, which generally 
consisted of a number of small standardised components. 
Similar continuous flow methods were increasingly applied to 
bulkier forms of production, including heavy chemicals, oil-
refining"papermaking, glass-making, and sheet-metal rolling. 
Electricity was well-suited .. to· provide the many sources of 
power on demand that mechanised assembly-lines and other flow 
methods required. 
Some non-technical factors were important, however, in 
explaining why so much of the benefit of falling costs was 
passed on to the consumer rather than being absorbed in higher 
wages or royalties. The increasing employment of women and 
the unskilled - often immigrants in the United States - at 
wages they could not get elsewhere probably helped to achieve 
57. P. Drucker, "Technological Trends in the Twentieth Centuryll in 
Kranzberg and Pursell, op.cit., p.19. 
58. J. Bright, "The Development of Automation", in ibid., p.648-50. 
59. Ibid., loc.cit. 
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a comparatively docile workforce. The decentralisation of 
factories which electric power made possible probably also 
assisted by enabling the entrepreneur to shift to areas where 
unions were weak and wages low. Certainly the coal-mining 
tradition of harsh conditions and industrial confrontation 
had no real counterpart amongst the white-collar and skilled 
employees of the prosperous new electrical supply industry. 
They were therefore not mobilised to extract the greatest 
possible share of the income being won over from the ailing 
coal industry. Similarly, workers in the underdeveloped 
oil-producing regions of the world which were opened up 
between the wars had little organised bargaining power. 
Their governments tended to be authoritarian and liable to 
side with the oil companies against rebellious employees 
who wanted higher wages. Furthermore, such governments were 
frequently unstable and susceptible to undue influence in 
granting concessions and setting prices. In several cases -
as in the Dutch East Indies -the oilfields were under 
colonial administration. Part of the benefit accruing to 
employers in the new technology from their advantageous 
bargaining positions with workers and native peoples was 
passed on in lower prices to consumers. 
Most of these consumers were to be found in the developed 
world, where much of the new technology proved particularly 
well-suited to meet the demands which the whole process of 
industrialisation was creating. 
The First Industrial Revolution took much of the world 
off the historic cycle of demographic crisis and slow recovery 
by making the necessities of life more readily available. 
3.1 
Railways and steamships transported food and bulky raw 
materials ~ver considerable distances within Europe and 
eastern North America, permitting specialisation and 
encouraging the development of local resources. They had 
also facilitated the colonisation of "new" lands by providing 
settlers with outward transport, initial supplies of 
industrial goods, and military support against native 
resistance. They had then provided reliable links to the 
metropolitan markets, permitting specialisation and 
exploitation on an international scale. Further vast 
quantities of food and raw materials such as wool and cotton 
flowed back from these colonies in the Americas and Austral-
asia, and from local populations in Asia, and Americas, and 
Africa. Meanwhile, the powering of pumping and hauling 
machinery ,in mines, steam's first major task, was helping 
to provide cheap fuel to households as well as industry. 
In factories steam-engines ,produced massive horsepower, and 
both used heat and engendered it. These features made it 
particularly suitable for large-scale industries such as iron 
and steel making, heavy engineering, pipe and brick kilns, 
heavy chemicals, textile factories, and flour mills. Thus 
the first wave of industrialisation was supplying more and 
better food, clothing, shelter, heating, water supply, and 
sanitation. 
By the final quarter of the nineteenth century industria-
lisation had conquered the worst excesses of hunger, exposure, 
and disease in Europe, North America, and the European 
colonies. Simultaneously, it had also begun to create in 
those areas a large market for less basic goods. Estimates 
vary, but it seems likely that in Britain real wages increased 
in the order of two-thirds to eighty per cent between 1850 
and 1900. 60 Between 1860 and 1900 the increase in real 
incomes per occupied person appears to have been around 75% 
in Germany and 90% in Sweden. Real wages in France went up 
by about 65% over the same period. 61 There was also some 
decrease in working hours, which allowed more time and 
energy for recreation, shopping and enjoying new consumer 
goods. Estimates of the length of working week appear to 
have fallen between 1870 and 1914 from a fairly general 72 
hours to 60 hours in France, Germany and Sweden, 53 hours 
in Britain, and 52 hours in the United States. 62 
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Agricultural wages and hours lagged behind almost every-
where, but agriculture employed a shrinking proportion of 
the workforce. 63 Conversely, an increasing proportion of 
that workforce was to be found in sa1arie~ occupations, helping 
to deputise for large employers and keeping the accounts which 
had swelled with the development of industrial organisation 
and the increased volume of goods traded. The disposable 
incomes of many households were also rising due to the decline 
in the birthrate in the industrialised world. This decline has 
been associated with a vast array of factors linked to industri-
a1isation. These include the higher net cost of dependents 
in urban areas, growing social ambitions in a rapidly 
developing economy, the availability of industrial consumer 
goods as alternative avenues of expenditure, the money incomes 
that factory work offered to women, increased knowledge of 
60. The lower estimate is favoured by Landes, op.cit., p.242. 
P. Deane and W. Cole, British Economic Growth, 1688-1959, Cambridge, 
1967, p.25, gives the higher figure. 
61. Phelps Brown, and Browne, op.cit., p.432-452. 
62. Ibid., p.206-212. 
63. Ibid., p.63, 66. 
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philosophy and birth-control due to greater literacy and the 
development of wider urban poois pf ideas, and the increased 
\ 
use of industrially-produced birth-control devices. 64 
Industrialisation had created "a market of high 
consumption, a body of consumers able and willing to buy 
above the line of necessity".65 Within this process, women 
and children appear to have exerted greater influence on the 
choice of purchases, perhaps partly because families were 
getting smaller. 66 The whole trend towards wider discretion-
ary spending formed the basis for what has been termed, 
inevitably, a "retailing revolution" 67 This involved the 
provision of lower-priced, standardised goods and services 
to a mass market which was largely concentrated in urban 
areas. It was based on the principle enunciated by Thomas 
Lipton, one of its. most successful adherents, that "the poor 
man's 20s is as good as the rich man's £1".68 Lipton's 
career exemplified other as~ects of the continuing "industrial-
commercial revolution". 69 These included the build-up of 
chain stores - enormously facilitated by the. railway and the 
64. N.Tranter, Population and Industrialisation, London, 1973, p.28-29. 
65. Landes, op.cit., p.243. 
66. Ibid., loc.cit. 
67. p.Mathias, Retailing Revolution: A History of Multiple Retailing in the 
Food Trades based upon the Allied Suppliers Group of Companies, London, 
1967. D.Davis, A History of Shopping, London, 1966, Ch.l3, talks of 
the same broad development as "The Second Retailing Revolution". 
The later application of similar principles to the retail clothing 
industry has been referred to as "a Merchandising Revolution" in 
G.Rees appropriately titled hagiography St. Michael: A History of 
Marks and Spencers, London, 1969, p.l09. 
68. Quoted in J. Camplin, The Rise of the Plutocrats, London, 1978, p.75. 
69. C. Wilson; Economic History and the Historian, London, 1969, p.189. 
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telegraph - and the use of flamboyant advertising. Depart-
t t d d 'd h' . 70 men s ores,appeare , as ~ ~re-purchase., Overall; 
rising wages and falling prices for food and clothing were 
enabling a growing proportion of the population to spend on 
new experiences; a little luxury, a bit more ornamentation, 
some new form of stimulation. 
The forms of production which flourished in these 
conditions were not necessarily dependent on electricity or 
oil fuels. New luxury foods appeared and the old ones became 
more accessible. Working people could now consume roller-
( 
ground white flour, white bread, sugar, bought biscuits, 
sweets, cocoa products, tinned foods, baking powder, condensed 
milk, more tea and coffee, butter, eggs, and red meat. 
Groceries turned from meagre accumulations of local produce, 
located in a private house, to specialist institutions 
housing shelves of tins, cardboard boxes, paper bags, and 
cellophane packets. The to~~cco industry expanded enormously, 
especially through the production of "tailor-made" cigarettes 
, 
as women increasingly adopted the habit with their new money 
incomes, and as cheap safety matches reduced the cost and 
trouble of lighting up. There was a similarly rapid rise in 
the sale of products designed to improve appearance rather 
than just maintain health. The development and production 
of new dyes became a major industry. Likewise, natural 
70. Whilst maintaining that "the bourgeoisie more than the working classes 
were the chief beneficiaries of the revolution in marketing before 
the First World War", the historian of one strongly "bourgeois" 
Paris department store admits that "mass retailing gave way to stores 
expressly directed at a lower-class clientele". M.Miller, The Bon 
Marche: Bourgeois Culture and the Department Store, 1869-1920, 
Princeton, 198k, p.165. He also notes that "there grew up a whole 
subculture of department stores that specialised in credit sales 
for the working-class trade" (p.178). 
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sources of ornamental buttons and jewellery failed to keep 
pace with increasing demand, and ,the nascent plastics 
industry. Later, shiny, lightweight rayon began to replace 
natural fabrics for dresses and stockings. Fine soaps 
displaced the coarse and home-made varieties, with Pears 
and Palmolive promising softer skin while Lifebuoy rescued 
white collar workers from the social and financial disasters, 
attendant on "B.O." Soap powders, developed in the l890s, 
claimed to improve the hands and demeanour of the housewife. 
Toothbrushes, toothpastes, and dentures were similarly 
promoted as improving appearance, along with shavers and 
cosmetics. 
Recreational industries also burgeoned. The latter half 
of the nineteenth century was the heyday of the music-hall 
and the travelling circus, and it saw the beginning of the 
rise of the commercial dance-hall. Popular sports such as 
soccer, cycling, trotting, .~nd baseball began to attract 
several thousand spectators regularly .. For the more active, 
the bicycle provided a passport to greater individual freedom 
and mobility. Increasingly the camera went with the cyclist 
or with the excursionists to the new popular seaside resorts 
close to big cities. Back home, the holiday photographs 
were likely to stand on a piano or a cabinet full of cheap 
editions of classics or popular novels. 
The commercial drive to separate the mass consumer 
from his discretionary cash combined with technological change 
to spawn new forms of retailing. These included national 
chains of shops, department stores, mail-order businesses, 
the use of hire-purchase and above all, advertising. 
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The new mass circulation .newspapers provided the main 
platform for the modern sales pitch while themselves moving 
to meet the mass market. The explosive growth of the 
popular press in the late nineteenth century was probably at 
least partly the result of mass formal education. 7l This 
was itself the product of the demand for more literate, 
numerate and disciplined recruits for industry and the 
military, combined with some disquiet in the dominant classes 
at the supposed social and moral ill-effects of industrialisa-
tion and urbanisation. At the same time, the price of news-
print and printing was being substantially reduced by the 
development of cheaper methods of producing caustic soda, 
faster presses and improved access to vast sources of wood-
pulp in Sciandanavia and North America. Railways helped to 
reduce unit costs by not only bringing the pulp and paper in, 
but carrying the finished product out to larger regional and 
national markets. urbanis~tion also assisted by providing a 
substantial local base which was cheaper to supply. However, 
the growth of advertising was probably the most important, 
single factor in the falling cost of newspapers to the public 
because it supplied the pounds which reduced the price by 
pennies. Now many more people could afford to experience 
regularly the sensations which came from reading about the 
latest murders, rapes, fires, floods, and frauds. The 
village gossip of a lifetime could be crammed into a few 
71. The significance of this factor in the rise of the popular press 
is disputed in the case of Britain in Perkin, op.cit., p.47-50. 
However, depth of literacy must be taken into account, and the 
ability to write one's name is not the same thing as reading a 
newspaper. 
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issues. Hearst and Harmsworth joined the Levers, Cadburys, 
Nestles, Liptons, Woolworths, Wills, Eastmans, and Sears 
as powerful magnates and household names in the new consumer 
society. 
Electricity and oil fuels might not have played a vital 
role in the initial rise of this new society, but they fitted 
into it magnificently and helped to maintain the momentum of 
its growth. At the simplest level, they continued to lift 
standards of living by increasing the efficiency of most 
forms of production. In particular they improved the produc-
tion and distribution of consumer goods. Electricity 
mechanised the intricate processes and provided many of the 
materials for packaging, tinning, and tubing products ranging 
from biscuits to toothpaste. Likewise, motor transport ensured 
that such products reached every country store or corner 
grocery,if necessary in a refrigerated form. The number of 
chains of shops in the United States increased from 94 in 
1900 to 720 in 1914 and 2726 in 1928. Amongst the industries 
and sectors of retailing most strongly affected by electrifi-
cation were "ready-to-wear" clothing and furniture. 72 
Furthermore, the new technology provided more of the new 
choices, experiences and excitements that the discretionary 
spender was seeking. The gramophone was an early example of 
this, bringing the popular music and dancing of special 
occasions and commercial halls ~nto the home. In 1909 
345,000 gramophones were produced in the United States, 
514,000 in 1914 and 2.2 million in 1919. 73 Although this 
72. USBC, op.cit., p.847. 
73. Ibid., p.696. 
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mechanism did not require mains current initially - its 
success would have been greatly retarded otherwise - the 
production of large quantities of cheap records relied on 
electrolysis for the creation of master copies. The 'twenties 
saw a great improvement in sound quality with the development 
of electrical recording, and electrical reproduction followed 
in the early 'thirties. 74 
By that time the industry was struggling to compete with 
a new electrical wonder of the age in the form of radio. 
This provided the latest music comparatively cheaply, along 
with sports commentaries and recent news. It supplied a 
link to developments locally and far away, and also reassur-
ance in a time of change through the broadcasts of "personali-
ties" who were often "parsonalities". Over thirteen million 
sets were built in the United States alone between 1920 and 
1930. 75 In Britain 125,000 broadcasting receiver licences 
were issued in 1923, three .~illion in 1930 and over eight 
million in 1938. 76 The motion picture was another form of 
electrical entertainment which was well-established before 
the 'twenties. However, its popularity continued to grow 
and received a new boost from the advent of the "talkies" 
in 1927. There was even colour, of a type, by 1930. The 
local cinema provided laughter, excitement, titillation and 
an escape from the anxieties of real life for millions of 
people. The average weekly attendance at motion pictures 
in the united states increased from forty million in 1922 to 
74. Williams, op.cit., p.3l9-22. 
75. F. Spencer , A History of the World in the Twentieth Century, Part II: 
1918-45, London, 1967, p.29. 
76. B.Mitche11 and H.Jones, Second Abstract of British Historical 
Statistics, Cambridge, 1971, p.114. 
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ninety million in 1930. 77 One study in Cardiff during 
the 'thirties indicated that 52% of unemployed youths attended 
the cinema at least once a week. 78 
The motor car and the motor cycle were also used 
primarily as a source of recreation by city-dwellers. They 
allowed flexible weekly outings and holiday trips without 
sharing a compartment with strangers. At the same time these 
vehicles could supply a sense of speed and power which left 
the bicycle far behind. By 1929 the United States and Europe 
were producing betwe~n them over five million cars annually, 
compared with around half a million in 1914. 79 The number of 
automobiles registered in the United States increased from 
l.6 million in 1914 to 21.3 million in 1929 and 25.2 million 
in 1938. 80 The growth in registrations in Britain was less 
spectacular but still massive - from 132,000 in 1914 to almost 
two million in 1938. The number of motor cycles in use in 
that country approached th~ee-quarters of a million around 
8l 1930 but then dropped away. 
Other aspects of the new technology had similar effects. 
The electric light extended the time available for reading or 
entertaining. It also appears to have introduced greater 
colour into ordinary homes. One historian of the British 
electrical supply industry maintains that "it is not too much 
to say that the electric light revolutionised interior domestic 
, 
decoration, as lighter and brighter paintwork and wall-coverings 
77. USBC, op.cit., p.400. 
78. C.L. Mowat, Britain Between the Wars, 1918-39, London, 1955, p.485. 
79. Spencer, op.cit., p.34. 
80. USBC, op.cit., p.716. 
81. Mitchell and Jones, op.cit., p.230. 
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were used with no danger of their being soiled by gaslight 
vapour".82 Along with other labour-saving devices and 
ready-to-wear clothing, it left more time and energy for 
recreation. That a housewife's work often seemed to take 
as long does not vitiate the change; by the mid-'thirties 
the average housewife had a larger house, more possessions, 
and less daughters to help her. Moreover, more time to 
listen to the radio, to read one of the new women's magazines, 
to window shop at bright new department stores, to travel to 
the central city in the tram or bus, or even to daydream, 
represented a new freedom of choice. 
Several features of the popular electrical and oil-fueled 
innovations simply continued the trends laid down by so many 
growth industries in the late nineteenth century. They 
provided a greater sense of freedom, especially personal 
freedom, and new sensations. ,They were designed for a mass 
market and, with the excep~~on of the motor car, became 
available to all classes between the wars. Furthermore, 
their appeal tended to be directed as much at women and even 
children as to menfolk. Romance always played a greater part 
in motion pictures than organised sport - except in brief 
newsreels; the radio brought popular entertainment more to 
the workplace of most women than the workplaces of men; and 
the motor car was clearly a vehicle designed for more than 
one. 
The methods of selling the new diversions also continued 
the trends of the late nineteenth century. Department and 
multiple stores flourished. Advertising expenditure increased 
82. Hannah, op.cit., p.IS7. 
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from around $542 million in 1900 to $3,262 million in 1928. 83 
The amount of consumer credit outstanding increased from 
$2.6 billion in 1919 to $7.1 billion in 1929 and $8.3 billion 
in 1940. 84 In 1929 an estimated two-thirds of car purchases 
and half those of home appliances were being financed in this 
way l.'n the Unl.'ted States. 85 Ab 11 th k ove a , e mass mar et 
for the new technology was upheld by further, if slower, 
growth in real wages and in leisure time provided by the 
continued spread of industrialisation - both of the first 
and second wave. Even at the depths of the depression, in 
1932, real incomes were still higher than in 1913 in the 
United States, Britain, Germany, Sweden and France. For most 
of the 'twenties and 'thirties they were ten to twenty per 
cent higher. 86 There was also a further drop in the 
average working week. Between 1905 and 1930-31 the number 
of hours in France, Germany and Sweden dropped from 60 to 48. 
Those worked in Britain fel,+ from 54 to 48 and those in the 
United States from 52 to 49. 87 
Like the First Industrial Revolution before it, the 
Second increased the discretionary consumer market. Further~ 
more, in its cultivation of new sensations and its provision 
of wider choice, the new technology pointed the way to the 
electronic and sexual revolutions which lay ahead. 
83. USBe, op.cit., p.856. 
84. Ibid., p.989. 
85. T.Marburg, "The Social Effects of Mass Production", in Kranzberg and 
Pursell, op.cit., p.90. 
86. Phelps Brown and Browne, op.cit., p.432-52. 
87. Ibid., p.209. 
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The spread of electrical and oil-fueled technology was 
particularfY rapid in New Zealand during the interwar period. 
Between 1921 and 1938 the amount of electricity sold rose 
by over 560% while the tonnage of oil landed increased by 
almost 630%.88 In both cases there was a large element 
of catching up. 
As late as 1926 per capita consumption of electricity 
was still only approximately that of Britain, and well behind 
that of the United States. 89 Before the main part of the 
Lake Coleridge power station came into operation between 
1914 and 1924, most urban electricity had been produced 
using coal, gas, or oil as prime movers. This current was 
expensive largely because its fuel had to be purchased. 90 
The relatively small size of New Zealand's cities, their 
isolation from each other, and their distance from the main 
coalfields also contributed to the high changes. However, 
the price of current fell rapidly and consumption boomed 
with the expansion of hydro-generation in the late 'twenties 
and 'thirties. During this period new stations were opened 
at Arapuni (1929), Waikaremoana (1929) and Waitaki (1934) 
while existing works were extended at Monowai (1926) and 
Lake Coleridge (1930) .91 
88. Electricity sold: eso, Industrial Manufacture, 1921, p.41; NZYB, 
1939, p.792. Imports of benzine, benzoline, crude petroleum, crude 
residual oil, kerosene, and motor spirit: eso, Trade and Shipping, 
1921, 1938. 
89. British consumption of electricity per capita in 1926 was 118 units, 
that of the United States 500 units. Most advanced nations fell 
between these figures. Aldcroft, op.cit., p.191. In New Zealand, 
electricity sold in 1925-26 divided by the 1926 census population 
yields 115 units per capita. 
90. Average charge per unit of electricity generated: Gas 4.42d., 
oil 3.74d., Steam 2.13d., Hydro 1.97d., AJHR, 1926, Dl, p.llO-112. 
91. For details of generating capacities, see N.M. Speer, The Electricity 
Supply Industry in New Zealand, Wellington, 1962, eh.5. 
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Similarly, consumption of petroleum per capital was 
comparativ~ly low for a developed country in 1921. At ten 
gallons per capita, usage of motor spirit was approximately 
a quarter of that in the United states. 92 The amount of 
liquid petroleum products imported was somewhat lower per 
capita than the amount imported into Britain in the same 
year.93 By 1938, however, New Zealand imports of motor 
spirit had reached 64 gallons per capita, almost half the 
United States figure, and roughly fifty per cent higher than 
the rate of importation of all refined petroleum products 
into Britain. 94 
The new technology was well suited to the dominion's 
often rugged topography. Steep hills and swift rivers 
provided abundant potential for the generation of hydro-
electricity. At the same time they made the construction 
of railways difficult and expensive, thus favouring the 
development of roading and ~otor transport. Similarly, the 
comparative lack of railways militated against the transport 
of coal in favour of the more weight-efficient liquid fuels. 
The nature of New Zealand's European economic develop-
ment assisted this trend. It was based from the outset on 
the production of food and raw materials to meet the demands 
created by the Industrial Revolution on the other side of the 
world. Consequently the main areas of settlement had 
developed where conditions were favourable to the production 
92. Calculated from figures in USBC, op.cit., p. 10, 716; CSO, op.cit., 
loc.cit.; and NZYB, 1928, p.81. 
93. Calculated from figures in Mitchell and Jones, op.cit., p.7S, and 
Mitchell and Deane, op.cit., p.lO. 
94. Ibid; Mitchell and Deane, op.cit., loc.cit.; USBC, 
CSO, op.cit. 1938; and NZYB, 1939, p.58. 
, loc.cit.; 
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of farm exports, and the major towns had evolved at or near 
the ports. In most cases these towns proved to be far from 
the country's best coalfields. Furthermore, a scattered 
farming population could not make the most economic use of 
railways or coal. Yet farmers formed a substantial sector 
of ~he population and enjoyed a disproportionate degree of 
political influence due to their economic importance and the 
country electoral quota. They were, moreover, thoroughly 
capitalist rather than subsistence. producers. They demanded 
good outlets to market and generally desired as many of the 
advantages of urban life as possible. Pressure on politiciafis 
to improve rural communications continued to bring the 
construction of uneconomic rail-lines during the interwar 
period. By then, however, the deputations to ministers 
increasingly sought better roads and extended electricity 
. 
supply lines. The extension of the well-established New 
Zealand tradition of state aid to development pushed 
electricity distribution and good roads far out into the 
country. Electric Power Boards were established in rural 
areas with government assistance from 1919. In the United 
States, where government was less active in electrical 
generation and supply, only one in ten farms had electricity 
in 1935. 95 A year later a survey of New Zealand dairy-
farming families indicated that eighty per cent of them had 
electric lighting. 96 Similarly, the Main Highways Board 
distributed central government taxation to local bodies, 
principally counties, to meet the cost of strengthening 
95. Wik, ~~~_, p.366. 
96. Hamilton, ~~~., p.l2? 
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roads to withstand motor traffic. 97 
However, it had been urban pressure that had initially 
brought the government into the sphere of electricity 
generation. During the late nineteenth century mining and 
manufacturing had been fostered in New Zealand by its 
distance from the industrialised world, and the need to 
harvest, transport, and process farm exports. Such 
industries increased the need for skilled and white collar 
workers and allowed a class of manufacturing and retail 
employers to develop. Together these urban groups pushed 
for improvements to city life such as clean water supplies, 
prohibition, improved sanitation, and better roads. In this 
they mirrored the municipal reform movements operating in 
Britain and the United States. Certainly there was consider-
able interest in such movements amongst local reformers. 98 
By the early years of the twentieth century, municipal 
electricity supplies were becoming widespread overseas, but 
it was evident that the expense of thermal and mechanical 
generation was holding development back locally. Therefore 
urban interests, led by T.E. Taylor, a Christchurch business-
man and radical politician, pushed for the state to provide 
the vast initial investment in hydro-power. In 1910 the 
Liberal Government accepted this role through the Development 
of Waterpower Act. The Lake Coleridge power station was the 
posthumous first fruit of Taylor's efforts. By 1936 £13 
million out of £33 million invested in the electrical supply 
97. In 1929-30 the Main Highways Board spent over£2 million on road 
construction and maintenance. AJHR, 1930, D1, p.171. 
98. N.Mac1eod, The Fighting Man: A Study of the Life and Times of 
T.E. Taylor, Christchurch, 1964, p.30, 50, 60-61. 
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industry in New Zealand and had been directly provided by 
central goyernment. 99 
The result of this investment can be seen in the sharp 
fall in the average cost of electricity in the dominion 
'(Table 1.1). The cost of imported oil fuels also fell 
TABLE 1.1: ENERGY PRICES 1911-38100 
1911 1916 1923 1926 1929 1932 1935 1938 
Electricity 
Motor Spirit 
Road-use 
Off-road 
Oil 
Coal 
Gas 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
58 
94 
94 
83 
105 
100 
33 
127 
127 
27 
230 
163 
29 
94 
94 
29 
191 
150 
23 
67 
54 
28 
183 
136 
20 
83 
44 
27 
172 
135 
17 
96 
57 
17 
161 
135 
15 
99 
59 
22 
177 
132 
Sources: CSO, New Zealand Statistics, 1911, Part IV; Ibid, 
1916, Volumes II and III; Industrial Manufacture, 
1923; Factory Production, 1926, 1929; Factory and 
Building Production, 1932, 1935, 1938; Trade and 
Shipping, 1923-38; NZYB, 1933, p.244; 1935, p.229; 
1939, p.251. 
99. AJHR, 1936, Dl, p.xvi. 
lOO.Gas and electricity prices have been calculated by dividing the 
revenue from energy sales by the cubic footage and units sold in 
March years. Coal prices are based on the amount and value of coal 
used in gasworks, also in March years. The value of oil-fuels 
imported in each calendar year has been divided by their volume 
to reach their comparative price-level. Motor spirit for road 
use was taxed from 1927; that for other purposes from 1931. The 
amount of taxation (in pence) has simply been added to the imported 
cost to maintain a rough comparability. In practice, there were 
wide fluctuations in the retail price of motor spirit during the 
late 'twenties and early 'thirties (Appendix A). This was due 
partly to increases in taxation and partly to exchange-rate changes, 
particularly against the united States dollar. Despite these added 
costs, there appears to have been a strong tendency for premium-grade 
petrol to settle at around 1/10d., with regular-grade consistently 
a penny cheaper. Thus the cost of petrol for motoring tended to 
increase during the early 'thirties when measured against the average 
wage and the general cost of living. On the other hand, substantial 
additional costs were being absorbed, and most of the taxation was 
spent by the Main Highways Board and thus passed on to the motorist 
in better roads. 
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precipitately over the interwar period. Coal and gas, on 
the other hand, remained well above their pre-war levels. 
Their rise in price to a large extent reflected the lift in 
wage-rates in the coal-mining, land transport, and shipping 
and cargo-handling industries. B'y 1926 rates in those 
industries were up to 82%, 77%, and 114% respectively on 
their 1909-13 averages. l01 Moreover, as overseas, these 
tended to be the industries most prone to labour disputes, 
leading to inconvenience and loss on the part of customers. l02 
More generally, wage rates had clearly outstripped 
interest rates since the beginning of the war, thus making 
investment in labour-saving machinery more attractive. The 
normal bank overdraft rate during the 'twenties was 6~%f as 
against 5~% at the end of 1913. 103 This represented an 
increase of around 18%. In comparison, the nominal-wage 
index was up between 46% (1920) and 64% (1929-30) on 1914. 104 
Moreover, unskilled workers,1 the backbone and biceps of the 
old technology, appear to have gained ground on their skilled 
counterparts. Clinkard's index shows the latter 45.5% ahead 
. . 4 105 of'their 1901 rates 1n 1919; the former 54. %. 
However, the greatest factor boosting the acceptance of 
the new technology in New Zealand was the successful nature 
of the country's economic development, particularly since the 
101. CSO, Prices, Wages, etc., 1926, p.55. 
102. Mining accounted for a third of all labour disputes between 1906 and 
1919, and about a half of the workers involved in such disputes were 
miners. From 1925 to 1932 the overwhelming majority of workers 
involved in strikes were employed in the mining industry. NZYB, 
1926, p.787; 1930, p.916; 1933, p.617; 1938, p.816. --
103. ~, 1924, p.578; 1937, p.566-67. 
104. CSO, Prices, Wages, etc., 19~9, p.53-54; Ibid., 1930, p.50-52. 
105. G.W.C1inkard, "Wages and Working-hours in New Zealand, 1897-1918", 
NZYB, 1919, p.860-935. 
eighteen-nineties. Unfortunately, the only systematic 
index of i~creasing earnings over that period is the 
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Census survey of factory employment. However, this represent-
ed a significant and growing proportion of the workforce. l06 
Between 1891 and 1926 male factory worker earnings rose by 
205%, and female earnings by 186%.107 This compared with 
an increase in prices of 157% for house-rents, 93% for 
dairy products, and 74% for meat. l08 Between 1911 and 1926 
male earnings increased by 102%, and female earnings by 
126%.109 Over the same period the All Groups Price Index 
rose by around 78%.110 Most other sectors of the community 
shared in the same prosperity. Certainly wage rates in 
factory industries do not appear to have increased greatly 
in excess of those in other industries between 1901 and 
1926. 111 Furthermore, factory earnings for male and female 
workers I at £ 230 and £ 9 9 respectively, did not vary much 
from the male and female median incomes of £ 205 and £ 105 
in the census of 1926. 112 
In that year New Zealand had one of the highest per 
capita incomes in the world. 113 It was also one of the most 
106. 10.14% of the workforce in 1891; 14.5% in 1926. Census, 1891. 
Part VII, p.245-61, Appendix B, p.xx; Census, 1926, Vol.9, p.50; 
Factory production, 1926, p.12. 
107. Census, 1901, Appendix A, p.viii Factory production, 19261' p.12. 
108. NZYB, 1915, p.783i CSO, Prices, Wages, etc., 1926, p.1-2. 
109. Census, 1916, Appendix D, p.xxxiii. 
110. NZYB, 1919, p.799; CSO, Prices, Wages, etc., 1926, p.l. 
111. Ibid., p.S5. 
112. Census, 1926, Vol.XI, p.6. 
113. H.F. Lydal1, The Structure of Earnings, Oxford, 1968, p.234. 
114 evenly spread. With the exception of house rentals, 
prices were low on the scale of the industrialised world. 
Consequently real incomes were comparatively high. lIS 
Furthermore, as in other developed countries, the birth-
rate had been dropping for some timel16 and therefore 
necessary household expenditure on food and clothing was 
falling. These factors combined to leave very many New 
Zealanders with a large measure of discretionary income 
which could be expended on new consumer goods. 
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Similarly, a widespread literacy was reflected in the 
large circulations of local newspaperp, whose columns and 
advertising fostered an awareness of these recent innova-
tions, their cost, and their availability. In Christchurch, 
the Star, a fervent disciple of modernisation, claimed an 
audited circulation of twenty thousand on 29 June, 1935. 
Even taking into account deliveries outside the urban area 
this was an impressive performance for one of four news-
papers in a city of around thirty-two thousand dwellings 
with six thousand men unemployed. The advertisements in 
the Star and its competitors presented the full panoply of 
consumer items to be found in Britain or the United States, 
from cigarettes to gramophones and from motor cars to 
lingerie. 
Favourable returns from exports of farm products and 
the import of developmental capital continued to underpin 
114. Ibid., p.193-94, 234-35. 
115. C. Clark, Conditions of Economic Progress, London, 1960, p.88-l97. 
116. The weighted total rate on the basis of all women 15 and under 45 
dropped from an index figure of 2416 in 1878 to 1000 in 1926. 
NZYB, 1933, p.80. 
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this prosperity up to 1926. However, the consequences of 
technologi~al change were already starting to knock away 
these supports. In common with most other developed 
countries, New Zealand was to move from the 'twenties to 
the 'thirties with the paradox of technological progress in 
the midst of a severe economic crisis. 
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CHAPTER T~\TO 
. THE ECONOMIC CRISIS 
The popular view of the causes of the depression is 
dominated by the collapse of the New York stock exchange 
boom in late October, 1929. However, the experience of 
most countries, including that of the United States itself, 
suggests that the "Wall Street Crash II was more a symptom 
than a cause of the depression. l Currency crises, high 
unemployment, falling prices and increased bankruptcy were 
severe in most of the advanced world by the beginning of 
1929. One set of measurements, used by the Brookings 
Institution, suggests that Australia and the Dutch East 
Indies entered the depressi.<;m in 1929; Germany, Finland 
and Brazil in 1928; and Poland, Canada and Argentina in 
early 1929. Even the United States experienced a sharp 
downturn before the stock market crash, along with Belgium 
and Italy.2 Rather than being a product of a sudden 
collapse, the extremely depressed economic conditions 
of the late 'twenties and early 'thirties were the outcome 
of a series of developments which gradually disrupted the 
.. 
existing system of international finance and trade from 1914. 
1. C. Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-39, London, 1973, 
p.114-118i C.Schedvin, Australia and the Great Depression, Sydney, 
1970, p.49. "To open the tale of the world depression with the 
stock-market crash in New York in October, 1929, is like starting 
the story of a flood at the moment when the last sod in the dyke gave 
way". H. Hodson, Slump and Recovery, 1929-37, London, 1938, p.53. 
2. Quoted in P.Fearon, The Origins and Nature of the Great Slump, 1929-32, 
London, 1979, p.31. 
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Britain had been the hub of this system. Due to its 
early indu~trialisation and need to import food and raw 
materials, it became not only the "workshop of the world ll 
but its emporium and bank as well. "World prices" for most 
commodities were effectively London prices, and the City 
dominated the international money market. 
This leadership was being strongly challenged by the 
United States and Germany before 1914. A number of factors 
had assisted the relative rise of those countries, including 
their development of large home markets behind protective 
tariffs while exporting to free-trade Britain. However, 
changing technology was also an important element in Britain's 
comparative decline. British industry tended to lag behind 
in the adoption of important new technical innovations, not 
least in electrical and motor engineering. 3 This was not 
necessarily because of some inherent conservatism amongst 
British entrepreneurs. For instance, there appears to have 
been severe technical barriers to the adoption of some new 
methods in the coal and the iron and steel industries - two 
4 particular laggards. Often the alternatives to innovation 
were more financially rewarding and safer than gambling on the 
future course of economic development. Steam and gas were 
far more cost-competitive with electricity and oil in Britain 
than in most other countries until well into, the twentieth 
century. This appears to have retarded in turn the development 
of the motor and electrical engineering industries by limiting 
3. D. A1dcroft (Ed.), The Development of British Industry and Foreign 
Competition, 1875-1914, London, 1968, p.32-35. 
4. R.Sayers, A History of Economic Change in Britain, 1880-1939, London, 
1967, p.78-93. 
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their home markets. 5 Similarly, unlike most of their 
German and ~erican counterparts, British capitalists had 
developed very extensive sources of investment within their 
formal and informal empire. These provided very profitable 
and generally secure alternatives to investment in innovation 
at home. It frequently made more sense to invest in enter-
prises overseas rather than in new ways of producing goods 
at home which would then face prohibitive tariffs on inter-
national markets. 6 The availability of resources also played 
an important role. The United States discovered and developed 
large oilfields at several points within its continental 
boundaries and was by 1913 producing over two-thirds of the 
world's petroleum. It continued to hold roughly that share 
of the rapidly growing world output of oil between the wars. 7 
The British were not yet aware of the liquid wealth lying 
beneath the North Sea and would probably have lacked the 
technology necessary to tap it. Furthermore, Britain did 
not have the vast distances, the widely scattered towns and 
farms, or the higher average standard of living which all 
underpinned the development of the American motor industry. 
By 1914 Britain was running a large deficit on visible 
trade but this loss was more than off-set by a massive surplus 
5. T. Sakamoto, "Technology and Business in the British Electrical 
Industry, 1880-1914", in A. Okachi and H.Uchida (Eds.), Development 
and Diffusion of Technology: Electrical and Chemical Industries, 
Tokyo, 1980, p.56. 
6. A. cairncross, Home and Foreign Investment, 1870-1913, Cambridge, 
1953, p.222-235. Also C. Wilson, Economic History and the Historian, 
London, 1969, p.199. 
7. G. Jenkins, Oil Economists' Handbook, London, 1977, p.85. 
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. . 'bl 8 on ~nv~s~ es. British capital had helped to develop the 
economies of other countries, particularly those supplying 
raw materials and food to Britain. Now the profit and 
interest on that investment was flowing back to London from 
Argentine railways, Australasian freezing works, and North 
American mines. The world's largest merchant marine fleet 
also made a significant contribution. Overall Britain 
remained by far the,most powerful trading country, and the 
size of its trade enabled it to perform a beneficial balanc-
ing role in the international economy.9 Its proportionately 
modest deficit in commodity trade permitted many smaller 
countries to maintain ,comfortable surpluses. Simultaneously, 
the continued export of British capital promoted further 
development overseas. 
The Great War devastated this arrangement. British 
traders lost markets both to local entrepreneurs and to 
American and Japanese competitors, while much of the pride 
of the British merchant marine succumbed to the U-boats. 
Above all, the conflict tore apart the financial cocoon 
which Britain had spun around itself at the height of its 
powers. Existing investments overseas were extensively 
liquidated or mortgaged to pay for wartime supplies, and 
substantial foreign debts were incurred. This was particular-
ly evident in the United States, previously Britain's largest 
field for investment. London was now a net debtor to New 
York. In 1929 total British overseas investments were still 
8. P. Bagwell and G. Mingay, Britain and America, 1850-1939: A Study 
in Economic Change, London, 1967, p.98-99. 
9. L. Williams, Britain and the World Economy, 1919-1970, London, 1971, 
p.ll. 
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less in money terms than they had been in 1914. Moreover, 
many of these funds were now in war debts on which interest 
and repayments were unreliable. There was some net new 
investment during the 'twenties, but at an annual rate 
forty per cent less in money terms than in the years 
immediately before the war. The dec1ine.in real terms was 
h t d t t ' 'f1 t' 10 muc grea er ue 0 war ~me ~n a ~on. Clearly Britain 
was no longer powerful enough to act as guarantor of the 
world's financial stability in a crisis. Either it had to 
relinquish that role to the United States, or the two major 
powers had to perform an unprecedented dual balancing act 
on a tight-rope still vibrating from the shock of war. 
Their failure, catastrophic for performers and spectators 
alike, was hardly surprising. 
Neither party succeeded in quickly discarding roles that 
had taken more than a century to develop. Post-war America 
was as dominant as ever in the new technology which was now 
taking over industrial production. Yet Washington refused 
to lower tariffs or to revalue in order to reduce its vast 
and growing trade surplus. Consequently other countries now 
found it extremely difficult to meet their greater foreign 
financial commitments (not least to the United States itself) 
by running a surplus on their commodity trade. Nor did the 
British authorities appreciate the change in their country's 
economic standing. In 1925 they hastened its decline with a 
substantial revaluation of sterling which disastrously reduced 
10. R. Skide1sky, "Retreat from Leadership; The Evolution of British 
Economic Foreign Policy, 1870-1939", in B. Rowland (Ed.), Balance of 
Power or Hegemony: The Interwar Monetary System, New York, 1976, 
p.171. Hodson, op.cit., p.10-11. 
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the competitiveness of British production. Wage cuts, 
industrial, strife, and higher unemployment followed in what 
was still by far the largest international market for food 
and raw materials. 11 World commodity prices slumped and 
primary producing areas suffered accordingly. 
The impact of this development was partially off-set 
by the continued flow of new foreign investment, particularly 
from the United States. New York had taken over London's 
pre-war role as the major provider of such investment during 
the 'twenties. American money tended to go to Central Europe 
and Latin America, whereas British investors now favoured 
t 1 . 12 Aus ra as~a. In both cases a high proportion of the 
capital went into central and local government bond issues. 13 
In the case of American investors this was partly because of 
the size of the outflow to areas where they lacked the 
experience and channels of direct investment previously 
built up by their European competitors. But official borrow-
ing was on the increase in most debtor areas, including 
Australasia. Much of this money was invested in aspects of 
the new technology such as electric power stations and 
distribution networks, improved roads, and the electrification 
and motorisation of services. These tasks were frequently 
the responsibility of governments rather than private 
enterprise. Often they were undertaken in response to 
political pressures rather than the prospect of an economic 
11. Kind1eberger, op.cit., p.88-89; Britain's share of international 
trade in 1929 was 21.5%; that of the United states 16%. 
Schedvin, op.cit., p.13. 
12. Kind1eberger, op.cit., p.54-57; Schedvin, op.cit., p.lOO. 
13. Kind1eberger, op.cit., p.43-44. 
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return. With the development of the consumer society and wide 
extension of the franchise, pOliticians were competing for 
support amongst people of limited means who were aware of, 
and eager for, the advantages that new technology could 
provide. In the process, levels of official spending and 
employment, and standards of living, tended to become very 
reliant upon overseas borrowing. 
Following the break in prices for primary production in 
1926, developing economies became even more dependent on this 
borrowing, often to finance stockpiles. 14 However, the flow 
of foreign loans was severely constricted by the rapid rise 
of the New York Stock Exchange from around the middle of 
1928. 15 International capital had been strongly attracted 
by the astounding growth of American industry and the shaki-
ness of economies elsewhere. Now .an "easy money" policy on 
the part of the Federal Reserve Board fueled a boom which 
drained funds from throughout the world, including agricul-
tural areas of the United States itself. 16 Interest rates 
were high, business contracting, and unemployment severe in 
.most countries by the end of the year. Nations with develop-
ing economies suffered as their sources of loan-money dried 
up, and they were also hit by a further fall in commodity 
prices, always sensitive to interest rates and alternative 
1 . 17 specu at~on. 
14. L. Robbins, The Great Depression, London,' 1934, p.74. 
15. H. F1eisig, Long-term Capital Flows and the Great Depression: The 
Role of the United States, 1927-33, New York, 1974, Ch.3. 
16. Kind1eberger, op.cit., p.102. 
17. , p.88-89. "About the middle of 1928, the trend [in the world 
wool price] turned downward again and has been descending ever since". 
29 March, 1930. 
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The outflow of capital to America forced the Bank of 
England to raise its bank rate from 4~% to 6~% during 1929. 
The Federal Reserve then took similar action, partly in 
retaliation and partly to curb the speculation. A precipi-
tate fall in share prices resulted. 18 
The collapse of the speculative boom brought a glimmer 
19 of real recovery. However, it was snuffed out by the 
widespread adoption of greater protection, largely in response 
to the American Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930. 20 This Act 
was in turn the outcome of a legislative process initiated 
by President Hoover in 1928 to fulfil promises made to 
American farmers hard-hit by the fall in commodity prices 
since Britain's revaluation. The shrinkage in world trade 
which resulted from this upsurge in protection compounded 
the effect of the reduction in United States foreign invest-
ment since the middle of 1928. Together these developments 
led to a financial collapse in Central Europe in 1931. This 
collapse exposed the inability of the Bank of England to 
fill its pre-war role as international lender of last resort 
and American banks did not step forward to replace it. 
Substantial British funds disappeared, London overseas lending 
virtually ceased, and a run on sterling forced it off the 
gold standard. The new British government which emerged from 
the crisis moved to increase protection, to encourage internal 
economic activity, and to create its own international 
trading bloc. 
18. Kinde1berger, op.cit., p.112-116. 
19. Ibid., p.128-129. 
20. Ibid., p.77-7S, 131-134; H.Fleisig, "The united States and the Non-
European Periphery", in H. Van der Wee (Ed.), The Great Depression 
Revisited, The Hague, 1972, p.161-64. 
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A gradual recovery began in most major economies during 
the third quarter of 1932 as high tariffs, low interest 
rates, and cautiously reflationary government policies 
rekindled confidence. 2l Demand for raw materials and food 
increased, and commodity prices generally showed a rising 
trend. The British economy enjoyed one of the strongest 
recoveries during the 'thirties. 22 This was due largely to 
the growth of industries based on the domestic consumer, 
including housebuilding, home appliances, and motor cars. 
British industry began to have considerable success with the 
new technology, particularly at home and within its trading 
bloc. 23 Generally speaking, countries dependent on trade 
with Britain now participated in its good fortune, just as 
they shared in its troubles during the 'twenties. However, 
international trade remained stunted. 24 The world economy 
awaited the outcome of another global war and the emergence 
of the United States as the predominant power. 
The degree to which the crisis affected individual 
nations varied according to their dependence on external 
trade, their principal industries, and the policies pursued 
by their governments and financial institutions. None of the 
technically advanced states could escape from the slump, but 
its effects could generally be ameliorated, or worsened, by 
local action. For example, most governments of small nations 
rightly chose to raise tariffs in order to protect their 
21. H. Richardson, Economic Recovery in Britain, 1932-39, London, p.19, 
299-312; Kindelberger, op.cit., p.233, 243; Schedvin, op.cit., p.283. 
22. Richardson, op.cit., p.313. 
23. R. Sayers, A History of Economic Change in England, 1880-1939, 
London, 1967, p.26. 
24. Aldcroft, op.cit., p.246. 
economies from having the debris of the disintegrating 
international system dumped onto them. These measures 
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added to the world crisis but shielded their own manufactures 
and exporters to some extent. Small economies faced collapse 
if they attempted to shoulder the burden that the giants 
either would not, or could not, bear. 
Some governments went further. They eschewed the 
traditional policies of cutting spending, balancing budgets, 
and eliminating borrowing. Instead they employed deficit 
spending to reflate their economies, particularly through 
public works. Various measures were used to deflect any 
consequent flood of imports. These included higher tariffs, 
exchange controls, import licensing, and devaluation. Such 
policies had considerable success in Sweden, Japan, and 
Germany, and went some way towards combatting the particularly 
severe and intractable American depression. 25 Similarly, an 
early recovery appears to have been brought about in Australia 
by increased tariffs and a large devaluation. Together, 
these measures sparked a rapid growth in local manufacturing 
long before the rise in prices for primary products. 26 
In New Zealand, on the other hand, there were repeated 
attempts to reduce the limited insulation of the internal 
economy. The aim was to diminish competition for capital and 
labour with the export sector, as the Reform and Coalition 
governments in particular could only envisage an export-led 
25. Richardson, op.cit., p.299-312. 
26. Schedvin, op.cit., p.10-12, 168, 212. 
27 
recovery. 
6l 
New Zealand's economy was certainly very vulnerable to 
the world crisis, particularly as it affected Britain. The 
combined value of exporting and overseas borrowing equalled 
roughly a third that of the Gross Domestic Product. Three-
quarters of exports went to Britain in 1925 and central and 
local government both borrowed extensively on the London 
money market. 28 A t l' h h ' us ra 1a was t e ot er ma1n source of 
overseas investment and trade, and there were strong Austral-
asian business links, not least in banking. Australia was 
to be particularly hard-hit by falling farm export prices 
and a drying up of foreign loans between 1928 and 1931. 29 
The lack of a central bank was also a handicap in seeking to 
monitor and control developments within the New Zealand economy 
or the movement of capital overseas. 
Even so, New Zealand was far from completely dependent 
on international trade; a newborn Canterbury lamb totally 
without shelter in an economic southerly. There was a signifi-
30 
cant local market for most forms of primary produce, manu-
facturing was well-established,3l and the country still met 
27. There was a strong tendency towards insulation in the Labour Party. 
Long before the collapse of international prices in 1931, Dan Sullivan, 
Labour MP for Avon and a future Minister of Industries and Commerce 
could write that "my own view is that we should aim at making New 
Zealand a self-contained economic unit". Times, 18 July, 1929. 
See also E. Olssen, John A. Lee, Dunedin, 1977, p.47-48. 
28. In March, 1926, 53.5% of the public debt and 24% of the local body 
debt were held in London. NZYB, 1934, p.690, 471. 
29. Schedvin, op.cit., p.96-l06. 
30. During the three years 1930-32, a time of diminishing local consumption 
and rapidly increasing exports, New Zealand still consumed 23% of its 
butter production. Levels for other farm products included cheese, 
5.4%; mutton, 47.4%; pork, 54.3%; bacon and ham, 98.2%. Sun, 
19 October, 1933. 
31. Value added in factories not involved in processing farm exports-amounted 
to over £24 million in 1925-26, compared with £8.5 million in all farm-
processing factories. CSO, Factory Production, 1926. 
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most of its own energy requirements. By 1926 New Zealand 
was produci~g most of its own food, fuel, clothing, furniture 
and building materials; many of its own machines and home 
appliances; and much of its own investment capita1. 32 
One argument repeatedly used to support internal deflation 
was that export farming faced a "collapse" if its wage costs 
were not reduced and held down. 33 Given the importance of 
primary exports to the dominion's economy, such a prospect 
certainly threatened disaster. However, debt-servicing was 
the main problem facing most farmers, or at least the multitude 
who had mortgaged land since the war. 34 The government 
recognised this from early in 1931 with a series of measures 
designed to prevent foreclosures and later to reduce debt. 
Furthermore, generalisations about a collapse of "farming" 
and "the farmer" were misleading. As F.L. Hutchinson,the 
president of the Canterbury Manufacturers' Association, pointed 
out at the time of devaluation in 1933, "though a farmer might 
fail, farming would not fail ... Someone else would take hold 
and carry farming on, though perhaps on a different basis".35 
There was also a considerable variation in the financial situa-
tions of farmers, even though most government measures failed 
32. For example, 45% of the public debt was locally held, and 67.5% of 
the local body debt. NZYB, 1934, p~690, 471. 
33. AJHR, 1931. B6 (Supp.), statement by W. Downie Stewart, 6 October, 1931; 
1933, B6, Statement by J.G. Coates, 9 November, 1933. liThe inescapable 
question before the Government is whether the farmer is to break or be 
saved. If he breaks, the country breaks, the Government breaks, the 
Budget breaks; the issue is as simple as that, and it is urgent". 
Press, 21 January, 1936. 
34. AJHR, 1934, H30, Report of the Dairy Industry Commission, p.60; 
J. Condliffe, The Welfare state in New Zealand, Westport (Connecticut), 
1975, p.14-21. 
35. ~, 27 April, 1933. 
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to make a distinction. The angry solicitors, bankers, share-
brokers and accountants who protested at devaluation were 
particularly incensed by the fact that so many rich farmers 
were benefitting at the expense of the rest of the community. 
They compared the government's action to the provision of a 
dole regardless of need. These professionals were in good 
positions to know that "many farmers were wealthy men, many 
had large sums on fixed deposit, many had large interest-bearing 
investments, many had freehold properties". 36 During the 
same year, a survey of South Island farmers, carried out by 
Lincoln College, revealed that a third were mortgagees. 37 
The local Lands Department had earlier noted that the number 
of farms abandoned in Canterbury was "not appreciably greater 
than in the boom times". 38 
Above all, there is no evidence of an incipient IIcollapse" 
in farm production at any time during the early 'thirties. 
On the contrary, New Zealand farmers joined their counterparts 
overseas in producing more in order to off-set lower prices. 
A brief slowing in the increase in farm exports during the 
1930-31 season was due not to rural despair but to wool stock-
piling and a year which the Yearbook described as "remarkable •. , 
one of the coldest and also one of the driest on record".39 
Lambing and dairy production along the eastern coasts of both 
islands were hard-hit, especially in Hawke's Bay, Marlborough, 
40 and South Canterbury. 
36. Press, 2 February, 1933. Also B. Moore and J. Barton, Banking in New 
Zealand, Wellington, 1935, p.370. 
37. ~, 15 November, 1933. 
38. ~, 10 June, 1933. 
39. ~, 1932, p.31. 
40. eso, Factory Production, 1930, 1931, IIMeat Freezing and Preserving", 
and "Butter .. Cheese .. atia. COtideHsedMilk Fabtot±es ll • 
64 
If the government had wished to insulate the domestic 
economy to ~ much greater degree, the machinery was either 
available or capable of being set up rapidly. New Zealand 
had its own note issues, bank legislation, and collection of 
banking statistics. Although it did considerable business 
in Australia, the dominion's largest bank was based in 
Wellington, and the government directed official transactions 
through it. There .was no constitutional barrier to the 
state's power to legislate on trade, banking, and finance. 
Nor does there seem to have been any danger of a disastrous 
run on bank deposits, as in the United States 41 and, to some 
extent, in New South Wales. In contrast to the American 
situation, the banking system in New Zealand was in the hands 
of a few patently sound institutions. They possessed large 
reserves, tended to co-operate, and were in fact somewhat 
b d b 1 l · f f' d d 't 42 em arrasse y a arge accumu at10n 0 1xe epos1 s. 
Furthermore, the leaders of the Coalition could never be 
portrayed with conviction as wild-eyed socialists bent on 
stealing people's savings. Like most conservatives in govern-
ment, they had the opportunity to change policy quite 
radically without promoting panic and "counter-revolution". 
Their failure to take such action to reduce the misery being 
imposed on so many citizens was not based solely on a lack of 
imagination and restricted access to new ideas. It was also 
founded on the belief that New Zealand had, and should continue 
to have, a colonial economy. 
41. M. Friedman and A. Schwartz, The Great Contraction, princeton, 1965, 
p.46-63. 
42. Moore and Barton, op.cit., p.20-24 • 
• 'J,I, , , 
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Yet, as in most other technically advanced nations, the 
rapid adopt~on of new technology after the Great War increased 
the need for government action to stimulate internal economic 
activity and to manage imports. 
In particular, the national debt had increased dramatically 
between 1919 and 1926, from £151 million to £239 million, a 
rise of just under 45%.43 A large part of this had been 
spent on farm settlement for returned servicemen, and still 
more on new railways. However, over a third had been 
invested in hydro-electric power development, telecommunica-
tions and roads. 44 Local body indebtedness more than 
doubled, from £23 million to £52 million. 45 An even greater 
proportion of these borrowings than those of central government 
was invested in aspects of the new technology such as elec-
tricity supply, improved sewerage and water supply, stronger 
roads, street-lighting, and the general electrification and 
motorisation of equipment. 46 Electric power boards alone 
had borrowed £8.7 million since their creation in 1921. 47 
In addition, over half the £ 13 million expended by boroughs 
out of loans between 1919 and 1926 went on roads, light and 
48 power alone. The annual interest bill on these vastly 
augmented local and central government liabilities had 
increased from £6.4 million in 1919 to £10.8 million in 1926. 49 
This represented a very large transfer of resources to those 
with a propensity to save, and its deflationary effect was 
43. ~, 1926, p.579; 1934, p.690. 
44. NZYB, 1926, p.574. 
45. NZYB, 1934, p.471. 
46. NZYB, 1928, p.656. 
47. NZYB, 1932, p.563. 
48. ~, 1920-26, "Expend.i,ture Out of Loans - Boroughs Only". 
«I~~ Q'~t ~(\"HJ.h~r4ltAl\S }~ls., 1921, p,140, .tl.Z:XJ!, l.n4, p.517. 
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increased by the fact that almost half of the interest 
payable overseas. Local bodies were further obliged to 
accumulate large sinking funds in bank accounts and gilt-edged 
securites to meet the eventual repayment of their loans. 
Between 1919 and 1926 the amount in such sinking funds rose 
from £2.7 million to £5.7 mi11ion. 50 Substantial depreciation 
and renewal reserves were also built up because so much of the 
money had been spent on working machinery. Over the same 
period the amount of local body loan balances, reserve invest-
ments and cash in hand, excluding sinking funds, increased 
from £2.8 to £9.7 mi11ion. 51 Private industrial and trans-
port firms built up similar funds to meet the costs they had 
incurred in the adoption of electrical and motor,techno1ogy. 
These funds comprised a large proportion of the £6.9 million 
accumulated in factory "cash in hand, bills receivable, and 
other operating accounts" in 1926. 52 By 1929 the Chairman 
of the Bank of New Zealand confessed that the bank was 
experiencing "difficulty in finding investments" for its vast 
accumulation of fixed deposits. 53 There was clearly a strong 
need for continued borrowing by government in order to recycle 
the additional savings. Otherwise the technological transfor-
mation of the 'twenties would exert an enormously deflationary 
influence in the 'thirties. 
Now there was also a greater need for the management of 
imports during a depression. This was not only to prevent 
50. ~, 1920, p.1l7; 1928, p.653. 
51. NZYB, i935, p.476-7. 
52. eso, Factory Production, 1928, p.15. 
53. Moore and Barton, , p.20. 
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dumping, but because the introduction of new technology and 
the nature of much of the investment in it would magnify the 
normal effect of a downturn. 
In the first place, a very high proportion of the new 
capital had been borrowed by central and local government. 
Investors in private enterprise had to accept some responsibil-
ity for their losses during a crisis, and either persevere 
with lower returns or liquidate their investment. On the 
other hand, there was extreme pressure on official agencies 
not to default, partly because of a sense of national or local 
honour and partly because they would be seeking loans again. 
Therefore, a vast overseas interest bill became a first charge 
on export income. There are considerable parallels with 
Australian experience in this. Across the Tasman official 
borrowing had helped to build up the infrastructure for the 
advance of manufacturing during the 'thirties. 54 Similarly, 
investment in back-blocks roads, electricity supply, and the 
general electrification and motorisation of services assisted 
the very large growth in primary exports from New Zealand 
between 1926 and 1936. Nevertheless, as in Australia:5 the 
problem of debt servicing was magnified by the fact that so 
much of the loan money had been spent on services which improved 
and diversified people's lives rather than directly earning 
overseas funds. with the downturn in export prices the burden 
became very severe. In the year to March, 1932, over a quarter 
of the value of the country's merchandise exports went to 
54. Schedvin, ~~-- , p.4-5. 
55. Ibid., p.69-71. 
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official interest payment alone. 56 
Furthe~more, new technology and the continuing lIindustrial-
commercial revolution II were having the net effect of under-
mining New Zealand's balance of trade. Certainly these develop-
ments sustained a growing demand for butter and lamb in Britain 
between the wars. However, there were alternative suppliers 
of these goods, including local producers, and prices for them 
tended to fall relative to manufactured goods. Nor was the 
market unlimited at economic prices, particularly as there was 
a growing list of other claims on the consumer's discre,tionary 
shillings. Yet the new forms of technology depended more 
heavily on imports than the forms they displaced. For example, 
New Zealand produced most of its own coal, but little oil. 
Therefore, it was now a growing importer of oil. The increas-
ing complexity of machinery also boosted the level of overseas 
purchases. By the time of the Great War horse-drawn vehicles, 
boilers, fire-boxes, and steam-engines could be constructed 
or cast in New Zealand at least as economically as they could 
be transported from overseas. Not so tractor engines, or 
hydro-electric turbines. Even when local factories were 
established to manufacture aspects of the new technology, 
many of the raw materials and components had to be imported 
in made-up forms. Moreover, because so much of the new 
production was market rather than resource based, the large 
metropolitan nations had the advantage of economies of scale. 
Their big international companies dominated the patent market 
56. Merchandise exports brought in £30.9 million (NZYB, 1936, p.196) 
while public debt interest payable overseas amounted to£6.7 million 
(NZYB, 1933, p.446). Local body interest payable overseas was 
£1.3 million (~, 1934, p.472). 
and had the funds for the modern research and development 
facilities from which innovations were now increasingly 
derived. 57 
69 
The same trend was evident with consumer goods as well. 
Light bulbs, cameras, vacuum cleaners and motor cars had to 
be imported along with the power cables and diesel lorries. 
Motion pictures and gramophone records came almost exclusively 
from overseas. Woollen stockings could be entirely made 
locally; not so those of artificial silk or cotton. Perish-
able exotic foods such as pineapples could now be brought in in 
tinned or bottled form while local food processors had to 
import tinned plate and, in many cases, bottles. Even the 
vast quantities of paper and cardboard needed to advertise 
and package goods for the mass market still had to come from 
overseas either as pulp or in finished form. 
The establishment of New Zealand subsidiaries of inter-
national firms and further ventures into manufacturing by local 
entrepreneurs during the 'thirties exerted some pressure in 
the opposite direction. But overall the movement towards 
greater national self-sufficiency seems to have been set back 
by the continuing development of science-based technology in 
methods of production and forms of consumption. This reverse 
trend was reinforced by the consumer's demand for greater 
variety and new experiences, a demand now assiduously 
cultivated by advertising. 
57. W. Lewis, "Industrial Research and Development", in M. Kranzberg 
and C.purse11, Technology in Western Civilisaton: Vo1.II, Technology 
in the Twentieth Century, New York, 1967, p.621-631. 
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It was against this background that the dominion faced 
the effects of the deepening crisis "at Home" after 1925. 
Export prices dropped sharply in the 1925-26, with wool and 
meat being particularly hard-hit and dairy products continuing 
th ' 't' d l' 58 d ' , e1r eX1S 1ng ec 1ne. . In a d1t1on, the London money 
market was somewhat constricted by Britain's growing financial 
difficulties, and New Zealand faced higher interest rates on 
't b' 59 1 S overseas orrow1ng. 
The response of the Coates Government to the crisis 
reflected both its political dependence on farmer votes and 
its ideological commitment to colonial economic status. 
Reform generally represented the interests of exporters and 
importers. It maintained that New Zealand was, and should 
remain, primarily a supplier of farm products to Britain, and 
a market for British manufacturers and investors. Economic 
conditions within. the country needed to assist primary produc-
tion, and should normally reflect international conditions. 
Terms such as "laissez-faire" and "free trade" do not capture 
this ideology fully. For example, reform was about to set up 
an Intermediate Farm Credit Board to channel more government 
money to established farmers. Similarly, Imperial rather 
58. During 1926 the official index price for wool fell 36%, that for meat 
26%, and that for dairy produce 7%. With the exception of 1922, 
the general level of export prices had not been so low since 1915. 
CSO, Wages, Prices, etc., 1925, p.50; 1928, p.51. There was a deficit 
of£4.5 million in visible trade for the 1926 calendar year. Judging 
by the 1930 estimates of the country's deficit on invisibles, New 
Zealand required a visible trade surplus of around five million 
pounds to break even after new government borrowing overseas at the 
1926 rate. NZYB, 1936, p.196. 
59. In May, 1925, 85% of New Zealand's annual London loan, yielding 43;4%, 
was left with the underwriters following sterling's return to gold. 
Thereafter New Zealand was forced to offer over five per cent 
(51;8% in 1926). AJHR, 1925, B6, p.2l; 1926, B6, p.14. 
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than international free trade was the party's ideal. 
Imports of, American motor vehicles attracted an increasingly 
discriminatory tariff during the 'twenties,60 while 
Reform's Christchurch newspaper, the Press, treated the 
trading surplus with Britain as a form of disloyalty,6l 
and regretted the Argentine's open access to the Home market. 62 
However, there was a certain moral element in the party's 
attitude; a suggestion that the farmer was the social as 
well as the economic "backbone of the country". 
In keeping with these sentiments the Coates Government 
followed a deflationary polley as much to help the farmer as 
to restore equilibrium. It cut general expenditure, reduced 
public works drastically, and employed relief workers at pay 
so low as to be uncompetitive with farm wages. 63 state 
60. Comparison· between the duties on British and foreign motor vehicles 
increased (percentage by value) : 
1921 
10:25 
1926 
10:35 
1930 
10:40 
NZYB, 1933, p.244; 1937, p.224-25. 
1934 
5:50 
61. "The prime consideration, however, is not the exact amount of our 
trade, but the duty of New Zealanders to omit no opportunity to help 
the Mother Country at a time when she is in greater need than she 
has ever been for some return for the immeasurable sacrifices she has 
made and continues to make for our maintenance as a free nation". 
Press, 7 September, 1926. Also editorials in Press, 5, 25, 26 October, 
2 November, 1926; 19 November, 1929. 
62. Press, 20 May, 1932; 29 December, 1933. 
63. Public Works Fund expenditure for the first six months of the 
.financial year (in millions) : 
1925 £2.09 1926 £1.58 1927 £1.47 1928.£1.24. 
CSO, Monthly Abstract of Statistics, December issues, 1926-28. 
In 1926 the wages of Public Works Department relief workers were set 
at 9/- per day for single men and 12/6 for married men, both on a 
forty-seven hour week and a co-operative contract basis (which 
meant that actual earnings could be much lower). In real terms 
this rate was lower than the 8/- and 10/- per day of 1933. 
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advances were also restricted. 64 These measures helped 
to permit a sharp reduction in government borrowing65 
without greatly increasing taxation to cover the projected ~ 
fall in customs receipts as imports contracted .. wealthY~ 
farmers could thus escape the danger of renewed ~ncom~ 
,r// 
tax or much higher tariffs on British imports. ~~Y would 
also face much less state pompetition for un~lled labour, 
or for capital. Tentative moves were even made towards 
dismantling the system of compulsory industrial arbitration, 
66 long the bete noire of farmer pressure groups. 
The economic outlook had improved considerably by the 
end of 1928, following a substantial fall in imports and a 
recovery in export earnings which was mainly due to 
, d' 'd t' 67 N th 1 t cont~nue ~ncreases ~n pro uc ~on. ever e ess, governmen 
64. 
1926 
1927 
1928 
Advances to Settlers 
£ 3. 9 million 
£ 3.6 " 
£ 1.4 II 
Source: NZYB, 1929, p.639 
Advances to Workers 
£ 2.2 million 
£ 2.5 If 
£ 1.4 If 
65. New government borrowing (£million). 
Overseas New Zealand Total 
1926 7.8 3.2 11.0 
1927 4.9 2.1 7.0 
1928 7.5 -1.8 5.7 
1929 (to 4.1 4 •. 1 
Dec. 1928) 
Source: NZYB, 1934, p.690; AJHR, 1929, B6. 
66. In the debate on the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration 
Amendment Bill of 1927, the Minister of Labour (Hon. G.Anderson) 
referred to support from "farmers' unions, sheep-owners unions, 
the Royal Agricultural Society of New Zealand, dairy companies, 
and other farmers' organisations". NZPD, Vol.2l6, p.401. On the 
other hand, the presidents of both the Canterbury and the New 
Zealand Employers' Associations came out strongly against the bill. 
Star, 24 August, 13 October, 1927. The Star used it as the basis of 
a campaign for the revival of Liberalism to save the country from 
"a reactionary country party" and "a farmers' government". Star, 
20 August, 21 October, 1927. 
67. The average export price for meat was still three per cent down on 
1926 in 1928, but production was up by 27%. The dairy price-index 
was up by five per cent; production by 11%. CSO, Prices, Wages, 
etc, 1929, p.Sl; NZYB, 1937, p.17l. 
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borrowing and spending on public works had been held down, 
and state advances further cut back. Building activity 
declined and the growth of production in industries not 
involved in processing farm products tended to stagnate. 
Most of the benefits of recovery were still going to farmers 
and their creditors. 68 
The defeat of Reform in November brought a radical change 
in economic policy. As the successor to the Liberals, the 
United Party had a strong tradition of assistance to local 
manufacturing, state spending on public works to counter 
depression, and help to aspiring rather than established 
farmers. Despite encompassing a number of the latter, the 
newly victorious party looked to its past, not least in its 
choice of Sir Joseph Ward as leader. It was less prepared 
than Reform to sacrifice the general standard of living to 
the interests of those primary producers who had consistently 
opposed social improvements, even during prosperous times. 
United came to power with promises of renewed developmental 
spending, increased state advances, and the maintenance of 
award wages, even on relief works. During 1929 and 19.30 
public works expenditure and employment rose to levels well 
68. In 1927-28 the combined value of production from dairy factories, 
freezing works, and wool scours was up 7.5% on 1925-26; that 
of other factories only one half of one per cent. eso, Factory 
Production, 1926-28. By the end of March, 1928, the percentage of 
bank advances to deposits was down to 88%, compared with 104% in 
March, 1927. By September the ratio was the lowest since 1920. 
NZYB, 1929, p.698. 
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above those of the mid-'twenties. 69 Thousands of 
unemploye~ men, and doubtless many farm labourers, were 
placed on state construction jobs at award rates. State 
Advances to Workers reached record levels, maintaining 
house-building at a time when tight credit, and demographic 
changes were tending to reduce demand. 70 Advances to 
Settlers also increased considerably, and the new government 
initiated a pglicy of developing land under Department of 
Agriculture supervision before selling it to settlers. 7l 
Most of the increase in state expenditure was funded 
by borrowing, as promised by Sir JoSeph. 72 Some was also 
derived from higher taxation with a redistributive or 
protectionist effect. Reversing the trend established by 
69. Average monthly number of workers employed by the Public Works 
Department (March years): 
1928 
8087 
1929 
8752 
1930 
10,867 
1931 
12,422 
September half year expenditure by P.W.D. (£million): 
1928 
1.24 
1929 
1.41 
1930 
1.92 
1931 
1.04 
Sources: NZYB, 1933, p.613; CSO, Monthly Abstract of Statistics, 
January issues, 1930, 1932. 
70. Advances to Workers increased from £1.4 million in 1928-29 to 
.£3.3 million in 1929-30. NZYB, 1933, p.456. 
71. Advances to Settlers increased from £2.1 million in 1928-29 to 
£3,'6 million in 1929-30. Ibid. p.452. 
The establishment of the principle of state land development under 
the Land Laws Amendment Act, 1929, was one of a number of 
significant innovations made by the short-lived United Government. 
P. Smallfield, The Grasslands Revolution in New Zealand, Auckland, 
1970, p.26. 
72. Net new government borrowing in the year to March, 1929 was 
£12.7 million, the biggest increase in the 'twenties. NZYB, 1934, 
p.690. 
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Reform, Ward raised direct taxation on wealthy farmers. 73 
He also doubled primage, a duty on all imports, regardless 
of origin. Local manufacturing was thus afforded some 
additional protection against British goods. This protec-
tion continued when primage was superseded by heavy 
. . 11 d" 74. ~ncreases ~n a ut~es ~n 1930. F~nally, the Unemployment 
Act of 1930 and more particularly its amendment in the 
following year entailed a considerable redistribution of 
income towards the poor, those with a greater propensity 
to spend. The levy of 1930 was rightly criticised as a 
"poll tax" - although the unemployed still received more 
from it than it cost them, of course. 
Unfortunately the continued development of the inter-
national crisis tended to undermine the reflationary 
effects of these policies. Faced with a tightening world 
money market during 1929 and 1930, the United Government 
h . .. 1 b . 75 c ose to ~ncrease ~ts ~nterna orrow~ng. This restricted 
credit within New Zealand but maintained a high level of 
economic activity. But the effect of falling commodity 
markets could not be met so readily. Wool prices had begun 
to slide in February, 1929, and dairy produce in March. 
73. In 1923 income from the direct use or cultivation of land was made 
exempt from tax, and the general rate of income tax was reduced during 
the 'twenties. In 1929 Ward reduced the maximum mortgage exemption 
for land tax, introduced a special land tax on properties with an 
unimproved value over £14,000, and reinstated income taxon farms 
over that value. There were further increases in income tax in 
1930. NZYB, 1931, p.59l. 
74. AJHR, 1933, H35, p.3. 
75. The government borrowed £5.8 million internally in 1929-30, the highest 
rate of new official borrowing for a decade. NZYB, 1934, p.690. 
The Christchurch City Council complained strongly about the resultant 
upward pressure on interest rates. Times 27 February, 1930. 
76 
M . h 76 eat pr~ces eld up only until August. Falling imports 
removed the deficit on visible trade by the end of 1930, 
but the traditional loss on invisibles resulted in a 
heavily deflationary trade balance in 1929-1930 and a 
much, lighter one in 1930-31. 77 
The operation of the trans-Tasman banking system appears 
to have magnified the effect of the international crisis on 
New Zealand during 1929 and 1930. 78 During this period, 
London investors withdrew their support from Australia, 
which many of them considered extravagant and potentially 
repudiationist. The banks which operated on both sides 
of the Tasman then almost certainly used New Zealand credit 
to meet their Australian commitments. This not only 
restricted their possible lending here, but affected New 
Zealand's creditworthiness in London. In the absence of a 
central bank in Wellington, lending to New Zealand could 
mean lending to New South Wales and the Lang government. 
The move to more domestic borrowing in this country there-
fore probably came much earlier than it would have. 
Export prices fell again in the 1930-31 season and 
returns were down by over a third on 1928-29 levels. 79 
Such a dramatic fall in the income of a major sector of the 
economy inevitably depressed the whole economy. Moreover, 
its fiscal and political effects brought an end to united's 
76. eso, Prices, Wages, etc., 1928, p.5l; 1929, p.5l. 
77. In 1929-30 the estimated deficit on all transactions was a massive 
£13 million; in 1930-31 it was £2.5 million. NZYB, 1936, p.196. 
78. G. Hawke, Between Government and Banks, Wellington, p.18-22. 
79. £56 million to £36.9 million. NZYB, 1937, p.17l. 
attempt to maintain economic activity by government 
spending. Reductions in revenue from customs, land tax, 
and the railways, and increased spending on unemployment 
threatened a large deficit before borrowing. with money 
tightening abroad, it was clear that overseas borrowing 
would be difficult and expensive. 80 Furthermore, it 
seemed that the deficit would be greater in 1931-32, at 
77 
a time when substantial loan repayments were due in London. 
A major increase in taxation, the main alternative to 
expenditure cuts, was politically undesirable. Some taxes 
were increased, but, faced with an election at the end of 
1931, the administration's room for manoeuvre was severely 
limited. Confronted by falling returns, farmers and 
businessmen were already pressing hard for a reduction of 
costs, including taxes. Retrenchment could alienate 
the working people who had formed a large part of United's 
support in 1928,81 but Reform posed the biggest threat to 
most Government M.P.s, including the Prime Minister. That 
party appeared most likely to benefit electorally from a 
failure to "cut costs" and the imposition of further 
taxation. 
Consequently the measures introduced to cope with the 
deficit leant heavily towards retrenchment. In April state 
pay rates were cut by ten per cent and the Arbitration 
Court was empowered to reduce existing awards. Simultaneously 
relief work pay was cut back to 12/6 and 9/- a day for 
married and single men respectively. Some taxes were 
80. The cost of the London loan increased by ~% between 1929 and 1930. 
This converted to ~% and rising if the cost of exchange depreciation 
is taken into account. AJHR, 1930, B6. The 1931 loan cost almost 
one per cent more again, and was for only three years. AJHR, 1931, B6. 
81. R. Chapman, The Significance of the 1928 General Election 
unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Auckland, 1948. 
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increased in July, when the closure of the London market 
for overseas loans brought the crisis to a head, but major 
rises were postponed until October, by which time Reform 
had agreed to share the opprobrium in a coalition. 
The economic policy of the Coalition had two aims. 82 
Firstly, it sought to balance the budget without heavy 
internal borrowing, and without sacrificing the country's 
credit or 'honour' by unilaterally altering financial 
contracts. This was also supposed to help revive productive 
investment at lower interest rates by reducing state 
competition for capital. Secondly, the Coalition aimed to 
raise farm profitability, thus encouraging export production 
and saving established farmers from bankruptcy. Within the 
previous Reform administration these aims had generally 
been regarded as indistinguishable. Many believed this 
still to be so, including William Downie Stewart, once 
again Minister of Finance. However, both the loss of farm 
income and the proportion of farmers in the government were 
now so great that even some aspects of 'sound finance' were 
in jeopardy. 
Initially Downie Stewart managed to combine the 
government's two central concerns in his financial measures. 
In October, 1931, he increased income tax and customs duties, 
but abolished the graduated land tax, so hated by large land-
owners; increased the fe+tilizer subsidy introduced by 
Forbes in July; and transferred £250,000 of Main Highways 
Board funds from road construction to the general funds 
rural local bodies. These changes put an extra~420,000 onto 
82. AJHR, 1931, B6 (Supp.). 
79 
state expenditure at a time when it was being savagely 
reduced in other areas. In April, 1932, all wage-earners 
employed by the Public Works Department were put on relief 
pay rates, and a number of projects were discontinued. 
Later in the year there were considerable further cutbacks 
in state wages and salaries, and a myriad of administrative 
economies, notably in education and health. Those on the 
lowest income levels also received cuts in pensions and 
relief work pay. 
In all, public account spending was reduced by ten per 
cent both in 1931-32 and 1932-33. 83 The transactions of 
the state Advances Department added to the deflation. With 
repayments now greatly exceeding new advances, and a large 
income from interest, the department was draining consider-
able funds from the economy to liquidate its own liabilities. 84 
Furthermore, the cuts were very heavy in areas with a 
multiplier effect, such as public works,85 whereas overseas. 
I 
interest payments were actually being increased by a ten 
per cent devaluation against sterling. This compounded 
the fact that ~ost of the reductions discriminated against 
the compulsory spenders of society, the poor, in favour of 
discretionary savers such as wealthy farmers and bondholders. 
The impact of retrenchment was especially severe in 
urban areas. Government spending and employment were 
concentrated there and city state .. advances mortgagors 
continued to be more reliable debtors than their rural 
83. NZYB, 1937, p.467. Figures include Unemployment Fund but not 
state Advances. 
84. During the 1931-32 year State Advances lent just over one million 
pounds but took in almost £2.8 million in repayments and interest. 
NZYB, 1933, p.452-57. 
85. NZYB, 1937, p.470-71. 
86 counterparts. Even the limited spending power 
80 
engendere? by the Unemployment Board was tending to be 
diverted from the main centres into the No.4 and "Over the 
Fence" schemes. 87 Value added in factories not involved 
in proces~ing export farm products dropped by over 22% 
in 1931-32 and 5% in 1932-33. This compared with rises 
of 3.6% and 3.5% respectively in the farm processing 
. d . 88 l.n ust;rl.es. Similarly, the value of production in the 
largely urban-based building industry dropped to less 
than a quarter of its 1929-30 figure in 1932-33. 89 , 
Some government measures did shed a little light in 
the prevailing deflationary gloom. In May, 1932, there 
was a reduction of twenty per cent in most private interest 
charges, and income from public securities held in New 
Zealand was taxed to achieve a similar cut. Mortgagors 
were also given further opportunities to avoid foreclosure 
and this may have led to some maintenance of spending. In 
addition, subsidies from the Unemployment Board for building, 
gold prospecting, and certain minor industries provided a 
little stimulation to production and employment. However, 
the amount of the assistance provided was small. 90 Of far 
greater importance was the government's merciful decision 
to finance a part of its spending in 1931-32 by the issue 
86. NZYB, 1933, p.452-54, 456. 
87. The "Over the Fence" policy applied the No.5 Scheme to private 
farm work. 
88. Cal,culated from "value added" figures in CSO, Factory Production, 
1931; Factory and Building Production, 1932, 1933. 
89. Ibid., "Building Production". 
90. At its peak, in 1933-34, £229,460 was expended on the building 
subsidy. In the same year about £200,000 was spent on gold-
prospecting subsidies. NZYB, 1936, p.6S1. 
8l 
of treasury bills to the banks. 9l It thus imposed on its 
Citizens somewhat less than the full cost of the temporary 
closure of the London market. 
Reduced state expenditure, a commandeer on overseas 
exchange for the banks, a ten per cent devaluation against 
sterling, the sale of treasury bills, and the reopening of 
the London loan market together enabled Wellington to 
meet its sterling commitments for 1932. By the end of the 
year the dominion had a reflationary balance of payments,92 
a stabilising currency,93 and the opportunity to borrow at 
comparatively low rates in Britain. 94 The psychologically 
important95 goal of a "balanced budget" seemed to be ih 
sight, without substantial further taxation or retrenchment. 
However, the unbalanced political situation undermined 
this position and helped to prolong the worst of the 
depression, especially for New Zealand's urban population. 
Pressure had grown during 1932 for the administration to 
give more support to export farmers, a group grossly over-
represented in the government caucus. The agitation was 
strongly led by Coates, still leader of the Reform Party 
and increasingly the dominant force in the Coalition. The 
interests he championed were finally successful around the 
91. The banks agreed to finance a budget deficit of up to£11.5 million, 
reducing to £6.5 million by 31 March, 1933. In the event, only£6.5 
million of the stand-by was ever used and the government was left with 
a "floating debt lf of only£3.96 million at the end of the year. 
R. Holder, Bank of New South Wales: Vol.II, 1894-1970, Sydney, 1970; 
NZYB, 1934, p.69l. 
92. About £4.3 million in the year to March, 1932. NZYB, 1936, p.196. 
93. NZYB, 1936, p.533-34. 
94. The average rate of interest on Empire government loans was down to 
'4.4% in 1932 and was falling. Richardson, op.cit., p.57. 
95. f p.2l8-9; but c.f. Aldcroft, op.cit., p.306. 
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end of the year and concern for the welfare of export farmers 
became the ,guiding principle of the government's economic 
policy, shouldering aside Downie Stewart's capitalist idealism. 
The officially directed devaluation from £110 to £125 
per £lOO sterling in January, 1933, overshadowed all other 
measures introduced on this principle. It increased most 
farmers' incomes over what they would have been, but the net 
economic benefit was decidedly questionable, especially for 
urban New Zealanders. Much has been made of the reflationary 
effect of the devaluation, and the protection and encourage-
t 't dl t 1 1 f t ' 96 men 1 suppose y gave 0 oca manu ac ur1ng. In fact, 
many developments associated with the alteration of the 
exchange rate militated in the opposite direction. 
In the first place, the New Zealand devaluation was not 
imposed to combat the deflationary effect of a balance of 
payments crisis, a major reason for devaluation in Australia. 
Thanks in part to the "natural" depreciation of the New Zealand 
pound by ten per cent, the country had a large and growing 
trade surplus during 1932. If this was not proving very 
reflationary in ~he face of deflationary government and 
banking policies, it was these policies that were in need of 
modification rather than the exchange rate. Furthermore, the 
impact on the trade balance was not entirely positive. 
Devaluation also meant higher service charges on overseas 
debts and further discouraged renewed off-shore borrowing. 
96, Condliffe, op.cit., p.46; W. sutch, Poverty and Progress in New 
Zealand, Wellington, 1969, p.228; K. Sinclair and W. MandIe, Open 
Account: The History of the Bank of New South Wales in New Zealand, 
1861-1961, Wellington, 1961, p.201. 
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It may also have led to lower prices for dairy products, 
the dominion's most valuable export in 1932-33. This was 
because New Zealand and Denmark completely dominated the 
international trade in these products on the London market. 
Copenhagen simply replied to Wellington's devaluation in 
kind and the British consumer got his butter much cheaper. 97 
In addition, the compensatory arrangement reached 
between,the government and the banks to meet the expected 
accumulation of funds in London actually promoted and prolonged 
that development. 98 It did so by guaranteeing as good a 
return to the banks on those idle funds as they could get by 
advancing them in New Zealand to their most secure customers. 
Nor did the government's action do anything but worsen 
its fiscal problems. Because income tax was set at low 
levels, particularly for farmers, relatively little of the 
exchange windfall was passed to the government. Yet the 
devaluation had considerably increased the state's overseas 
debt charges and import costs. A further decline in private 
imports due to the change in the exchange rate simultaneously 
reduced the gov~rnment's income from customs. 
The Coalition chose to counter its increased costs by 
imposing a sales tax on manufactured items not specifically 
99 
required by farmers. It followed this course rather than 
borrowing from the local banks, which were awash with funds. 
In August, 1933, Coates again rejected a suggestion for a 
ten million pound loan, to be spent on public works in order 
97. C. Kindleberger, "Competitive Currency Depreciation Between Denmark 
and New Zealand", Harvard Business Review, Vol.12: 1934, p.4l6-426. 
98. Hawke, op.cit., p.24-25. 
99. NZYB, 1936, p.454. 
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to reflate the economy.100 On the other hand, the sales 
tax put up,the cost of living and took a slice out of consumer 
spending. It was hardly an encouragement to manufacturers 
and retailers to expand investment and employment. 
Discretionary purchasing power was cut even more 
severely in another way. Higher export prices meant higher 
f d ' 'th' 101. 00 pr~ces W1 1n New Zealand, and th1s reduced the 
capacity of those on low incomes to purchase basic local 
manufactures such as clothing and footwear. Whether it came 
from the market or from devaluation, a recovery in export 
prices needed to be accompanied by an increase in low incomes 
if manufacturing ,for consumers was to expand significantly. 
Such an increase only came much later, through the partial 
restoration of pay and pension cuts in late 1934 and early 
1935. There was no full restoration until August, 1936. 102 
Many of the country's poor were employed on relief works 
by local bodies. Like the government, these authorites were 
strongly affected financially by devaluation. Over a third 
of local body debt was held overseas, and there was now a 
large additional amount required to service it. Furthermore, 
a considerable, proportion of the fuel, materials, and plant 
used by local authorities was imported and therefore now cost 
more. Already under considerable pressure to reduce rates 
and charges, they were faced with cutting spending in other 
areas. This probably contributed to the widespread withdrawal 
100. Sun, 16 August, 1933. 
101. By December, 1933, the dominion weighted average for the three food 
groups in the cost-of-living index had risen by 5.3% over that of 
December, 1932. At the end of the following year the cumulative 
rise was 8.2%, and by December, 1935, it was 13.8%. eso, Prices, 
Wages, etc., 1932-35, p.3. 
102. NZYB, 1937, p.668. 
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from the No.5 Scheme by local authorities during 1933. 103 
More unemployed were consequently placed on sustenance or 
charitable aid, at far lower rates of pay than on relief 
works. Devaluation also erected another barrier to any 
resumption of local body lending overseas, which might have 
increased their spending and employment. 
The devaluation tended to be regressive overall. While 
the cost of higher returns for primary production bore partic-
ularly heavily on the poor, the benefits went to wealthy as 
well as struggling farmers. The census figures for income 
during 1935 show approximately 9.2% of male farmers had 
incomes over £364, compared with around 6.1% of the total 
d 1 1 1 t ' 104 h t' f h f aut rna e popu a ~on. T e propor ~on 0 seep armers, 
the group that benefitted most by devaluation, was much 
greater at 27.2%. Increasing the income of farmers thus 
meant in Keynesian terms a net transfer to those with a 
greater propensity to save. Certainly prices and sales of 
farming land did not take long to lift substantially as 
export returns. rose. As early as May, 1933, one Christchurch 
real estate agen~ was observing that demand for farms was 
"steadily improving" 105 By August, a stock-and-station 
agency was reporting an increase of 75% in inquiries for farms 
over the previous twelve months. It noted that "most of the 
106 
men with cash were after sheep farms". Between the first 
quarter of 1933 and that of 1934, the average price of farms 
sold in New Zealand increased by 24%, with a ten per cent 
increase in numbers sold. In Canterbury the rises were 
103. NZYB, 1936, p.647. 
104. Census, 1936, Vo1.12, p.61. 
105. Sun, 31 May, 1933. 
106. ~, 12 August, 1933. See also 11 October, 1933. 
fifty per cent and l5% respectively.l07 
A considerable proportion of the extra farm income 
would have been devoted to debt servicing and repayment, 
whether the farmer was in difficulties or not. There was 
86 
a large increase in the discharge of mortgages following 
devaluation, particularly in sheepfarming areas. The value 
of mortgages discharged in 1933-34 increased by 61% over 
the previous year. But the figure was l23% in Canterbury, 
175% in Otago and 355% in Gisborne. 108 Much of this money 
would in turn have been withdrawn from productive inyestment 
as creditors followed contemporary business wisdom and used 
it to reduce their own liabilities. Furthermore, although 
many retired or virtually unemployable people drew low 
incomes from mortgages, the majority of such investments 
were held by wealthy individuals and institutions. They 
would have had an even lower propensity to spend than most 
farmers, and certainly most of those paying for devaluation 
through food prices and sales tax. This was reflected in a 
b ..... f . 1 . t ,109 d uoyant mar~et or commerc~a c~ y propert~es, renewe 
interest in the stock 110 exchange, a substantial acceleration 
in the growth of fixed d 't 111 epos~ s, and speculation on a 
112 possible revaluation of the New Zealand pound. The 
"liquidity trap" of rural debt, which absorbed so much of the 
113 impact of improving export prices for Australian producers, 
107. Calculated from figures in CSO, Monthly Abstract of Statistics, 
February to April, 1933, 1934, "Land Sales". 
108. NZYB, 1936, p.575; 1938, p.704-5. 
109. Sun, 31 May, 1933. 
110. Ibid. 
Ill. NZYB, 1937, p.560. 
112. Sun, 18 August, 1933. Also Sinclair and MandIe, op.cit., p.205. 
113. Schedvin I 
.......... -'---
, p. 294. 
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operated in a varied and voracious manner in New Zealand. 
Finally, the provision of greater protection to local 
manufacturing was, in terms of Reform Party philosophy, an 
unfortunate side-effect rather than an aim of devaluation. 
That philosophy had been exemplified by the government's 
promises at the ottawa Conferenee to reduce protection 
against British goods. In his subsequent statement to the 
New Zealand parliament, Coates made it clear that he 
considered the need for such reductions to be widespread. 114 
A tariff commission was established in 1933 to examine 
critically the p~otection afforded to each industry. These 
moves, and the attitude behind them, contrasted strongly 
with the Australian experience at the time of devaluation 
there. Then tariffs had been raised sharply and manufacturers 
were well aware that they had a government strongly and openly 
in support of their interests. Faced with the attitude of 
the New Zealand government in 1933, it would have been a 
very optimistic manufacturer indeed who increased his invest-
ment on the basis of the alteration in exchange rates. The 
management of one firm which had continued to make good 
profits throughout the early 'thirties due to continued high 
protection decided to conceal its real financial situation 
"in view of the Tariff Commission and some other considera-
tions". "Secret reserves were created" rather than have the 
increased profit distributed in dividends or invested in 
expansion further to that already planned. llS As the product 
of the commission's deliberations emerged during 1934, one 
Christchurch electrical manufacturer talked of "alarm 
114. NZPD, Vol.233, p.544-49. 
115. J. Angus, Papermaking Pioneers, Mataura, 1976, p.lll. 
amounting almost to despair". 116 
b ' f d I' 'd ' 117 us~nesses ace ~qu~ at~on. 
( 
Some long-established 
In the event, actual 
changes to tariffs up to the end of 1935 were not nearly 
118 
as great as feared, but the fear undoubtedly restricted 
the confidence of manufacturers. 
Moreover~ there was an almost universal belief that 
the "artificial" rate was only a temporary expedient. The 
government presented it as a medium-term response to a 
crisis which it repeatedly claimed would soon be over. 119 
Financiers said the change in rate could not last, ~nd the 
Opposition was strongly opposed to it. Devaluation ,was 
clearly not a firm basis on which to invest money in 
88 
manufacturing. This was particularly so when most of the 
modern machinery needed to increase production was imported 
and therefore subject to exchange. Indeed, investment in 
machinery, plant, tools, and implements in domestic manufac-
turing fell in each complete March year after devaluation 
until 1936-37 (Fig. 2.1). Yet there had been a marginal 
increase in such investment during the apparently very bleak 
120 year of 1932-33. Similarly, examination of the volume 
and value of production in New Zealand industries reveals 
that recovery often began in 1932-33 and frequently slowed 
in 1933_34.121 
116. Sun, 22 August, 1934. 
117. Sun, 7 July, 1934. 
118. ~, 1937, p.2l6. 
119. "Turning the corner" attained a similar political status to the later 
"light at the end of the tunnel". Manufacturers were probably more 
influenced by the long-term uncertainty implied in official statements. 
For example, that high exchange would remain "until at least the end· 
of the present export season". AJHR, 1933, B6, Statement by Rt. Hon. 
J.G. COptes, Minister of Finance, 9 November, 1933, p.lS. 
120. The increase in investment in these industries had been £67,000 in 
1932-33, as against a fall of £492,000 in 1933-34. 
121. See Appepqix B. 
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FIG. 2.1: INVESTMENT IN PLANT AND MACHINERY IN 
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY IN NEW ZEALAND, 1922-38 
1923 1925 1921 1929 1931 1933 1935 1937 
YEARS· to MARCH 31st 
Source: CSO, Factory Production, 1922-31; Factory and 
Building Production, 1932-38, "Valuation 
Motive Power, Location, and Character of 
Organisation" • 
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Other evidence casts some doubt on the importance of 
devaluation in recovery, at least in urban New Zealand. 
Both the number and value of building permits issued in the 
larger towns of New Zealand were significantly higher after 
September, 1932, than they had been during the corresponding 
months during 1931. In January, 1933, the month of devalua-
tion, this trend was reversed and not firmly re-established 
until six months later. 122 Business in Christchurch was 
certainly showing some signs of recovery well before devalua-
tion. One local newspaper reported a revival of sales in the 
areas of drapery', motor vehicles, real estate and radios as 
early as August, 1932. 123 A few weeks later it noted an 
increase in the number of small building jobs and a tendency 
f h . t f' 124 or s are pr~ces 0 ~rm. Greater retail activity was 
. t d l' N b 125 aga~n no e ear y ~n ovem er. Simila~ly, the approach 
to Christmas, 1932, seems to have seen a considerable growth 
in spending in the city over the previous festive season. 
Bicycle retailers reported a "boom", with one firm claiming 
to be at its busiest 126 in ten years. There was also a 
significant rise in the number of motor cars registered 
122. eso, Monthly Abstract of Statistics, 1932-34, February issues, 
"Building Permits in Larger Towns". Unfortunately the situation is 
somewhat confused by the operation of the Unemployment Board's 
building subsidy, which was in force between 1 July and 31 December 
1932, and June to September, 1933. NZYB, 1934, p.601. The local 
secretary of one trade union in the building industry related the 
sudden downturn to confusion over the effects of exchange and 
sales tax. Sun, 13 February, 31 March, 1933. 
123. ~f 20 August, 1932. 
124. Sun, 8 September, 1932. 
125. Sun, 7 November, 1932. 
126. Sun, 30 November, 1932. 
91 
d · b 127 ur1.ng Decem ere Accommodation at Christchurch beaches 
128 
was selling briskly by September and Christmas Eve saw 
the heaviest sale of tickets for the ferry train' "in the 
memory of present officers".129 Retailers repor~ed better 
"last-minute" trading in both city and suburbs. 130 There 
would seem to be some room for argument that New Zealand 
had been experiencing a measure of domestic recovery late 
in 1932, in common with much of the rest of the developed 
world. Further, it seems possible that the timing and 
nature of the devaluation tended to set recovery back. 
Some other government policies probably contributed a 
little to recovery. Cheaper capital may have become more 
available following the conversion of the internal public 
debt to lower rates of interest. But this did not add much 
to the effect of the previous year's taxation of that 
. t 131 l.n erest. Certainly the government did not use the 
reduction in its debt charges to borrow once more, at lower 
rates. Measures to encourage spending were more urgently 
required than conversion, but were less in evidence. The 
further relaxation of private mortgage commitments helped, 
and continued building subsidies almost certainly promoted 
activity in this important multiplier sector. The very 
modest increase in public works expenditure between 1933 and 
1936 would have had a similar effect. However, the total 
increase over that period was less than one million pounds, 
127. Sun, 17, 30 December, 1932. 
128. Sun, 9 September, 1932. 
129. Sun, 24 December, 1932. 
130. Sun, 23, 24 December, 1932. 
13l. ~, 1937, p.487. 
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compared with a drop of almost three million pounds in 
1932-33.13~ The belated partial restoration of the state 
pay and pension cuts also increased spending during 1935. 
The impact of such policies were largely nullified by 
devaluation and the continued severe restraint on total 
government spending. The Coalition actually achieved a 
budget surplus of £1.8 million in 1934-35, including a hand-
133 some contribution from the Unemployment Board. Thus 
rather than injecting more money into the economy, the 
government was tending to take it out. Although the amount 
spent on the public account did increase, it was still well 
below the level of 1930-31 as late as 1935_36. 134 Moreover, 
much of the increase in expenditure was due to the costs of 
exchange. Similarly, the surplus of repayments and interest 
over lending by the State Advances Department increased 
steadily to 1936. 135 Even the public debt was reduced. 
Between 1932 and 1935 it fell by approximately £1.3 million, 
and£.5 million of the new total was the outcome of the 
. t' 136 convers~on opera ~on. The economy was recovering from 
1933 onwards despite, rather than because of, the policies 
137 
of the government. 
132. Ibid. , p.470-71. 
133. Ibid. , p.467. 
134. Ibid. , loc.cit. 
135.- Ibid. , p.504-508. 
136. NZYB, 1939, p.501; 1934, p.69I. 
137. One prominent businessman who was on speaking terms with Coates firmly 
allocated the blame for these policies to him. N. Robinson, 
James Fletcher: Builder, London, 1970, p.109-lll. Fletcher claimed 
that Coates had told him that he confidently expected that the 
accumulation of reserves in London would bring political as well 
as economic benefits. 
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It was essentially the rising prices received for 
exports of primary produce and the continued low level of 
imports that brought about the sluggish economic improvement 
internally to 1936. Unfortunately, the recovery in many 
overseas economies from about the third quarter of 1932 was 
only reflected in higher prices for New Zealand exports well 
into the following year.138 Wool was clearly on the upswing 
in April, and its average price during the June year in 1934 
was almost double that of 1933. Prices for meat and other 
pastoral products had begun to improve by the winter of 1933, 
and the decline in prices for dairy produce slowed somewhat. 
The wool price was to fall sharply once again in the 1934-35 
season, and dairy prices did not show any substa~tial rise 
until 1935-36. However, thanks to higher incomes for sheep-
farmers and increased dairy production, overall returns 
were higher in 1934 than in 1930. 139 By 1936 they had risen 
above the record levels of the 'twenties, but were accompanied 
by a much lower rate of importation. Merchandise exports 
exceeded imports by £ 16 million in 1934, £ 10 million in 1935, 
and £12.5 million in 1936. Such massive trade surpluses could 
not fail to stimulate activity, despite the fact that much 
of the increase was being frozen in fixed deposit accounts 
until late in 1934. 
However, the sluggishness with which the rising overseas 
returns affected other sectors demonstrated the basic 
limitations of the policy of waiting for an export-led 
recovery. As with increases in the volume of primary produc-
138. eso, Prices, Wages, etc., 1933-36, "Export Prices". 
139. NZYB, 1938, p.225, 229, 230, 247, for these and the following figures. 
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tion, and the effect of devaluation, it was clearly 
demonstrated that the export sector could not absorb a much 
greater proportion of the workforce. There was only a 
minute rise in the percentage of the occupied population 
in farming or farm processing between 1926 and 1936. 140 
This was despite enormous increases in output, massive 
joblessness, and strenuous attempts by the Unemployment Board 
to put workers "on the land". Tractors, trucks, milking 
machines, shearing plants, and electric motors were permitting 
a much greater production per person employed. Clearly a 
policy of suppressing the domestic economy in favour of 
exports meant condemning more workers to unemployment. 
Some blame for the slowness of recovery can 'probably be 
attached to the banks. Despite improving export receipts, 
their ratio of advances to deposits continued to remain 
historically very low even after the Reserve Bank had taken 
141 
over their accumulation of surplus sterling funds. The ratio 
actually fell during 1936. Borrowing might have been given 
greater encouragement by an earlier and more substantial reduc-
tion in fixed~deposit interest and the overdraft rates demanded 
of the average borrower. However, the banks were commercial 
institutions and they were already experiencing a severe squeeze 
on their profits, partly as the result of previous cuts in 
interest on advances. 142 The National Bank, in particular, 
143 
appears to have been hard pressed. Above all, the effect 
140. The proportion of the male workforce employed full-time in farming 
increased from 27.8% in 1926 to 28.5% in 1936. Census, 1926, 
Vol.IX, p.41; Census, 1936, Vol.X, p.33. 
141. NZYB, 1937, p.560. 
142. Moore and Barton, op.cit., p.32b, 65, 206. 
143. R.Holder, Bank of New South Wales, Vol.2: 1894-1970, Sydney, 1970, 
p.814. 
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of "cheap money" on levels of investment is probably limited 
in a situa~ion where profitable opportunities are few. 
The onus was on the government to increase its spending, 
borrow some of the accumulated bank funds, and give some 
incentive for productive private investment. 
Yet it was only during 1936 that government policies 
began to reinforce the export-led recovery to any great 
extent. The Coalition had been planning further increases 
in public spending following the 1935 election,144 but its 
plans were certainly more modest than the reality of Labour's 
first year in office. Restored pay and pension levels, 
increases in unemployment relief, a shorter working week, 
more state advances, and a considerable expansion of public 
works all assisted reflation. Government borrowing for 
d 1 ' d 145 b h f h " d' eve opment 1ncrease , ut muc 0 t e r1se 1n expen 1ture 
was financed through taxation on those with middle and higher 
, 146 1ncomes. Imports climbed rapidly with the rising standard 
of living and aspects of the new technology were prominent 
amongst them. 147 With no import or exchange controls the 
surplus began to melt away. Nevertheless, the benefits of 
recovery were spread much more widely through the community. 
The depression resulted from a failure by the major 
economic powers to adjust to the changes that tecnhology and 
144. Sutch, op.cit., p.229. 
145. £4.6 million in 1936-37. NZYB, 1939, p.501. 
146. NZYB, 1938, p.557. 
147. Whereas the value of merchandise imports as a whole increased by 55% 
between 1935 and 1937, that of imports of motor cars rose by 74%, 
motor spirit by 67%, wireless apparatus by 90% and electrical machinery 
and equipment by 104%. NZYB, 1939, p.908, 920-22. 
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war had wrought. This failure was perhaps inevitable, 
especially given the rapidity of the change. Faced with the 
breakdown of the international system of trade a:nd finance, 
small states needed import controls and internal reflation 
t d 't' t th' 't' 148 o re uce ~ s ~mpac on e~r c~ ~zens. A number pursued 
such policies with success. 
In New Zealand, however, they were not applied in a 
sustained or integrated manner up to the end of 1936. The 
United Government did use state spending to maintain economic 
activity between 1928 and 1931. But it failed to move on to 
greater protection and deliberate deficit spending when 
confronted by the closure of overseas money markets. 
United turned instead to deflation, and linked up with 
the forces of financial conservatism. Together they cut 
state spending further and actually moved to reduce protection. 
They saw an increase in export returns as the only avenue to 
recovery, and eventually attempted to hasten it with a devalua-
tion. This did little to restore the severely depressed 
internal economy as the government maintained its rigorously 
deflationary pOlicies. Furthermore, devaluation was accom-
panied by measures which tended both to dampen down any rise 
in activity outside the export sector, and to encourage the 
148. "In the 19305 there was a world-wide revulsion against foreign 
lending, the multilateral trade and payments system had collapsed 
and in its place were bilateral agreements, very high tariffs and 
exchange control ••• In these circumstances, reliance on a recovery 
in world trade for domestic revival was foolish. Most of the 
successful recoveries from the depression achieved in the 1930s 
were accomplished by insulating the economy from instability and 
depression abroad". Richardson, op.cit., p.6. 
97 
accumulation of export receipts in London accounts. Because 
of these measures, the attitude of the government t9 local 
manufacturing, and a high level of farmer indebtedness, 
the considerable rise in export earnings from the autumn 
of 1933 brought only a slow domestic recovery. 
From the end of 1935 the Labour Government promoted 
this recovery with a strongly reflationary policy. Yet it 
too mistook the depth of the problems that new technology 
and the international crisis had created for a technically 
and socially advanced nation dependent on primary exports. 
In 1938 Labour was faced with renewed deflation as a result 
of a downturn in the world economy. Only then did they 
shelve the dream of Imperial free trade and move to strict 
import and exchange controls. 
Originally the product of technological change and 
war, the world depression became a massive economic and 
social influence in its own right. This was particularly 
so in New Zealand, a country greatly dependent on overseas 
trade and led by men thoroughly bound up in that dependence. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
Christchurch and Canterbury as a whole suffered a 
disproportionate economic decline during the early thirties, 
and their recovery lagged behind that of the rest of New 
Zealand. In the 1936 census the Christchurch Urban area 
recorded 14.5% unemployment amongst its male workforce, 
as against 11.8% in Auckland, 9.5% in Wellington, and 
9.3% in Dunedin. 1 Roughly the same pattern prevailed in 
the provincial statistics, with 10.4% male unemployment in 
Canterbury, 6.8% in Auckland, 7.7% in Wellington and 6.7% 
2 in Otago. Similarly, factory production by value reached 
a low of 65 (1925-26 = 100) in Canterbury in 1932-33, 
compared to the national low-point of 82 in 1931-32. 3 By 
1935-36 New Zealand factory production had recovered to 108, 
but that of Canterbury only to 84. Auckland had attained 
127, Wellington 111, and Otago 91. Some vital statistics 
reinforce this impression. Comparison of Canterbury's male 
21-29 age cohort in 1936 with that of 11-19 in 1926 yields 
a figure of 91.1%.4 This compares with 105.1% for Auckland, 
1. Census, 1936, Vol. X, p.iv. The unemployed totals used for these 
calculations comprised 17 "Persons wholly unemployed on sustenance, 
or part-time relief work". 
2. Ibid, Vol. XI, p.ii. 
3. CSO, Factory Production, 1926-31; Factory and Building Production, 
1932-36, "Production by Provincial Districts". Tramways production 
figures have been deducted from the totals prior to 1932 in order to 
make them comparable with the totals for subsequent years. 
4. Census, 1926, Vol. III, p.2D-2l; Census, 1936, Vol. IV, p.9-1D. 
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102.4% for Wellington, and 91.3% for otago. 5 Clearly many 
of the most mobile sections of Canterbury's population had 
given it a vote of no-confidence with their feet. 
Comparable regional variations in the impact of the 
depression have been noted overseas; the generally stagnant 
north and the developing south-east in Britain,6 New England 
versus California in the united States. 7 In most cases it 
was regional differences in resources and forms of economic 
activity which caused these differential rates of decline 
and recovery. Some industries, such as heavy engineering, 
suffered more from the effects of the international crisis 
than others; some, such as gold-mining, were actually 
encouraged by it. Generally speaking, industries associated 
with recent technological change, including motor engineering, 
electricity generation, electrical appliances and synthetic 
fibres, experienced less difficulty. In the case of Canter-
bury and its principal city, the structure of the local 
economy meant that both the depression and new technology 
operated to its comparative detriment. 
Primary production was extremely important in the 
economy of this region, not least through the activity it 
engendered within Christchurch. Wool and grain stores, 
freezing works, flour mills, and woolscouring plants were 
5, The loss from Otago is probably exaggerated. The number of visitors 
to the Dunedin Exhibition at the time of the 1926 Census swelled 
the population of the city by around five per cent. Those visitors 
included many parties of schoolchildren. Consequently the carry-
over of the 11-19 cohort was almost certainly underestimated for 
otago and slightly overestimated in other regions, notably 
Canterbury, the most accessible to Dunedin. Census, 1926, 
Vol. XVII, p.16. 
6. H.W.Richardson, Economic Recovery in Bri~ain, 1932-39, London, 
1967, Ch. 11. ' 
7. G. Gunderson, A New Economic History of America, New York, 1976, p.471. 
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large employers in and around the urban area, and much.of 
the work of, the railways and the port was based on seasonal 
primary production. Furthermore, the city dominated the 
manufacture of farm machinery in New Zealand, producing 
roughly two-thirds of the country's output by value in 
1926.
8 Stock and station agencies were also major employers 
in Christchurch, and some local retailers had substantial 
country sales. City law and accountancy firms, banks, 
insurance companies, and other service enterprises drew 
much of their business from the rural hinterland. 
At the top and the bottom of the social scale the land 
provided considerable income for people normally or frequently 
resident in the city. The big houses of the north-west and 
along the hills accommodated a number of "runholders" and 
"sheep-farmers". 9 Together with "mixed farmers" they 
constituted a higher proportion of the adult male workforce 
than in the other main urban areas - although Dunedin came 
10 
close. More significantly, a larger part of the workforce 
in Christchurch relied upon seasonal and general farm work 
than in the other main centres, and the city was a convenient 
haven for casual labour during the winter. Farm labourers 
8. CSO, Factory production, 1926, p.81. 
9. G.A. Stone (Ed.), Canterbury, Nelson, Marlborough and Westland 
Directorx, Dunedin, 1934. 
10.In 1936 there were roughly 40 such individuals per ten thousand in the 
male workforce in the Christchurch Urban Area, compared with 36 in 
Dunedin 22 in Auckland and 15 in Wellington. Census, 1936, Vol. X, 
p.64, and ibid., p.iv, for male workforce totals. In 1926 the 
relationship between the proportions of the workforce in these 
occupations in the three largest centres was similar. However, 
that in Dunedin was extraordinarily high - apparently because 
wealthy farmers were amongst those best able to travel to the 
Exhibition. Census, 1926, Vol. IX, p.55. 
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constituted 2.2% of the Christchurch workforce in 1936, 
compared w..ith 1.4% in Dunedin, 1.3% in Auckland and 0.6% 
in Wellington. ll Other categories of farm employees which 
were divided according to urban areas in the census showed 
a similar concentration in Christchurch. Furthermore, the 
proportion of "labourers, not otherwise defined" was 
highest here, at 6.5%, compared with 5.6% in Auckland, 5.4% 
in Dunedin and 4.6% in Wellington. Many such labourers would 
have been involved, in farm work during the season. 
However, there were a number of d~fferences between 
primary production in Canterbury and that in the other major 
provinces, and these differences were to affect significantly 
the impact of the depression in the area. Most importantly, 
the description of New Zealand at the time as "one gigantic 
l2 
cow-yard" was no-where so misleading as in Canterbury, 
where less than two per cent of the male workforce were 
dairy-farmers in 1926. 13 The low rainfall of the plains, 
and the rugged nature of the mountains to the west and north 
had made the province largely inhospitable to dairying. On 
the other hand, it had proved extremely suitable for sheep-
farming and cropping. In 1925 wool still made up approximate-
ly 35% of the value of Canterbury's farm production, followed 
by meat (mainly sheepmeat) with about 33% and agri~ulture 
with around 23%.14 Only Welli~gton Province had a similar 
11. Census, 1936, loc.cit. A remarkably large number of farm labourers 
were also in Dunedin at the time of the Exhibition. Census, 1926,' 
loc.cit. 
12. Quoted from unspecified source in K. Sinclair, A History of New 
Zealand, London, 1980, p.26l. 
13. Census, 1926, Vol. IX, p.36. Even Hawke's Bay had a higher 
proportion, approximately 3.5%. 
14. Calculated from eso, Trade and Shipping, 1925, "Details of Exports" 
(figures for wool); Factory Production, 1926, "Meat-freezing and 
Meat-preserving"; Agricultural and Pastoral Production, 1926, 
"yqJ;\J.~, ,Qf ,C~9PS". 
dependence on sheep-farming, but it was less reliant on 
wool. In no other major province was dairying such an 
insignificant part of farm production as in Canterbury. 
Other forms of primary production which were important in 
other regions, timber-milling, gold and coal mining, were 
also relatively negligible here. 
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Such a structure of primary production had a number of 
drawbacks during the depression. In the first place, the 
price of wool fell considerably further than the prices 
for other primary products. From a high-point of 100 in 
1925, greasy wool fell to 26.5 in 1932, scoured wool to 34, 
and slipe to 31.5. 15 L.R.C. Macfarlane, a prominent 
North Canterbury sheep-farmer, was moved to a little colour-
ful exaggeration in 1932: 
Wool used to be an important factor in New Zealand's 
economic life. Now it is only a by-product of an 
animal called the sheep and the trouble is to get 
rid of that .by-product so that we can get at the 
meat, which is really worth something. 16 
Butter and cheese, on the other hand, peaked in 1924 and 
reached their nadir at 53 and 58 respectively in 1935. 
From their high-point in 1925, the lowest average prices 
for sheepmeats fell in between those for wool and dairy 
products, at 53 for lamb in 1933 and 39 for mutton in 1932. 
Agriculture's low-points extended from wheat at 64 in 1932-33 
17 (1925-26 = 100) to oats at 45 in the same year. The very 
low figure for oats was as significant as the comparatively 
15. CSO, Trade and Shipping, 1926-36. Figures calculated by dividing 
value by volume. 
16. Sun, 28 July, 1932. 
17. CSO, Agricultural and Pastoral Production, 1926-36, loc.cit. and 
"Total Yields of Crops". Figures calculated by dividing value 
by yield. 
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good one for wheat, since in Canterbury the production of 
oats and oaten chaff was roughly as important economically 
as that·of wheat. Besides dropping further than other 
returns for farm products during the early 'thirties, the 
price of wool had a fitful recovery, plummeting halfway 
back to the levels of 1932-33 during 1935. 
Then again, wool, unlike most meat and dairy products, 
could be stored relatively cheaply and without a great loss 
of quality. The weight of wool exported from New Zealand 
actually declined following the drop in prices in 1930, 
contrary to the general rule here and overseas that farm 
production rose to compensate for falling returns. 18 The 
dominion's wool stockpile grew from 19.5 million pounds in 
1928 to l17.9 million pounds in 1932. 19 By 1934 it had 
fallen sharply to 49.8 million pounds, but nearly doubled 
with the fall in the wool-price in the following year. On 
the other hand, the dairy industry could only counter falling 
. returns by raising production, and the volume of its exports 
doubled between the years of highest and lowest prices. 20 
Furthermore, purchasers of wool could reduce their 
need for expensive credit and take advantage of lower 
processing charges elsewhere by shipping more wool in its 
greasy rather than scoured form. Between 1926 and 1931 the 
number of bales of scoured wool exported dropped from 59,893 
18. Richardson, op.cit., p.1. 
19. NZYB, 1937, p.361. See also editorial in Star, 31 January, 1931. 
20. CSO, Factory Production, 1923-31; Factory and Building production, 
1932-35. "Butter, Cheese and Condensed Milk Factories". 
to 38,849. 21 Exports from Lyttelton were particularly 
affected, falling from over twenty to under nine thousand 
bales. Such cutbacks in processing, coming on top of the 
drop in raw wool prices, reduced the value of production 
from Canterbury's woolscouring plants from £1,321,000 in 
1925-26 to £l86,000 in 1931-32. 22 Between 1926 and 1932 
all six fellmongeries in Christchurch closed down. 23 On 
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the other hand, traders in meat and dairy produce were not 
able to reduce processing substantially, so activity and 
employment tended to be better maintained in their industries. 
The number of jobs in the wool-scouring and fellmongery 
industry dropped by almost forty per cent between 1926 and 
1932, compared with a fall of under four per cent in 
employment in dairy-factories and an increase of four per 
t · . b . k 24 cen 1n JO s 1n meat-wor s. 
It seems likely that the socio-economic structure of 
farming in Canterbury also tended to retard the recovery of 
its consumer industries compared with those in provinces 
where average farm incomes were· lower. A high proportion of 
. 25 
Canterbury landowners were sheep-farmers, a group with a 
mean income well above other categories of farmer. 26 It 
21. CSO, Trade and Shipping, 1926-31, "Details of Exports". 
22. CSO, Factory Production, 1926; Factory and Building Production, 
1932, "Wool-scouring and Fellmongery". 
23. Sun, 13 January, 1932. 
24. CSO, op.cit, loc.cit., "Butter ••• ", and "Meat-freezing and 
Meat-preserving". 
25. Twenty-seven per cent of agricultural farmers in 1936, compared with 
the national average of 22%. A further 29% were "mixed farmers" 
(normally mixed sheep and cropping) compared with the dominion 
proportion of 14%. Census, 1936, Vol.X, p.60. 
26. The mean income of sheep-farmers who described themselves as employers 
in the 1926 Census was over £364, compared with £270 in the case of 
dairy-farmer employers. The majority of sheep-farmers were employers; 
the majority of dairy-farmers were not. In the 1936 Census the incomes 
of the two groups of employers were probably proportionately wider apart, 
at 229 and 146 respectively. Census, 1926, Vol.XI, p.8/lll 1936, 
Vol,X1lt p.l~t 2~~ , 
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appears fair to conclude that consequently a smaller propor-
tion of the increased farm income from devaluation, reduced 
interest rates and higher export prices went on the purchase 
of locally-produced consumer goods than in dairying regions. 
Much of this money appears to have flowed on instead to the 
repayment of debt and even the acquisition of more farmland, 
presumably with money borrowed at the new lower rates. The 
value of mortgages discharged in Canterbury increased by 
123% in the 1933-34 financial year, compared with a rise of 
57% in Auckland. 27 Within two years of devaluation and 
rising returns, most of the areas of the country dominated 
by sheep-farming had shown similar disproportionate increases. 
In effect, this meant that in Canterbury a greater proportion 
of the income transferred from urban workers to farmers through 
higher food prices and sales tax was going to generally 
wealthy individual and institutional mortgagees. Similarly, 
whereas the national number of sales of country property rose 
by less than one per cent between the last quarter of 1932 
and that of 1933, in Canterbury the increase was over twelve 
28 per cent. Finally, it is likely that wealthier individuals 
such as sheep-farmers preferred the more expensive imported 
merchandise to locally produced goods. Certainly prestigious 
emporiums such as Ballantyne's sold large amounts of imports 
in comparison with the stores such as Armstrong's and 
Miller's which catered mostly for working people. 
27. NZYB, 1936, p.575. 
28. eso, Monthly Abstract of Statistics, November 1932 to January 
1933 and November 1933 to January 1934, ULand Sales". 
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With heavy unemployment, little rural trade union 
activity and some farm labour subsidised by the Unemployment 
Board, it seems that little of the farm employers' additional 
income went to their employees up to 1936. The mean income of 
farm workers, already low in 1925-26 at £107, was amongst 
29 those most substantially reduced by 1935. • It had fallen 
by 44%, despite the fact that the later figure was supposed 
30 to include an allowance for the value of board and keep, 
something provided more often to rural workers than most 
other groups. In dairy-farming, on the other hand, labour 
was normally provided by the farmer himself and his family,31 
and their per capita income was frequently little above 
that of farm workers. 32 Consequently any growth in their 
income due to increased production, increased prices or 
mortgage relief was more likely to go on marginal improve-
ments in their standard of living, to the benefit of local 
traders and manufacturers. 
Partly because of the need to employ workers, the 
operation of most sheep-farms was more capital-intensive than 
dairying. However, like cropping, sheep-farming provided 
only a few payouts per year, thus necessitating the use of 
credit for long periods. But credit remained expensive 
until well into 1933. Dairy payments were typically by 
29. Census, 1926, Vol.XI, p.1S; 1936, vol.XII, p.SS. The 1926 figure 
has been calculated more precisely than the "approximate mean ll 
given in the Census table. 
30. Ibid, p.i. 
31. In 1936, only forty per cent of dairy-farmers were employers, 
compared with sixty per cent of sheep-farmers. Ibid, p.12, 22. 
32. In 1935 a quarter of dairy-farmers working on their own had incomes 
between £52 and £l03, along with a third of farm labourers. 
Ibid, loc.cit. 
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monthly butterfat cheque, and therefore the limited extra 
working ca~ital needed to increase production on dairy farms 
was more readily available to "cow cockies". 
Finally, farming in the new dairying and fat lamb 
areas of the country was often little beyond the pioneering 
stage. This meant that increases in production were still 
possible with the application of simple technology and little 
capital, plus a lot of hard work. It also meant that a 
higher proportion of the farming popUlation was endeavouring 
to payoff first farms, usually on mortgage. In most cases, 
this proved an effective, if cruel, spur to greater produc-
tion which led in turn to more employment for cream-collectors 
and factory workers. In Canterbury, large-scale irrigation 
and big quantities of fertiliser were needed to achieve 
similar increases in output. Moreover, its farmers appear 
to have been generally well-established and less burdened 
by mortgage debt than those in the newer, developing areas 
of the country. Informed contemporary observers believed 
this tO,be so~3and their view is supported by the record of 
registrations of country mortgages under the Land Transfer 
Act. In the era of record farmland prices between 1919 and 
1926, a gross amount of £39.3 million had been secured on 
such mortgages in Auckland, compared with £25.5 million in 
34 , Canterbury. . In 1914 a total of £18.2 mill~on had been 
registered on mortgages under the Land Transfer Act in 
Auckland, compared with £22.5 million in Canterbury. 
33. J.B. Condliffe, The Welfare State in New Zealand, Westport 
(Conn.), 1975, p.14. 
34. AJHR, H3, 1920-26. 
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In 1926 the respective amounts were £63.0 million and 
£43.9 million. 35 
In addition, the sales of several of Canterbury's 
established farm products, barley, small seeds, potatoes, 
d · ff d 1 f th d . 36 h an on~ons, su ere severe y rom e epress~on. T e 
usage of barley fell with the consumption of beer, and 
shipments of seeds to the North Island and to Australia 
dropped as their farmers economised. The previously signi-
ficant trans-Tasman trade in onions and potatoes virtually 
disappeared as Canberra sought to protect its own producers, 
hard-hit by the economic crisis. 
Nor had Canterbury the climate to stake much of a 
claim in the fruit bonanza or the tobacco borassa of the 
early 'thirties. The value of the dominion's fruit exports 
more than doubled between 1926 and 1932, despite a fall in 
. 37 
pr~ces. Shipments .from Lyttelton increased very little 
as Canterbury lacked the sunshine of Central Otago, Nelson 
and Hawke's Bay. Most of the large new export trade 
consist.ed of apples bound for Britain and its foundations 
had been built up over a long period not least through the 
38 provision of a subsidy by the Reform Government. Reform 
was evidently prepared to compromise on its opposition to 
"artificially supported" industries when they involved 
sending more farm produce "Home". 
35. 1915, p.5461 Ibid., 1927, p.757. 
36. Actual production totals for most of these crops can be found in 
CSO, Agricultural and Pastoral Production, 1926-361 exports and coastal 
shipments from Lyttelton in CSO, Trade and Shipping, 1926-36. 
Convenient summaries of national exports can be found in NZYB, 1932, 
p.246; Ibid., 1937, 183-84. 
37. loc.cit. 
38. One penny per pound weight from 1924. Altered to 11/- and 7/- per case 
in 1927. Limited to new markets in 1935. Ibid., 1929, p.466; 
1932, p.384; 1936, p.345. 
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However, there was also substantial growth in the local 
production,and consumption of stone and citrus fruit during 
the early 'thirties. These crops were concentrated in 
Central Otago and North Auckland respectively. Much of the 
increased production of stone-fruit was canned, thus provid-
ing another industry employing labour in fruit-growing 
regions. The weight of fruit processed in this way increased 
from 6,177 cwt. in 1926-27 to 26,951 cwt. in 1932-33. 39 
During 1933 sales of New Zealand-grown citrus and stone-
fruit was further encouraged by an embargo on much of the 
import trade from Australia in these products. This was 
imposed in retaliation for the Australian embargo on some 
New Zealand products, including potatoes. 40 In regional 
economic terms the government was responding to the harm 
that the Australians were doing to Canterbury in a way which 
assisted economic activity in North Auckland and Central 
Otago. 
The popularity of tobacco-growing in New Zealand resulted 
from deye10pments during the depression. During 1931 the 
import duty on tobacco was increased by half, and there was 
a further increase in 1933. 41 These measures were aimed 
primarily at raising government revenue in order to "balance 
the budget II • In addition, there was a signi,ficant barrier 
created against imports from the United States - the major 
source of the leaf consumed in New Zealand - by the devaluation 
39. ~, 1937, p.744. 
40. Press, 28 December, 1932; 9, 20 March, 1933. 
41. ~, 1934, p.239. 
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of sterling. This carried the New Zealand pound down with 
it and would have continued to exert a protective influence 
until the latter half of 1933. 42 The area producing tobacco 
in the dominion swelled from twenty-eight acres in 1924 to 
over two thousand in 1933. 43 Canterbury's frosts ruled 
out any extensive local production, although some attempts 
were made to grow this crop in the New Brighton area as an 
unemployment relief project under the auspices of the 
R t d S ' I A 't' 44 e urne erVlcemen s SSOCla lon. 
The lack of any significant gold-mining in Canterbury 
also gave the province a comparative handicap in facing the 
depression. The price of gold was greatly increased by the 
unsettled world economic situation in the early 'thirties. 
Its rise was particularly strong following the decision to 
take sterling off the gold standard in 1931, and the American 
dollar's depreciation against gold during 1933. From.£4 8s. 
in 1930, the approximate average London price per ounce rose 
to £6 9s. in 1932, £8 12s in 1934, and £8 17s in 1935. It 
peaked at £9 5s lId in March, 1935. 45 This boom sparked 
the floatation of a large number of gold-mining companies 
in New Zealand. It also persuaded the Unemployment Board to 
subsidise parties of prospectors and the unemployment of 
gold-miners. In 1933-34 over £198,000 was provided by the 
42. C.P. Kind1eberger, The World in Depression, 1929-39, London, 1973, 
p.162, 179, 202, 217. 
43. NZYB, 1930, p.457; 1937, p.355. 
44. Press, 6 December, 1932.1 
45. ~, 1938, p.474. 
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Board under these schemes. 46 Private investment in mines 
and dredges was immense, and engendered considerable 
engineering work in gold-bearing regions. For example, 
eleven dredges were built in Westland, Otago, and Southland 
between 1933 and early 1936, and four more were then under 
t t ' 47 cons ruc ~on. 
powered vessels. 
Several were very large, electrically-
There was some increase in gold production 
during this period, but the major effect was to divert risk 
capital, subsidies, and enterprise towards the auriferous 
areas of the country. No doubt Canterbury benefited from 
some of the engineering work, and some returns would'have 
been remitted from miners, companies, and company employees. 
However, these would have been small in comparison to the 
vast investment of capital from Christchurch. Gold prospect-
ing and mining companies provided almost a third of the 
£3.9 million in shares registered in the city between 1931 
48 
and 1936. In 1933 the proportion was 61%. Not all the 
capital would have been raised in Canterbury, although the 
principal shareholders ,were usually local. Furthermore, 
Canterbury investors doubtless bought many shares in 
companies registered in other centres. 
46. Ibid, 1936, p.650-1. Some assistance was provided for an unsuccessful 
expedition to the headwaters of the Rakaia, where gold-mining had 
been carried out under extreme difficulties some decades earlier. 
Press, 17 March, 1933. 
47. NZYB, 1937, p.405. Some private operations were undertaken on the 
beaches near the mouth of the Rakaia. Sun, 25 May, 1932. 
48. Calculated from notices published in Mercantile Gazette, 1931-36, 
"Companies Registered". 
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The new electrical and motor technology also served on 
balance to draw development in the area of primary production 
away from Canterbury. In particular, it assisted the growth 
of farm production in the North Island, notably in the 
southern portion of Auckland Province. This region, embracing 
the Waikato, Hauraki Plains, and the Bay of Plenty, had by 
far the greatest expansion of dairy production in the 
'twenties and 'thirties. The production of butter in 
Auckland Province increased by 149% between 1926 and 1936; 
that of cheese by 31%. The respective increases in national 
production were 118% and 16%.49 Such growth depended to a 
very considerable extent on the spread of small internal 
combustion engines, milking machines, and motor lorries. 
The effect of these innovations can be seen most clearly 
in the production of butter. Butter is a more perishable 
commodity than cheese, requiring the rapid delivery of fresh 
cream or whole milk to the factory. Nevertheless, it was 
commanding a large British market which was growing more 
quickly than that for cheese. Mechanical cream-separators 
driven by oil, petrol and kerosene, appeared in New Zealand 
round the turn of the century. They gradually obviated the 
need for farmers to transport large quantities of milk to 
, t t' 50 bl' th t 'lk d separat1ng s a 1ons, ena 1ng em 0 m1 more cows an 
giving them more time for developmental work. 
The advent of the cream-collection lorry after the Great 
War then created much larger catchment areas for butter 
49. CSO, Factory Production, 1926; Factory and Building Production, 
1936, "Butter, Cheese and Condensed-milk Factories". 
50. W.M. Hamilton, The Dairy Industry in New Zealand, DSIR Bulletin 89, 
Wellington, 1944, p.39. 
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factories, contributing to an increase in average annual 
output fro~ 187 tons in 1920 to 1,260 tons in 1938. 51 
!.fotor transport thus;\ economies of scale in the industry, 
and the price advantage of butterfat production to many 
more farmers at a time of continuously falling prices for 
dairy products. Like the mechanical separator, it gave the 
farmer more working time. Of all the major dairying areas, 
Auckland had by far the highest expenditure on cream collec-
tion per ton of product. In 1927 dairy factories in the 
province spent £15,889 on cream and milk collection per 
52 
million pounds worth of product. Wellington was the next 
highest, with £11,986. Auckland's spectacular success in 
increasing dairy production rested firmly on rubber tyres. 
On the other hand, given the marginal nature of so 
many of the farms contributing to the dairy factories, it 
seems unlikely that they could have supported the extra 
labour required to increase production without cheap 
mechanical energy. With electric current available from 
Horahora, and later Arapuni, southern Auckland dairy-farmers 
were well-placed to take advantage of electricity. In 1927 
there were over three thousand electrical milking machines 
in Auckland province, and almost nine thousand in 1936. 53 
In addition oil fuels continued to spread mechanised milking 
beyond the power lines, and now such fuels were considerably 
51. Ibid, p.69-70. A similar rationalisation occurred in cheese 
production, with numbers of factories dropping from 402 in 1918 
to 326 in 1929, despite a big growth in output. 
52. CSO, Factory Production, 1927, "Butter, Cheese, and Condensed-milk 
Factories 11 • 
53. ~, 1927, D1, p.119; 1936, D1, p.111. 
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54 
cheaper. Auckland led the country during the mid-'twenties 
in the overall ratio of milking-machines to persons engaged 
in dairying, and its lead increased during the depression. 
In 1926 Auckland Province had one milking-machine to every 
l.69 persons employed in dairy-farming, as against the 
national average of 1.77. By 1936 the respective ratios 
55 
were 2.76 and 2.87. 
The new technology also assisted the disproportionate 
growth in lamb production in the North Island. Lamb exports 
from Auckland grew by 205% between 1926 and 1936, compared 
with a rise of 52% from Wellington and 27% from Lyttelton. 56 
As with dairying, motor transport in back-country areas 
contributed much to this rapid growth, carrying fertilizers, 
farm supplies, and sometimes stock. Moreover, the operation 
of back-blocks farms was in many cases partly financed by 
the daily production of a few cans of cream, mechanically 
separated, and deposited at the farm-gate for collection by 
lorry.57 This option was not open to many farmers in 
Canterbury, where the climate was generally dry and such 
collections few. 
The combination of lorry collections, milking-machines 
and mechanical cream-.separators permitted the expansion of 
certain sidelines to dairy-farming and thus helped to keep 
54. See above, ~able l.~, p.46. 
55. eso, Agricultural and Pastoral Production, 1926, p.50; 1936, p.41. 
Census, 1926, Vol.IX, p.34,36; 1936, Vol.X, p.23,26. 
56. eso, Trade and Shipping, 1926, "Details of Exports"; 1936, "Principal 
Exports by Ports". 
57. P.W. Smallfield, The Grasslands Revolution in New Zealand, Auckland, 
1970, p.106. 
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income flowing into dairying areas during the worst of the 
depression: The production of pork for export was the most 
. significant of these sidelines. It was based largely on 
the capacity to feed pigs with skimmed milk, the by-product 
of cream-separation. Prom under ninety thousand pounds 
during the high prices of 1924, the value of exports of 
frozen pork increased to ,£,467, 000 in 1930, and growing 
production kept the returns up during the early 'thirties. 
It reached £950,000 in 1933-34 and £1.3 million in 1934-35. 58 
Skimmed milk also formed the basis of an expanding export 
trade in frozen veal. The value of such exports grew from 
less than ten thousand pounds in the early 'twenties to over 
eleven times that amount in 1932-33. 59pinally, the motorised 
collection of "bobby calves" formed another new source of 
income for the dairy-farmer. 
Much of this vast growth in farm production in the North 
Island would have been impossible without the upsurge in the 
use of artificial fertilisers, especially superphosphate, 
during the same period. Such treatment enabled the climatic 
advantages of the north for pasture-growth to be realised to 
a far greater extent. By the beginning of 1935 over forty per 
cent of the 2.3 million acres of grassland in the Auckland 
Land District was being top-dressed with artificial fertiliser. 
This was up from a quarter in 1926. On the other hand, the 
usage of such fertiliser on the two million acres of grassland 
in the Canterbury Land District had actually decreased over 
this period. The proportion treated was under three per cent, 
58. NZYB, 1929, p.303; 1932, p.260; 1938, p.241-42. 
59. loa.cit .. 
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having peaked at around five per cent in 1929. 60 The 
spreading of this fertiliser was greatly facilitated by 
the advent of motor transport - for di'stribution to and on 
the farm. 6l 
Similarly, the success of fruit-growers in getting 
their often highly perishable products to railheads and ports 
appears to have owed much to the spread of motor transport. 
Certainly they owned and presumably used a. large number of 
lorries in comparison with other farming groups. A survey 
of the occupations of registered owners of lorries in 1933 
suggested that roughly one in five orchardists owned one. 
This compared with one in nine in the case of. dairy-farmers 
. 62 
and one in twelve for sheep-farmers. Simultaneously, 
electricity did much to assist the development of the fruit-
canning industry. It was generally based on small factories 
scattered in rural areas, and required an economical and 
readily available source of heat and power. 
Mechanisation had a roughly comparable effect on methods 
of production in Canterbury agriculture as it had on dairying 
elsewhere, although here the agent of change was mainly the 
tractor. However, in contrast to the situation in the butter-
trade, there was no expanding export market for its grain in 
a world flooded with Australian, North American, and Russian 
wheat. World production had grown rapidly to counteract the 
break in price in 1925-26. Moreover, since the war many large 
consuming nations had sought to encourage and protect their 
60. CSO, Agricultural and Pastoral Production, 1926, 1935, "Grassland 
Top-dressed" • 
61. Hamilton, op.cit., p.39. 
62. Census, 1936, Vol.X, p.60; AJHR, 1933, H40, p.34. 
2. Early electrical milking-machine in use at Flock 
House. 
(Weekly Press and Referee, 20 May, 1926.) 
3. Traffic delayed by the 1926 Waimakariri flood. Note 
milk or cream cans on the back of the lorries at left. 
A more common sight in North Island dairying country. 
(Weekly Press and Referee), 20 May 1926.) 
4. Transferring apples from motor to rail trucks in North 
Canterbury. Motor lorries facilitated the development 
of new orcharding areas. 
nveekly Press and Referee, 27 May , 1926). 

own growers for strategic reasons. Attempts by major 
selling countries to subsidise production and to control 
the market backfired, and enormous stockpiles developed. 
Australia furnished the most disastrous example of this 
120 
with the "success" of the Scullin Government's "Grow More 
Wheat" campaign in 1929-30. 63 From peak to trough, the 
world wheat price actually dropped further than that for 
64 
wool. Moreover, the mountains of grain stacked along 
Australian railway lines were generally harder and therefore 
more readily accepted by bakers than New Zealand wheat. 
Nevertheless, there was a marked growth in sales of 
locally produced wheat on the domestic market. A large part 
of this increase comprised Canterbury grain on consignment 
to the North Island. The volume of wheat shipped out of 
Lyttelton to other New Zealand ports increased from 13,877 
tons in· 1926 to 59,749 tons in 1930. The lowest volume in 
the 'thirties was 32,942 tons in 1932. 65 Significantly, 
the principal reason for this expansion was the imposition 
of sliding-scale duties on imported wheat in 1926. This 
gave effective protection to local growers as the world 
price plummeted. The measure was hotly disputed at the 
time, particularly in Auckland. However, pressure from the 
growers, who would have been largely government supporters, 
outweighed urban condemnation of "the dear breakfast table". 
Paradoxically, the Reform Party succeeded in stimulating a 
branch of the domestic farming industry by providing it with 
63. G.C. Bolton, A Fine Country to Starve In, Perth, 1972, p.89. 
64. Kindleberger, op.cit., p.88-94. 
65. CSO, Trade and Shipping, 1926-39, "Shipping by Ports". 
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the protection that it sought to deny to other local 
industries. Yet far more workers were engaged in manufac-
turing than in the wheat industry. Furthermore, there was 
no obvious alternative employment for them, whereas grain-
growers (typically mixed farmers) could normally switch to 
pastoral production for export. 
However, the local market for wheat was still very 
limited in comparison with the vast export market for dairy 
products. Consequently the mechanisation of Canterbury 
agriculture, unlike that of North Island dairying, tended 
to displace labour. This was probably a strong factor 
behind the high level of unemployment in the province and 
its major city. Such unemployment tended to entail lower 
incomes and therefore less money circulating in the local 
economy. It may also have contributed substantially to the 
emigration of young men from the area. 
New technology was affecting the market for various 
farm products as well as the capacity to produce them. For 
example, the new emphasis on motor power reduced the national 
demand for oats and oaten chaff, major forms of agricultural 
production in Canterbury. Shipments of oats to the North 
Island from Lyttelton averaged over eight thousand tons in 
, h ' h I h' t' 66 the 'twent1es, but less than half t at 1n t e t 1r 1es. 
More importantly, the influence of electric power and motor-
isation can be seen in the growing demand for butter, fruit 
and frozen meat in Britain. Electrical refrigerators in 
stores and butchers' shops, and refrigerated vans were 
66. Ibid, lac.cit. 
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extending the market for such perishable imports to thousands 
of suburbs and small towns. Even within New Zealand, many 
orchardists were greatly assisted by gate-sales to. weekend 
motorists and the improved distribution of fruit to town 
green-grocers. The latter represented one of the very few 
areas of small shopkeeping which expanded between 1926 and 
1936. Even in hard-hit Christchurch the number of men in 
that trade increased from 126 to 158. 67 In comparison, the 
numbers of storekeepers and butchers dropped by almost half, 
and there were substantial falls in numbers of drapers and 
chemists. 
It is also possible that the growth of the new synthetic 
fibre industry was having an effect on wool prices by the mid-
'thirties. Most forms of rayon did not compete directly 
with the mainstream woollen textiles such as worsted. However, 
between .1930 and 1935 there was a dramatic growth in the 
production of rayon staple, a form which could act as a 
replacement for wool. By 1936 world output of this synthetic 
fabric considerably exceeded the volume of wool being 
purchased by Japan, the sixth largest world market for the 
68 
natural fleece. Furthermore, the trend of consumption of 
various fibres in the New Zealand hosiery industry suggests 
that wool was being displace~ to a significant extent by the 
colder but cheaper and much more glamorous rayon. Between 
1930 and 1936 the weight of wool used dropped by almost fifty 
thousand pounds while that of "silk" (overwhelmingly artificial 
67. Census, 1926, Vo1.IX, p.56; 1936, Vo1.X, p.66. 
68. H.Hodson, ~lump and Recove;y, 1929-37, London, 1938, p.463. 
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silk) increased by thirty-three thousand pounds. 69 Cotton 
cons,umption in the industry also soared over this period. 
Taken together, these factors may have moderated the 
resurgence in wool prices from 1932. 
New Zealand produced few raw materials that could be 
used directly by the motor or electrical industries -
rubber, copper or aluminium. However, it was caught up in 
the international rush to produce tung oil, an important 
constituent in the hard polymer lacquers being used on motor 
cars. A thousand acres of the oil-bearing trees had been 
planted in New Zealand by 1932 and almost five thousand 
70 
acres by 1935. Towards the end of 1931 there were six 
companies involved in the industry competing for the few 
71 funds seeking productive on the Christchurch Stock Exchange. 
Unfortunately, climate confined the growing of the tung tree, 
and therefore the benefits of, spending on its establishment, 
almost exclusively to North Auckland. 
While primary production was extremely important to its 
economy, Christchurch had long been more than just an over-
grown farm-service centre. Considerable industrial activity 
had developed in the city during the eighteen-seventies and 
eighteen-eighties, based not only on primary processing and 
farm machinery but also the production of consumer goods for 
the wider New Zealand market. Christchurch became a leading 
centre for a diversity of industries. Although clearly the 
69. eso, Factory and Building Production, 1933-36, "Hosiery Factories". 
, 70. NZYB, 1936, p.334; 1938, p.385. 
71. Sun, 3 september, 1931. 
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third largest province in terms of population, Canterbury 
had the highest provincial production by value of 
agricultural and dairying machinery, flour, and biscuits 
and confectionery. It was second in the output of hosiery, 
footwear and woollen textiles. 72 Much of this production 
was sent to the North Island, and some to Australia. 73 
Between 1926 and 1936 the proportion of New Zealand 
manufacturing production coming from Canterbury declined 
significantly (Fig. 3.1). However, this decline was far 
less than the case with farm processing (Fig. 3.2) and the 
relationship between the two appears to have been far from 
simple. In particular, local manufacturing actually improved 
its comparative position in the late 'twenties l at a time 
when the trend in farm processing was strongly in the opposite 
direction. Indeed, if the fall in the value of electric 
current sold in Canterbury due to the drought of 1930 is 
discounted, the relative position of the province's manufac-
turing continued to improve until the 1930-31 year. Recovery 
appears to have had. more effect on Canterbury's share of 
manufacturing output than the slide into depression. 
The province's initial success during the late nine-
teenth century had been based partly on the local availability 
of raw materials such as wool and flour. However, it had 
72. CSO, Factory Production, 1926. The position of Canterbury's woollen 
textile industry cannot be calculated from the figures given and must 
be inferred from employment figures in Census, 1926, Vol. IX, p.34,36. 
73. B.L. Evans, A History of Farm Implements and Implement Firms in New 
Zealand, Feilding, 1956, p.89. Unfortunately almost all manufacturers 
were lumped under the heading "all other goods" in port statistics 
on coastal shipping. Such "other goods" represented almost half the 
total tonnage shipped from Lyttelton. CSO, Trade and Shipping, 1926-36. 
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rested primarily on the area's early settlement and the 
flat local topography which had facilitated rail and road 
communications and created the largest contiguous market 
in the country on the east coast of the South Island. 
The development of dairying and fat lamb farming in the 
North Island after 1882 gradually altered this balance. By 
1926 the population of Auckland Province alone was rivalling 
that of Canterbury and Otago-Southland combined. Thus 
manufacturing in the north of the North Island now had 
ready access to a market of similar size. Furthermore, the 
opening of the North Island Main Trunk Railway in 1908 
presented Auckland and Wellington manufacturers with even 
greater opportunities. Lacking both a railway to Picton 
and a rail ferry, South Island industrialists had to rely on 
comparatively expensive coastal shipping and its associated 
double-handling to reach what was now the country's largest 
market. In addition, Christchurch lacked easy road access 
to its port, which meant that even freight with a local 
origin or destination had to use rail transport. This involved 
further handling and was a particular handicap at a time when 
the flexibility and speed of motor lorries were making road 
transport increasingly attractive. Thus the city's factories 
had to cope with the disadvantages of a smaller horne market 
and higher transport costs in competing on northern markets. 
Such disadvantages became rapidly more significant in the 
depression's climate of shrinking profit margins, cost-cutting, 
and falling prices. 
The flourmilling and hosiery industries were two very 
diverse exceptions which tended to prove this rule. As a very 
necessary quid pro quo for the virtual exclusion of imported 
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wheat, New Zealand millers were granted protection from 
imported wpeat products. This favoured Canterbury's mills, 
which were processing the local product, removing waste and 
adding value, before sending it north. In 1932 the value 
of production from the province's grain mills was still 
around 92% of that of 1926, whereas the value of national 
production was just under 89%.74 From over ten thousand 
tons in 1926, the quantity of flour shipped out of Lyttelton 
to other New Zealand destinations increased virtually every 
year to a peak of twenty-three thousand tons in 1934. 
75 Comparable shipments of pollard and bran almost trebled. 
The New Zealand hosiery industry grew even more rapidly 
during the 'twenties as the price of artificial silk fell. 76 
In 1932 the value of national production was still 17% up 
on 1926, although it had fallen somewhat from the 1930 total. 
Canterbury's production had increased by 24% over this period 
77 
and constituted almost half New Zealand's output. The 
entrepreneurial skills of firms such as Lane, Walker, Rudkin, 
doubtless contributed much to this success. However, the low-
volume, high-value nature of hosiery must have assisted 
Canterbury firms to remain competitive on northern markets 
despite the problem of transport. 
74. CSO, Factory Production, 1926; Factory and Building production, 1932, 
"Grain Mills". 
75. CSO, Trade and Shipping, 1926-36, loc.cit. 
76. Between 1921 and 1928 the cost of viscose yarn dropped by approximately 
46%. D.C. Coleman, Courtaulds: An Economic and Social History, Vol.II, 
Oxford, 1969, p.289. The average cost of artificial silk imported 
into New Zealand fell by forty per cent between 1930 and 1935. 
CSO, Trade and shipping, 1930-35, value divided by volume. 
77. CSO, Factory Production, 1926; Factory and Building Production, 
1932, "Hosiery Factories". 
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On balance, the shift to new forms of energy in factories 
also tended to hasten the relative decline of Christchurch 
industry. During the early 'twenties the city had the 
advantage of lower electricity charges, based on cheap 
hydro-generation at Lake Coleridge. This edge was greatly 
reduced after 1926 with the development of water-power in 
the North Island, and the Labour city council's decision to 
reduce charges on domestic rather than industrial supply_ 
Between 1926 and 1930 the price of electricity sold to 
households was reduced by almost half while the average cost 
of current to electric motors declined by less than three 
per cent. Between 1930 and 1935 a further 27% was taken off 
the price of domestic electricity but only 16% off that for 
industry. In Auckland, on the other hand, industrial charges 
were lowered by 27% between 1930 and 1935, more than the 
reduction in domestic rates over the same period. In 
Wellington the cost of current to electric motors was reduced 
by 23%.78 
Furthermore, the flexibility of electricity reduced the 
degree of inertia operating against the development of new 
factories in new areas. Budding entrepreneurs could now 
have the benefits of machine production far from a railway 
or gasworks, and without paying for a boiler, a store of 
coal, or labour to stoke a furnace. A factory could be set 
up in a small workshop and transferred to a large, permanent 
building only if the venture proved successful. The advantage 
78. Christchurch City Council, MED Annual Reports, 1926-35; CSO, Local 
Authorities Handbook, 1931, 1936, Electricity-supply stations -
units sold, and Electricity-supply Stations - Revenue. Revenue 
divided by units to yield prices. 
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of the large, established enterprise was thus reduced, and 
competition could develop rapidly where it was favoured by 
other factors such as proximity to the market. 
The nature of most of the major industries associated 
with the new technology also militated against Christchurch. 
Most of their products, - including electrical home 
appliances, radios, batteries, motor cars - were consumer 
goods increasingly directed at a mass market. Factories 
producing them were therefore typically located as near as 
possible to the largest population centres. Moreover, these 
new industries tended to rely on imported components and 
raw materials, and therefore favoured those cities closest 
to the main international trade routes. Wellington's growing 
industrial suburbs of Petone and Lower Hutt appear to have 
benefited strongly from this trend with the development of 
the motor assembly industry which followed the establishment 
of tariff preference for unassembled "completely-knocked-down" 
imports in 1934. 79 In the short-term, this led to stagnation 
in the established and dispersed motor-body building industry, 
and an emphasis on centralised assembly. In 1926 both 
Christchurch and Auckland had more persons employed in build-
ing motor cars than Wellington. By 1936 Wellington had more 
such employees than the other two centres combined. SO A 
similar situation prevailed in fuel distribution. When the 
British Imperial (later Shell) Oil Company decided to 
construct two factories in New Zealand to produce tins filled 
79. In 1934 the duty on c.k.d. British cars was set at five per cent, 
as against fifteen per cent for British cars in other forms. On 
foreign cars the duties were to be fifty and sixty per cent 
respectively. NZYB, 1936, p.745. 
80. 1926, Vol.IX, p.37; 1936, Vo1.X, p.28. 
with motor spirit, it chose Wellington and Auckland as 
their locations. 8l 
13l 
Whether by direct investment or through franchises, 
decisions about the siting of such plants were generally made 
by the international companies which dominated the new 
technology throughout the world. Such companies as General 
Motors, Phillips, and I.C.I. did not usually harbour senti-
mental attachments to areas of far-away countries whose 
economic leadership lay in the past. And the harsh economic 
climate of the 'thirties did nothing to discourage such 
severe rationality. 
This point should not be overworked, however. Christ-
church held considerable attractions for at least two 
industries swelled by the new technology - the production 
of rubber tyres and the assembly of farm machinery. One 
major overseas tyre firm explored the possibility of setting 
up a factory in the city in 1931. The availability of land, 
water, coal, and cheap electricity were all in its favour, 
but the United government, already on the brink of coalition 
with the anti-tariff Reform Party, refused to provide the 
protection the company required. 82 On the other hand, the 
local operations of international farm machinery companies 
were already centred in Christchurch because the demand for 
their products was strongest in agricultural areas. 83 This 
81. star, 27 January, 1926. The hurgeoning cigarette manufacturing 
industry, which employed a hundred persons in 1926, and seven hundred 
in 1936, was similarly overwhelmingly based in the North Island, 
where the main market was, rather than in the South Island, where 
most of the local leaf was produced. Census, 1926, Vol.IX, p.37,39; 
1936, Vol.X, p.28,31. 
82. Star, 21 July, 17 August, 1931. 
83. Evans, ~~~_, p.69-101. 
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remained true during the 'twenties and 'thirties, when 
pastoral fa~ming was much less affected by on-farm mechanisa-
t ' h . 1 84 ~on t an agr~cu ture. Nevertheless, the growing impor-
tance of dairying machinery was gradually drawing interest 
northwards. For example, the Christchurch firm of Booth, 
Macdonald and Co., had constructed a new factory in Penrose 
in 1921. 85 In the year to March, 1926, 21% of New Zealand's 
production of dairying machinery by value came from Canterbury; 
in 1931-32 only 8%. Auckland had increased its share from 
65% to 81% over the same period. Furthermore, whereas 
dairying machinery had made up 18% of the value of farm 
equipment produced in New Zealand in 1925-26, it comprised 
23% in 1931-32. 86 
canterbury was also handicapped in attracting government 
spending. Such expenditure made an important contribution to 
economic activity in any region of New Zealand, and espec-
ially any city. It became particularly significant during 
the depression. Initially this was because the United 
Government raised it to record heights in an attempt to main-
tain economic activity until the crisis passed. Later its 
importance was sustained by the still greater decline in 
spending in the economy generally. 
Cuts in wages, salaries, and pensions, sinking-lid 
policies, and the drying up of state advances probably affected 
84. Smallfield, op.cit., p.120. 
85. Evans, op.cit., p.86. 
86. eso, Factory Production, 1926; Factory and Building Production, 
1932, "Agricultural and Dairying Machinery". 
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Christchurch to much the same 'extent as other cities outside 
Wellington. Government expenditure on public works, which 
constituted roughly a third of the total in 1926, was more 
unevenly distributed and unevenly cut. Canterbury had 
failed to attract its 'share' of the massive state spending 
on public works during the 'twenties, and the proportion 
devoted to the region declined further during the 'thirties. 
This trend led to the charge of excessive caution on the part 
of Canterbury local bodies in initiating projects which would 
tt t t b 'd' 87 a rac governmen su S1 1es. Certainly the Christchurch 
City Council, and through it th~ city's electors, deserve 
some blame for failing to attract a proportionate share of 
Unemployment Board subsidies during the 'thirties. 88 That 
failure would not have helped to promote economic activity 
within Christchurch when it was badly needed. However, power-
ful geographical and economic factors were generally much 
more influential than the failure of local politicians to 
pursue government money. 
For example, the early development of Canterbury and 
the flatness of its plains had encouraged the construction of 
a relatively extensive network of railways well before the 
Great War. Consequently most of the very considerable rail-
way building in the 'twenties took place in the North Island, 
in regions of rapid farm development. The state's "net 
investment ll in railways in the North Island increased by 
over seven million pounds between 1926 and 1936. On South 
87. Sun, 29 August, 1929. 
88. See Chapter 7. 
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Island lines it actually decreased. 89 
On the other hand, capital spending by central government 
in the 'twenties was growing fastest in the areas of land 
settlement, roading, hydro-generation and forestry.90 These 
were also the fields in which expenditure was best maintained 
during the early 'thirties as the government chose to cut 
spending least on those public works which it considered 
economically "reproductive"; 
•.. it will be my endeavour while looking to the 
ultimate reduction in the expenditure of capital-
moneys to see that such money as is available is 
spent ••• on undertakings that promise to return the 
greatest value to the state. More particularly is 
it desirable that the public works undertaken in 
the future are of a character to enable more people 
than at present to earn their living at rural 
occupations and in other spheres which will result 
in increased production. 9l 
Continued land development was partly related to the 
"physiocratic" attitudes of those in power, including Coates. 
However, it was also firmly based on the opportunities 
technology had created for export production in back-country 
areas. Canterbury had few areas with such opportunities 
and therefore it acquired few new roads. 
Much of the state's spending on roading during the 
interwar period was directed to strengthening and improving 
existing roads to withstand the impact of motor transport. 
A Main Highways Board was created in 1922 to subsidise such 
work with funds from motor licensing and some customs duties. 
Here Canterbury's flatness, low rainfall, and abundant supplies 
of shingle again counted against it. Although the Central 
89. AJHR, 1926, D4, p.16; 1936, D2, p.14. 
90. ~, 1919, p.762; 1930, p.640; 1936, p.438. 
9l. Statement by Rt.Hon. J.G.Coates, Minister of Public Works on 
2 November, 1931, ~, Vol. 230, p.636. 
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Canterbury district contributed almost twelve per cent of 
licence fees in 1926, it attracted only 1.3% of the Board's 
d ' 92 spen ~ng. This disproportion decreased during the late 
'twenties as the funds of the board were swelled by the 
imposition of petrol-tax. However, Central Canterbury's 
share fell again when it was most needed. In 1933 it was 
93 
only 3.9%. Moreover, despite the notoriety engendered 
by industrial trouble at certain of its local projects, 
including the Lewis Pass and Hilltop jobs, little of the 
Public Works Department's spending on roads came to 
Canterbury. 94 
Nor was the ~rovince well-suited to the construction of 
further hydro-electric power stations. After the virtual 
completion of the Lake Coleridge works in 1926, waterpower 
development moved north to the Waikato and south to the 
Waitaki. Finally, Canterbury lacked the vast areas of public 
"wasteland" that permitted large-scale plantings of exotic 
forests in southern Auckland during the 'twenties. stretches 
of light land were planted, notably at Balmoral, Hanmer, and 
Eyrewell, but most of the s,tate' s large investment in forestry 
flowed north. In 1935, for example, over eleven thousand 
acres were planted in the Kaingaroa Forest alone, as against 
95 260 acres in all Canterbury forests. 
92. ~, 1926, D1, p.130. 
93. AJHR, 1933, D1. p.137. 
94. AJHR, 1926-36, Dl, Appendix B, Annual Report on Public Works by 
the Engineer-in-chief. 
95. NZYB 1937, p.389. 
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In addition to the decline in local state spending on 
capital wo~ks, Canterbury, like most areas of the country 
outside Wellington, was tending to lose some of its share 
of general government spending. Many factors associated 
with the new technology assisted or compelled this centralis-
ation including improved national and international communica-
tions and central government involvement in roading, motor 
licensing, hydro-power, electricity transmission, and 
broadcasting. There was also a growing demand for the 
state to deal with the problem of technological unemployment 
and its consequences.. Between 1926 and 1936 the number of 
public service clerks in New Zealand grew by 33%, but the 
number in Wellington grew by 43%.96 The number of the much 
higher-paid clerical and professional Public Service Officers 
increased by 87%, with the capital's share going from 31% to 
53%. The same factors also applied to major private enter-
prises, particularly those which did substantial.business 
with government, and to the international firms growing with 
the new technology. It was increasingly advantageous to 
them to have the head office for the dominion in Wellington. 
Therefore the proportion of the country's banking, insurance, 
shipping, and general clerks in the capital all rose, along 
with its share of the draughtsmen, accountants, professional 
engineers, and typists. Furthermore, these occupations showed 
considerable growth overall, both in numbers and real income. 97 
96. Census, 1926, Vol.IX, p.SS-S9; 1936, Vol.X, p.64-67. 
97. Ibid., 1926, Vol.XI, p.18-31; 1936, Vol.XII, p.88-l04. 
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Most also had a large measure of security of tenure and 
earnings. The presence of a high proportion of the working 
population in such jobs helped to maintain economic activity 
in Wellington, to some degree at the expense of other 
regions, which received back a lower proportion of their 
tax-money. 
Thus both the depression. and the changes brought about 
by new technology tended to reduce Christchurch's share of 
activity in all the major sectors of the economy. They 
conspired with Canterbury's climate, topography, geology, 
location, and political status to hold the region back during 
the 'twenties and 'thirties. However, the region still 
contained a high proportion of the country's industry and a 
large section of its population. The productive capacity 
existed to take advantage of the Labour government's imposi-
tion of strict import controls. Moreover, the long-term 
growth of state spending on health, education, and social 
welfare must have redressed the balance somewhat in 
Canterbury's favour. To the degree that the emphasis in 
government expenditure shifted from economic development 
towards spending on, people, Christchurch stood to gain. 
The city and its region were to suffer disproportionately 
again during the depressed conditions of the late nineteen-
seventies and early nineteen-eighties. Once again, 
Christchurch would find itself handicapped in an atmosphere 
of heightened competition, engendered by international 
crisis and slow growth in the domestic market. By then the 
main consumer market was to be even more heavily concentrated 
on the northern half of the North Island, and Wellington's 
civil service even larger. Similarly, the areas of major 
economic expansion were again elsewhere, in Taranaki, 
Waikato, and the Bay of Plenty. Compounding this would 
be a slow movement in government policy towards reduced 
real spending on social services, more international 
competition for local industry, and less subsidisation of 
state services. Both technological change and economic 
crises have tended to treat Christchurch harshly during 
the twentieth century. 
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CHAPTE R FOUR 
WORK 
Work and the lack of work were recurrent themes of the 
inter-war period in New Zealand as in Europe and America. 
IIUnemployed workers ll demanded IIwork not doles ll and 
politicians of various hues broadly concurred with slogans 
of their own - IIno pay without work ll and IIhe that will not 
1 
work, neither shall he eat ll • While the highest levels 
of joblessness were clearly due to the international economic 
crisis, the persistent nature of heavy unemployment bet.ween 
the wars betrays more fundamental changes. 
In some areas of production, notably in factories, 
labour-saving electrical and motor technology had become 
widespread since 1918. In others, particularly transport 
and agriculture, the decade 1926-36 was to see great innova-
tions. But in either case this period was clearly a time 
of adjustment to change in the nature, and level of employ-
mente At the outset the institutions available to assist 
1. The Labour Mayor of Christchurch, J.K. Archer,used this quotation in 
criticising able-bodied male applicants for charitable aid who 
refused to work in return for it. Press, 10 September, 1930. 
Bob Semple, Labour's Minister o~ Public Works, employed the same 
expression when attacking militant relief workers who demanded better 
wages. Star-Sun, 15 January, 1936. A week later he stated that 
Men who are physically capable of working but who refuse to 
work have no claim on the nation. In some countries this type 
of individual is put into a concentration camp where he can 
infect nobody but himself. A taste of that in this country 
would not do them any harm. Star-Sun, 23 January, 1936. 
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the casualties of this change were inadequate and degrading. 
It was the, mass unemployment of the early 'thirties which 
forced the creation of more socially satisfactory and 
generous assistance. Attempts to deal with depression 
unemployment were to serve as vehicles through which the 
victims of technological change were extended more humane 
treatment. 
By 1926 electricity was powering over ninety ,per cent 
of factory engines in use in Canterbury, and was providing 
almost sixty-nine per cent of the available horsepower 
(Fig. 4.1). Four years earlier it had supplied fifty-two 
per cent of the power; 
eighty-three per cent. 
five years later it was to provide 
Most of this extremely rapid 
growth took place at the expense of competing forms of 
mechanical power. However, as the increase in the number 
of factory engines indicates, electricity also fueled a 
substantial growth in overall factory mechanisation." The 
versatility and small size of the electric motor enabled 
it to be used in a variety of oper~tions which had 'been 
performed manually previously. Between 1926 and 1936 the 
rise in factory unemployment in Canterbury was less than 
, four per cent, compared with an increase in the number of 
factory engines of around sixty-eight per cent (Fig. 4.2). 
Few local industries were unaffected by electric power. 
Its influence proved particularly strong in the metal trades, 
with the speeding up of a wide range of drilling, cutting, 
grinding, and finishing operations, the increasing use of 
welding and electroplating, and the appearance of electric 
furnaces. The average number of electric motors being 
used in engineering works in Canterbury rose from 2.5 in 
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Source: Census and Statistics Office, Factory Production, 
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1923 to 4.4 in 1929. 2 It had reached 5.7 by 1932. Other 
forms of motor, never numerous, had disappeared by that 
time. Whereas the number of employees grew by less than a 
third between 1923 and 1932, the number of motors in use 
had trebled. The burgeoning business of motor and cycle 
assembly and repair, typically scattered in a large number 
of small workshops, also turned extensively to electric 
motors. Even the local producers of agricultural and 
dairying machinery increased the number of motors in use 
in their works from under one per establishment in 1923 to 
over three in 1932. Motors in use had increased by a quarter 
over this period, while the number of employees had decreased 
by over sixty per cent. Nationally the number of men 
employed as welders or oxy-acetylene cutters grew from 
106 in 1926 to 358 in 1936. 3 Some of these would have been 
engaged in the building and construction sector. The number 
of workers giving their occupation as "electroplater" almost 
doubled over the same period. 
The largest factory in Christchurch, the Addington 
Railway Workshop, was not included in the official factory 
statistics. Its conversion from gas and steam to electric 
and motor power was comparatively late for an engineering 
works, and was undertaken as part of a reorganisation of 
4 
railway workshops throughout the country. The decision 
2. Unless otherwise stated, these and following figures on industries 
are calculated from statistics for individual industry groups in 
CSO, Factory Production, 1923-31, and Factory and Building Production, 
1932. 
3. Census, 1926, Vol.9, p.45; 1936, Vol.IO, p.41. 
4. The main thrust of the reorganisation in the South Island was to 
concentrate construction and heavy repairs of locomotives on the 
Dunedin (Hillside) works while Addington specialised in the 
construction of cars and wagons. AJHR, 1926, D2, p.v. 
to electrify the whole complex was made in 1925, part way 
through the reorganisation, and was based on the rapid 
cheapening of hydro-electric power, a trend by then very 
evident. 5 A hundred and twenty-five electrical machines 
were ins.talled over the next three years, including 
"planning-machines, wheel lathes, slotters, grinders, 
welders, and shop trucks". 6 Two electric furnaces were 
also purchased EO that the railways could recycle some of 
its considerable supply of scrap iron. By 1930 the work-
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shop's electrical machinery was utilising 1,860 horsepower, 
about a twelfth of the capacity available in Canterbury 
factories. 7 The installation of electric lighting through-
out the complex also enhanced efficiency, as did the use 
of motor cranes and trucks to improve the movement of 
materials. Overall, the number of days required to over-
haul a locomotive was reduced from fifty-five to thirty-
eight between 1925 and 1928. 8 As a result of this increased 
efficiency, the number of workers employed at Addington 
was dropping long before the severe downturn in rail usage 
during the depression. Even within the first year of 
electrification and motorisation, 1925-26, the number of 
workshops employees was reduced by 89 through "natural 
attrition".9 At the same time, there was a considerable 
disruption to the lives of many local workers who were 
5. ~, 1929, D2, p.x1i. 
6. AJHR, 1926, D2, p.xiv. 
7. AJHR, 1930, D2, p.x1v. 
8. ~, 1928, D2, p.x. 
9. AJHR, 1927, D2, p.xi. 
forced to transfer to Dunedin as part of the reorganisa-
t . 10 ~on. 
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Amongst the woodworking trades, furniture-making 
demonstrated very clearly the inroads that light electrical 
machinery could make into a highly skilled area of produc-
tion. Despite a high rate of growth during the housing 
boom of the early to middl~ years of the 'twenties, the 
number of employees in the furniture-making industry in 
Canterbury decreased by a fifth between 1923 and 1932. Yet 
the number of motors in use increased by 121% over that 
period. Most of these machines were quite small - the 
amount of horsepower in use grew by only thirty per cent. 
Even in the timber resawing and dressing, and the sash and 
door manufacturing industries, the number of electrical 
motors in use doubled between 1923 and 1932 while the 
number of employees was halved. Despite the availability 
of waste wood as fuel., the number of steam engines in use 
dropped from thirteen to five over the same period. 
Amongst the machines utilising the advantages of electricity 
was the Elliot "Woodworker" which, it was claimed, "cross-
cuts, rips, mitres, bores, trenches, grooves, runs, rebates 
-II 
sills, mullions, sash stuff, mouldings etc". With the 
advent of such machines it is not surprising that the 
number of wood machinists and "joinery workers" in·New Zealand 
increased between 1926 and 1936 whereas the numbers of the 
highly skilled cabinetmakers and joiners decreased, in line 
10. In June, 1927, it was believed that up to three hundred men - about 
a third of the Addington workforce - would have to move. Star, 
27 June, 1927. Employees were still being transferred in 1931 and 
the order to shift may have contributed to the suicide of one of 
them in that year. star, 12 December, 1931. 
11. Times, 23 September, 1926. 
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with the general contraction in the industry.12 
Local textile and clothing manufacture was also greatly 
affected by the spread of electrical machinery. The number 
of wage-earning employees per machine in South Island 
woollen mills dropped by 22% between 1925 and 1929, the 
peak year for employment and production. The number of 
workers fell thereafter with the fall in output, but the 
number of machines continued to increase. The .electrical 
sewing machine was revolutionising clothing manufacture in 
the 'twenties, permitting more people to purchase a wide 
range of cheap clothes. The number of wage-earners in 
Canterbury clothing factories, typically workshops attached 
to (and above) retail outlets such as Ballantyne's and 
Beath's, increased by 11.5% between 1926 and 1929. Yet 
production by volume grew by between 47% for suits and 
528% for trousers. A rapidly growing newcomer to the 
local rag trade, Millers, was responsible for much of this 
expansion. Catering primarily for the mass market and for 
working people, this firm was to the fore in taking advan-
tage of electrical machinery. In the depths of the 
depression it expanded rapidly, applying "mass production 
principles" and utilising not only electrical sewing 
machines, but electric cutters and an electric steam iron 
patented and manufactured in Christchurch. 13 Boot and 
shoe manufacturing was facing difficulties in the late 
'twenties in New Zealand, principally due to a substantial 
increase in imports. Nevertheless, mechanisation appears 
12. Census, 1926, Vo1.9, p.46; 1936, Vo1.10, p.44. 
13. Star, 5 March, 1932. 
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to have brought about some saving in labour. The employment 
of wage-ea~ners in Canterbury footwear factories dropped 
by 14$ between 1926 and 1930, but production declined by 
less than six per cent. The rapidly growing hosiery 
industry was better placed financially to install new 
machinery. The number of mot0rs per establishment in 
Canterbury increased from just over one in 1923 to over 
four in 1932. The number of electrical motors in use 
increased from eighteen to thirty-five between 1929 and 
1932. 
Food and beverage industries were similarly affected. 
Large Christchurch bakeries such as Boon's and Stacey and 
Hawker's based their advertising on the wide range of 
electric mixing, baking, slicing and wrapping machinery 
employed initheir factories. An image of modern and 
hygienic mass production was considered more of an asset 
than one of cottage homeliness. Even so, a reputation for 
freshness was considered essential, and the large bakeries 
were able to point to their new fleets of motor vans -
solid competition to the horse and cart of the traditional 
14 
small producer. Unlike the decentralised breadmaking 
industry, local biscuit and confectionary production was 
dominated by a single large concern, that of Aulsebrook's. 
Consequently it was rather more mechanised than other forms 
of manufacturing by 1923 with an average of six motors per 
establishment. By that time Aulsebrook's was also featuring 
its use of electrical machinery in advertising. lS Neverthe-
14. For advertisements featuring electrical machinery and/or motor 
delivery vans, see star, 6 February, 1926; 9 February, 1929; 
12 April, 10, 17 May, 1930. 
15. Weekly Press and Referee, 25 July, 1923. 
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less, the increase in the use of motors to 1932 was still 
impressive with an average of over fourteen per establish-
ment, all of them electric. The well-established local 
brewing and malting industry suffered considerably from 
the long-term secular trend in per capita consumption' of 
alcohol, the short-term fall in sales due to the depression 
and its associated rise in taxation on beer, and increased 
competition in the North Island. However, there was 
a significant increase in the number of engines in use per 
establishment, from 3.6 in 1923 to 7.7 in 1932. The propor-
tion of those engines which were powered by electricity 
increased from 80% to 98%. 
Printing, a much larger industry in Canterbury, was 
expanding rapidly with the growth of advertising. Between 
1923 and 1932 the volume of paper used by printing works 
in the province increased by 15% in the case of job paper 
and 26% in that of newsprint. The number of motors in use 
per establishment rose from 3.9 to 6.7. Consequently there 
was a decline in the number of wage-earners employed 
within the local printing works despite the buoyancy of the 
industry over the period. The number of typesetting 
machines rose by a quarter, while the number of operatives 
for each of them dropped by over a quarter between 1923 and 
1929. The trend continued into the 'thirties with the Star 
installing a large new "push-button" rotary press in 193116 
and the Press adopting similar equipment in its new printing 
house, opened in early 1933. 17 
16. Star,11 August, 1931. 
17. Press, 31 March, 1983. 
The more heavily concentrated and even larger meat 
freezing and preserving industry was still a substantial 
user of steam power in 1923. Its early establishment in 
1 
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the form of very.large factories by New Zealand standards, 
its vast consumption of heat, and the usual proximity of 
railway lines all inclined the industry to rely on steam. 
In 1923 there were sixty steam-engines in operation in 
freezing works in the upper half of the South Island, 
compared with 258 electric motors. By 1932 the number of 
steam engines had shrunk to twenty-nine and the number of 
electr~c motors had risen to 372. During the following 
year, in the very depths of the depression, the number of 
electrical engines in use in New Zealand freezing-works 
increased from l594 to 1711, a larger increase than in any 
year during the 'twenties. The main reason for so 
extensive a technological change at such an inauspicious 
time was the determination of the meat companies to impose 
a substantial wage-cut on freezing workers with the minimum 
of interruption to processing. The same means was chosen 
as in a similar dispute during the depression of 1922; the 
adoption of a "one man, one cut" system to replace solo 
butchers. This system required little training and there-
fore permitted large numbers of non-union workers - men from 
farming families, casual labourers and the unemployed - to 
be drafted into the works. 18 In some cases freezing-works 
labourers, who generally far outnumbered the butchers, were 
19 
won over by the opportunity to gain higher wages. However, 
18. Sun, 5 January, 1933. 
19. Statement by the local secretary of the Freezi.ng Workers' Union, 
H. Revell, ~, 12 April, 1933. 
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unlike the situation a decade earlier, the meat companies 
appear to have decided on a permanent change in technique 
and chains were installed at Islington, Belfast and Kaiapoi. 
Their use was not new - Henry Ford claimed that he developed 
the engineering assembly-line after viewing chain-processing 
in Chicago meatworks. 20 Nor was it necessarily dependent 
on electric power. However, electricity si~plified the 
installation of the new system, providing an easily aug-
mented power supply, requiring no extensive networks of 
shafts and belts, and giving "push-button" control. The 
latter feature was particularly useful until the new batch 
of workers was trained and management got to understand 
the new system. 
Employees in the building and construction industries 
were affected rather later by electrical and oil machinery 
than their counterparts in factories. On the other hand, 
the effect was more dramatic because construction methods 
were traditionally very labour-intensive. Very large jobs 
sometimes made use of a steam shovel or a crane, and stearn 
rollers, lorries, and small locomotives were occasionally 
employed. But the pick, the "banjo" shovel, the hod, the 
wheelbarrow, and the horse-drawn dray were far more typical 
of construction work in New Zealand in the early 'twenties. 
Steam machinery was generally too heavy and powerful to be 
used economically on most jobs, while stearn, gas and 
electrical machinery tended to present problems of fuel 
20. J. Bright, "The Development of Automation", in M. Kranzberg and 
C. pursell, Technolo2Y in Western Civilisation, Vol.2: Technology 
in the Twentieth Century, New York, 1967, p.648. 
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supply. However, as electricity supply networks spread, 
the advantages of small electrical motors became increas-
ingly evident. Mobile and versatile, they were adopted 
for concrete mixers, welders, saw-benches, wood-working 
machines, pumps, and winches. Electric floor-sanding 
machines were advertised as "the greatest labour savers 
offered to the building trade in recent years".21 The 
even greater displacement of labour involved in the 
adoption of concrete mixers can be gauged from a description 
of the former system as it operated in 1922: 
I soon found out what lithe board ll was: a wooden 
platform about eight feet wide and about twenty 
feet long. Eight of us mounted the board, four 
on each side facing each other. A chain of men, 
pushing steel barrows loaded with sand and 
shingle, moved towards us. 
The first two blokes dumped their loads at our 
feet, another added cement, then my mate said, 
"Right-oh, Scotty. Off we go - and watch me!" 
We turned the heap towards the next pair, who 
in turn passed it to the next two. Then water 
was added from a hose, and the last two mixed 
it once more and shovelled it into the waiting 
barrows. 22 
The number of electric motors used in building and 
construction in Canterbury grew at a faster rate than the 
number in factories during the late 'twenties (Fig. 4.3). 
The virtual collapse of building activity during the early 
'thirties was reflected in the numbers of machines in use, 
which dropped to a low-point of 186 in 1933. But this 
was still far above the total for 1925-26, a boom year for 
local builders, with a turnover four-and-a-half times that 
of 1932-33. The overwhelming majority of the new machines 
21. Weekly Press and Referee, 7 June, 1923. 
22. J. Forsyth, "My First Job in New Zealand", in J. Henderson (Ed.), 
Our Open Country, Wellington, 1971, p.109. 
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FIG. 4.3: ENGINES IN USE IN THE CANTERBURY BUILDING 
INDUSTRY, 1926-36 
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were powered by electricity, although mobile oil engines 
had some a~tractions (Table 4.1). 
TABLE 4.1: NUMBERS OF MACHINES IN USE IN BUILDING AND 
CONSTRUCTION IN CANTERBURY 
1926 1929 1932 1935 
Electric 114 245 187 196 
Oil 14 23 20 16 
Gas 9 8 2 
Steam 2 2 1 
Source: Census and Statistics Office, Factory Production 
1926, 1929; Factory and Building Production, 
1932, 1935. 
The use of cranes, hoists and lifts also resulted in 
a great saving on labour. Ferro-concrete methods of 
construction had been in use in Christchurch since 1905, 
. . 11 b ttl . 1 1 b 'ld' 23 pr1nc1pa y, u no exc US1ve y, on arge U1 1ngs. 
They allowed contractors to dispense with large numbers of 
bricklayers and labourers to keep them supplied with 
6 
0 
materials - "no more big mortar-board gangs, or processions 
24 
of men with hods running up and down ladders". Neverthe-
less, it remained common practice in the mid-'twenties for 
23. Press, 31 March, 1983. 
24. Column by E.H. Howard, Labour M.P. for Christchurch South, Star, 
15 June, 1930. Howard was also well aware of the influence of 
new technology on employment in other fields: 
Go into any of our big factories where doors and sashes and tables 
and chairs are made. Watch the machines shape, make, glue and 
fit together any piece of furniture, be it door, sash, or drawer. 
It is only the other day that our cabinet-makers were doing the 
work those wonderful machines are doing today ••• Think of the 
number of stokers displaced. Then each of our factories had 
steam-driven plants, now Lake Coleridge supplies the power. 
Star, 15 February, 1930. 
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wet concrete to be pushed in wheelbarrows along inclined 
planks to, the top of buildings under construction. A 
spiral walkway of this type was used during the erection 
of St. Elmo Courts in 1929. 25 This block of flats, now 
overshadowed by the batholithic post office building and 
the new police station, was regarded as something of a 
local skyscraper when first completed. Five years later 
a crane was being used to carry concrete to the top of 
the State Fire Office during its construction. 26 At the 
end of the same year, the works foreman on the construction 
of the Avon Cinema noted the job would take four months 
whereas only "a few years ago it would have taken twelve". 
A large concrete mixer and electric hoist were being 
used. 27 In 1929 there were 245 mechanical cranes in use 
in New Zealand. 28 There were 303 in use in 1933 and 364 
in 1935. 29 The totals of mechanical hoists were 1209, 
1306, and 1352 respectively in those years. 
The building and construction activity covered by the 
official statistics did not include the work of central 
/ 
or local authorites. Here the certainly very substantial 
and much-publicised mechanisation programme of the first 
Labour Government has tended to mask the considerable degree 
to which machines had already replaced men on local and 
national public works since the Great War. 
25. Star, 9 April, 1930. The late Norman Albert Greenaway, who witnessed 
the work as a boy, described the method of construction in conversa-
tion with the author during 1978. 
26. Times, 28 July, 1934; Press, 20 September, 1935. 
27. Sun, 20 December, 1934. 
28. NZYB, 1930, p.973. 
29. NZYB, 1936, p.686. 
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TABLE 4.2: CHRISTCHURCH CITY WORKS DEPARTMENT 
MACHINERY 
1926 1932 1926 1.932 
- -
Horses 67 47 Electric trucks 6 7 
Drays 65 53 Petrol trucks 6 23 
Watering carts 7 0 Tractors 1 
Traction engines 1 0 Graders 0 
Steam lorries 1 0 Road sweepers 0 
Steam rollers 4 5 Street flushers 0 
Diesel rollers 0 1 Bitumen sprayers 0 
Petrol rollers 0 3 Petrol mowers 0 
Source: Christchurch City Council, City Engineer's Reports, 1926, 1932. 
The Christchurch City Council, for example, greatly 
augmented its inventory of motorised machinery between 1926 
and 1932 (Table 4.2). The new acquisitions were partly a 
response to opportunities presented to speed existing works 
and partly an attempt to cope with problems created by the 
I 
new technology. For example, the council was now able to 
sweep its sealed roads mechanically, but the damage done to 
them by motor vehicles meant that most of the existing 
surfaces had to be remade. Even then, constant repatching 
was often necessary in heavy traffic areas such as Moorhouse 
Avenue, which served the railway yards and'associated stores. 
The fact that methods for producing road surfaces capable of 
withstanding heavy motor traffic were still in an early stage 
of development added to the problem. However, the techniques 
adopted generally permitted a saving on labour, and in fact 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
necessitated heavy machinery such as rollers rather than gangs' 
of men tamping down metal. In a number of ways the new 
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technology reduced dramatically the very large labour-cost 
which would have been entailed in providing its infrastructure 
by traditional methods. For example, motor lorries permitted 
the establishment of large hot-mix bitumen plants which could 
supply roadworks over a radius of up to fifteen miles on the 
Canterbury Plains. 30 The Christchurch City Council installed 
a similar plant in 1929. 31 It also purchased a large 
concrete mixer which throughout the early 'thirties "considerably 
expedited the concrete paving prograrnrne, ... without this machine 
it would have been found impossible to lay the large yardage".32 
In the case of the City Council, change was hastened by 
a dynamic City Engineer, A.R. Galbraith, who was appointed 
in'1926. His exhaustive annual reports, which dwarfed those 
of his predecessor and of other departments, placed great 
emphasis on mechanisation. His first report noted the 
arrival of a "Pioneer" bitumen sprayer - "entirely satisfac-
tory in use both for tar and for bitumen, and considerably 
reduces the labour on surfacing roads".33 There was also 
praise for the new sweeper -
until recently this work was done by two horse 
brooms attached to the Fordson tractor; men with 
brooms followed brushing the sweepings into heaps, 
which were in turn collected by drays ... For the 
past two months the work has been done by the new 
"Karrier" sweeper which sprinkles the road with 
water, sweeps and picks up the rubbish automatically 
and only one man, the driver, is required. 34 
In 1929 a set of hand-held kerosene weed-burners was purchased 
to replace the Council's teams of weed-chippers and their 
drays.35 A "street flusher and gully emptier" also arrived 
30. Weekly Press, 29 July, 1926. 
31. Christchurch City Council, City Engineer's Report, 1933, p.6l. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
Ibid, 
Ibid, 
Ibid, 
P,?,i,d. 
1929, p.54. 
1926, p.43. 
p.53. 
19.29 ; p.S9. 
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as part of the Engineer's campaign to displace the City's 
brush and shovel brigade. 36 Between relatively sympathetic 
reflections on the problem of unemployment amongst the 
unskilled and calls for more office staff, Galbraith 
regularly pointed to the amount spent on wages for the 
Council's thirty-seven gutter sweepers and urged their 
37 
redundancy. 
Other Christchurch local bodies also mechanised much 
of their work during the late 'twenties and early 'thirties. 
Both the Drainage Board and its contractors invested heavily 
in new machinery during the massive expansion of the sewerage 
system carried out between 1926 and 1932. In April 1927, a 
local newspaper reported that 
as a result of the adoption of modern methods by 
the contractors, the work of extending the sewers 
in the Christchurch Drainage Board's district has 
been considerably expedited during the past few 
months, and those who took part in an inspection 
of the Board's works were greatly impressed by 
the extent to which mechanical appliances had 
replaced manual 1abour. 38 
Amongst the equipment noted were a drag-line; a caterpillar 
trench-digger, a tractor-drawn scoop for filling trenches, 
three pneumatic soi1-rammers, a pneumatic pile-driver, and a 
large, tracked excavator. All these machines were petro1-
driven. The report noted that mechanisation had brought keen 
competition between contractors, and "a considerable saving 
to ratepayers". One board member boasted that "last year 
{weI were in the pick-and-shove1 age, and now [we] are in the 
mechanical age". At the same time, the increased use of 
36. Ibid., p.45,59. 
37. Ibid., 1926, p.55; 1927, p.53; 1928, p.55; 1932, p.54; 1934, p.60. 
38. Star, 11 April, 1927. 
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tractors and electric pumps at the sewerage farm permitted 
a substantial rise in the scale of operations without any 
great increase in the number of labourers on the staff. 39 
Similarly, the Tramways Board claimed in 1928 to have 
"doubled the efficiency"of relaying tracks and resurfacing 
roadway by using "up-to--date machinery and modern methods".4Q 
As with the City Council, the use of bitumen and concrete 
in new roading removed the need for street watering. Such 
roadmaking methods were applied earlier by the Waimairi 
County Council, which laid the first concrete road in the 
South Island and was consequently labelled "progressive 
41 Waimairi" by some newspapers. The Waimakariri River 
Trust also undertook a substantial extension of its works 
in the late 'twenties using much motorised machinery.42 
This included draglines, crawler tractors, and lorries, 
claimed to be doing the work of many more horse scoops and 
drays at a much greater speed. A netting machine was also 
said to be in use. 
The public works carried out by central government 
agencies were also extensively mechanised before 1932, with 
the items most favoured including lorries, graders, cement 
mixers, and bitumen sprayers. 43 There were comparatively 
39. Christchurch Drainage Board, Minutes, 20 May, 1924; 17 May, 1927. 
40. star, 28 September, 1927. 
41. Sun, 21 March, 1928; Press, 21 May, 1930. 
42. Star, 3 May, 1930. 
43. Central government invested in new machinery for public works in three 
ways: through the Public Works Department, the Main Highways Board, 
and a hire-purchase scheme operated by the board for local bodies. 
Up to 1936 most of the machinery purchased in these ways was itemised. 
in AJHR, Dl. Each list was followed by a form of "etcetera". In 1937 
the Public Works Department list became one long etcetera - "over one 
thousand items" at "approximately £500,000", AJHR, 1937, Dl, p.xxxv. 
The highest number of items in any previous year had been over 200 
in 1930. 
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few state public works in progress in the Canterbury region 
between 192~ and 1936, but modern methods were increasingly 
used on those that were. Work on the expansion of the 
Middleton Rail Yards was criticised initially for its use 
.of horse-drawn implements and manual labour for earth-
. 44 
mov~ng. However, machinery was soon introduced. 45 In 
its annual reports to Parliament in 1929 and 1930 the Public 
Works Department illustrated its rapid new roadmaking 
techniques with photographs of work near Christchurch on the 
Akaroa, Dunedin, and Blenheim highways.46 The bitumen-
concrete surfaces laid on these roads required much less 
maintenance than the shingle they replaced. Further afield, 
but employing many Christchurch men, work on the South Island 
Main Trunk Railway involved a considerable use of motor 
47 
machinery by the time it ceased in October, 1931. In 
addition to the bevy of steam locomotives and steam shovels 
usual on such railway works, there were a large number of 
diesel and petrol machines including a drag-line, excavator, 
48 tractor scoop, caterpillar tractors and "power-shovels". 
With the help of this equipment the time taken on one major 
cutting was reduced from the planned fifteen months to nine 
months. Far to the south, on the boundary between Canterbury 
and Otago, work on the Waitaki Hydro Scheme was extensively 
mechanised. In 1930, a year after construction had started, 
49 
electrical machines on the site were rated at 770 horsepower, 
44. Star, 14 April, 1926. 
45. 30 September, 1926. 
46. AJHR, 1929, 01, p.195-96 i 1930, 01, p.182-84. 
47. 1931: , 01, p.34. 
48. ~, 1932, 01, p.3!. 
49. ~, 1930, 01, p.56. 
5. Excavator on Christchurch Drainage Board's works. 
(Weekly Press and Referee, 28 September, 1927.) 
6. Concrete-mixer on Christchurch City Council roadworks. 
(Weekly Press and Referee, 14 July, 1927.) 
7. Large-scale bitumen plant in Canterbury. Note the 
fleet of tip-trucks which could carry the hot-mix up 
to fifteen miles, making a larger labour-efficient 
plant economic. 
(Weekly Press and Referee, 29 July, 1926.) 
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roughly equivalent to that of all the building and 
construction machinery in Canterbury. By 1932 the list 
of machines employed included "electrical pumps, air 
compressors, inclined tramways; cement mixers, machine 
tools, drills, etc.,,50 
161 
Management on this and other works became increasingly 
schizophrenic as the depression and government policies put 
more emphasis on public works as relief work. In 1931 the 
PWD was using "as little machinery as possible" from its 
impressive catalogue in constructing the tail race. 51 
The whole of the extensive plant on the works 
is now well supplied with power and is working 
with great efficiency. To assist towards the 
relief of unemployment, however, work, where 
possible, is being carried out by manual labour 
rather than by mechanical means, wherever such 
a course can be ~conomically justified". 
The PWD went further in 1932 -
manual labour is being utilised where practical 
and reasonably economic, in preference to 
excavating machinery.52 
Even with this policy and less than half the original work-
force, the job took only five years instead of the projected 
three. with modern machinery, public works were clearly 
not the massive users of unskilled labour they once had 
been. 
Problems of 'power supply delayed the spread of electrical 
machinery in farming in Canterbury even more than in the 
building and construction industry. However, as the multitude 
of power supply authorities created in the early 'twenties 
established their networks, small electric motors were 
50. AJHR, 1932, D1, p.44. 
51. AJHR, 1931, D1, p.46. 
52. AJHR, 1932, D1, p.44. 
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installed on farms for a wide range of jobs. These included 
cream-separating, shearing, cutting posts and firewood, 
pumping household and stock water, and chaff-cutting on a 
limited scale. The versatility of such motors, their ease 
of starting and economy of labour enhanced their appeal to 
small farmers in particular. In dairying areas of the 
province, the electric milking-machine spread rapidly during 
the late 'twenties and early 'thirties, despite the depression 
and a local decline in butter and cheese production, In 1927 
there were 359 such machines in Canterbury; by 1936 there 
were 723. The number of shearing machines - increasingly 
powered by electricity - grew from 850 in 1925 to 1105 in 1935. 
Overall, the number of electric motors on farms in Canterbury 
increased in every year between 1926 and 1936, with the 
exception of 1931-32 (Fig. 4.4). At that time there was a 
drop of only fourteen in the provincial total, wiped out by 
a rise of forty~four in the following year. 
Internal combustion engines powered by oil or kerosene 
had become widespread on Canterbury farms before 1920 and 
maintained their numbers during the 'twenties and 'thirties 
despite the popularity of electric motors (Table 4.3). 
TABLE 4.3: NUMBERS OF STATIONARY FARM ENGINES 
IN CANTERBURY 
1923 1926 1929 1932 1935 
Electric 301 711 1254 2445 2876 
Internal Combustion 1625 1852 1686 1708 1719 
Steam 53 32 32 n.a. n.a. 
Water 186 104 82 n.a. n.a •. 
Source: Census and Statistics Office, A9:ricultural and 
Pastoral Production, 1923-35. 
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FIG. 4.4: ELECTRIC HOTORS ON FARMS IN CANTERBURY 
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With an output of up to fourteen horsepower, they powered 
a wide range of machinery from medium-sized chaff-cutters 
and small threshing mills to milking machines and cream-
l64 
53 
separators. One application of particular significance 
to Christchurch's unskilled workforce was the development 
of a threshing machine for cocksfoot harvesting. 54 Each 
summer for around fifty years "an army" of workers had 
issued out from Christchurch qnto Bank's Peninsula to cut 
this grass with sickles and scythes and to thresh it with 
flails. Steep hillsides and the dispersed nature of the crop 
had discouraged the use of the heavy steam-powered threshing 
machinery which worked the plains. In 1913, however, Andrews 
and Beaven developed a small portable machine for cocks foot 
threshing. During the 'twenties, forty-seven of these mills 
took over most of this previously entirely manual operation. 
Yet it was through the tractor that the internal combus-
tion engine most affected farm work in Canterbury during the 
interwar period. The dry, flat croplands of the province 
were particularly suitable for the use of tractors, and the 
local growth in their numbers at' times rivalled the spread 
of the much cheaper electric motor (Fig. 4.5). By the late 
'twenties they were clearly replacing both traction engines 
and horses in agricultural areas of Canterbury (Table 4.4). 
53. M. Anderson, The Water-Joey, Wellington, 1976, Appendix 3 
(letter from W. Beaven), p.112. 
54. Ibid., p.lll. 
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TABLE 4.4: MECHANISATION OF FIELDWORK IN CANTERBURY 
1923 1926 1929 1932 1935 
Tractors 77 805 1378 1800 1901 
Traction Engines 184 187 143 n.a. n.a. 
Horses (thousands) 60 57 55 52 49 
Source: Census and Statistics Office, Agricultural and 
Pastoral Production, 1923.:..35. 
In 1927 there were 196 traction engines in use on farms in 
the province. By 1930 the total was down to 138. The fall 
was even more dramatic amongst these steam locomotives which 
wer~ operated by contractors. In 1927 the number of traction 
engines registered for road use (the majority of them in 
55 Canterbury) totalled 494. By 1930 they were down to 234. 
There was also a significant drop in the number of horses 
on the province's farms. As pastoral farming work was as 
yet little affected by motor technology, most of this drop 
would have been due to the use of tractors in agriculture 
and trucks on roads. 
Cultivation and drilling were the operations first 
affected, but harvesting soon followed as tractor-drawn 
reapers-and-binders began to replace horse-drawn models. The 
swathe cut by the new machines could be up to twice as wide. 
They were therefore particularly favoured by owners of big 
56 farms who were large employers of labour. 
55. AJHR, 1930, H40, p.72. 
Threshing was 
56. B. Evans, A History of Farm Implements and Implement Firms in 
New Zealand, Feilding, 1956, p.40-4l. 
8. Tractor working on rolling country, previously 
thought unsuitable for machinery. 
(Weekly Press and Referee, 23 December, 1926.) 
9. Tractors and motorised machinery at Christchurch 
A. and P. Show. Note early model of power-grader 
in centre of display. This one belonged to the 
Paparua County Council • 
. (Weekly Press and Referee, 23 November, 1927.) 
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next affected, with the arrival of the American, or tin, 
mill in 1926. It required less labour than the established 
wooden mill, and could be driven off a tractor rather than 
a traction engine. 57 Furthermore, it was cheap enough for 
many farmers to thresh their own grain in co-operation with 
their neighbours rather than waiting for a contractor,58 
and a possible shower of rain. In this way they could also 
cut the labour cost of threshing because under legislation 
passed by the Reform Government in 1927 industrial awards 
could not be applied to their farm employees. The threshing-
mill contractors also resisted the extension of their award 
to tin mills. When they finally gave in, three years 
after the introduction of the new machinery, most Canterbury 
farmers operating such mills on their own farms gained an 
exemption from the Cl.ward. 59 within a couple of seasons of 
its introduction the tin mill was itself facing competition 
as header-harvesters were imported for peas, grain and small 
60 
seeds. These machines were generally tractor-drawn, but 
in 1932 the first motorised "autoheaders" appeared. 61 
These innovations led to the progressive displacement 
of large numbers of horse teams and threshing gangs. As 
early as 1926, unemployed men were blaming tractors for 
their plight. R.B. Owen, the businessman who was the main 
57. Anderson, , p.107. 
58. This and the advent of the tractor may well have formed the 
technological background to repeated reports from itinerant labourers 
that farmers were doing their own work. Times, 3 February, 1926; 
Sun, 21 November, 1930; 21 July, 1931. 
59. Star, 13 November, 1930. 
60. Evans, op.cit., p.82-100. 
61. Anderson, op.cit., p.lll. 
10. Traditional threshing-mill with traction engine 
in 1923. Note the size of gang required to work 
the mill. This was only the last part of the harvest -
reaping and binding, stooking, and stacking had to be 
done over a prolonged period before this stage was 
reached. 
(S. Penney, Lake Ellesmere to Te Pirita, p.152.) 
11. "Sunshine" header-harvester in a crop of peas. 
Most crops could now be harvested in a single 
operation with few workers. 
(Weekly Press and Referee, 14 March, 1928.) 
12. "Sunshine" auto-header, introduced to New Zealand 
in 1932. 
(B. Evans, A History of Farm Implements and 
Implement Firms in New Zealand, p.4l.) 
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force behind the Christchurch Unemployment Committee, conveyed 
their view that "these tractors were able to. do the same 
amount of work as two, and sometimes three, teams of horses, 
with the result that fewer men are needed u • 62 Similarly, 
the gradual elimination of the need to dry wheat and barley 
by stooking in the field and stacking represented a vast 
saving of labour. It also cut the time required to get the 
crop in and reduced the depredations of weather and pests 
in stooks and stacks. Oats for chaff still had to be treated 
in the old way, but the use of tractors and trucks had 
clearly reduced the demand for chaff. Andrews and Beaven, 
the major New Zealand manufacturers of chaff-cutters, ceased 
making them in 1926. 63 Oaten chaff actually increased in 
price during the mid-'twenties, speeding the decrease in its 
competitiveness with petrol (Table 4.5). Between 1927 and 
1932 the price of the latter fuel was much less affected by 
increased taxation if used on the farm rather than for road 
transport. The competitiveness of chaff therefore declined 
further. There was ,some reduction in'this decline between 
1932 and 1935, a petrol-tax was imposed upon all imports 
of the fuel, regardless of end-use. This may well have 
contributed to the slow growth in the number of tractors in 
Canterbury thereafter. The total had dropped by about five 
per cent in 1931-32 and it recovered only slowly. In 1936 
there were 1920 tractors on Canterbury farms, as against 
1893 in 1931. On the other hand, the total amount of tractive 
power in use appears to have levelled off rather than declined. 
62. Press, 22 July, 1926. 
63. Anderson, 
-*---
, p.IIO. 
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TABLE 4.5: PRICES OF FARM FUELS, 1923-35 (1923 =100)64 
1923 1926 1929 1932 1935 
Electricity 100 76 28 26 
Petrol 100 74 43 35 
Oil 100 107 104 100 
Coal (a) 100 94 104 
(b) 100 92 90 88 
Oaten Chaff 100 137 98 91 
Sources: AJHR, 1923-35, Dl, Report of the Electricity 
Division, (electricity) i CSO, Trade and Shipping, 
1923-35: NZYB, 1933, p.244i 1935, p.229 (oil and 
petrol); Prices, Wages, etc., 1923-29, "Wholesale 
Prices - Christchurch" (Coal (a» i Ibid., 
"Wholesale Prices - Index Numbers byGrCiups" 
(Coal (b» i Agricultural and Pastoral Production, 
1923-35, "Value of Crops Grown" and "yields of 
Crops by Land Districts" (Oaten Chaff) • 
A steady increase in the average horsepower per tractor 
25 
45 
63 
94 
79 
. indicates both that purchases of new tractors were continuing 
at a significant rate and that their working capacity was 
growing. Between 1932 and 1936 the average rating of 
tractors in Canterbury increased from 13.93 hp. to 15.57 hp.65 
64. The electricity figures are calculated from revenue per unit sold by 
the springs-Ellesmere Electrical Power Board, which was one of the 
few rural power boards in Canterbury with a full year's operation 
in 1923. It served a substantial rural population in a fertile 
mixed cropping and livestock area within a relatively short distance 
of Christchurch. Comparison with other rural Canterbury electrical 
authorities such as the Bank's Peninsula and North Canterbury 
Electric Power Board shows them to have reduced charges more rapidly 
but from a higher starting point. 
Coal (a) has been calculated from prices for New Zealand screened 
coal at wharf (presumably Lyttelton); Unfortunately that series was 
yet another statistical .casualty of the depression. Coal (b) is 
based on a more general index combining prices in ,the four main 
centres and for different types of coal. 
65. CSO, Agricultural and Pastoral Production, 1932, 1936, "Machines on 
Farms" • 
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Some of this rise may well have been due to a move towards 
diesel-pow7red machines. The price of oil was becoming 
increasingly competitive and diesel technology was making 
significant advances. 
In all, the number of engines, mobile and stationary, 
on Canterbury farms grew by at least 150% between 1923 and 
1933, and their total horsepower rose by over 245%.66 
Between 1933 and 1936 there was a further increase in the 
total number of internal combustion, electrical and tractor 
engines of just under twelve per cent, and an increase in 
their power of over fourteen per cent. 67 In addition the 
use of motor lorries and even motor cars greatly reduced 
the labour required on many farms to tend and to drive 
horses. In July, 1933, farmers owned almost a third of all 
light trucks in New Zealand, and around a fifth of all heavy 
ones. 68 They also held thirty per cent of all motor cars. 
These vehicles were not only widely used for transporting 
materials and produce about and off the farm, they were 
often converted into motors for saw-benches and other small 
machines via ingenious power take-off systems. 
While factory machinery began its major shift to the 
new technology in the early It wen ties, and agricultural 
machinery in the second half of the decade, change in the 
transport industry in Canterbury was rather more complex. 
In urban transport, for example, there were two waves of 
change, dominated by two different forms of energy_ The 
66. 1923-33. 
67. Ibid., 1933-36. 
68. AJHR, 1934, H40, p.34. 
173 
electric tram had provided the main form of transport for 
Christchurch commuters for some time. Commencing in 1906, 
this service superseded much more limited horse and steam-
tram networks. Its cheap fares had permitted the spread 
of "quarter-acre" sections for working people, and had 
converted surrounding villages such as Papanui and New 
Brighton into outlying suburbs. There were no significant 
additions to the system's permanent-way after 1918, but the 
Tramways Board, an elected body, did expand and modernise 
its fleet. 69 And there was ,further investment in 
electricity after 1930 in the form of several trolley-buses. 70 
The technological innovations which affected the employ-
ment of Christchurch's "trammies" most severely between the 
wars were the installation of driver-operated doors and 
"dead-man" handles. These effectively converted most rail-
cars to one-man operation and contributed to a fall in the 
number of conductors in Christchurch from 159 in 1926 to 
only 7l in 1936. 71 These reductions were also assisted by 
the passage of an Order-in-Council allowing the board to use 
72 trailers without separate conductors. Behind the adoption 
of such labour-saving methods lay the influence of oil-fuel 
technology in the shape of the motor car. This progressively 
--; 
whittled away at the profitability of all forms of public 
transport. Although the total number of passengers carried 
69. G. Stewart, The End of the Penny Section, Wellington, 1973, p.125. 
70. Ibid., p.158. 
71. Census, 1926, Vol.9, p.56; 1936, Vol. 10, p.65. 
72. H. Roth, "The Christchurch Tram Strike of 1932", New Zealand Monthly 
Review, August, 1973, p.12. 
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by the trams only reached its peak in 1926-27, the number 
of passengers as a proportion of the population served by the 
tramway s¥stem had been dropping since 1919-20. 73 The 
municipal tramways had never been very profitable in 
Christchurch. The sprawling nature of the city made a very 
extensive system necessary, with a large investment relative 
t h 1 · 74 . o t e popu at~on served. At the same t~me, the flatness 
of the terrain encouraged the use of bicycles. Mark Twain had 
described Christchurch as a city in which it seemed that half 
the population rode bicycles and the other half dodged them. 
Yet the traffic surveys carried out by the city council in 
the 'twenties and 'thirties suggested that the number of 
bicycles in use was growing faster than most other forms of 
75 transport. On top of this the motor car was skimming off 
76 
much of the tramways' wealthy and recreational patronage, 
pushing the desperately struggling Board inexorably towards 
a trading loss. 
A strong .growth in the taxi business, facilitated rather 
than discouraged by the depression, contributed to the decline 
of the tramways. Christchurch's hansom cabs proved remarkably 
resilient, with fifteen licences still being issued in 1926. 77 
There was little expansion in the number of taxi-cabs operat-
ing after 1926, but a considerable increase in the number of 
drivers licensed,78 particularly with the arrival of the share-
73. Christchurch Tramway Board, Annual Report, 1918-36. 
74. Press, 18 November, 1927. 
75. See Appendix C. 
76. Press, 18 August, 1926; 29 April, 1930. 
77. Christchurch City Council, Town Clerk's Report, 1926. 
78. In 1926 the city council issued 296 taxi-drivers' licences; in 
1928, 360; in 1931, 532. Ibid., 1926-32. 
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driving system during 1929. Although the number of men 
giving their occupation as taxi-driver increased only from 
126 to 155 between 1926 and 1936,79 446 taxi-drivers' 
licences were issued in the latter years. 80 Large numbers 
of out-of-work young men drove taxis occasionally and in 
Christchurch, as in some Australian cities, saying that you 
drove a taxi was often a roundabout way of saying you were 
81 
unemployed. An official inquiry in 1936 found that some 
drivers were virtually working the clock around for very 
low returns. 82 Although minimum fares were set by the 
city council and policed by its traffic officers, under-
cutting must have been impossible to prevent in such a 
desperately competitive situation. Certainly the council's 
traffic surveys showed an increase of more than fifty per 
cent in taxi movements between 1929 and 1932, and a doubling 
between 1929 and 1936. This came after a decade of static 
to falling taxi traffic. It seems likely that taxis provided 
even hotter competition for the trams after 5.30 p.m., when 
the survey period ended, because the share-driving system 
had obviated the need to pay overtime. Clearly hunger was 
helping to keep more cars on the road for longer. This did 
nothing to improve standards of road safety - there were 
drivers falling asleep at 83 but it reports of the wheel -
permitted the capture of more passengers. Service cars 
("taxi-buses") and coaches were not as significant in long-
79. Census, 1926, Vol.9, p.56; 1936, Vol.10, p.6S. 
80. Christchurch City Council, op.cit., 1936. 
81. W. Lowenstein, Weevils in the Flour, Melbourne, 1978, p.312. 
82. See below, p. 224. 
83. Star-Sun, 30 September, 1936. 
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distance passenger services out of Christchurch as in the 
other main,centres. 84 This was perhaps because of the 
relatively extensive local railway network. Nevertheless, 
long-distance bus services out of Christchurch did grow 
during the late 'twenties, with a large part of their 
custom coming from workers who travelled to, and between, 
jobs in the country. Consequently they shared in the hard-
ships of rural labour during the early 'thirties and the 
number of buses and service cars in Canterbury fell by 
about a third between 1931 and 1933. 85 
The Railways Department believed that it was the 
private motor car rather than the bus that was taking away 
its passengers. However, it was more concerned with competi-
tion from goods lorries: "the road transporters are becoming 
more and more active, ..• many must be running at a loss •.. 
[but] others seem to be always prepared to take up the 
• II 86 runn~ng This was an important aspect of the background 
, 
to the lay-offs of the depression years which reduced the 
number of railways staff in the South Island from 7314 in 
1930 to 5391 in 1933. 87 
New technology also exerted a direct influence on the 
level of employment in the railways. Besides the reorganisa-
tion and modernisation of the rail workshops, there were 
numerous labour-saving innovations in daily working. These 
included automatic warning,devices at busy level-crossings, 
beginning with the Riccarton Road crossing in 1926. Such 
84. AJHR, 1930, H40, p.87. 
85. AJHR, 1934, H40, p.3!. 
86. ~, 1928, D2, p.xxii. 
87. AJHR, 1930-33, D2. 
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, 88 
machines were judged "less expensive than crossing-keepers ll • 
There was ~lso a rapid spread of automatic train-signalling 
equipment in Canterbury and the installation of telephones 
for communication between stations. Local marshalling 
and goods were now extensively flood-lit and their work 
speeded by the use of electric shunting engines, pumps and 
89 
cranes. 
However, the most significant local use of electricity 
in rail transport was the electrification of the Lyttelton 
line, completed early in 1929. One of the main reasons 
behind this move was a large projected increase in the 
tonnage of goods to be carried on the line. A widening 
of the existing tunnel to take two tracks or the construction 
of a road tunnel were suggested alternatives, along with 
the perennial chestnut of a port in Christchurch itself. 
Such major undertakings would have been very large employers 
of local labour in difficult times. In the event, the 
decision of the Coates Government to electrify the single 
track proved to be correct economically, at least in the 
short-term. There was no major increase in traffic on the 
line until the 'forties, and the electrified single track 
was always able to cope. The six electric locomotives which 
used the new system also brought great savings on fuel and 
90 labour costs. The wage cost per locomotive mile was half 
that with steam engines and there was a massive reduction 
in expenditure on boiler and general cleaning. In 1931-32 
the total cost per locomotive-mile on the Lyttelton line was 
88. AJHR, 1926, 02, p.xxv. 
89. AJHR, 1928, 02, p.xxiii, xxiv; 1935, 02, p.xiv. 
90. AJHR, 1932, 02, p.28. 
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calculated to be 18.52d., compared with 22.2d.on the 
much 10nge+ runs of the South Island Main Trunk, which had 
to carry a much lower capital cost per mile. The undoubted 
improvement to the comfort of passengers and crew91 must be 
, set against the loss of a number of steady jobs which might 
otherwise have been created on the railways. 
At the far end of the tunnel electricity was n.odernising 
the waterfront. Manpower, shunting horses and a limited 
number of steam winches and steam cranes had carried out 
most of the cargo-handling on the wharves up to the early 
!t 
'twenties. In 19/2, however, the Lytte1ton Harbour Board 
92 began to purchase a range of electric cranes and capstans. 
By 1926 it was sufficiently impressed by the improvement in 
turnaround, the lower running costs and the comparative lack 
of maintenance involved with the new equipment to embark 
93 
upon a full replacement programme. Two years later 
virtually every ship to visit the port was using these 
facilities. During the same period, e1ectric£100r-lighting 
was installed on the wharves to increase security and to 
facilitate longer working hours, and electric pumps replaced 
94 
steam at the port's dry-dock. Some elevators were also 
mechanised. Despite the considerable displacement of casual 
labour that these innovations entailed, there was compara-
tive1y little increase in the number of permanent staff 
91. Lyttelton Harbour Board, Annual Report, 1930, p.2. liThe journey 
of 7 miles between Lyttelton and Christchurch is now a pleasure, 
instead of a penance, as it was in the days of 13/ 4 miles of smoke, 
steam and soot in the Moorhouse Tunnel". 
92. Ibia., 1920, p.l. 
93. Ibid., 1926, p.l, 33; 1927, p.7; 1928, p.9. 
94. Ibid., 1926, p.3. 
employed by the Board to carry out regular work such as 
the manning of cranes. 
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The whole movement in transport towards oil fuels and 
electricity meant less work for the port. Its effect combined 
with that of the opening of the otira Tunnel in 1923 to 
reduce drastically the amount of coal-handling at Lyttelton. 
~ 95 In 19~2 over 150,000 tons of coal passed through the port. 
By 1925 this total was down to 119,000 tons and in 1936 it 
stood at 17,000 tons. There was also a significant decline 
in the northward shipment of horse fodder. Coal and fodder 
were bulky commodities, usually requiring a large amount of 
labour to load - in 1927 the Board finally rejected a 
proposal for a coal-handling crane because of the continuing 
rapid decline in tonnage consigned through the port. 96 On 
the other hand, the handling of the growing volume of oil-
fuel became increasingly labour-efficient. During 1926 the 
Vacuum and British Imperial oil companies installed bulk 
oil tanks and in October of the following year almost a 
million gallons of motor spirit was pumped from the S.S. 
Lincoln Ellsworth. 97 The use of pumps, pipelines, bulk 
storage tanks, and special rail tankers all considerably 
streamlined the port's work in the late 'twenties. 98 
Nor were the changes wrought by the new technology 
confined to dry land. The move towards burning oil rather 
than coal in steamships, a development which had begun 
95. CSO, Trade and Shipping, 1921-36, "Shipping by Ports". 
96. Lytte1ton Harbour Board, op.cit., 1927, p.2. 
97. Ibid., 1928, p.2. 
98. W. Scotter, A History of Port Lytte1ton, Christchurch, 1968, p.249. 
before the Great War, was particularly rapid .during the 
'twenties. In 1924 the inter-island ferries Maori_and 
Wahine were converted to liquid fuel. 99 These two 
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vessels provided a high proportion of the shipping movements 
at Lyttelton. All the seven steamships launched by the 
Union Line, the largest local carrier, between 1925 and 
1939 were oil-burners. lOO Such ships promised a faster 
turnaround, without the laborious work of loading coal and 
ensuring its safe distribution in the bunkers. They were 
also able to devote much less space to fuel and more to 
cargo. Above all, they required less labour to stoke, clean 
and refuel .. Nevertheless, motor ships were already beginning 
to replace oil-burners in their turn by the end of the 
'twenties. These diesel-powered ships tended to be faster. 
They required still less fuel, and had no boiler-room, thus 
enabling even more cargo to be carried. Once again, they 
required less staff for cleaning boilers and furnaces, and 
for tending the engines. The growing number of oil-tankers 
visiting Lyttelton were all motor ships, as were a number 
of new coastal vessels which called regularly. Between 
1928 and 1934 much of the export frozen meat trade out of 
, 1 h' 101 h Lyttelton was g1ven over to arge new motor s 1pS. T e 
volume of such exports was not adversely affected by the 
depression - it actually increased significantly - and the 
number of ocean-going arrivals remained fairly constant. l02 
However, the amount of coastal cargo carried tended to decline 
99. Ibid., p.191. 
100. S. Waters, Union Line, Wellington, 1952, p.52. 
101. Scotter, op.cit., p.191-93. 
102. Ibid., p.192. 
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in the face of competition from motor transport on the 
roads. The effect was particularly severe in the case of 
trans-shipments from the smaller ports.l03 At the same 
time, the predominant source of mechanical power to local 
vessels shifted from steam to labour-saving diesel in 
around a decade (Table 4.6). 
TABLE 4.6: VESSELS REGISTERED IN NEW ZEALAND 
31 Dec. 1924 1926 1929 1932 1935 
---
Sail 123 92 71 58 52 
Steam 276 262 253 225 188 
Motor 165 204 217 236 255 
Source: NZYB, 1926-37. 
The technological changes in the shipping industry were 
fl d · h . . t' 104 re ecte ~n t e census stat~st~cs on occupa ~ons. 
Between 1926 and 1936 there was a fall of less than seven 
per cent in the number of seamen, sailors and deckhands in 
New Zealand and a decline of less than ten per cent in the 
number of officers. However, the total of stokers, firemen 
and trimmers dropped by almost half, from over a thousand 
in 1926. 
The transport of goods by road was also being revolu-
tionised between the wars. The number of motor lorries 
registered in central Canterbury more than doubled between 
1926 and 1932 (Fig. 4.6). There was also a marked increase 
103. CSO, op.cit., loc.cit. 
104. Census, 1926, Vo1.9, p.52; 1936, Vol.lO, p.6l. 
182 
FIG. 4. '6: LORRY REGISTRATIONS IN CANTERBURY, 
1925-36, (1925 = 100) 
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Source: AJHR, H-40, 1930-37. 
in their average weight. The proportion of the national 
lorry fleet classified as under two tons fell from 71% in 
1926 to 66% in 1932. 105 There was certainly some growth 
in the total volume of goods carried by all forms of 
transport to 1931 - increased exports and imports, and 
the growing volume of factory production, retail sales, 
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and public works outweighing the fall in building activity 
since 1926. However, much of the increase in the tonnage 
carried by motor transport appears to have been at the 
expense of horse-power and road locomotives, and the 
growth of rail freight. For example, the Christchurch City 
Council licensed 311 heavy horse-drawn vehicles in 1924-25, 
but only 117 in 1929-30. 106 Similarly, the railways 
carried only a marginally greater tonnage of freight in 
1930-31 than they had in 1923-24. 107 
The effect of the economic crisis on the move to motor 
transport does not appear to have been great or prolonged. 
There was a drop of less than five per cent in the number 
of lorries registered in Central Canterbury between 1931 
and 1933. The city council's traffic surveys and licensing 
records also suggest that any setback was temporary. The 
number of light and heavy vans recorded in the surveys 
increased by 32% between 1926 and 1932, and by a further 
29% between 1932 and 1936. The number of "horse and trade 
carts" fell by over 60% between 1926 and 1932, and again 
by 55% over the next four years. The number of licences 
issued by the city council for "motor delivery vans" 
105. NZYB, 1927, p.402; 1933, p.295. 
106. Christchurch City Council, Chief Inspector's Report, 1925; Chief 
Traffic Inspector's Report, 1930. 
107. NZYB, 1926, p.365; 1932, p.308. 
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fluctuated wildly, but stood no lower at its lowest point 
during the early 'thirties than in 1928. 108 The number 
of van drivers' licences issued actually increased from 
1931 and leapt ahead in 1935. From the surveys and the 
licensing records it would appear that the displacement of 
older forms of road transport in the city accelerated 
during the recovery phase of the depression. The number 
of lorries registered in Canterbury as a whole seems to 
have been rising again by March, 1934,109 and the number 
of lorries in central Canterbury had exceeded the previous 
record of 1931 by the end of 1934. 110 Moreover, the 
further development of diesel power had brought with it a 
speeding up of the trend towards bigger trucks. The 
proportion of lorries under two tons in Canterbury fell 
from 70.9% in December, 1932, to 68.5% in March 1933, and 
66.8% in March, 1934. 111 This was a significant decline 
in just over a year. The fall in total registrations was 
more dramatic in rural areas of the province than in the 
area around Christchurch (Fig. 4.6). But so were the 
increases in lorry registrations before 1931 and after 1933. 
There were also more opportunities to evade the expense of 
registration in the country, and hard times would have 
increased the incentive to try. Whether in town or country, 
motor goods transport was too cost-efficient, rapid and 
108. Christchurch City Council, op.cit., 1926-36. 
109. 1933, H40, p.27j 1934, H40, p.31. 
110. 1935, H40, p.24. 
Ill. , 1933-35~ 
convenient not to continue to replace other forms of 
transport, despite the depression. 
l8S 
There were also significant changes under way in the 
nature of retailing and office work due to new technology. 
One of the most widespread was the increasing use of type-
writers, a largely non-electric innovation. The number of 
persons employed primarily to operate these machines rose 
much faster than the 16% growth in the workforce between 1926 
and 1936. 112 The rate of increase (38%) was much smaller 
than that between 19.16 and 1926 (386%) but was still half as 
large in absolute terms, despite the depression. 113 However, 
electricity did help to improve business communications in 
a number of ways. The year 1926 saw the installation of a 
machine printing system in Christchurch and the establish-
ment of a toll link to Wellington, the commercial heart of 
the dominion. 114 A high proportion of Christchurch1s 
telephones were in businesses, and their operation was 
speeded in September, 1929, when the local exchange was 
automated. lIS Th t d th' b . t' e s ea y grow ~n us~ness connec ~ons 
received something of a setback during the depression -
even the city council dispensed with some of its extensions -
but it was soon resumed. 116 There was also some use of 
112. Census t 1926, Vo1.9, p.50i 1936, Vol.lO, p.Sl, 59. 
113. Unless otherwise stated t national figures for occupations are 
calculated from Census, 1926, Vol.9, p.44-50t 1936, Vol.lO, 
p.38-51 (males)t 52-59 (females). 
114. AJHRt 1926, Fl, p.2, 27-28. 
115. 1930, FIt p.48-49. 
116. The total number of connections in Christchurch fell by less than five 
per cent between 1931 and 1933, having risen over a quarter since 192£. 
The 1931 total was again reached by the middle of 1935. Figures for 
each engineering district show that the number of extension telephones 
(overwhelmingly in businesses) fell far less than the number of "main 
stations" and recovered within a year, both in Canterbury and through-
out the country. AJHR, 1926-36, Fl. 
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electrical calculating machines. 117 More importantly, many 
aspects of, the new technology encouraged the growth of office 
work. Better communications, faster transport, greater and 
more varied production, increased consumption, the expansion 
of hire-purchase for the new home appliances and motor cars, 
vast new capital investments in plant and infrastructure, 
and the domination of the new technology by international 
firms all fostered the growth of private and public bureau-
cracies. Furthermore, increased efficiency in production 
meant more wealth to be distributed and some to be redistri-
buted. Employers could afford to record more, delegate more, 
and to isolate themselves more in congenial surroundings 
with "nice" and generally sympathetic employees. With the 
minor exception of the law clerks, every clerical occupation 
recorded for males in the Christchurch Urban Area in both 
1926 and 1936 Censuses showed an increase. 118 The greatest 
growth in absolute terms occurred amongst general clerks 
(1222 to l454) and public service clerks (515 to 646). The 
biggest percentage increases in employment were to be found 
amongst public service clerical, professional and administra-
tive officers (80 to 102 or 27.5%), public service clerks 
(25%) and bank clerks (187 to 234 or 25%). In most cases the 
growth in such occupations in the dominion as a whole was 
considerably greater than that in Christchurch. For example, 
the number of male public service clerks throughout the 
country rose by 33% while the number of male general clerks 
117. Photograph in MED, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 1930. 
118. Unless otherwise stated, figures for occupations in the Christchurch' 
Urban Area are calculated from Census, 1926, Vol.9, p.55-57 (males), 
p.58-59 (females); 1936, Vol.10, p.64-67 (males), 68 (females). 
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by 37%. Despite the rise in numbers, these occupations 
showed far less of a fall in income than did most categories 
of wage and salary earners. Bank clerks were one of the very 
few groups to experience an increase in their incomes in 
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money terms. The ,average money incomes of public service 
clerks dropped by only about seven per cent, and cost 
accountants by eleven per cent. 
The "mean" policeman was another individual to secure a 
higher nominal as well as real income between 1926 and 1936. 
His money income went up by over four per cent while the 
number of policemen rose by 14%. On balance, however, new 
technology had tended to make the work of the police more 
difficult. While headquarters enthused about the new science 
f f ' 't' h' h b h 't t 120 o 1ngerpr1n 1ng w 1C roug t some 1mpor an successes, 
the "man on the beat" struggled to cope. He faced wholesale 
disregard at the often makeshift laws of the road but had 
little equipment with which to determine speed or sobriety, 
and had to commandeer motor transport if he wished to pursue 
the defiant. More importantly, increasing numbers of his 
criminal adversaries acquired cars or entered the new sport 
of joyriding in other people's. The problem of motorised 
crime brought nationwide notoriety to Christchurch with the 
depredations of the Gray brothers, two young men from a 
respectable background who caused immense damage in night-time 
robbery and arson about the city during 1929. 121 Possession 
119. Unless otherwise stated calculations of the incomes of occupational 
groups are derived from Census, 1926, Vol.ll, p.8-39; 1936, Vol.12, 
p.88-104. The mean has been calculated/in each case to the nearest 
pound rather than the nearest five pounds as in the "approximate mean" 
given in 1926. The 1926 figures take into account all "grades" 
employed in that occupation. 
120. AJHR, 1930, H16, p.4. 
121. Press, 15, 16 January, 1930. 
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of a motor car appears to have facilitated their rapid escape 
on a number of occasions and it was largely chance that a 
young policeman on foot managed to apprehend them during a 
robbery. 
The direct effect of the new technology on levels of 
employment in retailing appears to have been even less than 
in office work. Nevertheless, there were immense changes in 
the structure of the retail industry due to the indirect 
effects of technological change. Between 1926 and 1936 there 
was a massive swing away from small, often owner-operated 
businesses towards larger operations employing a number "of 
salesmen and assistants. This trend ran counter to the 
traditional impetus provided by depressions. Such crises 
had traditionally compelled unemployed people to go out on 
their own rather than use up their savings on day to day 
consumption while waiting for work. l22 The provision of 
state unemployment relief may have discouraged such a move-
ment to some extent in the 'thirties, but changes in technology 
were the principal influence operating against the small 
businessman. Mass production methods, whose spread was 
greatly assisted by electrical machinery, increased the 
opportunities for bulk buying and at the same time increased 
the range of goods available to the consumer of average means. 
Improved motor goods transport had a similar effect, while 
the motor car and new forms of public transport assisted 
suburban buyers to shop in the department stores of the 
122. T. Vigne and A.Hawkins, "The Small Shopkeeper in Industrial and Market 
Towns", in G. Crossick {Ed.}, The Lower Middle Class in Britain, 
London, 1977, p.1S7. 
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central city. The costs of eye-catching advertising in mass 
circulatio~ newspapers, neon signs, illuminated displays 
behind plate glass windows, chrome-plated cabinets, and 
bright electric lighting throughout shops had all come down 
considerably. Yet expenditure on such innovations still 
seemed a large and risky expense to the cautious small 
businessman, if he could ever afford them at all. Although 
there was undoubtedly still a market for the small trader 
with a reputation for quality and service, the large stores 
maintained sufficiently high standards for their wider range 
of goods, their cheaper prices, and above all their air of 
excitement and modernity, to make the difference. At the 
same time, many of the new electrical and motor appliances 
available required considerable capital from ,the retailer. 
They were generally costly items and were increasingly sold 
to customers through hire-purchase arrangements. Specialised 
staff was often required to service these expensive mechanical 
gadgets. Whereas a cabinet-maker or a tinsmith had been able 
to establish himself with little more than his own skills, 
the tools of his trade and a limited amount of basic material, 
a seller of radios or motor cars needed a good deal of 
capital. 
The resulting fall in the number of retailers in such 
categories as storekeeping, drapery and pharmaceuticals was 
particularly noticeable in urban areas. Over New Zealand as 
a whole the number of storekeepers fell by thirty per cent. 
In the four main centres the decrease was 45% and in 
Christchurch it was 49%. In the case of drapery and soft-
goods, the respective figures were 23%, 33% and 30%. At 
two per cent, the increas.e in the number of grocers in both 
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Christchurch and the four main centres as a whole was less 
than that of the total workforce and that of grocers through-
out the dominion at fifteen and ten per cent respectively. 
These declines in the number of self-employed retailers 
must be set against an increase in the employment of shop 
assistants and salespeople which was massive both in absolute 
and proportionate terms. The number of shop assistants in 
New Zealand rose from around fifteen thousand to about 
twenty-four thousand, an increase of more than sixty per 
cent. The number of salespersons rose by over two thousand, 
or over a quarter. Although these increases were accompanied 
by enormous reductions in average incomes - by around 46% in 
the case of male shop assistants - there had clearly been a 
substantial shift in the proportion of the national wage and 
salary bill towards the retail. sector, despite the depression. 
A disproportionate amount of the increase in this employment 
took place outside the main centres, suggesting that 
provincial retailers were not only surviving better than 
their urban counterparts but were employing more labour. 
They did not have to face so much competition from big depart-
ment stores. 
New technology was clearly creating many jobs as well as 
displacing them. Not only did major categories of work such 
as retailing and office work swell in size, but specific 
occupations in other areas experienced an influx of workers. 
Blacksmithing might have been in decline, but motor maintenance 
was burgeoning; where there had been draymen there were now 
lorry drivers; and thousands of electricians and linesmen 
were needed to maintain the flow of mechanical energy 
previously provided by stokers and general ~abourers. However, 
although this mitigated the employment effects of the 
changes, it certainly did not remove them. 
19l 
In the first place the new technology was so much more 
efficient in its use of labour that an extremely rapid rise 
in consumption would have been necessary to create the 
number of new jobs necessary to replace those rendered 
redundant. This position was not achieved during the 
'thirties, even under the Labour government. Despite very 
large increases in public service employment, much greater 
government spending in other areas, and the forty-hour week, 
thousands of men remained on social security who would have 
been "gainfully employed" during similar good times in earlier 
years, albeit mostly at low wages. 
Then again, many of the jobs created by the new 
technology were temporary, concerned primarily with putting 
the new infrastructure and new machinery in place. For 
example, a vast number of labourers found employment as 
linesmen during the 'twenties as the new electric power 
boards quickly wove their webs across the country. Between 
1926 and 1936, however, the number of linesmen and wiremen 
in New Zealand fell by almost a third. The number of men 
employed in stone quarries (mostly providing road metal) 
dropped by a similar proportion. As early as 1929 the 
Labour Department was noting that the completion of much 
infrastructural work was having a considerable effect on 
l23 
employment. 
Finally, the servicing and operating of,the new 
technology required new sets of skills - and generally a 
123. 1929, Hll, p.2. 
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higher level of skill than the technology it displaced. 
A man who had spent a considerable part of his working life 
shovelling coal into a furnace stood little chance of 
retraining as a motor engineer or an electrician. Generally 
it was the male school-leaver, typically from a skilled 
working class background, who entered these fields. Their 
parents had the contacts, the money and the determination 
to help them to secure an apprenticeship and to support them 
financially through it. Older men lacked these advantages 
and had normally acquired family responsibilities of their 
own which could not be met on an apprentice's allowance. 
Apprenticeship also involved a junior social status in the 
workplace which sat uneasily on an adult. In a few cases 
these problems were overcome by the state funding of 
apprenticeships for returned servicemen. The Christchurch 
M.E.D. trained a number of men under this scheme, and one 
of them, H. Urlwin, was to establish a large electrical 
f ' d 'I b' 124 manu actur1ng an .reta1 US1ness. It was also sometimes 
possible for older men who had built up capital and skills 
in areas such as blacksmithing or cycle repairs to move into 
the motor repair business. On the other hand, the capital 
value of some older forms of enterprise had declined 
considerably by the mid-'twenties, and continued to decline 
thereafter. Furthermore, younger men were generally more 
interested in the new technology - much of their spare time 
might well be spent tinkering with motor bikes or radios. 
124. Press, 9 July, 1983. 
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In the case of the white-collar occupations which were 
growing so rapidly, there was a class barrier. A survey of 
applicants under the age of twenty-five on the Labour 
Department's unemployed registers on 26 July, 1929,125 
suggests that while individuals employed in commercial 
and clerical jobs on leaving school might "slip down" into 
labouring occupations, there was little or no movement the 
other way. At least fourteen of the sixty-five men in the 
sample who had begun their working lives in commercial and 
clerical occupations were now in essentially unskilled 
categories. On the other hand none of the twenty-seven 
clerks and shop assistants had begun work in manual occupa-
tions. Amongst the categories of work created by the new 
technology, motor-driving was the most omnivorous in its 
appetite for new recruits. Most of the unemployed drivers 
had begun work as labourers or in farming (probably as farm 
labourers) but a number had been employed in skilled work 
and even the commercial and clerical category. All the 
seven electrical workers in the sample had begun work as 
apprentices, two of them in different occupations. All 
three of the mechanics had been recruited as apprentices from 
school. with the exception of the thirteen who had become 
drivers (at best a semi-skilled occupation), and one in the 
tailoring trade, all the 150 unemployed who had entered the 
workforce as labourers had remained in unskilled occupations. 
The number of individuals in each occupational sample was 
quite small and because it was a study of unemployed men the 
survey was biased towards failure. Nevertheless, it indicates 
125. ~, 1929, H11B, p.34. 
that the unskilled, the very group worst hit both by 
technological change and the depression, was also the 
group least likely to be recruited into the occupations 
expanded by the new technology. It seems probable that 
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unskilled men over the age of twenty-five found the transition 
even more difficult to achieve. 
There were certainly some indications by 1926 that 
unemployment was becoming a significant problem even in 
comparatively prosperous times. During the 1925-26 year 
the levels of exporting, importing, farm production and 
building activity were all of record levels. Yet the propor-
tion of "actively employed persons" describing themselves as 
unemployed in the census of April, 1926, was almost as great 
th t .. 1 . . 1921 12 6 h . as at a a s~m~ ar t~me ~n • T en econom~c 
conditions had been much more difficult and the total of 
unplaced applic~nts at the Labour Department's employment 
bureaux roughly twice as high. 127 In addition to a large 
increase in the rate of unemployment amongst old skilled 
trades such as blacksmithing and leather-working, the gap 
between the unemployment rate for labourers and the general 
rate had widened between 1921 and 1926. 128 The number of 
126. The figure was 26 per thousand in 1921; 24 per thousand in 
1926. Census, 1926, Vo1.10, p.7. 
127. CSO, prices, Wages, etc., 1926, p.62; AJHR, 1929, H11B, p.24-25. 
128. The rate of unemployment amongst blacksmiths had increased from 
2.7% to 3.3%, and that amongst 1eatherworkers from 0.5% to 3.0%. 
In addition, there had been a drop in the numbers giving those 
trades as their occupations. The rate.of unemployment amongst 
labourers was 4.3% in 1921, 7.7% in 1926. This was 1.5 and 3.2 
times the general male rate for the respective censuses. Census, 
1921, Part 8, p.145-59, 123-137; 1926, Vol.10, p.7-14. 
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registered unemployed continued to climb each year following 
the sudden downturn in activity during the winter of 1926. 
A preponderance of those registered were labourers and their 
domination of the totals tended to increase. "Unskilled 
labour" made up 53% of those registered during early July, 
1927, but 63% of those on the Labour Department's books at 
the same time in 1929. 129 The level of unemployment amongst 
skilled trade unionists tended to fall as spending by the 
United Government stimulated activity but the level amongst 
the unskilled fell much less. 130 The displacement of so 
many labouring jobs by electrical and motorised machinery 
was becoming evident. 
Paradoxically, the very high rates of unemployment 
brought about by the depression may well have smoothed some 
of the difficulties faced by those made redundant by new 
technology. Not only did it probably help to reduce their 
sense of individual failure and social isolation, it fgrced 
local and central government to provide new forms of 
assistance for all unemployed men. without these the older 
and less fit of the technologically displaced would have 
been condemned to steadily longer periods of unemployment, 
progressively lower incomes, constant begging for jobs" 
separation from home and family to search for work in the 
country, the diminution of savings for their old age, and, 
in all likelihood, a shameful resort to the local hospital 
board for charitable aid. 
129. CSO, Prices ••• , 1927, p.6l; AJHR, 1929, HllB, p.30. 
130. In 1927 General Labourers' Unions reported an average quarterly level 
of unemployment of 16.6% as against 10.1% by all unions. In 1929 
the respective figures were 18.9% and 8.4%. "Shipping and cargo-
working" unions recorded a 25% average level of unemployment in both 
years.CSO, op.cit., 1927, p.62; 1929, p.62. 
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Between 1926 and 1929 local authorities provided very 
large amou,nts of relief work, substantially assisted by 
government subsidies. 131 This work relieved many urban 
unemployed, particularly those with families, of the need 
to travel far from home in search of casual jobs. The 
I provision of thousands of positions at award rates on 
public works for the unemployed in· 1929 meant adequate, 
secure incomes for displaced workers able to move away from 
home. Through the Unemployment Act of 1930 central govern-
ment guaranteed an income for all unemployed men prepared 
and able to work. The Unemployment Board, created to 
administer the Act, gradually came to accept that the 
unemployed should be allowed to take paid employment outside 
f th ' d I' f k 132 o e~r ays on re ~e wor . A very large number did 
, th' 133 earn extra money ~n ~s way. Many would have been 
technologically displaced workers who were thus enabled to 
follow their trades in a limited way. There was usually 
some satisfaction in the relief work provided as well. 
Although some No.5 Scheme jobs were unconstructive and the 
131. During 1928-29, for instance, the Christchurch City Council spent a 
total of £19,665 on unemployment relief, but £7973 of that amount 
came from Public Works Department subsidies and only £7327 from its 
own accounts. A further £4165 was contributed by the private 
Citizens' Unemployment Committee and £200 from the local Returned 
Servicemen's Association. Christchurch City Council, Balance Sheet 
and Statements, 1929. 
132. Shortly after the introduction of the No.5 Scheme the local Labour 
Department made strong attempts to trace other income. Sun, 
28 March, 1931. Nevertheless, the local head of the department, 
R.T. Bailey, gave repeated assurances that casual earnings did not 
penalise relief workers. Times, 12 July, 1932; Press, 22 November, 
1932. The Board gave the same assurances. Sun, 4 April, 1934. 
Certainly this was in keeping with the Unemployment Board's declared 
policy to encourage the "efforts of the individual to supplement his 
measure of relief by every means in his power". AJHR, 1932, H35, 
p.12. 
133. AJHR, 1935, H35, p.2. 
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methods and the rates of pay could lead to anger and 
frustratio~, projects such as the Summit Road, the McCormack's 
Bay Causeway, and the stopbanks along the Waimakariri were 
clearly of some considerable social value. Certainly more 
so than a fruitless door-to-door search for odd jobs. A 
man was after all still working and he could maintain contact 
with fellow workers in the same situation. He did not have 
to feel he was begging for charity. A further option was 
provided with the advent of sustenance pay, envisaged in the 
1930 Act but only brought into operation in 1933. Redundant 
workers could now retire early without facing either labouring 
relief work or destitution and the hospital board. 
The measures introduced by the United and Coalition 
governments to provide for the depression unemployed actually 
represented a much wider advance in social welfare. Although 
the Unemployment Act was clearly framed with able-bodied 
unemployed in mind, in practice its benefits became available 
to a large proportion of those whose capacity to work had 
been reduced by sickness, accident or old age. 
Previously large numbers of these men had had to depend 
on a combination of charity and whatever casual work they 
could get. with the partial exception of miners, returned 
servicemen and the blind, the only state benefit disabled men 
could expect was the Old Age pension. 134 The qualifying 
age for the pension for men was sixty-five, roughly equivalent 
to the male life expectancy. Yet many were suffering from 
chronic disabilities long before the qualifying age, having 
134. ~, 1929, p.669-78. 
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lived through times in which harsh living and working 
condition~ were standard and medical treatment rUdimentary. 
With limited mechanisation, constant heavy lifting and 
repeated accidents tended to leave a legacy of hernias, weak 
backs, poorly knitted bones, and stomach ulcers which 
greatly reduced a manual worker's efficiency. Labouring 
men working in the bush or on farms were also liable to 
suffer from the effects of a restricted diet, prolonged 
over-indulgence in alcohol - the great painkiller - and 
poor cooking. Housewives in town often found that it was 
not difficult to be a bad cook on a coal range - and it was 
much easier over an open fire. 
Even at sixty-five a man might be obliged, or feel 
obliged, to continue working. Applicants for the pension 
had to have spent most of the previous twenty-five years 
in New Zealand, a provision which excluded many immigrants 
and footloose locals for a further period. Pensioners were 
subject to a strict me~ns test and were examined under oath 
in front of a magistrate. They then had to make an annual 
declaration of their income and property in each subsequent 
year. Some eligible men baulked at such a searching examina-
tion, preferring to continue to work as long as possible. 
The level of savings allowed was not high - the pension began 
to be abated at about the level of the average amount lodged 
, ff' S' A 135 1n Post 0 1ce aV1ngs ccounts. On the other hand, 
pensioners were allowed to earn up to twelve shillings a week 
over and above their pension. Some less respectable applicants 
135. Every complete £10 over £ 50 of savings led to a reduction of £1 
in the pension. The average amount in Post Office Savings Bank 
accounts wasS58. Ibid., p.670, 722. 
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had other problems, despite the fact that they were less 
likely to ~ave saved much to support themselves in their old 
age. They could be rejected on the grounds of four convic-
tions for comparatively minor offences during the previous 
twelve years or the desertion of a spouse within that period. 
The requirement to be "of good moral character" and to have 
led "a sober and reputable life" during the preceding twelve 
months also presented problems for some. 
Men over sixty-five who did not qualify for the pension 
joined younger men unable to earn enough to keep themselves 
and their families due to sickness or disability. These 
individuals were generally forced to depend on a mixture 
of casual work and charity. Savings, benefits from friendly 
societies or trade unions, and legal compensation could help 
in certain cases. "Charity", often with an accompanying 
stigma, came in many forms. Relatives were probably the 
main source of such support. They were in fact legally 
obliged to assist if they could. But many households were 
unable to keep an additional adult, still less an additional 
family, and immigrants often had no relatives in New Zealand 
anyway. Religious institutions tended to concentrate their 
charitable work on short-term assistance or on specific 
groups such as orphans, widows and the very elderly. Adult 
men facing destitution or unable to keep their families were 
usually obliged to seek charitable aid at the local hospital 
board. 
For many this tended to be a very painful process 
psychologically. Although about half the funds disbursed 
in the form of charitable aid were provided by central 
government, the representatives of the ratepayers remained 
anxious to discharge their legal duty by detecting and 
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detering any malingering. At Christchurch Hospital 
applicants,were interviewed every month, their assets were 
carefully determined and liens could be taken over any 
property they owned in order to secure repayment of 
. t 136 ass~s ance. A staff of inspectors was retained to make 
spot checks on the honesty of recipients, and able-bodied 
male applicants were required to work in return for any 
relief granted. They were normally sent to assist the 
staff in the nearby Botanical Gardens. Payment was not 
ordinarily in the form of cash, but in rations issued from 
the hospital's store. The Board maintained that this 
increased the level of assistance because it could provide 
goods at wholesale prices. 137 Nevertheless, the practice 
took still more freedom and dignity away from the'destitute 
and was bitterly resented as a form of "truck ll by a number 
of the unemployed. 138 The rate of assistance was anyway 
very low and the Charitable Aid Committee emphasised that 
, . d l' . 139 ~ts grants were not ~ntende to equate to a ~v~ng wage. 
Men were expected to find casual work to make up the 
difference. 
136. Times, 6 May, 1930. 
137. Press, 28 October, 1926. 
138. Sun, 27 October, 1926. The debate resumed strongly in 1930 with 
solicitors acting for one leader of the unemployed, W.H. Bayard, 
writing to the Health Department questioning the legality of this 
"truck" system. The Crown Law Office considered that the practice 
was probably illegal but that a court would throw the case out as 
"trivial". The board continued to require work and the Law Office's 
opinion was not divulged to the unemployed or to trade unions 
which joined the protest. James McCombs requested a copy of the 
paragraph claiming that a court would dismiss the case so that he 
could prove to the unemployed that there was no point in taking 
action. Health Department Files, 54/49/10. 
139. Food was "awarded sparingly enough to leave the applicant with an 
incentive to improve his condition". Times, 6 May, 1930. 
The existing system of social welfare thus tended to 
support the development of a substantial casual workforce 
which was subject to long periods of unemployment due.to 
sickness and which was generally unable to work with the 
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same efficiency as its able-bodied counterparts. Some ten 
thousand wage and salary earners, over three per cent of the 
total, were unemployed for over a quarter of the working 
days in 1925~26 due to sickness, accident or injury.140 
Almost the same proportion of men working on their own 
account were similarly affected. After all, much lost time 
due to sickness and lack of employment could only be expected 
in a workforce where at least three per cent o·f male wage 
and salary earners were older than sixty-three years, the 
141 
average male life expectancy. More than ten per cent 
were in excess of fifty-five years old. Unskilled manual 
workers were particularly well-represented in these. older 
142 
age-groups. For instance, wage-earning labourers were 
almost as likely to be over sixty-five in 1926 as medical 
practitioners, a group renowned for its late starting but 
long working life in generally comfortable and unstrenuous 
conditions. Similarly a waterside worker was more likely to 
be over fifty-five than his doctor. Gardening work was the 
haven for an especially large proportion of elderly wage-
earners, with almost eighteen per cent over sixty-five. Just 
under a third of self-employed gardeners fell into that 
age-group. 
140. Calculated from figures in Census, 1926, Vol.lO, p.l4. 
141. ~, 1930, p.l44i and Census, 1926, Vol.9, p.84. 
142. The following figures are calculated from ~, p.62-64, 66-69, 
75-84. 
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Depressed economic conditions tended to worsen the lot 
of these elderly or handicapped workers by bringing them into 
greater competition with younger and fitter men. 143 On the 
other hand, they were often able to take advantage of the 
community's attempts to provide unemployment relief, whether 
in the form of work or goods. From 1926 onwards there were 
complaints that many of the men on relief work were unsuitable 
for heavy labour - even though a substantial majority of the 
unemployed described themselves as labourers and as fit for 
such work. The P.W.D. in particular found itself dealing 
with a very different group from the robust, if often 
disreputable, workers with whom it was familiar. In October, 
1926, the P.W.D. Engineer in Christchurch, W. McNamara, 
summed up the winter's relief work with some bitterness. 144 
The men offered were often "of a very poor c1ass .•. many 
unused to heavy manual 1abour ... some totally unfit". 
Similarly, the Christchurch City Engineer claimed in his 
report for the 1927-28 year that 
one significant fact that has disclosed itself 
as a result of recurring unemployment is that 
there are quite a large number of men who may 
be said to be 'unemployable' from either a 
physiological or a psychological standpoint ... 
or both. l45 
Technically such men should have been the responsibility of 
the hospital board. However, they were presenting themselves 
and being accepted for work on relief projects at much higher 
rates of cash payment than they would have received on 
charitable aid. 
143. Sun, 7 June, 1933. 
144. Press, 22 October, 1926. 
145. Christchurch City Council, City Engineer's Report, 1928, p.62. 
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The proportion of the registered unemployed described 
as "fit for light work onlyll remained relatively constant 
at around twelve per cent from June, 1928. 146 As little 
such work was available as unemployment relief it was not 
in the interests of men seeking assistance to get themselves 
classified in that way even if it were a fair assessment of 
their capabilities. However, the light brigade was in the 
van of the rush to register following Sir Joseph Ward's 
promise to find state jobs at award rates for all the 
147 
registered unemployed. Their proportion of the total 
148 increased within a month to around twenty per cent. This 
dropped back again when it became evident that most of the 
work being made available involved labouring and after the 
Labour Department purged many men from the register when they 
declined to leave town for employment on distant public 
works. 149 It seems likely that many "light" workers returned 
to eking out a living from whatever casual employment or 
charitable aid they could get. 
Men classified as fit for light work only again featured 
disproportionately in the next big rise in unemployment 
registrations, towards the end of 1930. From a low-point of 
, 146. Calculated from figures in CSO, Monthly Abstract of Statistics, June 
to December, 1929, Table 2. The Monthly Abstract is also the best 
source for Christchurch and national unemployment statistics from the 
beginning of 1926. CSO, Wages, Prices, etc. 1924, p.137-39 takes 
these figures back to the spring of 1921. AJHR, 1929, HllB, p.24-25 
gives national registrations to April, 1921. 
147. Times, 30 September, 1929. The effect of Ward's announcement was 
startling. Within a fortnight the national total of registered 
unemployed increased against the seasonal trend, from 2466 to 6264. 
In Christchurch there were 438 registrations on one day whereas the 
previous record had been less than a hundred. Sun 4 October, 1929. 
148. CSO, Prices ••• 1929, p.62. 
149. Sun, 31 October, 2 November, 1929. By the end of December registrations 
were down to 1242 nationally, less than at the same time in 1928. 
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8% of registrations in May, they increased to 14% in 
December. 1SO 0 "t b nce aga~n ~ appears to have een the 
prospect of paid work for all the unemployed that was the 
stimulus. This time it was made clear by the newly-formed 
Unemployment Board that work would be provided in urban 
areas, through local authorities. Where suitable work could 
not be supplied, there was an apparent assurance of sustenance 
payments. In the event these were not paid, and almost all 
relief workers were expected to do labouring work of varying 
degrees of difficulty. In Christchurch the "light" workers 
tended to be put onto scrub clearance and tree-planting in 
the Bottle Lake Reserve, north of the city. lSI 
Care for the sack, aged and otherwise handicapped men 
remained the responsibility of the hospital boards. In 
addition they were called on to assist most relief workers 
during their stand-down week each month. This placed 
enormous pressure on the boards as they attempted to main-
tain their usual restrictions and checks in the distribution 
of relief. A man and his family could not be regarded as 
destitute simply because they qualified for assistance from 
the Unemployment Board. Each applicant had to be examined 
every month by a charitable aid committee and a large number 
were further checked by inspectors who could call at their 
homes without notice. The ,requirement of a monthly interview 
led to se~ious overcrowding at the hospital board's offices 
each Thursday ("charitable aid day") : 
150. eso, Prices ••• , 1930, p~59. 
151. Times I 13 February, 1931. 
In a portion of the office where not thirty 
people could gpmfortably be accommodated there 
are grouped over a hundred men and women ••• 
Every inch of room was taken up and the office 
staff had to push through the throng to 
shepherd the applicants into the committ~e room 
or to the ration room ..• Many of the people were 
almost at the end of their tether and the long 
wait in a close atmosphere was obviously telling 
on their nerves. 152 
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The situation greatly worsened as unemployment grew during 
1931 and 1932, particularly with the advent of the "stand-
down" week each month for relief workers. On one day there 
were over six hundred applicants at the hospital board. 153 
By the beginning of 1932 there was considerable concern 
in the Health Department and on the part of J.G. Coates, 
Minister in Charge of Unemployment, that some hospital 
boards were unable to carry out their normally rigorous 
h k 11 I , , f ' 154 c ec s on a app ~cat~ons or ass~stance. Furthermore, 
a number of board - notably those in Auckland and Wellington -
were not requiring wor~ from the able-bodied unemployed in 
return for rations granted during the stand-down week. The 
possible danger to public order of having large numbers of 
unemployed men in crowds outside hospital board offices 
also caused disquiet, but mainly inasmuch as it might some-
times allow them to get additional relief: 
Coates was of the opinion that it only required. a 
mob of men to come along and they got what they 
wanted •.. He had three or four instances where, 
as a result of demonstrating, what was wanted 
had been obtained. It was clear that they had 
to be pacified. It was going to come to a head. 
There were politicians to-day drawing definite 
attention to this matter and saying there were 
152. Times 22 August, 1930. 
153. Press, 17 April, 1931. A month later the police were called to clear 
the crowd outside the offices. Times, 22 May, 1931. 
154. Memorandum for the Minister of Health from the Director-General of 
Health, 6 January, 1932, Health Department Files 54/49/10; report 
of a meeting between a deputation from the Hospital Boards Association 
and members of the government, including G. Forbes and J.G. Coates, 
14 January, 1932, 54/49/10. 
plenty of clothes and food in the country and it 
was paradoxical that people should be starving. 
Those were seeds of revolution. 155 
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Coates waS already planning a new centralised system of 
relief, based around the Unemployment Board, and able to 
resist demands by the able-,bodied for relief without work. 
It would end the stand-down week and relieve the hospital 
boards of a substantial burden. However, the thoughtful 
and energetic leader of Reform Party was dissatisfied: 
The practice of Hospital Boards, I understand, 
is to give to the unemployed in their stand-down 
week, and often for additional periods, orders 
for specified commodities, but very little money 
that might be ill-spent. If now we simply 
eliminate the stand-down week by making able-bodied 
unemployed a charge on the Unemployment Fund, we 
shall lose the elements of value in the methods 
devised by Hospital Boards. 
There is another good reason for making use of 
the idea advanced by your correspondent [Mr. Wyvern 
Wilson]. It is difficult to devise a scale of 
relief that will be at once barely adequate for 
city needs and not over generous in country districts. 
We cannot give a single man in Wellington much less 
than 18/- weekly (conditional, of course, on his 
working the prescribed time - and I am more than 
ever convinced that the "prescribed time" must 
amount to not less than 5 days weekly) , ..• 
On the other hand we cannot differentiate in cash 
payments between city and country, for this would 
attract people to the cities. 
A way of escape from the difficulty, perhaps the 
only one, is to give less in cash and more in orders 
for food etc. in the cities. 156 
Much of the planning for the new system was completed 
during March, 1932,157 ~nd it was introduced in July. 
155. Ibid. 
156. Memorandum for the Minister of Health from the Minister in Charge 
of Unemployment, 6 February, 1932, Health Department Files, 
54/49/10. Coates clearly had no scruples about "truck". His 
slogan might well have been "less pay for more work". 
157. Memorandum for the Ministers of Unemployment and Health from 
R.M. Campbell and A.V. Keisenberg, 9 March, 1932, Health Department 
_Files, 54/49/10. Also statement by J.G. Coates, 23 March, 1932, 
AJHR, 1932, H35A, p.3. 
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Under it the Unemployment Board took full responsibility 
for men who were fit for either light or heavy work. Those 
unfit for any kind of work - classified "e" - were to be 
entirely the responsibility of the hospital boards. 
In practice the distinction between fit relief workers 
and unfit charitable aid recipients became very difficult 
to maintain. Most men preferred to be on relief work'- it 
paid better, principally in cash, involved no regular, 
searching examination before a committee, did not have the 
stigma of charity, and provided more of the social inter-
action that is one of the attractions of most work. It 
was generally the doctors employed by the hospital board 
who were responsible for grading men when there was some 
d b t th ' f' 158 f h d t ou t as 0 e~r ~tness. Some 0 t ese oc ors were 
almost certainly open to persuasion from the unfortunate 
individuals they were examining and had only a hazy idea 
of what sort of "light work" was available and to whom. 
This is clearly suggested by a local case which gained 
, 1 bl" 1 t 159 . 1934' t t d nat~ona pu ~c~ty a er.Dur~ng ~ was repor e 
that a man had been pushed in a wheelchair by his wife 
to Bottle Lake in order to undertake his relief work on 
158. One of the reasons for this was that the local Labour Department 
put "little value on medical certificates" according to the officer 
in charge in Christchurch. Sun, 13 July, 1932. Similar views 
had been expressed earlier by a local member of the Unemployment 
Board, P.R. C1imie. He claimed that forty per cent of single 
relief workers in Dunedin had secured medical certificates 
exempting them from work. Sun, 2 June, 1932. Presumably the 
exemption was from the camp-work introduced by Coates for the 
single unemployed at the beginning of the year. 
159. W. Sutch, The Quest for Security in New Zealand, 1840-1966, 
wellington, 1966, p.137; Times, 2 January, 1935. 
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two consecutive days.160 Perhaps significantly, it was 
the foreman on the job who complained, not the individual. 
involved or his wife. Technically he should have been on 
charitable aid or, quite conceivably, on sustenance 
"awaiting suitable work" •. But this would have entailed a 
substantially lower rate of pay. The doctor who had 
classified the man as fit for light work had possibly been 
led to believe that he would be put onto boot-repairing. 
It seems very possible that the relief worker had managed 
to get the classification he wanted. 
During the same year a relief worker charged with 
operating a whisky-still revealed that. he had experienced 
some difficulty in combining the roles of labourer and 
distiller when his relief work allowance was increased 
from one to two days.161 His frequent absences from work 
appear to have led to his reclassification as class "C", 
unfit for work. This, however, meant much less cash and 
liability to a rigorous inspection without warning. A 
visit to the hospital and "the doctor who made out my 
medical certificate modified it to class "B". The most 
likely result of such a classification, transference to 
sustenance pay, meant few interruptions to attend relief 
work and no snooping by hospital board inspectors. 
160. Sutch was clearly right in branding this case "administrative incompe-
tence" but gives the rather misleading impressions that there was no 
alternative ("there was no invalidity pension and the principle laid 
down was 'no pay without work''') and that the situation was prolonged. 
Moreover, if many of the men at Bottle Lake were unfit and lacked 
tools, the city council was at least partly responsible - it could 
have provided more tools and it rejected a proposal that the men 
should be reclassified. Times, 25 May, 1934. 
161. Star, 31 May, 6 June, 1935. Such transfers were very unpopular. 
For example, the local Returned Servicemen's Association protested 
against its disabled members being taken off "relief work" in 1934. 
Sun, 3, 16, 23 July, 1934. 
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The progressive introduction of sustenance payments had 
actually ~educed the absurdity of the situation to some 
extent by making it unlikely that men classified for light 
work would have to do any work at all. Light tasks were 
particularly difficult for local bodies to provide at little 
cost for tools, housing and materials. Therefore it was 
this category of relief work that tended to be reduced first 
as local authorities shed their No.5 Scheme responsibilities 
and effectively transferred the men to sustenance. 162 
By 1935 the pretence that individuals on sustenance were 
merely fit men lacking work and therefore no charge on the 
hospital board had worn very thin. Claims that many were 
reporting to the Labour Department in ambulances were probably 
exaggerated, but there were strong protests against susten-
ance men having to visit the Labour bureau or post office 
163 three times a week, partly on humanitarian grounds. 
One correspondent claimed that some 
have to go on sticks, being cripples; others have 
to pay long tram fares, and others again, by 
having to report on three days, lose some of the 
casual jobs which help them make a little more for 
their families to get along on. ,164 
The height of absurdity was reached in June, 1935, when it 
was argued that men going into hospital should be able to 
continue to collect sustenance payments from the Unemployment 
165 Board. In support of the proposal, the secretary of the 
North Canterbury Hospital Board pointed out that the 
162. 6 November, 1934. 
163. Star-Sun, 24 August, 1935. 
164. ~I 11 February, 1935. 
165. 28 June, 1935. 
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charitable aid it provided was "not usual [ly] .•. on the same 
scale as sustenance payments". The failure by both local and 
central authorities to provide a reasonable allowance for 
sick breadwinners had led to a situation where a man lying 
in a hospital bed could be described as "fit for light work". 
The same development can be seen in the response to 
the questionnaire on unemployment in the 1936 census. Time 
lost by men through accident or illness had fallen from an 
average of nineteen days in 1925-26 to just over twelve in 
1935. 166 A little of the difference can be put down to the 
genuine increase in unemployment due to scarcity of work -
with less work to do there was less to lose due to sickness 
arid a possible reduction in the danger of work-related, 
accidents. It is also possible that depressed economic times 
encouraged workers to undertake work even when they were sick. 
On the other hand, very few employees enjoyed rights to sick 
pay in 1925-26, so even then a day off work had meant a 
substantial loss of wages. Rather it seems likely that the 
decrease in the loss of working time due to sickness arose 
from the way that the system of unemployment relief had 
developed. Men who could not get regular work because of 
their ill-health stated as much in 1926. Ten years later 
such individuals were likely to be on sustenance, officially 
declared "fit for light work" but unemployed because the 
authorities could not find suitable work for them. Consequ-
ently they recorded themselves as unemployed due to scarcity 
of work. 
166. Census, 1926, Vol.10, p.2l; 1936, Vol.ll, p.28. 
The fact that such individuals continued to be 
classified as unemployed was an important cause of the 
prolongation of high unemployment during the 'thirties. 
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Sick and handicapped men, located mainly in urban areas, 
were poor candidates for public works jobs in comparatively 
remote locations. Neither were they suitable for retrain-
ing in the skills of the new technology when there were 
easily sufficient young men offering with long working lives 
ahead of them. 
The solution adopted by both the Coalition and Labour 
governments was to transfer the older and handicapped 
unemployed onto pensions. By the middle of 1934 men 
between sixty and sixty-five years of age were being given 
sustenance "in anticipation" of the old age pension or if 
their wives were on it and at the end of the year men over 
sixty-five were effectively denied any help from the Unemploy-
ment Board. 167 Men over fifty years of age and those 
"under fifty per cent efficient" were granted sustenance 
168 
effectively a pension - if they chose. As local bodies 
167. Sun, 29 December, 1934. The process had actually begun earlier, as 
exemplified by the case of J.A.McCullough, a former Workers' 
Representative on the Arbitration Court. Despite Sullivan's efforts 
on his behalf, this seventy-three year old was tossed off relief 
work and onto the old age pension in 1933. Christchurch City 
Council, Outward Correspondence, 2 August, 1933. 
168. 15 June, 1934. In explaining the rules regarding sustenance, 
Bromley, secretary of the Unemployment Board, coincidentally 
pointed to the way in which Christchurch local bodies, not least the 
Labour City Council, were failing the unemployed. He mentioned that 
"in two main centres" (Press, 7 June, 1934) sufficient light work 
had not been provided for all those registered: 
the board had, in Christchurch, for instance, provided that 
when sufficient employment was not arranged to employ the 
whole of the men registered and eligible for , that 
work should be given in rotation amongst the men - a section 
standing down each week .•• During that stand-down week it had 
been the practice to pay a small sustenance allowance equal 
to fifty per cent of what they would earn if they were in 
employment. (Sun, 6 June, 1934). 
(Continued on next page) 
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discarded "light work " and selected the fittest men for 
full-time employment, the element of choice became 
hypothetical. Under Labour the period of residence 
required to be eligible for the old age pension was reduced 
to fifteen years. The introduction of an invalidity 
pension was foreshadowed by the Coalition government at 
the end of June ,:1 1935. 169 The new Minister of Labour, 
H.T. Armstrong, pushed the proposal strongly170 and the 
new pension was introduced during 1935. It led to the 
reclassification of several thousand of the unemployed. 
However, it was the Social Security Act of 1938 that 
finally separated the unemployed due to lack of work and 
those redundant principally because of their physical 
incapacity. This largely removed the widely disliked 
system of charitable aid and effected a substantial reduc-
tion in the number of registered unemployed at the cost of 
a large increase in the number of recipients of social 
welfare. 
In 1926 the state provided less than fifty thousand 
pensions which were supposed to meet most or all of the 
living expenses of the pensioner and his or her dependants. 
In 1937 it provided over ninety thousand such pensions, not 
including unemployment payor sustenance. In 1939 the total 
was over 140,000.171 There was a significant aging of the 
population during this period, but the combined total of men 
168. (Continued) See also statement by P.R. Climie on a special 
arrangement, lIapplied only to Christchurch, where local bodies 
have been unable to absorb all the men eligible for relief workll. 
Times, 24 August, 1932. 
169. Sun, 26 June, 1935. 
170. Star-Sun, 6 January, 1936. 
171. NZYB, 1926, p.650-55i 1937, p.590-600i 1940, p.6l9-39. 
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over 65 years and women over 60 years increased only 46%,172 
a far lower rate than the rise in dependence on the state. 
The provision of charitable aid must also be taken into 
account. However, the total number of charitable aid 
"cases" supported during the 1925-26 year was only 6089. 173 
At anyone time it would obviously have been much lower, 
and large numbers of the "breadwinners" amongst those cases 
would have been obliged to find extra work during the period 
of assistance and possibly in return for it as well. Further-
more, some account must be taken of the nineteen thousand 
individuals on sustenance in March, 1937, and the six 
thousand on unemployment benefits in March, 1939. 174 Clearly 
a very substantial slice of the most casual and least 
efficient workers had been largely removed from the labour 
force. 
Essentially the depression had hastened the development 
of a structure through which large sections of the work-
force rendered redundant by new technology could be sustained 
by the estate. The new system of social welfare allowed 
'--~-
recipients to maintain a much greater degree of dignity 
than the previous locally based structure. It also ensured 
that some of the additional wealth being created by the new 
technology should be channelled both to those it displaced 
and to those who had previously been neglected; the sick 
and the handicapped. These men had now been largely removed 
from the workforce - whether they liked it or not - and their 
172. Census, 1926, VOl.3, p.10; 1936, Vol.4, p.4. 
173. Figure compiled from a table entitled IlCases and Number of Persons 
Affected Respectively from Various Causes of Poverty", Health 
Department Files, 54/49/10. 
174. NZYB, 1938, p.804j 1940, p. 635. 
7 
214 
contribution to production replaced by new machinery. 
In the meantime the depression had created a vast new 
form of employment in the shape of relief work. It is 
difficult to travel around Christchurch without seeing the 
legacy of such work. To the north much of the network of 
stopbanks along the Waimakariri and the extensive Bottle 
Lake Plantation represent the efforts of thousands of 
unemployed men. To the south thousands more have a magnifi-
cent monument in the form of the Summit Road and the Sign 
of the Takahe. In the west there is the Wigram Aerodrome 
and in the east the road across McCormack's Bay, the 
Estuary Road, the Sumner Esplanade and golf courses at 
Brighton and North Beach. Stopbanks along the Heathcote, 
a wide sweep of roading along the Avon, and parks from 
Burwood to Beckenham were constructed largely by relief 
workers. They did much more than weed-chipping along 
d 'd 175 roa Sl es. 
Nevertheless, there was an air of irrelevance about 
'much of the relief work carried out within the urban area. 
This was above all because the methods employed were so 
primitive, so clearly designed to use the maximum amount 
of labour at ,a time when labour-saving machinery had become 
standard on such works. For example, the Waimakariri River 
Trust pointed out that seven men and a mechanical drag line 
could accomplish as much as three hundred of its relief 
176 
workers using shovels, barrows and drays. Local bodies, 
the main employing authorities under the No.5 Scheme, sought 
175. Private institutions in Christchurch which benefitted from the "over 
the fence" variant of the No,5 Scheme ranged from the St.Albans Park 
Bowling Club and the Oxford Terrace Baptist Tennis Club to the 
Phillipstown Kindergarden and the Methodist Orphanage. Unemployment 
Board, Minutes, 25-26 July, 19 October, 1934. 
176. Star, 31 March, 1932. 
to minimise their share of the cost.of relief work, the 
provisio~ of tools, materials and supervision. 177 Yet 
most of the major projects which they would have under-
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taken in the absence of the economic crisis, including 
road reconstruction, required all three. Therefore "make-
work" jobs did tend to creep in. 
The Christchurch seaside borough of New Brighton 
furnished some extreme examples of the problems that could 
arise as a result of restricted local financing of relief 
work. The borough had become the haven for hundreds of 
Christchurch unemployed and their families, attracted by 
the low or non-existent rents for accommodation in holiday 
baches. The council strove to provide as much relief work 
as possible, even assisting single men, a group largely 
spurned by the Christchurch City Council. Yet the borough 
had considerab~e financial difficulties. In normal times 
its population had been under five thousand, it contained 
many undeveloped sections whose owners were quite prepared 
to relinquish them rather than meet a second rates bill, 
and a large part of the borough's territory was in reserves. 
Consequently New Brighton struggled to provide supervision 
for some 350 relief workers with a permanent staff of just 
177. ~ Metropolitan Relief Works Committee was established in Christchurch 
in 1932 to suggest large projects for No.5 Scheme work. It detailed 
a large number but was exasperated by the local bodies' reluctance 
to provide more than a small fraction of the total cost of any 
project. The chairman of the Committee, H. Kitson, pointed out 
that men were happier doing useful work and that "it was almost 
impossible to find work where the expenditure was all for labour". 
J.S. Barnett, a Labour city councillor, claimed that the Unemploy-
ment Board would soon be forced to pay for materials, just as it 
had been forced to pay all wages - presumably by the threat of 
thousands of unemployed being forced to seek hospital board charity 
or to starve. Times, 30 July, 1932. A copy of the Committee's 
report can be found in Howard Papers, 980/149. 
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over a dozen, only four of them being administrators. 178 
These employees had to combine their existing duties with 
the supervision of relief workers. 
One story, possibly apocryphal, is told of a New 
Brighton borough official who returned unexpectedly to a 
scrub-clearing job to collect a piece of surveying equip-
mente Unable to find the gang where he had left them, he 
called out, "Have you got the 'T'?" Back came the reply 
from deep in the scrub, "Yes, we've got the tea, have you 
179 got the milk and sugar?" 
walter Bromley, the secretary of the Unemployment 
Board, sparked a crisis over the quality of supervision at 
New Brighton in 1934. A large proportion of the borough's 
relief workforce was then eng~ged on the construction of a 
golf course at the Rawhiti Domain. The job had already 
absorbed so much Unemployment Board money in wages that it 
was dubbed, perhaps by Bromley himself, "the Golden Golf-
course". The board proposed to transfer the majority of 
the borough's relief workers, married as well as single, 
t k t th A hl R ' t t ml.'les to the north. 180 o wor a e s ey l.ver, wen y 
The plan obliged the men to stay in camp for at least a 
week at a time. The resulting public outcry brought together 
local body politicians, clergymen and leaders of unemployed 
k ' 't' 181 f h f d t 182 wor ers organl.sa l.ons. Most 0 t e men re use 0 go. 
178. At one stage in 1934, the borough was employing 420. Press, 
30 April, 1935. 
179. Retold to the author by R. Greenaway. 
180. Press, 4,9,19 October, 1934. Bromley claimed that New Brighton's 
lack of supervision was the worst he had seen. Sun, 11 October, 
1934. 
181. Sun, 5,8,12,19,20 October, 1934. 
182. Press, 6 October, 1934. 
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As well as offending against an important tenet of what 
was becoming the dominant working-class set of values -
the unity of the nuclear family - and depriving men of 
home comforts, it was widely believed that there were 
particular dangers to the wives of the unemployed ih New 
Brighton. A.E. Armstrong talked of their being "left to 
the ravages of a certain section of young men who parade 
New Brighton during the summer". 183 The hospital board 
refused to provide the strikers with rations, but a number 
of pr ';vate firms f d' th d t' 184 Th »d' t ..... came orwar w~ ona ~ons. > e.> l.SPU e 
> was eventually settled by making the orders to camp 
dependent on a medical certificate of fitness. Those 
unemployed graded as unfit were to be transferred to 
sustenance. with the assistance 'of a sympathetic doctor 
almost all the married men proved to be unfit: 
If they passed they went into the country ... Were 
they physically fit for this? Perhaps. Were they 
fit psychologically to desert wife, home and family, 
in the crisis of destitution, at the very time when 
male support was most needed? No, they were not. 
In all of them was either the anxiety neurosis or 
its potential. The great majority were certified 
by me as unfit. Dr. Fox fully approved. So probably 
did many of my colleagues in other centres, for 185 
after a while married men were no longer sent to camp. 
Work on the Summit Road had also become notorious for 
lack of tools and lax oversight. Although at times over 
seven hundred men were employed there, the Summit Road 
Trust lacked the finance for anything more than minimal 
.. 186 
superv~s~on. Much of it was provided personally by 
183. Press, 24 October, 1934. 
184. ~, 27 October, 1934. 
185. F.O. Bennett, A Canterbury Tale, Wellington, 1980, p.161. ' 
186. See criticism of Justice Frazer in giving judgment for compensation 
to the widow of J. Banks, relief labourer. Times, 14 March, 1934. 
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Harry Ell, an eccentric Progressive Liberal from the days 
of Tommy ,Taylor, and the driving force behind the project. 
Late in 1933 the Unemployment Board insisted that the job 
be handed over to the Public Works Department1s super-
'. . 187 v~S~on. Thereafter the work-rate appears to have 
been stepped up at the cost of some friction with the 
radical organisers on the job. 188 The Summit Road had 
tended to become the dumping ground for those relief workers 
who proved least amenable to discipline. It normally 
entailed the most arduous journey to and from work. 
A factor which particularly afflicted work under the 
No. 5 Scheme was its part-time nature. Depending on the 
worker1s family responsibilities, the number of days worked 
per week could vary between one and four at various times 
during the scheme1s life. Workers were therefore more than 
usually alienated from their work, returning after a week 
or more to a different piece of ground and seldom being able 
to use the same tools. This effect was compounded when the 
Unemployment Board introduced a system of rotation of the 
189 
men around the various relief jobs in the urban area. 
However, the low rate of pay on relief works, whether 
part-time in the city or full-time in camp, alienated the 
187. Press, 31 October, 1983. There were 750 men employed on the Summit 
Road at that stage. 
188. There was something of a confrontation early in the new year when 
the organisers of a stop-work meeting found "twenty grinning 
policemen" awaiting them at the top of the hill. The local head 
of the PWD proceeded to threaten them with piecework. ~I 9, 
10 January, 1935. Press, 15 January, 1934. 
189. Sun, 28 July, 1931. 
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men still more. The effect was compounded by the imposition 
of a ten ,per cent cut in time, and therefore earnings, on 
relief work between 1932 and 1935. 190 This may have helped 
the board to finance full-time work and the provision of 
rations, blankets and boots, but it appears to have disgusted 
most of those left on No. 5 Scheme work. It seems to have 
particularly affected work on the McCormack's Bay Causeway, 
begun in 1932 and intended to be completed by the end of 
1933. Ultimately it drifted to a conclusion some months into 
1935. The City Engineer noted that 
Since the 10% cut was inflicted the output has 
steadily gone down from bad to worse, mostly 
because many of the workers are losing heart, 
taking no interest in their work and labouring 
under a keen sense of injustice. Sacking them 
even after repeated warnings has but little 
effect, for they are sent to work at other places 
and eventually come back to the old task again 
because of the rotational system of working. Men 
in this way have been discharged several times. 191 
Low pay was also a major reason for discontent in the 
single men's camps. These were established in 1932, partly 
to give what the farmers in government considered more 
productive work than they were getting in town - building 
country roads and supplying farm labour. They were1also 
intended to get some of the more troublesome of the unemployed 
out of the main centres. The PWD was responsible for most 
of these camps and imposed its system of co-operative 
contracts on their work. Under this, gangs competed with 
each other for their share of the amount allocated for 
labour on the job. From 1932 to 1934 this amount was 
190. Times, 15-,19 November, 1932; AJHR, 1935, H35, p.19. 
191. Christchurch City Council, City Engineer's Report, 1933, p.76. 
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calculated at ten shillings per man. Under co-operative 
contract ,conditions, less competent or less enthusiastic 
workers tended to get forced into a single gang which 
consequently earned much less than the ten shillings. 192 
Some of the unemployed were of the type normally found on 
PWD Works, but many were not, and this encouraged a wide 
range of payment. One of the main demands in the dispute 
at the No.2 Camp at Glen Wye on the Lewis Pass in 1934 
was for the formation of a single gang. 193 
Primitive living conditions were similarly a great 
cause for complaint, especially during the period in which 
the camps were being established. The Hilltop (Akaroa Road) 
camp in particular experienced such difficulties. Initial 
complaints included the two-mile walk to and from work, an 
inadequate water supply, deep mud due to poor drainage, and 
d · . h fl . d 't 194 tent accommo at~on w~t out oor~ng on an expose s~ e. 
At the Lewis Pass works an unofficial commission sent by 
Sullivan early in 1934 found complaints about one of the two 
camps fully justified. They described many tents as "torn, 
ragged and draughty" and considered the food and storerooms 
to be "disgraceful". They also criticised the worn tents 
195 and low average pay at the small PWD camp at Lake Sumner. 
192. One editor maintained that some men on the Lewis Pass received only 
3/9d. Sun 2 February, 1934. Shortly after these single men's camps 
had been established, Coates emphasised that he had always 
intended that the pay would be merely an "allowance", not wages. 
27 November, 1931. 
193. Sun, 12 February, 1934. The "co-operative contract" system of gangs 
competing for a fixed sum led to a strike at Hilltop within a fort-
night when the men realised that they had not been guaranteed ten 
shillings a week and "found". Press, 24 September, 1931. 
194. Press, 26 September, 1931; Times, 1 October, 1931. 
195. Star, 2 February, 1934. Some other PWD camps appear to have been 
well-planned, including that at the Ashley River. Press, 8 June, 
1933. Nevertheless, there was a dispute over payment for weekly 
transport back to Christchurch. Press, 17 September, 1933. Few 
protests emerged from the small camps at Motunau, Burnham or Waipara. 
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The local PWD must bear some of the blame for the level of 
complaint at its camps, as the Forestry Department had 
little trouble with its tree-planting gangs in the Hanmer 
area which involved at least as many men over a longer 
. d 196 perJ.o • The same commission that condemned the Lewis 
Pass camps reported favourably on the forestry camps at 
Hanmer and Balmoral. The camps for farm workers subsidised 
under the No.4A Scheme also appear to have been generally 
197 quiet, although farmwork was not popular. Landowners 
tended to expect hard labour over long hours for low wages. 
The problems of low pay, hard conditions and isolation 
were related. The attractions of the city over isolated 
country living had tended to increase since the turn of the 
century. Average housing conditions had also risen sharply, 
especially in town. It was now far more of a sacrifice for 
city men to be confined, virtually under compulsion, in make-
shift camps far from their homes and urban life. They 
expected good wages to compensate them for this sacrifice. 
Furthermore, many of the city men were unused to coping 
with the boredom of camp life where distractions such as 
books, newspapers and gramophone records were difficult 
and expensive to obtain. Following a number of visits to 
198 the camps, Sullivan helped to organise the provision of 
196. Press, 19 September, 1931. There was, however, some minor trouble 
at Hanmer in 1934. Sun, 6, 18 June, 1934. 
197. Star, 4 July, 1932; Sun, 22 February, 1934. It would be easy to 
exaggerate the importance of the local camps. Most were supervised 
by the PWD and its relief camps never contained more than three or 
four hundred men in the whole of Canterbury. The Waimakariri 
River Trust employed over a thousand men at its camps but only 
limited numbers "lived in" with the city so close. 
198. Sullivan was seldom able to afford the time to visit the often 
isolated camps in person. Therefore he despatched little detach-
ments of city councillors from both parties and council officials 
to investigate camp conditions and morale. Press, 30 September, 
1931; star, 22 August, 1932; 2 February, 1934. 
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these materials to the men. 199 Radio sets were sought 
with particular eagerness. 
Another feature of the depression, casual employment, 
was encouraged by part-time relief work and possibly by 
short-time working. Attempts to keep a close check on 
relief workers' nother earnings" proved exceedingly 
difficult to administer without a large inspectorate and 
the Unemployment Board had enough trouble in collecting 
its levies and tax. It would also have entailed complicated 
arrangements with local bodies to reduce allocations of 
different men by different amounts. The board therefore 
200 tended to rely on the honesty of relief workers, 
information received and the fact that the number of days 
spent on relief prevented the unemployed from taking full-
time jobs and still drawing their fldole n• 
Many of them turned to canvassing. It had not been 
unusual for women and children to sell surplus home produce 
and some purchased goods door-to-door,201 but now there 
was an influx of men into this form of employment. During 
June, 1931, one householder claimed that he had been visited 
202 by twenty-three hawkers in three days. Items hawked 
included meat, fruit and vegetables, bootlaces, stationery, 
fancy goods and a liquor "absolutely guaranteed to make 
199. Press, 16 October, 1931. The Star also collected large quantities 
of old books and magazines for the camps. Star, 9 July, 1932. 
200. There were strong complaints at the vast amount of detail that 
relief workers were expected to provide. Star, 24 April, 1935. 
For summary of questions on UB 32 see Press, 17 March, 1933. 
201. Information supplied to the author by the late Mrs. Peggy Jennings 
of Woolston, who had canvassed regularly with her mother as a youn~ 
girl during this period. Also information from Mrs. R.E. Righton, 
who sold surplus produce from he.r parents' farm in Bromley door-to-
door. 
202. Sun, 9 June, 1931. 
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coal burn more slowly". The number of licenses issued 
by the city council for this form of selling increased from 
160 in 1930 to 356 in 1931, and with a fee of three 
shillings a month it seems likely that very many sellers 
l ' d 203 were un ~cense • Within a year most licences had 
lapsed, and the enthusiasm of canvassers and the tolerance 
204 of householders had tended to wane. It seems likely that 
the shift to sustenance pay after 1933 increased the resort 
to casual work, including canvassing, by eliminating the need 
to set aside a number of days each week for relief work. 
Certainly Christchurch shopkeepers were strongly complaining 
of unlicensed competition from hawkers in 1936. 205 
During that year the Unemployment Board carried out a. 
survey in one major centre which revealed that over half 
the men on its payroll had supplementary earnings. 206 This 
was almost certainly an underestimate, given the understand-
able caution of which most of the unemployed in providing 
such information to officialdom. In 1936 Terence McCombs, 
the new Labour M.P. for Lyttelton, claimed that at least 
one in six of the forms required by the board were falsely 
207 
made out. Gardening and repair jobs were probably the 
commonest form of casual labour performed. On occasions 
odd-jobbing could extend to breaking the law by carrying out 
203. ~, 24 August, 1931. 
204. Sun, 22 August, 1931. 
205. The city is crowded with wood and fruit hawkers, bottle dealers, 
and boot lace and lead pencil artists who are on the dole and do 
not think it worth while to mention this at the Labour Office. 
Star-Sun, 12 August, 1936. 
206. " •.• a cross-section taken in one of the main Employment Bureaux 
recently disclosed the fact that approximately 50 per cent of the 
registered unemployed supplemented their relief earnings by casual 
earnings". AJHR, 1935, H35, p.2. 
207. Star-Sun, 26 June, 1936. 
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plumbing or electrical work without a licence. 208 Other 
illegal attempts to fill empty pockets and empty hours 
included bookmaking and bootlegging. 209 Taxidriving was 
a notorious means of supplementing relief pay. In 1936 
an inquiry into the taxi and carrying business was told in 
Christchurch how the share-driving system of Gold Band 
Taxis, operated by C.S. Trillo, had first driven out most 
210 driving for wages. Then the number of taxis working 
for the company was doubled, then trebled, and the drivers 
found it impossible to make wages, despite long hours and 
ruses such as driving their cabs backwards to reduce the 
mileage on the meter. One former employee stated that 
Many Gold Band men had to go on relief. They 
would drive again at the weekends, from twelve 
o'clock on Saturday nights continuously until 
they were relieved on Monday mornings. A number 
were receiving sustenance and driving right 
through the week. They were sleeping a lot in 
the cars. They had to do it."2l1 
It was further claimed that in October, 1935, forty of the 
drivers had been officially relief workers. 
The importance of relief work and associated casual 
employment should not be exaggerated, however. The greatest 
number of relief workers employed on the No. 5 Scheme in 
and around the urban area was less than four thousand. 212 
Even allowing for the few hundred single men sent Uinto the 
country" to full-time work, those on relief work did not 
constitute more than around fifteen per cent of the city's 
208. Sun, 1 February, 1933. 
209. Star, 6 November, 1934; Times, 15 November, 1932. 
210. Star-Sun 29 September, 1936. 
211. Star-Sun, 30 September, 1936. 
212. Calculated from figures given in Press, 21 February, 21 April, 
5 August, 1933; 30 April, 1935; Times, 15 April, 1933. 
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male workforce at anyone time. Many more men would have 
gone through a short spell of relief work at some time, 
but it was far from being the experience of the majority 
of Christchurch men during this period. 
For most the impact of the depression on earnings was 
represented by a reduction in working hours (loss of over-
time and short-time working), the official cuts in wage 
and salary rates, and falling profits. On the other hand, 
these must be set against a rapid fall in the cost of living. 
In particular, the dark cloud of falling prices for primary 
producers had a silver lining for urban consumers. In 
Christchurch the official index of prices for the three 
food groups (fruit and vegetables, groceries and meat) had 
fallen 15% by 1931, compared with the average between 1926 
and 1930. 213 In 1932 the fall had increased to 23% and 
in 1933 it was 27%. Even in 1935 the average level was 19% 
below that for 1926-30. The index of house-rents was slower 
to fall. 214 In 1932 it was 16% down on 1926-30 in Christ-
church. A year later the reduction stood at 25% and it 
was still over twenty per cent in 1935. Interest rates on 
mortgages had been cut by the latter amount in 1932. 
The numbers of employees who had their earnings reduced 
by less than twenty per cent during the depression were 
considerable~ They included public servants, local body 
employees and the "average ll factory worker. Public servant 
wages and salaries were cut by ten per cent in June, 1931, 
213. eso, Prices, Wages, etc. 1936, p.l. 
214. Ibid., loc.cit. 
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and again by a maximum of ten per cent during the following 
year. This represented a maximum cut of nineteen per cent 
in all, but the second reduction was graduated and there-
fore most cuts fell into the fifteen to seventeen per cent 
215 
range. These reductions were partially restored at the 
beginning of 1935. Most local body employees suffered only 
a ten per cent cut in their pay rates, with only the 
higher-paid salaried officials of the Christchurch City 
C . 1 f . d' 11 216 ounc~ ac~ng any re uctl0n at a . The annual average 
earnings of male factory workers in Canterbury dropped 
by seventeen per cent between their apex in 1930-31 and 
their nadir in 1933-34. 217 The fall in the average female 
factory earnings over the same period was thirteen per cent 
but the decline continued to fifteen per cent in 1935-36. 
The calculation of average earnings, based on the division 
of total earnings by total employees, may slightly under-
estimate the actual decline in the pay of individual 
employees in 1933-34 because it is probable that higher 
paid staff with particular skills were less likely to be 
made redundant. On the other hand, it tends to under-
estimate the rate of recovery in earnings as less skilled 
and younger employees were taken on. The incomes of workers 
in private shops and offices are difficult to trace. 
Nevertheless, one Christchurch merchant returned his thirty-
five employees wages to pre-cut levels in October, 1933 218 
215. NZYB, 1934, p.650. 
216. In June, 1931, their salaries were reduced on a graduated scale from 
15% on £1000 to 8% on £350. In August, 1931, ten per cent was made 
the maximum, but in most cases the cut was much less. Sullivan 
suggested the average was around 7.5%. Christchurch City Council, 
Outward Correspondence, 28 June, 1932; 8 February, 1933. 
217. Calculated from figures in CSO, Factory Production, 1926-31; Factory 
and Building Production, 1932-36, "Sununary by Provincial Districts". 
218. Sun, 3 October, 1933. 
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and there were repeated reports of other employers restoring 
between 2~% and 7~% of the ten per cent by the end of 
1934. 219 Almost all groups of workers whose earnings can 
be estimated from published figures appear to have had an 
increase in their real incomes by the middle of 1933. This 
increase was eroded somewhat by the rise in the cost of 
living to 1935, but some gains still remained in real income 
for persons in employment over their situation during the 
more prosperous late 'twenties. 
A reduction in average hours worked was another improve-
ment in labour conditions which the combined influences of 
technological change and economic depression helped to 
bring about. In addressing the problem of how to reduce 
very high and persistent levels of unemployment the 
authorities handed on part of the increased production 
from new technology in the shape of shorter working hours. 
The rebellious A.E. Armstrong was not the only prominent 
citizen of Christchurch pushing for this change. In 1935 
Sidney George Holland, later to be Prime Minister but then 
the immediate past-president of the Canterbury Employers' 
Association, joined other progressive businessmen in 
219. The Canterbury Education Board restored the second cut in 
August, 1933. Sun, 2 November, 1933. In April, 1934, a 
m~rchandising firm employing a hundred workers became the fourth 
large firm to restore half the ten per cent cut. Sun, 16 May, 
1934. At the beginning of the 1934-35 killing season the 
freezing companies had almost entirely restored the rate per 
hundred stock killed. Sun, 17 October, 1934. Another national 
hardware merchant just beat the Labour-controlled Christchurch 
Tramway Board to partial restoration. Sun, 15 November, 
21 December, 1934. 
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advocating a forty-hour week without loss of pay.220 
As earlY,as 1933 the Unemployment Board limited workers 
employed on building work under the No. 10 Scheme to 
forty hours work per week. This became standard on the 
full-time relief works initiated by local bodies at 
award rates during 1934 and 1935. 221 Even in the private 
sector there was a sudden downward movement of four per 
cent in full-time weekly hours during 1935-36. 222 Between 
1914 and 1926 average hours dropped by five per cent and 
then scarcely moved for the next nine years. 223 Clearly 
there was a strong downward pressure on working hours to 
back the implementation of a forty-hour week in most 
industries by the new Labour Government. Average hours 
220. Together they constituted an Industries Development Sub-committee of 
the Canterbury Manufacturers' Association (CMA). Sun, 14 March, 
1935. Holland's importance and capability have tended to be 
underestimated, or at least neglected, by historians. Not only 
did he lead the way on the question of reduced hours, he welcomed 
the partial restoration of the cut in civil service salaries 
(Times, 25 August, 1934), was a strong advocate of tariffs to 
develop New Zealand's domestic market (Press, 26 September, 1934) 
and took a leading part in public protests against the devaluation 
of 1933 (Sun, 2 February, 1933). On the latter occasion his 
retirement from the presidency of the Canterbury Employers' 
Association may well have been foreshadowed by his suggestion 
. that individual farmers should have been subjected to a "means 
test" rather than automatically assisted through the exchange rate. 
Holland's proposal for "debt;...free money" has received some 
notice (Sutch, op.cit., p.174) , and is an example of the same 
determination to find ways to get the economy expanding again. 
221. Labour Department Files, 1/2/872. The CMA's report is in the 
file and served as a basis for cabinet approval of a conference 
on the subject, to be held after the general election. 
222. CSO, Prices, Wages, etc, 1936, p.15. 
223. Ibid., 1933, p.16. 
worked dropped by another eight per cent when this 
legislat~on was applied in the 1936-36 year. 224 
229 
The employment of women was an area particularly 
affected by new technology in the 'twenties and 'thirties. 
Their opportunities for paid employment expanded despite 
the depression, and to a limited extent because of it. 
Nationally the number of women "in gainful employment" 
increased by 20.9%, compared with an increase of only 
14.8% for then. 225 
Manufacturing industry saw a particularly substantial 
growth in its female workforce. Between 1926 and 1936 the 
average number of women wage-earners in Canterbury 
factories during the year increased by 57%, as against a 
rise of about eight per cent in the number of their male 
226 
counterparts. As a result, the female proportion of 
wage-earning factory staff in the province increased from 
22% to 30%. 
There was a particularly large growth in the employ-
ment of women in industries which already had well-estalished 
female workforces. Most striking was the increase in the 
proportion of female employees in the Christchurch footwear 
224. Ibid., 1939, p.17. The Labour Party in Christchurch had made 
the provision of a forty-hour week without loss of pay to council 
employees a central plank of their programme for the 1935 
Municipal election. NCLRC, Minutes, 14 March, 1935. Unfortunately 
this merely compounded the impression that the party represented 
the interests of council workers rather than ratepayers. 
225. Census, 1926, Vol.9, p.44-50; 1936, Vol. la, p.38-51, 52-59. 
226. CSO, Factory ••• , 1926-36, "Employment - Male Wage-earners by 
Months" and "Female Wage-earners by Months". 
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industry, from 23% in 1926 to 33% in 1936. 227 The local 
tailoring industry also employed a substantially higher 
percentage of women at the end of this time, as did the 
manufacturers of biscuits and confectionery.228 
However, there was also a considerable movement of 
female wage-earners into forms of manufacturing traditionally 
dominated by men. This was not simply a wage-cutting 
measure. In a number of cases the employment of female 
workers was agreed to by the Arbitration Court while the 
industries concerned were still increasing production and 
employment under the stimulus of the United Government's 
expansionary policies and an international economic 
recovery was widely envisaged rather than any collapse. 
During 1930, for example, the dominion's engineering 
employers managed to get female workers accepted into 
awards covering the lighter areas of their work. These 
included "light drilling, cutting and screwing, light 
milling, ore grinding, light lathe work, assembling! 
. .. b k' d k' II 229 solder1ng, pa1nt1ng, ac 1ng an core-ma ~ng • The 
Iron and Brass Moulders' Federation of Workers had declared 
the proposal "a dastardly attack on the standard of culture 
of the womanhood of this dominionll. It maintained that 
lithe women of New Zealand are on a higher plane of culture 
than in countries where womanhood is degraded to do such 
work" - scrubbing floors and handling dirty clothes were 
clearly more uplifting. Under the changed award many young 
227. Ibid., "Boot and Shoe Manufacturing". 
228. Ibid., "Biscuit, Confectionery, and Sugar-boiling Works". 
229. Star, 23 May, 1930. 
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women subsequently found employment in the light 
engineering enterprises fostered by electrical technology. 
For example, "dozens of girls" were employed by the New 
Zealand Dry Cell and Battery Co., established in Christ-
church in 1933. 230 Women had also -been accepted into 
the motor upholstery trade in 1930. 231 At the end of 
1934 they were introduced into the award covering motor 
232 
assembly, following the introduction of c.k.d. quotas. 
Other male-dominated industries also experienced an 
influx of female workers during the late 'twenties and 
early 'thirties. In 1930 the Christchurch Printers' 
Union was calling for the cessation of classes in their 
trade at the Technical Institute, linking them to an 
233 increase in the number of women employed. Between 
1926 and 1930 the number of female wage-earners in 
Canterbury printing works had increased by ten per cent, 
compared with an increase of two per cent in the number 
234 
of such male employees. In the Canterbury furniture-
making industry the proportion of female wage-earners 
increased from eight to twelve per cent between 1926 and 
1929. 235 Even the male bastion of the freezing-works 
experienced an influx of female workers into their ancillary 
operations such as bag-making, packing, tinning and 
preserving. In 1934 H.C. Revell, the Secretary of the 
Canterbury Freezing Workers Union noted that provision 
230. Star, 17 February, 1934. 
231. Sun, 16.August, 1930. 
232. Sun, 7 November, 1934. 
233. Sun, 8 November, 1930. 
234. CSO, Factorx:.~., 1926-30,' "Printing Establishments". 
235. Ibid. , "Furniture and Cabinet Making". 
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for such employment had existed for some time. However, 
Canterbury employers had not taken advantage 
of the right to employ girls and women in the 
preserving departments until four years ago, 
when the New Zealand Refrigerating Company at 
Islington dismissed some male workers and 
substituted females. The Canterbury Frozen 
Meat Company at Belfast the following year did 
the same. 23b 
Revell considered "the displacement of male labour by 
female labour ••. a serious aspect". He was commenting on 
an outcry against the employment of women in freezing-works, 
led in parliament by Bob Semple and Elizabeth Mccombs. 237 
Herbert H. Kyle, the very conservative Reform M.P. for 
Riccarton, agreed that such employment was "a scandal". 
However, the most striking increase in female employ-
ment in terms of absolute numbers of workers occurred in 
the white-collar occupations, especially in shops and 
private offices. The national growth in female commercial 
employment (28.4%) was not as large as that in comparable 
male employment (47.9%) .238 Nevertheless, it was well 
above the percentage increase in the total female work-
force. Most of the growth took place in the lower paid 
occupation of shop-assistant rather than the better paid 
and more prestigious occupation of saleswoman. But the 
number of female managers increased significantly. 
On the other hand, the national increase in numbers 
of female office staff (23.2%) compared favourably with the 
rise of 16.7% in their male colleagues. Again most of the 
growth took place in the lower-paid office occupations such 
236. Sun, 12 October, 1934. 
237. Sun, 17 October, 1934. 
238. Unless otherwise indicated, these and following figures are 
calculated from Census, 1926; 1936, loc.cit. 
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as typist, cashier and office machinist. Yet there was 
substan~ia1 expansion in usually more distinguished and 
more lucrative vocations such as that of "secretary" -
private, company, organisational and "not otherwise 
described". There was also a greater percentage of women 
amongst those giving book-keeper, or customs, shipping or 
law clerk as their occupation. Unfortunately too few 
clerical jobs are enumerated for the Christchurch Urban 
Area in both. 1926 and 1936 censuses to make a comparison 
between local trends in male and female office employment. 
Nevertheless, examination of the annual factory returns 
from twenty-two Canterbury industries reveals that the 
female proportion of their total office staff increased 
from 27.8% to 33.8% between 1926 and 1932. 239 
Other white-collar occupations showed a similar trend. 
) 
The national proportion of women employees in journalism 
rose frQm eight per cent in 1926 to eleven per cent in 
1936, despite an increase of over a third in the number of 
male employees. This was evident to a minor degree in the 
returns from Canterbury "Printing Works", which included 
240 
newspapers. The number of female literary staff grew 
from ten to eighteen between 1927 and 1931 while the 
number of males actually dropped from 133 to 127. Similarly, 
women increased their dominance in the expanding vocation 
of library work. In 1936 they formed 80% of the total 
employees in that field, compared with 73% in 1926. The 
numbers of persons employed had risen from 204 to 376 or 84%. 
239. eso, Factory ••• , 1926-32, individual industries. 
240. Ibid. 
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Two major areas of white-collar work where female 
employment tended to decrease were teaching and the public 
service. Between 1926 and 1936 the national proportion of 
teachers who were women declined from 64.4% to 62.1%, 
although their total numbers remained roughly static. 
The number of women in the public service occupations 
decreased by twelve per cent, compared with an eleven per 
cent increase in the number of men employed. In both 
cases the constriction of recruitment meant that women 
employees leaving to marry were not replaced. There was 
also some discrimination against married women in the 
h ' ,241 teac ~ng serv~ce. 
Conversely, the numerically small but socially very 
important representation of women in the professions showed 
a significant increase. Their share of the total of 
medical practitioners rose from 6.5% to 7.6% between 1926 
and 1936. They also held their share of the rapidly 
growing number of university posts, although they had still 
not gained a professional chair in 1936. The first academic 
appointment of a woman at Canterbury University College 
occurred in 1916. 242 Up to 1926 there had only been two 
241. As early as January, 1930 1 the Canterbury Education Board was 
protesting at having to continue employing married women whose 
husbands could support them. Sun, 17 JanuarYI 1930. It was 
eventually decided to employ no more married women teachers from 
17 March, 1933. Sun 1 21 April, 1933; 20 September, 1935. The 
feeling against married women' holding jobs when their husbands 
had steady employment was very strong 1 particularly amongst working 
people. Sun, 17, 25, 27 July, 26 August, 27 September, 1929; 
7 February, 1933; 30 August, 1934; 26 March 1935. In 1929 the 
Otago Labour council condemned the practice. 7 December, 1929. 
Sullivan wrote of "the absorption in commerce thousands of girl 
and women workers, who, because they are competent and their 
labour cheapi have pushed out their fathers, brothers, husbands 
and sweethearts into the ranks of the workless". Times, 22 May, 1930. 
242. W. Gardner, E.Beardsley and T.Carter, A Historx of the University 
of Canterbury 1 1873-1973, Christchurch, 1973, p.457-68. 
such appointments, but there were five more during the 
next decade. 
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The drive by employers to reduce costs in difficult 
economic times was certainly one motive behind the growth 
in female employment. Where women were admitted to awards 
they were usually given a lower wage-rate, and in all 
occupations where there were significant numbers of men 
and women the latter had substantially lower incomes. 
However, the desire by employers to save money was not 
the only reason for the influx of women into the workforce. 
Electrical machinery was usually lighter to operate than 
its predecessors and its attendants did not normally require 
a long period of apprenticeship, as they had when the same 
work had been performed manually. Similarly, in the case 
of secretarial work, applicants generally acquired their 
skills outside their place of employment, in their own 
time and at their own. expense at Technical Institute 
night school or a private commercial college such as 
Digby's. Thus an employer lost comparatively little of 
his investment when a female employee left to get married, 
and she could be replaced relatively easily. The increase 
in female factory employment was further assisted by the 
fact that the greatest expansion was taking place in 
retailing, officework and light industries such as 
clothing manufacture, food processing and assembling. 
Work in these areas offended least against the prevailing 
view of women as inherently weak. Finally there was a 
strong demand for jobs from increasing numbers of young 
women seeking employment between school and marriage. 
With fewer brothers and sisters to look after, less family 
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self-sufficiency and less domestic industry, keeping girls 
at home ,had become an expensive anachronism in a growing 
number of households. To this extent the Sun was right 
when it claimed in 1934 that IItimes have greatly changed 
since it was thought fitting by men that their wives and 
daughters should sit by the fire and stagnate mentally in 
what was little else than domestic imprisonment".243 
As more young women earned a little money of their own, 
producers and advertisers increasingly directed their 
activities towards the exploitation of the new market. 
This closed the circle by enhancing the appeal of paid 
employment for girls. 
There is comparatively little evidence that the big 
shift in employment towards women between 1926 and 1936 
represented the efforts of a large number of employers to 
,take advantage of depression conditions to sack men in 
order to replace them with lower-paid and more docile 
women. In some Canterbury industries, such as printing and 
grain-milling, the proportion of male to female wage-
earners actually increased between 1930 and 1932. 244 In 
none did the movement to a higher percentage of women wage-
earners accelerate between those years. Women workers were 
often the last on, the least skilled and those less likely 
to have to support a family. It was during the recovery 
period that the spectacular growth in female factory 
employment resumed in Canterbury and it continued long 
after economic and industrial conditions had changed. 
243. Sun, 1 May, 1934. 
244. CSO, Factory ••• , 1926, 1932. 
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The percentage increase in such employment was still 
double ~hat for male wage-earners in Canterbury factories 
between 1936 and 1937. 245 This was roughly the same 
differential as between 1926 and 1929. There was almost 
certainly some II sweating II on some jobs especially in 
Auckland. However, there appears to have been little in 
Christchurch's clothing industry, a major and expanding 
employer of women. J. Roberts, a leading local trade 
unionist and Secretary of the New Zealand Clothing Trades 
Federation put this down to lithe local officers of the 
Labour Department, particularly the chief and the lady 
inspector, for their zeal in dealing with anything 
suggesting Jsweatingl •.. ".246 
Paid domestic work was an area into which many girls 
were still forced by economic necessity and in which poor 
wages and conditions prevailed. The number of women in 
female domestic occupations increased by twenty-two per 
cent between 1926 and 1936. This was somewhat more than 
the overall increase in female employment but was signifi-
cantly less than the twenty-seven per cent growth in 
domestic employment between 1921 and 1926. Furthermore, 
there was a clear decline in the number of housemaids, 
pantrymaids, lady helps, and nursemaids, typically full-
time workers living within the households that employed 
them. On the other hand there was a big increase in the 
number of general female domestic servants and housekeepers, 
many of whom would have lived in their own homes. Electric 
245. Ibid, "Sununary by Provincial Districts". 
246. Star, 19 October, 1933. He was commenting on an Auckland Anglican 
Synod resolution on "sweating", and touched on the situation in 
that city. 
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irons, gas and electric stoves, water heaters, and, above 
all, vacuum cleaners were rapidly reducing the need for 
full-time domestic staff. The "daily" became increasingly 
prevalent in wealthy homes which once would have had one 
or two servants tucked away in little rooms at the back of 
the house. In 1929 a group of Christchurch professional 
and society women formed a Home Service Association with 
the aim of bringing together those wishing to employ part-
t ' d t' 1 b d th d t 'd' 247 lme omes lC a our an ose prepare 0 provl e It. 
The Association offered 
someone to wash up, to look after your children, 
to darn or mend, to do fine smocking, to read 
to an invalid, to undertake odd sewing, to look 
after your home in the afternoon or the evening, 
to arrange suppers for bridge parties, to set 248 
tables for afternoon teas, to iron, to shop ..• 
With such assistance wealthy wives could continue to live 
in decorative idleness without 'the cost of full-time 
servants. 
The development of the home appliances which reduced 
the need for such servants was timely, as the growth of 
alternative employment for young women was hardening their 
resistance to service. Live-in domestic jobs had been 
unpopular with working people not born into servant 
249 families even in nineteenth century rural England. 
Such work meant being constantly on call, taking low 
wages for long hours of labour, enjoying little private 
life, conforming to their employers' often strict models 
247. Sun, 26 March, 1929. 
248. Sun, 18 May, 1929. 
249. R. Samuel, "Quarry Roughs", in R. Samuel (Ed.), Village Life and 
Labour, London, 1975, p.157. 
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of behaviour, enduring the latter's varying moods from 
the base of the pecking order and sUffering isolation 
from family and friends. This isolation was particularly 
significant in New Zealand, where a high proportion of 
the people able to afford servants lived on farms. 
Despite widespread unemployment amongst women, private 
labour bureaux in Christchurch repeatedly reported 
difficulty in filling applications for female domestics 
h h t th d . 250 t roug ou e epress~on years. For example, the Sun 
reported in March, 1934, that 
two weeks ago a dental firm in Christchurch 
advertised for an assistant and received well 
over 150 applications. Of the number only 
one girl was working. Meanwhile labour 
exchanges and homes in town and country are 
crying out for help. Something is wrong 
somewhere. 251 
Miss M. Trent, a member of the Women's Unemployment 
Committee (WUC) and a stalwart of the anti-Labour Citizens' 
Association, replied that "it all boils down to the fact 
that unless housework is put on a union basis and made a 
profession, with definite hours, things will never get 
better". Two months later labour bureaux told the Sun 
that there was a big demand for "daily work" in shops, 
tearooms and factories because it gave young women freedom 
at the weekends, but "it was most difficult to persuade 
. t " 252 girls to accept country appo~ntmen s . 
Nevertheless, the main thrust of the work of the local 
WUC was towards training girls for paid domestic service. 
250. Sun, 11 May, 1931; 17 October, 1932; 21 January, 6 October, 1933; 
3 May, 1934; 4, 18 May, 1935. 
251. Sun, 2 March, 1934. 
252. Sun, 27 April, 1934. 
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One trade unionist on the committee described this ,emphasis 
as amounting to a "fetish,,253 and alleged that the intention 
of government policy under Coates seemed to be "to provide 
the farming community with cheap female domestic labour".254 
He talked of "domestic slavery". Certainly two non-Labour 
social workers mentioned cases where requests for domestic 
employees had been made on the assumption that no wages 
would be pa."d.255 A tl d t d M C ~ pparen y un e erre I rs. oates 
opened a new domestic training centre in Christchurch, 
telling the assembled girls that they would be ever grate-
ful for the opportunity they were being given. 256 The 
small allowance of 7/6, later 10/-, per week appears to 
have been the major attraction for the 150 or so young women 
who attended the centre. 257 
For young women as well as young men, the attractions 
of city life had increased greatly since the turn of the 
century. Moreover, alternative and much more attractive 
opportunities for employment had been increasing in town. 
Finally, the new system of regular relief work for married 
men helped to relieve the pressure on their daughters to 
253. Sun, 25 June, 1932. 
254. J. Roberts was the trade unionist. Sun, 3 July, 1931. E.H. Howard 
MP had a rather different complaint. He maintained that the WOC 
was spending "money that unemployed men should get". Sun 1 December, 
1933. 
255. Sun, 23 April, 1931. Duties included milking five cows. Sun, 
16 July, 1932. A. Fraer claimed "I have been asked, not once but 
many times, for girls to do housework and help in the home, but 
no wages are offered for such services". 
256. Sun, 6 October, 1932. 
257. Press, 24 February, 3, 17 June, 17 July, 1933. Also information 
from a Mrs. Ellis, who spent some time at the centre. 
13. New technology and new personnel in the office. 
Note electricity cables snaking across the floor. 
(MED, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 
1930.) 
, , 
14. One of the workrooms at Miller's, a Christchurch Company 
that expanded its workforce from six to 117 between 1930 
and 1932. The vast majority of its employees were women. 
By May, 1934, it was employing 320 people. This family 
firm exploited the potential of new electrical machines 
to produce clothing cheaply for the mass market. 
(Star, 12 May, 1934.) 
15. Mrs. J.G. Coates opens the new domestic training centre 
in Christchurch in October, 1932. 
(E. Ebbett, Victoria's Daughters, p.54.) 
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go into service in order to support the family.258 
However, work for pay constituted only a small part 
of the labour ordinarily performed by women. Unpaid 
domestic work at home remained their greatest task - even 
for many of those taking outside paid employment. But 
for many housewives changes in technology were already 
doing much to reduce this traditional burden. 
Electric lighting was by far the most common applica-
tion of the new technology in Christchurch households in 
1926 and one which required less cleaning and maintenance 
than illumination by gas, kerosene or candle. As a 
further incentive the MED provided loans to householders 
259 to make the expense of connection more manageable. 
By 1926 well over three-quarters of households in the 
city and New Brighton were receiving an "electric light 
bill".260 A number of new connections, in excess of 
disconnections and new building, were made during the early 
'thirties, and by 1936 virtually every home in the Christ-
h h b '11' d b 1 " 261 c urc Ur an Area was 1 umlnate y e ectrlclty. 
258. Another area of "paid employment" which may have grown during the 
depression was that of prostitution. Certainly there was talk of 
an increase in its incidence. Sun, 4 April, 1932. The local 
social worker for the Society for the Protection of Women and 
Children maintained that it was less prevalent than after the Great 
War. In early 1934 a policeman'described Latimer Square as a "hot-
bed of thieves and loose women just recently". Star, 27 March, 1934. 
National figures for in-patient treatments for gonorrhoea are 
subject to the usual reservations such as low reporting due to 
cost. However, a large rise in the number of women treated in 
1931 may indicate a ,greater resort to prostitution at a time when 
female unemployment was growing rapidly. CSo, Vital Statistics, 
1925-39, "Diseases Treated in Public Hospitals". 
259. MED, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 1927. 
260. Ibid., and Census, 1926, Vol.XII:j:,p.20. 
261. Census, 1936, Vol.XIII,p.ll. Approximate totals of electric ranges 
and water heaters can be found in CSO, Local Authorities Handbook, 
1927-36, and AJHR, 1927-36, Dl. 
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A wide range of other labour-saving household electrica: 
appliances were available by 1926. These included irons, 
vacuum cleaners, water-heaters, toasters, cookers, radiators, 
sewing and washing machines, kettles, and even refrigerators. 
Electricity was more versatile than its main competitor, 
gas, whose main home appliances were stoves, heaters, small· 
water heaters and rather fearsome irons. Once a house was 
wired for power, a much more extensive list of appliances 
could be used. Furthermore, electric stoves, usually had 
, 
an extra power point incorporated in them, enabling an 
electric jug or a toaster to be plugged in. Electricity 
also had other advantages in the home; electrical leads 
could be connected and disconnected more simply, were more 
flexible, and were less liable to leak than gas lines. 
However, the installation of most electrical home 
appliances required a new link to the mains supply and heavy 
wiring through conduits to each heating point. The cost of 
such work deterred many householders and helped to make the 
electric light and the electric iron - which could be 
powered from a special "ironing point" - the only wide-
spread electrical home appliances in Christchurch up to 
1926. 262 Moreover, the stove tended to be the purchase on 
which the decision to electrify pivotted and gas ranges 
262. There were 1,235 ironing points in 1922, MED, op.cit., 1922. 
The enthusiasm with which other household electrical appliances 
were taken up should not be underestimated, however. Electrolux 
reported that it had sold four thousand vacuum cleaners during 
its first nine months operating in New Zealand. 30 January, 
1926. It was only one of a number of companies in that 
field. Given an average wholesale price of seven or eight 
pounds, about eight thousand were imported in 1929 and rather more. 
in 1935. CSO, Trade and Shipping, "Imports", 1929, 1935. 
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continued generally to be cheaper than their electrical 
counterparts. Consequently the majority of the new stoves 
installed in Christchurch during the building boom of the 
'twenties were powered by gas. The number of gas stoves 
in Canterbury, most of them in Christchurch, more than 
doubled between 1923 and 1929. 263 
On the other hand, the rapidly falling price of 
domestic electricity (Table 4.7), its versatility, and the 
decrease in the cost of electrical appliances (Table 4.8), 
meant that the number of Christchurch homes with electric 
ranges was actually growing at a much faster rate than the 
number with gas cookers. Between 1929 and 1932 the two 
forms of energy attracted roughly the same number of new 
users, but thereafter electricity moved ahead. As the 
large-scale building of new homes resumed after the middle 
of 1933, it was the MED that captured the largest part of 
h k . h . 1 . 264 t e mar et w~t an aggress~ve range sa es campa~gn. 
TABLE 4.7: DOMESTIC ENERGY PRICES (1923 - 100) 
1923 1926 
86 
1929 1932 1935 
Electricity 100 56 43 34 
Gas 
Coal 
Sources: 
---,----".;-
100 90 
100 81 ' 
/ 90 
92 
(83) 
(88 ) 
(83) 
(85) 
MED, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 1923-
35; CSO,' Factory and Building Statistics, 1932, 
1935, (gas prices) ~ Prices, Wages, etc., 1923-29 
(gas and coal prices). 
263. CSO, Factory .•• , 1923, 1929, "Gasworks". 
264. MED, op.cit., 1934, 1935. 
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TABLE 4.8: PRICES OF SOME NEW ELECTRICAL APPLIANCES, 1923-35 
1923 1926 1929 1932 1935 
Electric -
iron 17/6 15/6 13/6 11/6 
toaster 25/- 18/6 11/9 
boiler 15/6 10/6 6/9 
kettle 37/6 32/6 24/6 
light 1/5 1/2~ 1/- 1/2~ 1/1 
Sources: Star, various issues, cheapest advertised prices. 
CSO, Trade and Shipping,. 1923-35 (light bulbs). 
Its offers of no-interest hire-purchase and free installa-
tion were firmly based on the rising profitability of 
selling current as bulk charges fell and the volume flowing 
through existing facilities increased. Electrical supply 
authorities now had greater profits to distribute than 
their competitors. 265 In building their new homes, young 
married couples faced the capital cost of installing some 
sort of power and electricity had versatility and an image 
of modernity as well as a growing cost-competitiveness. 
In all, the proportion of dwellings in the Christchurch 
Urban Area with electric ranges rose from less than four 
per cent in 1927 to approximately twenty-seven per cent 
in 1936. (Fig.4.7) 
265. This can be seen in a comparison between the surpluses of revenue 
over expenditure recorded by gasworks and urban electricity 
authorities in 1935-36. The former recorded a 19% surplus 
while the electricity departments of city councils achieved a 
29% surplus. Many gasworks were located in boroughs, where 
operations may have been more marginally economic than in cities. 
Yet borough electricity departments enjoyed a sur2lus of 32%. 
Figures calculated from CSO, Factory and Building Production, 
1936, p.52, and AJHR, 1936, Dl, p.97. 
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FIG. 4.7: ELECTRIC RANGES IN THE CHRISTCHURCH 
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Electrical tenchology also reduced the work of the 
housewife in indirect ways. The further development of 
aluminium smelting industries overseas led to a further 
reduction in the cost of utensils made from it, and this 
no doubt boosted their sales. According to official 
figures, the cost of an aluminium saucepan in Christ-
church fell from 8/7~ to 7/I~d. between 1925 and 1930. 266 
Aluminium did not require as much scouring as iron, and 
was cheaper and less easily damaged than enamel. Stain-
less steel performed a similar function by providing 
relatively inexpensive cutlery which did not tarnish. As 
cheaper aluminium reduced the cost of extracting chromium, 
the price of stainless steel fell rapidly' in the late 
'twenties in relation to its plain steel competitors. 
In Christchurch the cost of a dozen stainless steel knives 
fell from 49/- to 33/6d between 1925 and 1930, while that 
of cheap quality knives dropped from 24/3d to 21/3d. 267 
Other new products that were progressively lightening the 
load of household work included new chlorine bleaches, 
dry-cleaning fluids, and rayon - shrink-proof dress material 
as well as hosiery. 
The appeal of these labour-saving devices and materials, 
and the ability to pay"for them, was greatest amongst young 
women from economically comfortable backgrounds. An 
increasing number of them had tasted the freedom provided 
by taking paid employment outside the home. Given a capable 
266. eso, 1925, 1930. 
267. Ibid. 
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breadwinner they could now reasonably expect that matrimony 
could be free of some of the year~r6und tyranny of cleaning 
the fire-grate, sweeping carpets, and scouring iron pots. 
Furthermore, they might avoid learning housekeeping the 
hard way: "No smoke, no smell, no coal to bring up, no· 
ashes to carry out. No fallen cakes, no burnt meat, no 
delayed meals".268 Now women of the skilled working and 
white-collar classes could aspire to the decorative and 
, 
dependent upper-class ideal that had previously necessitated 
the employment of servants. Not only could they continue 
to enjoy themselves, they could be more entertaining to 
their husbands: 
Deep down in his peculiar heart, your husband .•• 
prefers your bobbed hair, and your ability and 
willingness to fox trot, to the sort of girl you 
would be if you spent all your time with a 269 
scrubbing brush and a tome on domestic science. 
Work had tended to become less arduous, particularly for 
the growing army of white-collar employees, while gramo-
phones, radios and increased mobility by tram and car 
encouraged a more lively social life amongst young people 
generally. Shrewd and unscrupulous advertisers of home 
appliances played on the fear that domestic skills might 
no longer be enough to hold a man. They warned that a 
wife's failure to meet the new social demands could lead 
. 270 her husband to IIseek home away from home". 
Such dangers were undoubtedly exaggerated. Neverthe-
less, something of a functional hiatus had been created for 
268. Star, 4 September, 1926. 
269. 3 July, 1926. 
270. Ibid. 
16. MED Showroom in 1926, showing much of the range of 
electrical household appliances available. Note the 
rather old-fashioned, jumbled and poorly lit nature 
of the display. 
(MED, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 1926.) 
17. MED Showroom in 1936. The department has clearly learnt 
something of the possibilities of its own technol~gy 
in advertising - bright lights and shiny surfaces 
abound in an uncluttered display. Note the prominence 
of electric ranges in comparison with 1926. 
(MED, Annual Report and St,atement of Accounts, 1937.) 
18. Gordon Coates (with his coat on) opening another 
extension to the Lake Coleridge power-station. 
Growing consumption necessitated an entire new scheme 
on the waitaki within a few years. The use of cooking 
and heating appliances by domestic consumers accounted 
for the majority of the increased demand. 
(Weekly Press and Referee, 19 August, 1926:) 
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many housewives. There was less work to do at horne 
because of the new labour-saving horne appliances and 
smaller families, but as yet few married women had paid 
employment. The time and energy left over were often to 
be transferred into a fanatical devotion to cleanliness 
and the acquisition of new goods. 
Nowhere were the two influences of technological 
change and economic depression so interwoven during the 
period 1926-36 as in the area of paid employment. They 
tended to hit the same groups of workers particularly hard 
and to benefit similar. sections of the labour force. 
Furthermore, the adoption of new technology was compara-
tively little affected by the depression. The initial 
severe economic downturn of 1926 actually coincided with 
the introduction of much new labour-saving machinery. 
After a brief levelling out in the rate of innovation during 
the worst of the crisis between 1931 and 1933, new methods 
and machines quickly resumed their spread. Their impact 
on social organisation and social policy was immense. 
Looked at from one direction, that emphasised by contemporary 
observers, new technology displaced very large,numbers of 
workers. Regarded from another, it eventually permitted 
not only a reduction in working hours for most employees 
but the reasonably dignified retirement of categories of 
worker whose participation in paid employment had been 
marginal and even painful. The relationship between these 
two developments was both fostered and masked by the massive 
unemployment of the early 'thirties and the change of govern-
ment in 1935. These imposed a somewhat artificial division 
onto the whole movement. Up to the end of 1935 such 
developments tend to fall under the dismal headings of 
251 
"unemployment" and "unemployment relief". Thereafter 
they are both subsumed by a triumphant 'lfurther advance 
. , 
of the welfare state". Simultaneously technological change 
was altering the working lives of women, well over half 
of the city's adult population. It was providing many 
new avenues of employment, especially for single women, 
while reducing the drudgery of tasks in the home, still 
the main workplace for the majority of women. In the area 
of work the depression tended to play variations on the 
dominant themes laid down by changing technology. 
252 
CHAPTER FIVE 
RECREATION 
New technology altered forms of recreation between the 
wars to at least the same degree as it influenced patterns 
of work. In some cases it provided entirely new diversions; 
in others it extended exciting recreational opportunities. 
Overall, technological change had a more profound influence 
on leisure-time activities in the period 1926 to 1936 than 
the depression. 
Motor transport was the form of new technology which 
had the most diverse impact on recreation. The motorcar 
and the motorcycle were used far more than leisure-time 
activity - the former had, for instance, become almost 
1 
standard equipment for doctors by the time of the Great War. 
Local and central government officials made growing use of 
motor transport to supervise outside works. At the beginning 
of 1926, for example, the Christchurch City Council Works 
Department office and administrative staff operated one car 
and a motorcycle, while in 1932 they had the use of three 
2 
cars and two motorcycles. Then again, it is difficult to 
make a precise distinction between leisure and work in the 
1. In S~hPscopes and Saddlebags, Auckland, 1965, p.93, Dr. E. Baker-
McLagan noted that about 1910 "in Christchurch, when doctors were 
getting cars, I still had only a bicycle ll , One of her young patients 
doubted that she was "a proper dokker" because she lacked a 
"mokar-car". 
2. Christchurch City Council, City Engineer's Report, 1926, p,62; 
1932, p.38. 
253 
use of motor vehicles. Faster travel to the workplace may 
mean more disposable time, while the role of the shopper -
strongly delegated to women - may be work, entertainment or 
a combination of both. Some wealthy citizens doubtless 
welcomed the chance to commute more flexibly to maintain 
their physical distance from other classes .and to relax 
with acquaintances of their own choice on their way to work 
or shopping. Questions of parking places and times were 
leading to some local political agitation by 1926 while the 
Chief Traffic Inspector expressed concern at traffic conges-
tion in 1930. 3 Comparison of the City Council's traffic 
"censuses" for 1929 and 1932 suggests that commutingc!) and >< 
therefore the problem continued to grow despite the 
depression. 4 Christchurch's first pedestrian "traffic 
lights" were installed at the end of 1930. 5 
However, cost deterred most Christchurch motorists from 
using their cars in preference to public commuter transport, 
and weekend, or holiday, recreation was probably the most 
widespread motive for purchasing a car or motorcycle. The 
weekend drive had become a popular institution by 1936 with 
heavy traffic on roads leading out of the city. A national 
survey of traffic densities on highways outside cities 
indicated that Saturday and Sunday were by far the busiest 
. b t' . t 6 days ~n summer, ut no ~n w~n er. Between 1930 and 1936 
3. Christchurch City Council, Chief Traffic Inspector's Report, 1930. 
4. See Appendix C. 
5. Star, 1 March, 1932. 
6. AJHR, 1936, H40, p.23. Judging by the information in the text, the 
labels on the figure (Fig.5) are reversed. 
more fatal road accidehts occurred on Sunday than on any 
weekday, despite hotels b~ing Officially closed. 7 
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The move to more prolonged motoring holidays appears '/ 
to have gained popularity rapidly in the late 'twenties. 
In 1926 the Star, normally well aware of new trends, was 
referring to motor camping as largely a North Island 
phenomenon: "Steps have been taken in the North Island 
to organise picnic grounds at selected points for the 
convenience of motorists, among whom the fashion of carrying 
a tent and provisions is growing" 8 Less than two years 
later it was strongly in evidence locally as well. 9 
Impromptu and official motor camps proliferated as the motor 
car pushed the range of family holidays beyond the established 
tram-line resorts such as New Brighton and Sumner. Akaroa-
which had never been accessible by rail - became a popular 
holiday centre while the coastline north of Christchurch 
became dotted with baches from Brooklands and Stewart's 
Gully up to Motunau. Inland waterholes also attracted 
motorised campers, as at Coe's Ford, Ashley Gorge, and 
Glentui. These invasions by the new mobile vulgus were 
bemoaned by those who had previously enjoyed such spots 
. 1 h . 1 . 10 1n wea t y 1S0 at10n. The adventurous rich now tended 
I( 
7. Ibid., p.5l. Traffic densities were only slightly greater on 1 
Saturdays but the number of fatal accidents was over fifty per cent 
higher - indicating that alcohol was probably an important factor. 
8. Star, 13 January, 1926. 
9. Star, 12 October, 1927. Five months later the same newspaper 
praised the Labour City Council for prohibiting parking outside 
dancehalls. Star, 20 March, 1928. 
10.See M. Holcroft, Carapace: The Motor Car in New Zealand, Dunedin 
1979, p.46-47; and N. Marsh, Black Beech and Honey Dew, Boston, 
1965, p.lIO. 
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to drive their cars further afield, to Mount Cook and 
Arthurs Pass. There they could follow the expensive sports 
f k " . . t d ... 11 o s ~-~ng ~n w~n er an mounta~neer~ng ~n summer. 
On a much larger scale, private motor transport made 
the sport of golf increasingly accessible to small business-
men, lesser professionals, and the salariat, as their 
greater mobility allowed them to travel further for a game. 
New links could now be established on cheaper land outside 
the city, providing many more alternatives to the exclusive 
Christchurch Golf C1ub. 12 A rash of new courses sprang up 
around the fringes of the urban area, at Avondale (1919), 
Harewood (1923), Russley (1928), Templeton (1931), Waimairi 
Beach (1932), Rawhiti (1932), Tai Tapu (1934) and Waitikiri 
(1937) .13 Four of these eight courses were opened during 
the worst years of the depression. Nationally the number 
of golf clubs grew from 96 to 109 between 1925 and 1926, 
with the number of players increasing from 9115 to 10171, 
almost 12% in one year. 14 The further growth in the sport, 
and particularly the large number of golf courses established, 
is reflected in an increase in the number of professional 
golfers in New Zealand from 30 in 1926 to 65 in 1936. 15 
More widespread motor transport also contributed to an 
impressive expansion in the number of tennis clubs. Between 
11. Star, 30 June, 1930. 
12. The Christchurch Golf Club itself acquired new links at Shirley 
in 1930. 
13. P. Russell, Golf Courses of Canterbury, Christchurch, 1983. 
14. NZYB, 1927, p.926. 
15. Census, 1926, Vol.IX, p.49; 1936, Vol.X, p.Sl. 
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the 1923-24 and 1925-26 seasons the total increased from 
302 to 366, with the number of registered players rising 
from just under twenty thousand to well over twenty-three 
thousand. 16 No doubt much of this growth took place in 
the country, where motor transport was particularly 
important for gathering players. However, the same factor 
would have operated to a lesser extent in the city, 
especially for inter-club competitions. Paradoxically, 
the new technology may have encouraged the use of horses 
in the sport of polo, with a substantial increase in the 
small club membership between 1924 and 1926, from 128 to 
300. 17 
Sports directly based on motor vehicles also 
flourished. "Broadsidingll (speedway motor-cycle racing) 
made a popular, though very dangerous, addition to the 
professional sports of young working men, and Monica Park 
in Woolston became the nursery for future world champions 
such as Ronnie Moore. It seems likely that broadsiding/;\ had 
"-
a particularly severe effect on other forms of summer 
professional sport, notably athletics. Certainly there was 
a sharp drop in the number of men affiliated to that sport 
between 1924-25 and 1925-26. The total declined from 6539 
18 to around 4400. Wealthier motor sportsmen could join the 
Canterbury Aero Club, or try power-boating on the Estuary. 
More generally, speed, control of a powerful machine, 
and freedom to travel were intoxicating new sensations, 
16. ~, 1925, p.762; 1927, p.925. 
17. 
18. Ibid. 
especially for the young. Motor transport could permit 
a rapid escape from public, parental and even police 
oversight. Inner city residents objected to motorised 
boisterousness around some dance halls, and "the noise 
caused by the parking of cars until the small hours of 
th . II 19 e mornlng Some city fathers were shocked by the 
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amount of "spotting" (illegal drinking) which took place 
in motor cars outside commercial dances. Some halls were 
closed as a result, and an 11.30 p.m. curfew was imposed 
on the remainder. 20 They were also forbidden to let 
patrons leave and return, possibly "spotted".21 However, 
. it was virtually impossible for the authorities to do 
anything about complaints of noisy drinking parties on 
vacant sections in distant suburbs. For example, "keg 
parties" were reported to occur regularly in Shortland 
Street in Aranui, on the fringes of the city. New Brighton 
in particular gained a reputation for moral laxity, not 
least because its numerous baches provided a comparatively 
isolated and unpoliced field in which motorised tearaways 
could sow their wild oats. In 1926 a lawyer sought to 
excuse the actions of two "respectable" young Ashburtonites 
in pestering a girl to accompany them in their motor car 
by remarking that "things are a little unorthodox down at 
New Brighton".23 Later it became something of a risque 
19. Star, 16 September, 1927. 
20. Sun, 1 October, 1929. 
21. Star, 31 January, 1929. 
22. Sun, 13 September, 1930. 
23. Star, 7 January, 1926. See also description of "frightful orgies" 
by individual who had rented a bach. Sun, 10 September, 1930. 
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joke to ask a woman "are you married or do you live in 
New Brighton?,,24 Such humour had its darker side in the 
discovery of the body of Emily Forward, who gassed herself 
in a bach at New Brighton after being abandoned, pregnant, 
by her taxi-driver boyfriend. 25 
Taxi-drivers appear to have attracted more than 
their share of sexual scandal. During 1928 the daughter 
of a prominent Heathcote County Councillor was found 
murdered at Burwood. Her lover, a taxi-driver, was 
charged with the crime but acquitted due to doubts about 
identification by witnesses in the vicinity of the crime. 26 
During the early 'thirties, two young taxi-drivers, one of 
them a son of C.S. Trillo, the proprietor of the Gold Band 
Company, were harshly criticised by the local coroner for 
their part in an affair which concluded in the death of a 
young domestic following an abortion. 27 Trillos' share-
driving system permitted many impecunious young men to 
acquire motor cars and the prestige that went with them. 
Even a cartoonist could picture Harry Holland as a 
lecherous taxi-driver for the dilapidated Red Taxi Company 
giving "the glad eye" to the civil service. 28 
24. Information from R. Greenaway. The slightly seedy nature of New 
Brighton to a large extent resulted from its having been superseded 
as a resort for the better-off because of the advent of motor 
transport. "We're going to Pegasus Bay this yearll was a jocular 
response from the hard-up to the motorists' boasting of holidays 
at Goose Bay or Akaroa. Information from the late Leo Greer of 
Bryndwr. 
25. star, 22 June, 1928. 
26. Press, 16, 22, 26 November, 1927. 
27. Sun, 16 April, 1931. 
28. Times, 18 May, 1932. 
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The growing popularity of the private motor car was 
reflected in a 76% increase in registrations in Cen~ral 
Canterbury between 1926 and 1931 (Fig. 5.1). The number 
of registrations was affected by the depression, with a 
nine per cent decline between the end of 1930 and the end 
of 1933. However, this fall was surprisingly low consid-
ering that the real price of petrol tended to rise. 29 
The level of registrations was restored in the subsequent 
two years. Moreover, it appears that most of the decline 
had taken place in rural areas of the district. The drop 
in the number of private driving licences issued by the 
city council was negligible, at less than one per cent, 
and occurred only between 1932 and 1933. Likewise, the 
number of registrations in the more heavily rural roading 
districts of South and North Canterbury show far greater 
declines than those in central Canterbury. Certainly the 
30 
city council's traffic censuses and the tramway's 
continuing fall in patronage suggest that the usage of 
motor cars for commuting at least was increasing at a 
considerably faster rate than that of car ownership in 
Central Canterbury as a whole. 
Nevertheless it would be easy to exaggerate the social 
scope of such ownership. This does not appear to have 
extended much beyond the wealthy, the professions, business-
men, and the salariat. Statistics on the occupations of 
those re-registering their vehicles in July, 1933, show 
that these groups owned most of the motor cars (Table 5.1). 
29. See Appendix A. 
30. See Appendix c. 
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TABLE 5.1: CERTAIN OCCUPATIONS OF OWNERS OF MOTOR 
VEHICLES, 1933 
26.1 
occupation per motorcar occupation per motor cycle 
1. Doctor 
2. Merchant 
3. Business Manager 
4. Sheepfarmer 
5. Agent 
6. Schoolteacher 
7. Accountant 
8. Clerk 
9. Salesman 
10. Labourer 
11. Farm Labourer 
* Male and female 
.98 (1.04) * 1. 
1.03 2. 
1.45 3. 
1. 46 4. 
1.61 5. 
1.92 (5.00) 6. 
Labourer 
Schoolteacher 
Clerk 
Merchant 
Farm Labourer 
Agent 
3.85 7. Sheepfarmer 
5.80 8. Salesman 
6.62 (8.44) 9. Business Manager 
10.10 10. Doctor 
31.02 11. Accountant 
14.20 
19.00 
19.43 
24.70 
25.77 
31.65 
38.45 
40.89 
64.63 
91.58 
104.90 
Source: AJHR, 1933, H40, p.34; CSO, Census, 1936, Vol.X, p.38-51. 
The smallness of the fall in registrations and licences 
between 1932 and 1933 would therefore appear, to be another 
reflection of the continued economic security of the 
capitalist and white-collar classes. 
Figures for the registration of motor-cycles also 
seem to bear this out. The annual totals of Central 
Canterbury rose little in the late 'twenties and declined 
in every year between 1930 and 1935. Even during the 
winter of 1933 a substantial proportion of these machines 
were registered by wage-earners, particularly labourers. 
The fall in motor-cycle registrations therefore probably 
reflects the disproportionate economic difficulties of the 
unskilled and much of the independent working classes. 
Unlike the use of motor cars, attendance at the 
cinema was a form of entertainment made possible by new 
technology which was within the financial reach of all 
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classes. Commercial motion pictures had arrived in 
Christchurch as early as 1906 and twenty years later there 
were seven cinemas operating in the central area (mostly 
in Cathedral Square) and a number in the suburbs. The 
"talkies" reached the city less than two years after their 
debut in the United States with the use of sound equipment 
at the Liberty on 10 June, 1929. 31 Surprisingly, given 
the overwhelming dominance of Hollywood, the film was 
Mother Knows Best, a British-film featuring Harold Lloyd. 
Just over a year later the "silents" had virtually 
disappeared from central Christchurch and there were eight 
talkie cinemas in :the ci~y. These included the vast new 
Regent and Majestic theatres. 
It is difficult to be precise about the impact of 
the depression on attendance at picture-theatres. There 
was fierce competition between large theatre chains -
notably Fullers and J.C. Williamson's - and statistics of 
ticket-sales were not published. The report of a parlia-
mentary commission of inquiry into the motion-picture 
industry in 1934 estimated that gross theatre takings had 
32 fallen almost 38% between 1930-31 and 1933-34. However, 
this does not necessarily denote a commensurate decline 
in the number of patrons. According to evidence accepted 
by the committee, the prices charged for seats had been 
reduced substantially during the 1931-32 year. The lowest 
charge in city cinemas had been cut from a general 1/6 to 
1/-, the minimum which the film wholesalers had imposed on 
31. Star, 17 January, 1931. 
32. ~, 1934, H44A, p.12. 
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their customers in 1930. A number of suburban theatres 
had apparently defied this attempt to control the market 
by introducing II gues t nights" where two persons were 
admitted for one shilling charge. In addition, the consumer 
had a considerable degree of economic choice as sonte seats, 
some sessions and some theatres were cheaper than others: 
It was stated that exhibitors had noted that 
individual patrons who previously patronized 
the 3s.3d. and 2s.9d. seats now patronized 
the 2s.2d. and Is.6d. seats and the previous 
patrons of these latter sections of the 
theatre are now found in the minimum Is. 
seats. It had also been found necessary to 
increase the number of seats available at 
the minimum price to meet the demand, and 33 
to reduce the maximum prices in most theatres. 
Theoretically, it is possible that virtually the whole of 
the reduction in gross receipts" could have been explained 
in this way. Nevertheless, the general minimum charge in 
New Zealand was well above the lowest admission prices in 
the united States and Canada (the equivalent of 5d) and in 
Britain (approximately 4d.). This almost certainly 
restricted the patronage of motion pictures to a greater 
extent that in those countries. One study in Cardiff in 
the early 'thirties discovered that 52% of unemployed youths 
went to the cinema once per week and that half of those 
. 34 
went tW1ce. Studies in Liverpool and Glasgow put the 
"once per week" category even higher, at eighty per cent. 
The price differential no doubt cut this rate significantly 
in New Zealand cities, but much the same appeal was there. 
33. Ibid., p.9. 
34. C. Mowat, Britain between the Wars, London, 1955, p.485. 
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The effect of the depression is not strongly 
evident in the commercial decisions of the cinema industry -
except for a short period in 1931 and 1932. Certainly the 
footage of film imported dropped from 14.5 million in 1929 
to 11.8 million in 1932, a reduction of almost a fifth. 
However, the former year was during the full initial flush 
of the talkies, while the latter years total was still 
substantially higher than the 11.2 million feet imported 
in 1926. The average length of film brought into the 
country annually during the five years between 1931 and 
1935 was greater than in any consecutive five years during 
the 'twenties. 35 Furthermore, the progress of theatre-
building seems to indicate a continuing popularity for 
films during the depression.' The last of the Christchurch 
cinemas built or extensively renovated in the immediate 
post-talkie boom, the Plaza, was opened as late as March, 
1931. 36 Less than three years later the construction of 
picture-houses was once again a major growth area for the 
local building industry.37 In 1934 two cinemas, the 
Tivoli (Everybody's) and the Crystal Palace, were 
completely remodelled. During the following year three 
more were opened in the city, the Mayfair, Avon and the 
State. Such investment in celluloid and cement suggests 
that the showing of films was hit less hard and recovered 
more strongly and earlier than many other industries. 
35. CSO, Trade and Shipping, 1921-35. 
36, 21 March, 1931. 
37. During 1933 there were 26 applications for cinema licences throughout 
New Zealand and in 1934 there were 65, eight of them within the . 
Christchurch Urban Area. AJHR, 1934, H44A, p.12. 
Nationally, the number of people employed in the 
motion-picture industry increased dramatically between 
1926 and 1936. The number of men employed grew by 87% 
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from 553 to 1032. 38 These were principally employed as 
projectionists or managers. The number of women in the 
industry rose at almost double this rate, from 235 to 580, 
or 147%. Most of them were employed as ushers or at the 
box-office. 
The employment statistics also indicate the impact 
of the "talkies" on forms of live entertainment. The 
number of people employed in the live theatre fell from 
513 to 360 or thirty per cent between 1926 and 1936. 
Circus and sideshow performers also dwindled in number, 
as did the number of musicians. The shrinkage in the latter 
category can be partly put down to the displacement of the 
cinema pianist or organ~player who had frequently enhanced, 
or ruined, the silent picture-show. Whereas many theatres 
such as Fuller's had combined vaudeville and motion pictures, 
they now converted almost wholly to films. 39 Many of 
those films featured music and singing, and they were 
. . l' 1 40 ~ncreas~ng y ~n co our. The decline in the live theatre 
was a significant change in patterns of entertainment, 
particularly in urban New Zealand, and it was the product 
of technological change, not the depression. The reduction 
in the number of touring stage companies and musical artists 
that occurred in the early 'thirties was not reversed in the 
later half of the decade. 4l 
38. Census, 1926, Vol.IX, p.24, 33; 1936, Vol.X, p.13, 22. 
39. M. Hurst, Music and the stage in New Zealand, Wellington, 1944, 
p.77, 93. 
40. "Technicolour" first came to Christchurch with the film "Song of 
the West in 1932. Star, 29 December, 1932. 
41. Hurst, op.cit., p.77, 84. 
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If the continued growth of the cinema was exceptional, 
that of the radio was spectacular. In the ten years 
, 
following the establishment of the officially-funded Radio 
Broadcasting Company in 1926 the number of listening 
licences in Canterbury increased eightfold, to over thirty-
four thousand (Fig. 5.2). This growth actually accelerated 
in the 1932-33 year, deep in the depression. The continued 
acceleration after 1933 could be partly put down to an 
increase in the rural audience following the installation 
42 of the Gebbies' Pass transmitter at the end of that year. 
However, the national growth in the number of listening 
licences had been speeding up since 1930-31. In that year 
the total increased by 17%, compared with 20%, 25%, 26% 
and 29% in the succeeding four years to March, 1935. 43 
The licence figures must be regarded as something of 
an underestimate of the number of radios actually in use. 
The construction of a crystal set was extremely simple 
and could be achieved with materials costing only a 
shilling. 44 This was only a thirtieth of the annual charge 
for "operating a receiving-station" and it is likely that 
many avoided paying it. Furthermore, a large number of 
workplaces installed radios for the employees - thus 
providing many people with entertainment in the daytime 
that they could not afford at home. It is possible that 
a majority of Christchurch households possessed a radio 
in 1936 as the number of radio licences in the Canterbury 
provincial district then totalled more than half the number 
42. Times, 15 December, 1933. 
43. NZYB, 1936, p.290. 
44. Information from James Younger, radio salesman during the 'thirties. 
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FIG. 5.2: RADIO LISTENING LICENCES IN CANTERBURY, 
1925-36 
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of households. Many of the radios in Christchurch would 
have been installed in shops or factories,45 but higher 
, 
worker incomes and proximity to more than one radio 
station probably encouraged a higher rate of radio owner-
ship in the city. 
The number of hours during which people could listen 
in also increased markedly during the 1926-36 decade. 
The official 3YA was broadcasting only 63 hours per week 
in 1927, with Tuesdays entirely silent. 46 By March, 
1933, this had expanded to 79 hours, spread over the 
whole week. 47 In 1934 there was a further increase to 
105 hours, plus 28 hours from 3YL, the newly acquired 
"alternative" station. 48 Private radio enterprises were 
not numerous in Christchurch - in 1931 the city had one, 
49 
as had Eketahuna. But they had strong popular support, 
not least because of their emphasis on "light entertain-
ment". This support enabled private radio to survive 
through repeated government refusals to sanction "aerial 
advertising,,50 and the state purchase of the existing 
45. A "radio plebiscite" carried out by the Star in 1927 had a response 
of 955 from factories, as against 1434 from homes. The survey 
showed the overwhelming popularity of "entertainment, not 
education". Popular music, songs and musical comedy were the 
categories most strongly favoured by the predominantly working-
class readers of the Star. Over half the radios reported in the 
"plebscite" were crystal sets, including two-thirds of those in 
homes. Star, 19 November, 1927. . 
46. NZYB, 1928, p.406. In addition, many people listened regularly 
to Australian stations and some even further afield. As valve 
sets became more prevalent, such options doubtless became more 
widespread. 
47. NZYB, 1933, p.302. 
48. NZYB, 1935, p.295. 
49. T.Scott (ed.), Scott's Radio Handbook, sixth edition, Christchurch 
1931, p.36-37. 
50. Star, 11 November, 1933. Most of the newspaper's readers would 
probably have disagreed with the claim that the loss of the "B" 
stations "would be a small to pay" to avoid such advertising -
"the greatest of all curses". However, the interests of editors 
and listeners tended to diverge. 
19. Sunday at Sumner and an incipient parking problem. 
(G. Ogilvie, The Port Hills of Christchurch, 
Wellington, 1978, p.33.) 
20. Child's play. Another aspiring radio 
technician assembles his own crystal set. 
(Weekly Press and Referee, 19 May, 1927.) 
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private station in 1933. Anger at what were seen as 
government attempts to "strangle" private radio led to 
considerable agitation shortly before the 1933 general 
election and may have contributed some support to Labour, 
which appeared to be guaranteeing the commercial survival 
of the "ZB" stations. 51 
The depression certainly had some effect on the size 
of crowds at sporting events where an admission fee was 
charged. In rugby, by far the largest formal sport, 
this was particularly evident at major inter-club matches. 
In 1926 the final between Old Boys and Meriva1e drew ten 
thousand spectators, as did the deciding game between Old 
Boys and Christchurch in 1929. 52 These totals were not 
equalled during the early 'thirties, despite the fact that 
by that time rugby crowds could expect to have been swelled 
by an influx of youths born during the post-war "baby boom". 
The 1931 inter-club final attracted a crowd of only six 
53 thousand. The drop in gate receipts forced the local 
51. R.M. Burdon, The New Dominion, Wellington, 1965, p.307. 
There were a number of links between Labour and the "B" stations, 
not least being their common popularity amongst working people. 
In Christchurch one of the most popular announcers, Gracie Green, 
was the daughter of a Labour member of the North Canterbury 
Hospital Board. A son of the latter was one of the two 
principal owners of 3ZM, the local "B" station. J. Hall, 
The History of Broadcasting in New Zealand, 1920-1954, Wellington, 
1980, p.76. In Auckland, the Rev. Scrimgeour was a strong 
supporter of Labour. C. Scrimgeour, J. Lee, T. Simpson, 
The Scrim-Lee Papers, Wellington, 1976, p.? 
52. L. Saunders, The Canterbury Rugby History, 1879-1979, 
Christchurch, 1979, p.22. 
53. Ibid., p.3l. 
union to fall back on its insurance against such 
10sses. 54 Many of the seven thousand spectators who 
attended the first major match in 1932 were attending 
27l 
for more than the rugby.55 With a number of "specials" 
playing, including the brilliant winger, G.F. Hart, 
several sympathisers of the striking tramway men and 
their unemployed supporters turned up to barrack. No 
doubt many others came along to see the show. 
The fall in attendance at representative games was 
rather less marked. During the economically bleak and 
uncertain winter of 1933 a crowd of over twenty-five 
thousand made its way to Lancaster Park to see Canterbury 
turn back Southland's challenge for the Ranfur1y Shie1d. 56 
This was a record for a Shield match. When demographic 
factors are taken into account, the 1933 figure appears 
roughly comparable with the 23,200 spectators at the park 
in 1926 when Hawke's Bay brought the Shield south - and 
took it home again. 57 International games were too few 
during the interwar years to provide a good comparison 
between depressed and comparatively prosperous times. 
Numbering approximately twelve thousand, the crowd which 
witnessed Canterbury's victory over the Australian 
tourists in 1931 was under half the estimated twenty-five 
thousand who attended the clash between the local province 
and the British team in 1930. 58 However, the weather 
was extraordinarily miserable for the game in 1931. 
54. Sun, 27 May, 1931. 
55. Sun, 7 May, 1932. 
56. Press, 21 August, 1933. 
57. Saunders, op.cit., p.28. 
58. Ibid., p.36; Press, 31 August, 1931. 
Furthermore, it was against a much less prestigious 
international team with many fewer compatriots in the 
local population. The gate at the game against the 
Springboks in 1921 had registered 10,685, but that 
Canterbury triumph was also during a particularly sharp 
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d . 59 epreSSlon. No test match was played in Christchurch 
during that tour, or as part of the Australian visit in 
1931. 
Attendances at many rugby games within the city were 
partly sustained by the decision of the Canterbury Rugby 
Union to provide special tickets to the unemployed. 
Initially these passes were distributed free from the 
Labour Department's Employment Bureau at the rate of four 
hundred a week, a total of eleven thousand being handed 
out during the 1932 season. 60 
It is also probable that Canterbury's hold on the 
Ranfurly Shield from 1931 to 1934 kept interest in the 
sport generally high throughout this period. At the 
beginning of 1934 local officials considered that the 
union had had "a couple of good seasons".6l Certainly 
possession of the "log of wood" swelled the numbers of 
spectators and players during later periods of Canterbury 
ascendancy, particularly during the 'fifties and the 
'eighties. Those fit or enthusiastic enough to play rugby 
do not appear to have been put off by economic stringency 
during the early 'thirties. The number of "football" 
59. Saunders, op.cit., p.22. 
60. Press, 28 September, 1932; J.K. Moloney, Rugby Football in 
Canterbury, 1929-1954, Christchurch, 1954, p.30. The Canterbury 
union raised £400 for the Mayor's Relief of Distress Fund during 
the same year. 
61. Times, 13 March, 1934. 
grounds prepared and charged for by the Christchurch 
City cou~cil increased substantially during the 
depression decade. 62 From 20 in 1925 the total grew 
to 27 in 1930 and 33 in 1933. In 1931 a new club -
Athletic, was successfully launched in Christchurch. 63 
In addition, it is virtually impossible to separate 
the short-term effects of the economic crisis from the 
long-term trend in the popularity of rugby and other 
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sports amongst spectators. Whereas crowds of ten thousand 
were exceptional at club games in Christchurch in the 
late 'twenties, they had been relatively frequent during 
the early part of the decade. 64 The Marist versus 
Merivale encounter at the end of the 1923 season brought 
13,665 spectators through the Lancaster Park turnstiles. 
Not only did this record stand through the depression 
years, it was not seriously challenged when prosperity 
returned before the Second World War, despite the sub-
stantial increase in the potential crowd due to the 
increase in the adult male population. In fact, the 1923 
figure still stands as a record for a crowd at an inter-
club fixture in Christchurch. Spectator numbers at the 
city's international games during the 'thirties also 
illustrates this trend •. During the 1937 Springbok Tour of 
New Zealand, 26,500 watched South Africa avenge its 
65 previous defeat at the hands of Canterbury. However, 
62. Christchurch City Council, Parks and Reserves Report, 1925-34. 
63. Saunders, op.cit., p.3l. 
64. Ibid., p.22. 
65. Moloney, op.cit., p.73. 
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this crowd was less than two thousand larger than that 
which had witnessed the province's previous comparable 
international game seven years earlier. The test match 
in Christchurch in 1937 had a gate of 41,600, not a 
remarkable increase on the 35,500 for the game against 
the British in 1930. In particular, there was much more 
private motor transport available for rural rugby fans 
throughout the South Island to get to railheads or 
directly to Christchurch. 
New technology - including the motor car - played a 
central role in the long-term decline in the size of 
crowds at rugby games. The possibility of a Saturday 
afternoon drive, and pressure from the family to make 
sure one was forthcoming, must have contributed to the 
reduction in numbers of spectators in relation to the 
total adult population. This would seem to be indicated 
by the greater fall-off in gates at inter-club matches 
compared with the major international fixtures. The 
latter were at least setting new records, even if their 
growth lagged behind the demographic potential. Radio 
must also have been contributing to this relative decline 
in crowd sizes. On the one hand, it was an alternative 
attraction, providing a different form of entertainment 
on a Saturday afternoon (or evening where a trip to a 
game meant a journey of several hours). Commentaries at 
important race-meetings in other centres would have 
provided particular competition for the side-line sports-
man. There were no transistors and therefore no opportunity 
to combine the two attractions. On the other hand, radio 
commentaries of major matches must have thinned the crowds, 
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particularly at inter-club fixtures, in bad weather or 
where a ~ajor match was being broadcast from another centre. 
A Christchurch businessman and stalwart of the Douglas Social 
Credit League, Alan Allardyce, provided the first New Zealand 
commentary on a rugby match in 1926. There was strong 
opposition to the broadcasting of matches by the Canterbury 
Rugby Union to 1931. 66 However, they could not prevent 
broadcasts of international matches or stop listeners from 
hearing commentaries from other centres. By 1933 local 
b d t . b' d 67 h' roa cas s were aga~n e~ng rna e. Even t e c~nema 
presented some competit~on for organised spectator sport. 
The introduction of sound equipment into the cinema was 
certainly a great boon to the New Zealand rugby fan. Now 
he could listen to commentaries on films of the All Black's 
exploits on tour overseas rather than have to read captions. 
The technical quality of films and film-making techniques 
had also improved greatly. However, the cinema was also a 
competitor for the spectator's often very limited discre-
tional;"y shillings and IImatinee ll performances in the after-
noons generally attracted a lower charge for admission than 
those in the evening. 
The competition for patronage between a traditional 
sport such as rugby and new forms of recreation based on 
new technology was particulqrly fierce during the 'thirties. 
Working hours were not substantially reduced until the end 
of 1936, and even then a significant number of industries 
retained more than forty-hour weeks. Shops remained open 
66. Hall, op.cit., p.43. 
67. Times, 13 March, 1934. 
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on Saturdays until the early 'forties. On the other hand, 
Sunday sport was banned in most places, and certainly in 
Christchurch City - a ban which was strongly supported by 
most of the Labour Counci1. 68 This meant that the time 
available for daytime recreation continued to be severely 
restricted for those in employment. Any new attraction, 
whether motoring, golfing, skiing, or afternoon radio-
listening tended to compete for that time with existing 
69 
sports. This competition for time was in addition to the 
financial competition between ticket-sales at matches, the 
box-office, the garage, the hire-purch'ase charge on the 
radio and the radio licence. 
Some of the extra "football" grounds prepared by City 
Council staff during the 'thirties may have been devoted to 
Rugby League or Association Football. Certainly the 
professional rugby game had additional attractions for 
working-class athletes during the depression, with the 
prospect of gaining paid contracts with Australian or British 
sides. A number of players from the Sydenham Club switched 
f h d d · h l' h' . 70 rom t e amateur co e ur~ng t e ear y t ~rt~es. On the 
other hand, league appears to have been attracting greater 
numbers of players even during the comparatively prosperous 
days of the mid-'twenties. In 1926 the code recorded a 
total New Zealand club membership of 4614, compared with 
3818 during the previous year. 71 The advent of overseas 
68. Sun, 27 March, 1934. 
69. The early 'fifties saw an increase in the sizes of crowds at 
Lancaster Park over the early 'thirties, in relation to the size of 
the male adult population during the two periods. By then there was' 
compulsory closing of shops on Saturdays, outside of certain localities 
such as New Brighton, and average full-time working hours were well down 
70. Saunders, op.cit., p.3l. 
71. NZYB, 1927, p.925. 
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tours by national league teams and visits by professional 
sides to this country no doubt had a major influence on 
the popularity of the code. Nevertheless, there was a 
distinct fall in attendances at league matches in Auckland 
during the early 'thirties, and there the same trend was 
b bl 'd ' h' h h 72 pro a y ev~ ent ~n C r~stc urc . League support was 
heavily concentrated in working-class areas, particularly 
amongst the unskilled, those very hard-hit by unemployment. 
Evidence from other centres suggests continuing strong 
spectator interest in cricket. There was a record gate of 
twenty thousand on one day during the game between Wellington 
and the England team in early 1933. 73. Auckland also filled 
its stands and embankment. 74 On the other hand, the 
tourists were the notorious "bodyline" or "leg theory" 
team, returning from an enraged but beaten Australia. As 
with the football, the number of cricket grounds prepared 
for cricket by the Christchurch City Council showed a 
substantial increase during the early 'thirties. There were 
22 in the 1925-26 season, 25 in 1927-28 and 34 in 1931-32. 
The total peaked at 37 in 1932-33. 75 In addition, there 
were a large number of pitches let at ten shillings a day. 
These numbered 138 in 1930-31 and 153 in 1932-33. The 
generally favourable weather of these years may well have 
contributed to this enthusiasm, but the inability of most 
people to afford to travel was probably the major factor. 
72. W. Davidson, Rugby League, 1908-1947, Auckland, 1947, p.25-32. 
73. D. Neely, 100 Summers: A History of Wellington Cricket, Auckland, 
1975, p.125. 
74. Auckland Cricket Association, 100 Not Out, Auckland, 1983, p.52-3. 
75. Christchurch City Council,Parks and Reserves Report, 1925-33. 
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Judging by totalisator betting figures, and the stakes 
offered at races, the horse-racing industries were badly 
affected by the depression. 76 However, these figures almost 
certainly exaggerate the decline in spectator and even 
gambler interest in trotting and galloping. In 1933 a 
large increase was noted in the New Zealand Cup Day crowd 
at Riccarton, but this was not reflected in a great increase 
in betting turnover. 77 Unemployment itself gave men on a 
few days relief work more opportunity to place "off-course" 
bets in the only way possible - with a bookie. One "reliable 
source" placed the number of bookies at work in Christchurch 
in 1932 at five hundred. 78 They were particularly busy on 
the day that relief payments were made. 79 
The coincidence of major trotting and galloping meetings 
during August and later during Carnival Week in November 
affords some basis for comparison between the two forms of 
horse-racing. On the basis of totalisator turnover, trotting 
did not suffer as badly as its rival. Comparison between the 
amounts wagered at the August meetings of the Metropolitan 
Trotting Club and the Canterbury Jockey Club show falls of 
51% and 56% respectively between 1929 and 1932. 80 Certainly 
this was an era of strong interest in light-harness racing, 
particularly in Christchurch, with the local wonder-horse, 
Harold Logan, setting the pace. In April, 1934, a crowd of 
22,500 gathered on the course at Addington to see him narrowly 
76. P. Oakley, The Handling of Depression Problems in Christchurch, 
unpublished MA thesis, Canterbury University, p.188. 
77. Press, 6, 8 November, 1933. 
78. Star, 17 January, 1933. 
79. Star, 24 March, 2 November, 1933. 
80. Oakley, op.cit. , loc.cit. 
beaten by the Australian horse Walla Walla in a special 
81 
match-race. However, crowd numbers were always 
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approximate at Addington, with many clear views from 
structures outside and the tracks close proximity to the 
city. This was particularly so during the New Zealand Cup 
in November: 
It is also a fact, obvious enough to those 
inside the ground, that many hundreds, possibly 
a few thousands of people, contrive to spare 
a half hour or so from daily tasks to sS2 it 
from vantage points outside the ground. 
The urban and comparatively plebian nature of trotting also 
assisted it to hold its audience. Sheepfarmers in particular 
had suffered a very large drop in their incomes and many 
eschewed the long car journey neccssary to attend. Other 
considerations had to be taken into account at such a social 
event: "There was also the all-important viewpoint of the 
women-folk, who without their newest smartness to wear would 
not go near the course".83 The Press reported numerous 
reunions of friends at that race-day in 1933. The problem 
of cost - particularly in the transport of horses - had an 
even harsher effect on polo, very much the sport of wealthy 
farmers. There were no games in Christchurch between 1930 
and 1935. 84 
The effects of the depression can also be seen in the 
popularity of low-cost group entertainments. These included 
h 'k d 1 'd 85 h d t t mass 1 es an mass cyc e rl es. T e tren 0 mo or 
81. Times, 2 April, 1934. 
82. Press, 13 November, 1931. 
83. Press, 6 November, 1933. 
84. Sun,S January, 1935. 
85. Between 1500 and 2000 people went on a "mystery cycle tour" to 
Stewart's Gully in 1934. Times, 13 August, 1934. 
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transport had previously reduced the popularity of the 
train excursion for the staffs of large enterprises. Now 
the excursion reappeared on a less formal basis, provided 
by the railways for whoever was prepared to buy a ticket to 
go on a "mystery hike".86 The crowds which packed the Civic 
Theatre for Community Sings were also reversing the trend 
towards privatisation of recreation which the motor-car, 
the radio and the cinema, had brought. Community dances 
were also popular, with an estimated seven thousand people 
87 squeezing into Victoria Square for one of them. with 
donations amounting to around 3~d. each on average, most 
had a very cheap evening's entertainment. An estimated 
forty thousand spectators watched the Venetian Night parade 
of boats on the Avon during the Corne to Christchurch Week 
in 1932. Five thousand children attended a mass party at 
Linwood Park given by Sullivan through the Mayor's ,Relief 
of Distress Fund. S8 Commercial dances within the city 
continued to draw large numbers. There were twenty-three 
such events advertised on 24 June, 1933. 89 Many would have 
attended by bicycle and cycle dealders reported a large 
increase in sales from 1932 to 1934. 90 
The amount of travel outside the city was certainly 
limited by economic stringency. The "unprecedented II 
86. Sun, 21 May, 1934. The local Youth Hostel Association was formed 
in 1933 and was very successful in its first two years. Sun, 
17 May, 1934. During that winter "mystery hikes" were setting new 
records each week - 650 went up Mt. Grey in August. Times, 13 
August, 1934. 
87. Sun, 11 November, 1931. 
88. ~, 22 December, 1934. 
89. Star, 24 June, 1933. 
'" 90. Sun, 9 July, 1934. See also the increase in bicycle traffic in the 
city in Appendix c. 
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numbers of passengers on trains in and out of Christchurch 
during the Christmas weeks of 1932 and 1933 suggest that 
rail travel was benefitting from the rise in the real cost 
f t 1 d t l ' , 91 h l' o pe ro an mo or 1cens1ng. T ere was a so sa1d to 
be some renewed demand for baches at New Brighton after the 
decline of the late 'twenties. 92 However, some of this 
pressure was due to the fact that unemployed people from 
Christchurch were occupying the accommodation on a year-
round basis. 
The economic crisis had a significant impact on the 
popularity of different forms of recreation by restricting 
those which were most expensive - notably motoring. 93 It 
also tended to encourage group activities rather than the 
privatisation of leisure that the new technology was 
encouraging. Numbers attending spectator sports showed a 
surprising resilience in the early 'thirties. However, 
sports and recreational activities based on that technology 
continued to grow. Even the ownership and use of motor 
cars never threatened to slip to the levels of 1925, or even 
1929. Technological change was altering recreation as 
inexorably as it was transforming patterns of work. 
91. Sun, 24 December, 1932; Press, 26 December, 1933. 
92. Sun, 16 December, 1933. 
93. On the other hand, future motorists did well out of the depression, 
with the construction by relief workers of scenic drives along the 
Avon, on the Summit of the Port Hills and across McCormick's Bay. 
Other forms of recreation to benefit in this way, included tennis, 
bowling and, in particular, golfing. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
HEALTH 
The immediate economic impact of the depression on 
Christchurch and Canterbury can be measured accurately enough. 
Decreases in factory production, prices, wages and profits, 
and increases in unemployment and bankruptcy are clearly 
demonstrable. The human cost, the deprivation and the 
despair, cannot be determined so precisely. However, indices 
of physical and mental health can be regarded as a very rough 
measure of these effects. Most of the city's inhabitants 
were dependent on a monetary income to provide their food, 
clothing and shelter. As this income was in many cases 
severely reduced and only partially supplemented by government 
or private charity, some increase in mortality and morbidity 
could be expected. This was especially so amongst those who 
had little to lose in the first place. These included 
families in which the breadwinner was chronically sick, the 
indigent elderly and households with many children but low 
incomes. 
No systematic work has been done on the depression's 
impact on health in New Zealand. The most thorough overall 
surveys remain the reports of the Director-General of Health 
to parliament, and these suggest the paradox of improved 
public health in a poorer country: 
There is no evidence from the vital statistics that 
the health of the masses has been in any way impaired 
during more recent years. The death-rate, the infant 
mortality rate, the mortality from tuberculosis, 
were all lower in 1932 than at any other time in 
the history of the Dominion. This is all to the 
good, ,but it may be argued that the death returns 
do not represent the true position as the effects 
of malnutrition are delayed and, while causing 
sickness, may not have had time as yet to affect 
the death-rate. The records of our public 
hospitals, however, do not support any suggestion 
that there is increasing morbidity in New Zealand 
as the result of the depression. l 
In 1933 the Director-General concluded that "this year's 
figures still show no signs of detrimental effect". 2 The 
following year lithe state of the public health remained at 
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much the same level •.• as in recent years ll • 3 Such statements 
did not make any reference to statistics on 'the treatment of 
outpatients at hospitals. These showed a strong rising 
tendency during the late 'twenties and early 'thirties, with 
the number of patients treated reaching a peak in 1931-32 
and then falling away temporarily.4 However, it seems 
likely that most of the rise was due to the attendance of 
people unable or unwilling to pay regular doctors' fees, 
rabher than any widespread deterioration in public health. 
This trend was to recur in the nineteen-eighties. 5 
The published statistics on public health in Christchurch 
broadly support the official conclusions (Table 6.1). The 
crude death-rate for the Christchurch Urban Area reached its 
lowest point ever in 1931, and dropped below that level in 
1933. The local infant mortality rate was more erratic, 
dipping to a very low thirty-one per thousand in 1931 but 
I. AJHR, 1933, H31, p.4. 
2. AJHR, 1934, H31, p.6. 
3. AJHR, 1935, H31, p.l. 
4. NZYB, 1931, p.199; 1936, p.138; 1939, p.163. 
5. Press, 12 April, 1984. 
TABLE 6.1: CHRISTCHURCH VITAL STATISTICS 6 
1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 
Death rate (per thousand 
mean population) 8.98 9.92 9.49 9.31 9.13 9.57 8.86 9.23 8.76 9.69 9.70 
Birth rate (per thousand 
mean population) 18.2 18.8 17.6 17.5 16.1 16.4 15.8 14.5 14.2 13.9 13.1 
Infant Mortality (per 
thousand births) 47.5 54.3 59.2 44.1 39.8 41.1 31.0 38.6 42.2 39.1 37.6 
Notifiable Diseases 744 443 553 658 1409 543 366 428 215 192 152 
Hospital In-Patients 6161 6843 7539 7986 8186 7850 8017 7669 7681 7826 7999 
Sources: CSO, Vital Statistics, 1927, p.139-140; 1931, p.l02-3; 1936, p.84-85 (death rate, birth rate, infant mortality); 
Ibid, 1925, "Public Hospitals-Ages of Patients"; 1926-36, "Public Hospitals-Patients Treated" (hospital patients); 
and ,Christchurch City Council, Town Clerk's Reports, 1925-36 (notifiable diseases). 
6. Death, birth and infant mortality rates apply to the full Christchurch Urban Area, numbers of hospital patients to all 
public'hospitals in that area, but the incidence of notifiable disease to Christchurch City only. The latter figure 
covers ,March years; all others encompass calendar years. 
1936 
9.71 
14.0 
36.8 
148 
8224 
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rising quite sharply in 1932 and 1933. However, between 
1929 and 1936 it was well below that of any previous year. 
In fact, the average annual infant mortality in Christchurch 
between 1931 and 1935 was actually lower than that between 
1936 and 1940. 7 There were also far fewer cases of 
notifiable diseases reported in the city in the early 'thirties 
than during the 'twenties. The average annual number of 
notifications between 1929 and 1936 was 292, compared with 
729 between 1922. and 1929. 8 The totals of admissions to 
public hospitals in the Christchurch area reinforced the 
impression of bett~r health. They rose by twenty per cent 
between 1926 and 1929, but dropped sharply in 1930 and 1931. 
The level of 1929 was only attained again in 1936. In this 
case, and that of the death rate, the lo~ level appears 
particularly remarkable against the background of an aging 
population. Between 1926 and 1936 the proportion of the 
population in the Christchurch urban area over the age of 
sixty increased from 9.2% to 12.3%.9 
Faced with the statistical evidence, some observers were 
tempted to make the "deduction associating plain living with 
10 good health". The temptation appears to have been 
particularly strong amongst those with secure annual incomes 
7. CSO, Vital Statistics, 1940, p.139-40. 
8. Christchurch City Council, Town Clerk's Reports, 1923-36. 
9. Census, 1926, Vol.III, p.20-2li 1936, Vol.IV, p.9-10. 
10. F.O. Bennett, Hospital on the Avon, Christchurch, 1962, p.160. 
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of over a thousand pounds. Thus in January, 1932, Dr. W.Fox, 
the Medical Superintendent of Christchurch Hospital, remarked 
that it was 
undeniable that many people were better off for 
being restricted, through necessity, to simple 
methods of living ... A big proportion of diseases 
sprang from overindulgence •.• lt seemed that with 
the depression the health of the people improved, 
due no doubt to the fact that there was not so 
much overindulgence. ll 
However, there were a number of factors unconnected wit~ the 
depression which were tending jtoimprove the public health 
statistics in Christchurch and throughout the country. When 
these influences are taken into account, and specific areas 
of public health are examined, the true impact of the 
depression emerges. 
Amongst the factors tending to improve the statistics of 
public health during the early 'thirties was the absence of 
any major epidemic of influenza, poliomyelitis or scarlet fever. 
Such outbreaks appear to occur in an unvaccinated population 
regardless of economic conditions. A sharp, but brief, 
aftershock of the 'flu epidemic of 1918 did strike in 1926, 
elevating the death-rate considerably for that year.' Similarly, 
a prolonged epidemic of scarlet fever swelled the total of 
disease notifications in Christchurch and crowded the local 
isolation unit at Burwood Hospital during 1928 and 1929. 
Poliomyelitis was to strike hard in the late 'thirties 
but was quiescent during the worst of the depression. The 
absence of any major outbreak of these periodic epidemic 
11. Sun, 7 January, 1932. See also reference to Professor J. MacMillan 
Brown on the "boons of depression", Sun, 13 January, 1932, and 
Professor J. Shelley on the themes "material depression is good for 
a country" and New Zealand "has suffered more from prosperity than 
depression". Sun, 13 December, 1930. 
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diseases during the early 'thirties had some effect on 
mortality, and substantially reduced the notifiable disease 
statistics. The latter were further improved from 1932 
onwards by the omission of pneumonia from the list of ail-
ments requiring notification. 
Secondly, theaccuracy of the figures for the incidence 
of notifiable diseases, and the total number of patients 
admitted to hospitals were probably distorted by the depression 
itself. A stay in hospital was expensive, as was a visit to, 
or by, a doctor. Evidence of destitution might induce the 
latter to waive his fee,12 and it was possible to get free 
treatment under charitable aid at the Christchurch Hospital. 
However, the necessity to plead poverty and to seek charity 
almost certainly deterred many from seeking medical assistance. 
This trend would have been accentuated by the large number of 
"new poor", those who had previously been capable and proud 
of always paying their way. One doctor who arrived in the 
city in 1931 has described the comparative lack of custom, 
even for practitioners with a wealthy clientele: 
It came as a miserable truth that the medical 
profession was also a victim of the Depression. 
As I went on my visits, in Harley most waiting-
rooms were empty. The secretary of the Canterbury 
Division sat at his desk at three p.m., head 
back, mouth agape, noisily snoring. 13 
Nor would a failure to seek medical treatment for mild cases 
of notifiable diseases such as scarlet fever and influenza 
necessarily result in a noticeable increase in mortality. 
Lacking antibiotics, doctors could provide only a limited 
amount of assistance to such patients. Nevertheless, one 
12. Bennett, op.cit., p.160. 
13. F.O. Bennett, A Canterbury Tale, Wellington, 1980, p.lS8. 
See also comments to this effect by a chemist in ~, 10 October, 1931. 
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indication that potentially serious illnesses had gone 
unremarked during the early 'thirties was a sudden increase 
in deaths from tuberculosis nationally in 1936. Even the 
Health Department suspected a possible link with the 
economic crisis: 
To what extent the rise experienced this year is 
due to conditions existing as a result of the 
recent depression it is impossible to gauge with 
accuracy, but it is of interest to note that 
provisional mortality reports for the United 
States for 1936 indicated that the decided down-
ward swing in the trend of this disease had been 
checked - at least temporarily.14 
The reversal of the downward trend had actually occurred 
earlier in Christchurch, with an increase in deaths from 
tuberculosis in 1933,15 and an increase in notified cases 
in the 1933-34 year.16 
The high incidence of tuberculosis during the 'twenties 
had been largely the product of another factor - the effect 
of the Great War. In 1914 the rate of deaths from consumption 
had been 6.67 per ten thousand population, and it was declining. 
In 1918 the rate was 7.54 per ten thousand population. 17 
The total number of deaths remained above pre-war levels for 
much of the 'twenties as infected returned servicemen and 
their families succumbed to the disease. However, the resur-
gence in mortality from tuberculosis in the mid-thirties 
occurred largely amongst young adults who would have been 
children during the war. There was also some rise in such 
h d h f f ' 18 deaths amongst t ose un er t e age 0 ~ve. 
14. AJHR, 1937, H31, p.ll. 
15. CSO, Vital Statistics, 1933, p.82. 
16. Christchurch City Council, op.cit., 1934. 
17. NZYB, 1923, p.114. 
18. CSO, op.cit., 1926-37,"Deaths from each Cause - by Sex and Age-groups". 
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The war had increased mortality and admissions to 
hospitals more generally during the 'twenties. The effects 
of wounds, mustard gas, psychological scars, and parasitic 
and venereal diseases were undoubtedly exacting a severe toll 
during the 'twenties. Although the appearance of a number of 
"burnt-out cases ll was noted in the 'thirties as returned 
servicement entered middle-age, many more of the inhabitants 
of Memorial Homes and Sanatoriums would have died in the 
years immediately following the war. The wider impact on 
wives and families must also be taken into account. In 1933 
the local School Medical Officer reported that the children 
of widows were more likely to be malnourished than those 
19 
with unemployed fathers, and it seems probable that the 
same applied during the 'twenties when there were many more 
such children. Similarly, grieving widows would have been 
more susceptible to fatal illness. Certainly both male and 
female death-rates in the 25 to 50 age-range showed a 
particularly strong fall between the mid-'twenties and the 
mid-'thirties. 20 
A related factor which affected a wide range of medical 
statistics was the fall in the birth-rate from the mid-
'twenties. In Christchurch, for instance, the rate fell from 
almost nineteen per thousand population in 1926 to just over 
thirteen per thousand in 1935. 21 To a considerable degree 
19. Health Department, 35/70. 
20. In 1927 the male death-rate in this age-group was roughly .47%, 
and the female .38%. In 1936 these figures were .37% and .30% 
respectively. There was no significant "aging" within the 25 to 50 
age-group. Use of the 1926 mortality figures would have revealed a 
greater difference, but the 'flu epidemic of that year may have 
distorted the comparison. 
21. eso, , 1927, p.139; 1931, p.102i 1936, p.84. 
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this marked a return to the long-term decline since the 
eighteen-ei~hties after a brief post-war reversal. However, 
it was almost certainly also a response to depressed economic 
conditions. Whatever its cause, the falling birth-rate 
reduced the proportion of the population in an age-group 
particularly vulnerable to disease. In addition, this group 
contained many babies dying from congenital defects or needing 
treatment for them. 
The weather pattern during the early 'thirties also 
exerted a considerable favourable influence on rates of 
mortality and morbidity. The years 1931-33 and 1935 were 
extremely mild and dry along the east coasts of both islands 
22 
of New Zealand and particularly in Canterbury. The cause 
of these prolonged spells of clement weather was a recurrence 
of the meteorological phenomenon known as the Southern 
Oscillation. This appears to be correlated with sunspot 
activity and involves an unusually large difference in 
atmospheric pressure across the southern Pacific Ocean 
between Australia and South America. This draws anti-cyclones 
23 further south in their tracks across New Zealand. A 
similar development had brought severe drought to eastern 
New Zealand in the early eighteen-nineties, and comparable 
conditions were to reappear in the early nineteen-eighties. 
The lengthy periods of fine weather almost certainly had a 
beneficial effect on public health and morale, and hence 
mortality. The previous decade had provided some clear 
22. NZYB, 1932-38. 
23. R.G. Vines and A.I. Tomlinson, "An Analysis of New Zealand's Rainfall",' 
New Zealand Journal of Science, Vol.23, No.2, 1980; A.I. Tomlinson, 
"Wet and Dry Years", Soil and Water, October, 1980; H.Coates, 
IIEl Nino's Link to N.Z.'s Drought and Floods", Press, 16 July, 1983. 
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examples of the effect of exceptionally cold and wet weather 
on the deat~-rate. The years 1923, 1926, and 1930 stand out 
as times of both unusually severe weather and high mortality 
in Christchurch. On the other hand, the record low death-
rates of 1931 and 1933 were recorded against a background 
of outstandingly fine weather. Certainly some contemporary 
observers were aware of the impact on health of three 
successive. fine winters of 1931-33. 24 
The year 1934 emerges as an exception to this pattern 
of mild weather and low mortality. Even when allowance is 
made for the aging of the population, the national mortality 
25 
rate was high for this one year. Conditions had been 
unseasonably cool and damp during six of the first seven 
26 
months of the year. However, although this weather was 
a sharp contrast to the previous three years, it was not 
exceptionally severe, and it seems likely that the higher 
mortality partly reflected the effect of the depression. 27 
Nineteen thirty-four was a year of rising food prices,28 but 
static relief work and sustenance pay rates. Local bodies 
were tending to shed No.5 Scheme labour, effectively trans-
ferring large numbers of workers to sustenance, old age 
24. Sun, 22 September, 1933. 
25. eso, op.cit., 1939, p.30. The internationally standardised death-rate 
with distinction between the sexes was 8.06 per thousand in 1934, 
compared with an. average of 7.84 per thousand over the period 1932-36. 
26. NZYB, 1936, p.2l-23. 
27. Both the NZYB, 1936, p.119 and A. Ashton-Peach, The Social Effects of 
the DepreSSIOn in Auckland, unpublished M.A. Thesis, Auckland 
University, 1971, p.62, use this argument partly to explain the 
increase in hospitalisation during 1934. Improving economic conditions -
another argument which both advance - may be a better explanation for 
this increase except amongst "the poorer classes". 
28. eso, Prices, Wages, etc., 1934, p.3. 
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pensions and charitable aid. 29 These forms of support 
almost invqriably provided less money, and transference to 
them could involve a shattering loss of pride. At the 
same time, reductions in interest rates on savings and 
legislation for the relief of mortgagors were lowering 
\ the incomes of many elderly people who had provided for 
their own old age. Furthermore, household stocks of 
clothing, fuel, pawnable items and small savings were likely 
to be running out after three years of very high unemployment. 
The improvement noted in the health statistics during 
the early 'thirties also partly reflects the improvement of 
public services during the 'twenties. This included the 
extension of treated water supplies and sewerage to a far 
greater proportion of the population in Christchurch. The 
construction and operation of such extensions were both made 
cheaper, and therefore more attractive, by new technology. 
Motor power permitted rapid installation of new pipelines 
while cheaper electric energy supplied automatic machines 
for scattered suburban pumping stations. For example, the 
number of pumping stat~ons in the city council's high 
pressure water supply system doubled between 1926 and 1936, 
with the new stations being located in the outer suburbs 
which had burgeoned with the extension of tram services and 
. 
the spread of the motor car. The mileage of water-pipes 
increased by 63% between 1928 and 1936,30 while the number 
of house connections grew by 38% between 1926 and 1936, 
29. AJHR, 1935, H35, p.28. 
30. Christchurch City Council, Chief Engineer's Report, 1936, p.42. 
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(Fig. 6.l) compared with a 20% increase in the number of 
dwellings. In addition, householders in areas without a 
public water supply were now able to augment their supplies 
of artesian water by the use of electric pumps. It seems 
likely that this encouraged greater usage of water in such 
households - pumping up the water by hand had never been a 
popular chore. 
Electricity also brought about a transformation of the 
Christchurch Drainage Board's sewerage system. The number 
of houses connected to it doubled between 1926 and 1936, 
with most of the increase taking place between 1929 and 
1932 (Fig. 6.2). In 1926 less than half the dwellings in 
the urban area were connected; in 1936 over eighty per cent. 
Again, it was the new suburbs which benefitted to the largest 
extent, with the mileage of sewers increasing from 118 miles 
in 1926 to 284 miles in 1932. 31 This rapid growth was made 
possible by the installation of twenty-four automatic 
electric pumping stations. Previously the system had relied 
upon one large steam-powered station, and four smaller 
electric pumps established before 1914. These had restricted 
the municipal service to the central city and some of the 
older suburbs, and the steam plant had proven expensive to 
run and maintain. Now the costly system of night-soil 
collection and the risky use of septic tanks in a swampy 
city could be largely superseded without a large permanent 
workforce to tend steam engines. Household living was thus 
made healthier as well as more pleasant for a substantial 
section of the city's population, without a prohibitive 
31. Christchurch Drainage Board, Annual Report and statement of 
Accounts, 1926-36. 
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increase in drainage rates. As with the installation of 
electricity, loans to householders were used to help overcome 
the cost of connection. These loans were provided by 
territorial local authorities under an Act passed by the 
Liberal Government in 1908. 
Such improvements had a marked effect on the incidence 
of infectious diseases. These loomed large amongst the list 
of notifiable cases, and were particularly significant as 
causes of mortality amongst infants and young children. 
For example, typhoid fevers, and diphtheria had killed 
around twelve people a year in Christchurch during the 
'twenties and had constituted around ten per cent of the 
number of notifiable disease cases. By 1936 they were 
scarcely appearing in mortality statistics. 32 
New technology was providing more direct medical 
assitance through the use of motor ambulances, x-rays and 
radium treatment. The Order of St. John acquired Christ-
church's first motor ambulance in 1917 and had four by 
1932. 33 The Hospital Board ran two others for "infectious 
cases" • Between 1931 and 1934 a Christchurch Free 
Ambulance Association also operated a service, financed by 
public contributions. 34 Although a radiographic service 
was established at Christchurch Public Hospital before the 
32. six people died of such diseases in Christchurch in 1926; none in 
1936. CSO, Vital Statistics, 1926, p.l05; 1936, p.86. Nationally 
the rate of deaths from typhoid per ten thousand mean population 
fell from 0.54 in 1922 to 0.14 in 1926 and 0.06 in 1936. 
Ibid, 1930, p.27; 1936, p.32. 
33. R.E. wright-St.C1air (Ed.), The Order of St. John in New Zealand, 
Wellington, 1977, p.59. 
34. 21 August, 1934. This appears to have been very much a working-
enterprise, relying on very many small subscriptions. The 
Wellington Free Ambulance Service, founded by Sir Charles Norwood in 
1927, still operates. A.O. Dare, Ambulance Services in New Zealand, 
Wellington, 1979. 
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Great War, its work was intermittent until the 'twenties. 35 
By 1931 it w~s doing more work in a single month than during 
the whole of 1914, and its output had doubled again by 1937. 
Radium therapy began at the hospital at the end of 1924, and 
its operations increased rapidly, both in number and 
h ' , t' 36 sop 1st1ca 10n. 
Finally, some account must be taken of the long-term rise 
in the standard of living in New Zealand due to industrialisa-
tion here and in markets overseas. The limited evidence 
available suggests that real incomes had risen significantly 
, h' ht ' , 37 S1nce t e e1g een-n1net1es. This would have left a 
legacy of improved housing, healthier people and greater 
reserves of clothing and household goods. 
Most of these factors would have served to improve 
public health during the 'thirties regardless of the 
depression. This suggests that mortality and morbidity might 
in fact have been even lower during this period if economic 
conditions had been better. The resurgence of tuberculosis 
and the increased death-rate of 1934 have already been noted. 
A close examination of the causes of death and reasons for 
admission to hospital reveals a number of other areas in which 
the depression brought death and suffering. 
Increases in psychological illness and suicide provide 
the most striking examples of harm done by the economic crisis. 
In 1932 the Annual Report on the Mental Hospitals of the 
Dominion noted a "definite .•• increase in the incidence of mental 
35. F.O. Bennett, Hospital .•• , p.192-96. 
36. Ibid, p.203-4. 
37. See above, p. 48. 
disorder in New Zealand" during the 'twenties. 38 In the 
following year, however, it suggested that the depression 
was actually reducing psychological problems: 
One would be tempted to expect that the distress 
arising from the prevailing economic difficulties 
would be reflected in an increase in our admissions. 
Actually, the total admissions, including voluntary 
boarders, are ten less than in the previous year, 
and one can only surmise that the spirit of altruism, 
which is always at its height in periods of national 
danger and anxiety, is working as it did during the 
war years. The great occasion is one of real 
stresses which leave no room for petty vanities 
and morbid imaginings and introspections; there 
is a call to action, an exaltation of the community 
and a self-discipline which tends to sanity. 39 
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This optimistic assessment rested upon a decrease of less than 
one per cent in admissions, compared with a rise of over 
twenty per cent in the pr~vious six years. 40 At Sunnyside, 
Christchurch's mental hospital, admissions went from 147 in 
1925 to 188 in 1926, and 266 in 1931 (Fig. 6.3). Nationally 
the respective figures were 875, 947, and 1063 (Fig. 6.4). 
Much of the increase was due to the inability of many 
parents to continue to support their mentally deficient 
children at home. Around half the additional admissions 
between 1925 and 1931 were classified as "congenital" or 
"adolescent" cases. Similar problems contributed to a 
general increase in admissions due to senility. However, 
there was also a substantial growth in cases due to stress or 
"involution" (schizophrenia). During 1925 a total of nine 
such cases were admitted to Sunnyside, compared with twenty 
in 1931 and eighteen in 1932. The number then tended to 
fall away until 1936, when a new peak of twenty-eight cases 
38. ~, 1932, H7, p.3. 
39. AJHR, 1933, H7, p.2. 
40. AJHR, 1926-33, H7, "Principal Assigned Causes of Insanity". 
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was reached. There was a similar trend in the hospitalisa-
tion of pat~ents whose conditions were ascribed to a 
"previous attack". Such people were doubtless particularly 
susceptible to breakdowns under the sorts of stress 'the 
depression was imposing. Other categories of cause, such 
as senility, may have been similarly affected. 
National figures for admissions to mental hospitals on 
the grounds of stress, involution, and previous attack 
followed broadly the same pattern as those at Sunnyside, 
except that the period 1931-35 resembled a high and irregular 
plateau rather than a peak followed by a trough. There was 
the same renewed increase during the mid-'thirties, beginning 
this time in 1934, a year later than at Sunnyside. Outward 
migration may have kept the incidence of stress-related 
breakdowns in Christchurch at an artificially low level, 
but the sample involved is too small to draw any firm 
deductions. More importantly, the national totals confirm 
the conclusion that the depression did increase such 9reak-
downs. A comparison of admissions to New Zealand mental 
hospitals between the relatively prosperous period of ,1923-25 
and the depressed years of 1930-32 shows a total increase 
of 17%.41 The number of patients admitted due to congenital 
causes, puberty, and senility rose by 66%, whereas those 
admitted with disorders attributed to stress increased by 
l64%. 
Admissions to Christchurch Public Hospital for the 
treatment of nervous disorders also reflected the impact of 
the depression (Fig~ 6.5). In this case the first peak 
41. Ibid, 1924-33. 
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FIG. 6.5: ADMISSIONS TO CHRISTCHURCH HOSPITAL FOR 
THE TREATMENT OF CERTAIN NERVOUS AND ILL-DEFINED 
DISEASES*, 1923-37+ 
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Source: CSO, Vital Statistics, 1923-25, "Diseases Treated 
in Public Hospitalslli Christchurch Public Hospital, 
Diseases Treated, 1927-37. 
* Neurasthenia, hysteria, neurosis, melancholia, 
incipient melancholia, mental alienation, psychasthenia, 
dementia, dementia praecox, neuralgia, cephalgia, nervous 
impotence, mania, insanity, anxiety state, paranoia, 
delusional and confusional insanity, mental derangement, 
nervous exhaustion, insomnia, obsessional state, 
schizophrenia, exhaustion neurosis, amnesia, tic 
douloureux, causalgia, mental depression, migraine, 
general paralysis of the insane, catalepsy, functional 
nervous disorder, debility. 
+ 1923-25 calendar years; 1928-37 March years; 
1926, 1927 no information available. 
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occurred rather earlier, between 1929 and 1931. There was 
then a trough similar to that in the Sunnyside figures, 
followed by the same sort of resurgence, this time between 
1933 and 1936. The comparable statistics for all public 
hospitals in New Zealand were roughly analogous, but with 
peaks and troughs less marked (Fig. 6.6). The trend of 
psychological admissions to public hospitals tended to fore-
shadow movements in the rate of admissions to mental hospitals. 
It seems logical that the less serious symptoms of stress -
those suitable for treatment in a general hospital - should 
appear first. Furthermore, the patients involved and their 
relatives would probably have resisted admission to the 
"mental asylum" for as long as possible. The stigma of having 
been a Sunnyside patient or having a family member "down 
Lincoln Road" must be added to the cost of the depression 
for many citizens. 
There is thus a strong chronological correlation between 
the development of the economic crisis and the increase in 
mental disorder. Sharp increases in the number of patients 
suffering from psychological problems coincided with the 
sudden economic downturns of 1926, 1929 and 1931. These were 
times of severe personal crisis as large sections of the 
population struggled to adjust to unemployment, lower incomes, 
and bankruptcy. Once the initial shock had passed, some 
decline in new admissions could be expected as most of those 
particularly economically or psychologically vulnerable had 
already succumbed. It is possible that much of the decline 
was due to attempts to economise by hospital boards and 
mental hospital authorities. This would not, however, explain 
the sharp resurgences in admissions during 1933 and 1933-34, 
when the demand for economy was very strong, particularly in 
FIG. 6.6: ADMISSIONS TO NEW ZEALAND HOSPITALS FOR 
THE TREATMENT OF CERTAIN NERVOUS AND ILL DEFINED 
DISEASES*, 1923-37 
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1938 
* General paralysis of the insane, insanity, mania, dementia, 
melancholia, psychasthenia, psychosis, mental alienation, 
neuralgia, hysteria, migraine, neurasthenia, neurosis, 
nervous debility, insomnia, headache, amnesia, dementia 
praecox, delusional insanity, paranoia, "other diseases of 
the nervous system", angioneuratic oedema, syncope, 
debility, shock, schizophrenia. 
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hospitals. There were a number of other social and economic 
factors supporting the downward trend between 1931 and 1933~ 
The institution of relief work was well-established, reducing 
the fear of utter destitution. Prices for food, accommodation, 
d ' 11 f II' 'dl 42 an grocer1es were a a 1ng rap~ y. Above all, there 
was a widespread sense of shared misfortune, of "all being 
in the same boat". Few people seemed to be improving their 
economic positions. By the middle of 1935, however, most 
, h d' " f' tl 43 h' 1 h ' pr1ces a r1sen s1gn1 1can y w 1 e t e 1ncomes of several 
vulnerable groups had not kept pace. The restoration of 
pension, sustenance, and relief pay rates lagged behind 
prices, as did charitable aid allowances. Many of those 
dependent on income from mortgages or interest on savings 
had found their returns reduced and not restored. Some would 
have seen their incomes temporarily frozen as a result of 
government legislation to protect mortgagors. Defaults would 
have affected others. 
Nor was the increasingly visible evidence of recovery 
always reassuring. Paradoxically this could be a time of 
despair for the many who found themselves left behind amongst 
the unemployed and the unprofitable. Elderly workers might 
well find youths taken on before them, or be rejected while 
their erstwhile colleagues were accepted. New signs of 
prosperity amongst fellow entrepreneurs could indicate 
failur.e to the businessman still languishing in depression. 
Certainly the Press noted an increase in the number of nervous 
42. CSO, Prices, Wages, etc., 1926-37, p.1-6. Food prices rose by 5.3% 
between December, 1932, and December, 1933. By the end of 1935 
they were 13.8% up. 
43. Ibid., 1935, p.1-6. 
breakdowns amongst men prominent in local commerce 
during 1935. 44 
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However, whereas men had contributed the largest part 
of the increase in the indices of mental disorder up to 
1931, it was women that predominated after 1933 (Fig. 6.7). 
The explanation for this trend probably lies in the role 
to which womenfolk were generally assigned. They were 
normally expected to manage household expenditure in such 
a way as to maintain the family's standard of living. When 
the male breadwinner lost his job, or brought home less money 
from the business, the failure was essentially his, though 
the economic and psychological stress would be passed on to 
some extent to the rest of the family. But when the income 
was secure, albeit at relief work rates, it was lithe lady 
\ 
of the house" who felt the pressure of rising prices. She 
now faced possible charges of bad management when the family 
had to cut i~s standard of living. Moreover, the progressive 
wearing out of clothes after years of patching and non-
replacement would have put added stress on the household 
budget and its supervisor. Social workers noted a high 
degree of emotional strain amongst women requesting assistance 
throughout the early 'thirties, but particularly at this 
time. For instance, Miss E. Cardale, secretary of the local 
society for the Protection of Women and Chidlren from the 
late 'twenties, noted in March, 1935, that there had been 
45 
"a large number of mental cases" during the year. Rising 
prices may also partly account for the increased amount of 
44. Press, 6 April, 1925. 
45. Sun, 2 March, 1935. 
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political activity on the part of working women during 
1934 and 1935. 46 A further source of tension was the 
rise in desertion during the early 'thirties. 47 Clearly 
more husbands and fathers were seeking to shed their now 
more onerous family responsibilities. The greater need 
for men to travel to other areas for work increased the 
danger of either partner forming new alliances. It is 
likely that wives suffered more than husbands as a result 
of such developments, given the values prevailing in most 
classes. These included sexual double standards and an 
emphasis on horne and child-care by mothers. Conversely, 
308 
the strong trend towards more paid employment for women may 
also have increased the degree of stress on them if they 
had children. The high rate of abortion suggests that 
knowledge or .effectiveness of contraception was limited 
and that unwanted pregnancies were leading to severe stress. 
The average family size was still considerably larger than 
today, and the range of mechanical horne appliances within 
the economic reach of most working people was very limited. 
Overall, the relatively steady upward trend in the number 
of female patients admitted to mental hospitals indicates 
that many women were under severe stress throughout the 
economic crisis. They appear to have lost on the upswings 
as well as the slides. 
The occupations of patients admitted to mental hospitals 
also reflected the impact of the depression. 48 vocations 
typical of the unskilled working class loomed particularly 
large amongst the admissions. Leaving aside those with no 
46. See below, Chapter 8. 
47. Sun, 2 March, 1935. 
48.AJHR,1924-33, H7. 
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occupations, over half the increase in admissions of male 
patients between the periods 1923-25 and 1930-32 consisted 
, 
of labourers. Other unskilled groups such as farm labourers, 
gardeners, and seamen also showed significant rises, both 
in absolute terms and as a proportion of the higher total 
of admissions. This parallels the disproportionate repres-
entation of the unskilled amongst the unemployed. It is 
possible that some of those recorded in the mental health 
statistics as labourers, farm labourers, or gardeners may 
well have been relief workers from other occupations by 
1932. However, it is significant that such unskilled occupa-
tions dominated mental hospital admissions to a similar 
degree during the late 'twenties, when labourers alone 
comprised well over half the registered unemployed. 49 
Between 1927 and 1929, for example, labourers made up 38.8% 
of new male patients with occupations, compared with 33.5% 
in 1923-25 and 40.6% in 1930-32. The unskilled suffered 
most both from the economic crisis and the loss of jobs 
due to technological change, and this appears to have been 
mirrored in their rate of mental breakdown. 
When combined in class groups, the occupations typical 
of other classes reveal no comparable rises. The proportion 
of "farmers" tended to decline, while those of white-collar 
workers and professionals remained at much the same level. 
Nevertheless, variations within classes appear significant, 
although the samples involved are very small. There was, 
for example, a marked increase in the number of "salesmen" 
and "agents", and solicitors made a strong appearance. 
49. See p. 195. 
These groups were under heavy economic pressure, and the 
latter wer~ particularly liable to have gambled on the 
continuation of good times in the investment of their 
clients' money. On the other hand, the number of clerks 
admitted did not show a comparable rise despite their 
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increasing share of the workforce. Civil servants, a group 
with a rising real income and considerable job security, 
, h d f th f' 50 van1S e rom e 19ures. 
The substantial rise in suicide is probably the most 
serious indication of the depression's effect on mental 
51 health. From a low-point of eleven in 1926, the number 
of suicides recorded in the Christchurch Urban Area increased 
to thirty-four in 1931 (Table 6.2). After 1933 the total 
fell away and did not rise significantly until the renewed 
economic difficulties of 1938. The national trend was 
similar, except that the depression peak occurred a year 
50. It is possible that they would have reappeared after 1932 as the 
pressures engendered by' the "sinking lid", enforced early retirement, 
and the effect of rising prices on twice-cut incomes began to take 
their toll. However, this statistical series was another casualty 
of cuts in government expenditure. 
51. For overseas studies o·f the correlation between suicide and economic 
crisis, see Mr. Halbwachs (trans. H. Goldblatt), The Causes of Suicide, 
London, 1978; W. Breed, "Suicide and Occupational Mobility", in 
A. Giddens (Ed.), The Sociology of Suicide, London, 1971; H. Brenner, 
Estimating the Social Costs of Economic Policy: Implications for 
Mental and Physical Health and Criminal Aggression, Report to the 
Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress, Washington, 
1976. Also D. Wecter, The Age of the Great Depression, 1929-1941, 
New York, 1948, p.39-40; G. Bolton, A Fine Country to Slave In, Perth, 
1972, p.142-43; and R. Broomhill, Unemployed Workers, St. Lucia 
(Queensland) 1978, p.70-71. Broomfield· notes a tendency for suicides 
in South Australia to increase going into and coming out of the 
depression. For a striking recent New Zealand example of the linkage 
between suicide and unemployment see table on suicides and attempted 
suicides per ten thousand population in employed and unemployed groups 
in G. Campbell, "The Out-of-Work Force", Listener, 13-19 September, 
1980. 
TABLE 6.2: VIOLENT DEATHS IN THE CHRISTCHURCH URBAN AREA, 1926-38 
1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 
Suicide 11 21 22 18 18 34 21 26 13 
Accident 39 41 54 46 61 33 60 33 45 
Homicide 4 3 o 1 1 2 o o 5 
Source: CSO, vital Statistics, 1926-38, "Urban Areas - Causes of Death". 
1935 1936 
15 16 
37 45 
1 o 
1937 
12 
50 
o 
1938 
26 
54 
o 
W 
I-' 
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later (Table 6.3). 
In addition, there was a noticeable rise in accidental 
deaths not'involving motor vehicles. A' number of these 
deaths were almost certainly suicides in which the benefit 
of the doubt was given to the victim and his family. As 
well as the loss of their public reputation, a merciful 
magistrate might take into account their need for a life 
insurance payment in the harsh economic circumstances which 
often occasioned the suicide. During 1932, there were 
twenty-one accidental deaths as a result of falls in the 
Christchurch Urban Area, compared with a maximum of ten in 
the previous decade. This followed a widely publicised dual 
suicide during 1931 in which a young unemployed carpenter 
and his girlfriend leapt to their deaths from Whitewash Head, 
53 
near Sumner. A number of the "accidental deaths as a 
result of falls" took place at the same relatively isolated 
54 
spot over the succeeding twelve months. The Coroner was 
clearly requiring a high standard of proof of intention to 
commit suicide before bringing down such a verdict. Less 
dramatic examples of cases where decisions were left open 
included one in October, 1930, in which a middle-aged drover 
was seen to wait and then walk in front of a train at the 
Clarence Road level-crossing in Riccarton. 55 Nationally 
there was a particularly strong increase in the rate of 
accidental death during the crisis year of 1931 - despite 
53. Press, 7 March, 1931, 9 March, 1931, 17 March, 1931. The last previous 
suicide at Scarborough with details published in the newspapers was 
that of a young man in 1927. Star, 7 June, 1927. 
54. At one stage early in 1932 there were three possible identities 
suggested for one body found at Sumner. ~,22 January, 1932. 
55. Sun, 25 October, 1930. 
TABLE 6.3: RATES OF DEATH FROM VIOLENT CAUSES IN NEW ZEALAND PER MILLION STANDARDISED POPULATION, 
1925-38 52 
1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 
Suicide 130 113 145 145 157 135 157 165 137 123 100 100 111 
Accident 467 523 477 535 515 542 642 456 416 436 419 468 484 
Homicide 11 10 16 7 6 8 9 18 10 15 6 12 5 
Source: CSO, Vital Statistics, 1934-40, "Certain Principal Causes of Death" and "Principal Causes of Death - Numbers 
and Rates". 
52. "The standard population compiled and used by the International Institute of Statistics, and based on the age-
distribution of the population of nineteen European countries at their censuses nearest to the year 1900". 
CSO, op.cit., 1934, p.x. 
1938 
124 
526 
9 
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a fall in the number of motor vehicle fatalities. It is 
possible that inattention due to anxiety contributed somewhat 
to the increase, as well as concealed suicide. 
The pattern of suicides largely followed the trend in 
hospitalisation for psychological disorders. There was only 
a slight lag, with the first sharp increase occurring in 
1927 and the dominion peak in 1932. There was no marked 
second peak, but the number of women committing suicide 
did reach a record level in 1937. As usual in European 
, t' , 'd d 'tl 1 h' 56 b t soc~e les, SU1Cl e was pre omlnan y a rna e c Olce, u 
the proportion of women amongst those killing themselves 
increased after 1931 (Table 6.4), just as the female share 
of nervous breakdowns was increasing. The overall trend 
appears to confirm the impression that while men suffered 
somewhat more from the stress of declining income, women 
suffered worse from ;the pressures brought by recovery. 
Details of the background to individual cases of suicide 
reinforce the strong chronological link to economic stress. 
At least a quarter of the cases in 1931 involved people 
strongly affected by unemployment, or the downturn in business 
activity. 57 Reports on local inquests into cases of suicide 
noted repeatedly that the victim had been "depressed for 
58 
some time and unemployed" "was unemployed and worried about 
it"59 or "had financial worries".60 The misery and gloom 
created by the economic crisis could also lead to deep 
56. A. Giddens, "The Statistics of Suicide", in A. Giddens (Ed.), 
op.cit., p.421. 
57. Figure compiled from reports in the four Christchurch newspapers. 
58. ~, 10 March, 1931. 
59. Star, 6 July, 1931. 
60. Star, 14 July, 1930. 
Number 
Percentage 
of total 1 
1923 
23 
17 
TABLE 6.4: FEMALE SUICIDES IN NEW ZEALAND, 1923-38 
1924 1925 1926 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 
32 35 28 28 48 48 37 30 46 44 
20 20 18 14 24 22 19 13 19 21 
Source: CSO, Vital Statistics, 1923-38, "Causes of Death", 
1934 1935 1936 1937 . 1938 
48 35 35 58 38 
27 23 23 35 20 
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depression among~t those not themselves severely affected 
financially. For example, a solicitor from a prominent 
elite family shot himself in February 1931. 61 A graduate 
of Christ's College, former President of the Canterbury 
District Law Society, member of the Christchurch Hunt, and 
a director of the Press, the man was judged by a colleague 
to be "worth, on a conservative estimate, £50,000, even 
taking into account the depressed state of all markets". 
But "he had handled some large estates which were affected 
by the present financial position, and had acted for people 
who themselves were affected by the depression". Very few 
other cases involved leading landowners, professionals or 
businessmen. Unsuccessful speculation in land - New Zealand's 
equivalent of the Wall Street Stock Exchange may have 
contributed to some suicides. However, there was no local 
parallel to the widespread self-immolation of prominent 
businessmen that is said to have followed the New York crash. 62 
Those who killed themselves in Christchurch between 1926 and 
1936 tended to be relatively obscure individuals rather than 
local magnates. The only Christchurch stockbroker to commit 
suicide during this period did so in 1934,63 when the market 
had risen somewhat and speculation in gold shares was building 
to a peak. 
The tramway strike of 1932, itself partly a product of 
the depression, probably contributed to at least two suicides. 
The only two tramway employees to kill themselves during the 
eleven years between the beginning of 1926 and the end of 
61. 6 February 1931. 
62. 15 November, 1929. 
63. Sun, 2 July, 1934. 
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1936 did qO within nine months of the strike. One of them, 
an inspector, was said to have been ill since the dispute. 64 
Supervisory staff had been instrumental in maintaining/the 
service during the strike and had doubtless suffered daily 
reproaches from ex-tramwaymen and their supporters ever 
since. Unlike most of those who had assisted the board, 
they had to continue to ride the trams through working areas, 
wearing a uniform which marked them as strikebreakers. 
However, in many cases it appears that the economic 
crisis led people to suicide by compounding their existing 
troubles. For instance, ill-health had been a common cause 
of suicide amongst middle-aged and elderly men even in 
prosperous times. But now the depression was exacerbating 
such problems at the same time as a growing number of war-
scarred individuals were entering this age-group. The problem 
of prematurely aged veterans, "burnt-out cases", was troubling 
the local Returned Servicemen's Association as early as 
1929. 65 The Sandi lands Settlement in Aranui was established 
with the use of relief labour to accommodate a few such 
. d' 'd 1 66 ~n ~v~ ua s. Nevertheless, inquests into suicides during 
the mid-'thirties frequently mentioned that the victim was a 
returned serviceman suffering from a physical or psychological 
illness. Older, chronically sick men were in more danger of 
being put off work than their younger counterparts. They had 
less chance of re-engagement and were unlikely to be considered 
for retraining. If in business, they were poorly equipped 
to compete in a shrinking market. At least seven of the 
64. star, 16 December, 1932. The other tramway worker was a conductor whose 
wife had left him. Sun, 11 March, 1933. 
65. Star, 19 October, 1929. 
66. Sun, 2, 3, 12 October, 1933. 
Christchurch suicides in 1931 were suffering from poor 
health, and a clear majority of the men involved were aged 
between forty and sixty. A comparison of the national 
figures on the ages of male suicides between the periods 
1923-25 and 1930-32 also reflects the depression's harsh 
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impact on middle-aged men. Whereas the total number of male 
cases increased by 41%, those involving men between the ages 
of forty and sixty increased by 66%.67 A comparison of 
rates per thousand men in each five year age-cohort in the 
years 1926, 1931 and 1936, demonstrates that little of this 
disproportionate growth was due to changes in the age-
constitution of the male population (Fig. 6.8). 
There was significant divergence between the occupations 
of the men committing suicide in Christchurch during the 
period 1930-32 and those admitted to Sunnyside. Labourers 
and the unskilled generally were proportionately much less 
likely to take their own lives than to be admitted to a 
mental hospital. Less than twenty per cent of suicides in 
1931 came into this category. Self-employed, skilled workers, 
white-collar workers and men from the other respectable 
1 d ' d t h "d 68 c asses pre om~nate amongs t e su~c~ es. This reflected 
67. cso. op.cit., "Causes of Death by Sex and Age". 
68. This would seem to parallel the figures for England and Wales at 
roughly the same time (1930-32). Note that these were divided 
according to the five categories in the British census, which places 
many self-employed tradesmen in the "entrepreneurial" group. 
Rate of suicides per ten thousand adult males. 
Professional Entrepreneurial White- Skilled Unskilled 
collar 
1921-23 116 128 91 89 98 
1930-32 120 137 95 87 87 
1950 134 110 89 99 119 
A. Giddens, oj2.cit. , p.422. 
FIG. 6.8: AGE DISTRIBUTION OF MALE SUICIDES, BASED 
ON SUICIDES PER TEN THOUSAND MALES IN EACH GROUP 
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differences in class situations and the different values 
built on them. The tendency for members of the respectable 
classes to suffer isolation rather than seek assistance 
was repeatedly noted by contemporaries. A "Good Neighbour" 
organisation was formed in Christchurch to try to detect and 
alleviate such cases as private IX as possible. Within a 
month it found itself with "hundreds" of people in need of 
69 help. However, the prospect of admitting failure and 
having to seek charity clearly put immense psychological 
stress on men reared on the gospel of self-help. Most of 
those from sales or clerical backgrounds were also likely to 
be unsuited to outdoor relief work - practically all that 
was available. Furthermore, the economic value of their 
labour was frequently related to their long service with a 
certain firm and their knowledge of its methods and develop-
70 
mente Once such a job was lost, the middle-aged clerk 
was seldom an attractive prospective employee. It is also 
noticeable that a large number of suicides by white-collar 
workers and small businessmen followed incidents of dishonesty 
or disgrace. In some cases economic pressures may well have 
impelled a greater number of trusted workers to peculation, 
or entrepreneurs to theft. In other cases, tighter accounting 
in order to save money may have revealed transgressions 
dating back some time. Once discovered, the erring employee 
faced not only poverty but also social degradation. Trust-
worthiness was essential to the economic role and therefore 
to the ethical perception of his class. Men described as 
69. Sun, 18 June, 1932. 
70. D. Lockwood, The Blackcoated Worker, London, 1958, p.82-83. 
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labourers continued to troop through the courts and they 
dominated ~he unemployment figures, but relatively few 
committed suicide. Their ability with the "banjo" was of 
more interest to a potential employer than a short stretch 
in Paparua; they would be in no position to embezzle money 
and their work could be overseen by a foreman. Moreover, 
a number of their friends, workmates or relatives may well 
have faced charges themselves at some time. When condemned 
to unemployment by the economic crisis they could usually 
adapt quite' readily to relief work. Their wages were 
ridiculously low - a matter for particular discontent because 
skilled relief workers were guaranteed their award rate 
when doing skilled work. But the labour was normally poorly 
supervised and lasted only for a few days each week. Anyway, 
periods of unemployment tended to be a feature of unskilled 
labour, which was typically employed on a daily basis. Self-
confidence and self-image were not dependent on the possession 
of a steady job or the same ethical values as the bos~. 
A higher rate of homicide has also been associated with 
economic crises. 7l The figures for Christchurch represent 
a sample which is far too small to draw firm conclusions, 
although the "clustering n around times of downturn and upturn 
seem suggestive (Table 6.2). However, rises in the national 
total suggest that the depression was having the effect of 
71. See Brenner, op.cit., p.iv. Also M. MacDonald, N. Pearce, D. Salter, 
and A. Smith, ' "Health Consequences of Unemployment ", in M. Abbott 
(Ed.), Mental Health Foundation of New Zealand - New Zealand 
Psychological Society Symposium on Unemployment, Auckland, 1982. 
The table in R. Broomhill, op.cit., p.109, shows substantial 
increases in homicide in South Australia in 1929 and 1938 - two 
years of severe economic 'shock/. 
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lifting the rate of homicide (Table 6.3). An annual average 
of eleven homicides occurred in New Zealand between 1923 
and 1925, compared with an average of twenty between 1932 
and 1934. 72 The trend was roughly similar to those of 
suicide and psychological hospitalisation. There was a 
significant increase in 1927, coinciding with the raised 
suicide rate, and a generally higher level after 1930. The 
peak of twenty-five homicides in 1932 also coincided with 
the national. high-point of suicide, and there was the 
familiar second peak in 1936. Clearly the same economic and 
social conditions which were leading to the rise in suicide 
and mental disorder were bringing an increase in homicide. 
This increase appears to have been more the result of 
greater psychological stress rather than part of the growth 
in crimes of dishonesty such as burglary and insurance fraud. 
The local evidence is sparse, but depression homicides appear 
to have been typically irrational responses to intolerable 
pressure rather than calculated gambles or attempts to evade 
arrest. No case of homicide during robbery occurred in the 
city between 1930 and 1936, but there were two incidents in 
which murder accompanied unsuccessful suicide attempts. 
Although other factors were evident in each instance, the 
prevailing harsh economic environment may well have exerted 
an influence. In 1930 a Christchurch mother poisoned one of 
her teenage children, and attempted to kill the other and 
herself. 73 Her husband was "out in the country", working 
72. eso, op.cit., loc.cit. 
73. ~, 21 October, 1930. 
on the Lewis Pass Road as a relie~ worker. During 1933 a 
Dallington man gassed his wife and three children and 
attempted to kill himself. 74 Such multiple homicides 
within families accounted for a significant proportion of 
killings in New Zealand between 1926 and 1936. 75 In most 
cases mothers killed their children. It seems likely that 
economic stress often exacerbated other pressures such as 
loneliness, ill-treatment, desertion, or large numbers of 
young children, in precipitating tragedy. 
In addition, at least two of the homicides occurring 
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in Christchurch during the depression arose from industrial 
disputes which in turn were related to the economic crisis. 
A conductor working during the tramway strike of 1932 was 
attacked by three men at the Lancaster Park disturbance. 
He died some weeks later from complications arising from his 
. . . 76 
~nJurl.es. However, intimidation could be hazardous. In 
the following year a Summit Road relief worker punched a 
colleague who had called him a IIscab ll • 77 The unionist fell 
to his death over a wall. Such a direct clash would have 
been unusual in normal economic times, especially in so 
uncontrolled a situation. Supervision was very lax on many 
relief works because its cost was a charge on the employer 
rather than the Unemployment Board. This was especially 
true of the Summit Road project. 78 In the case described, 
74. Star, 15 November, 1933. 
75. This is reflected in the ages of those killed. Thirty-two per cent 
of deaths from homicide between 1923 and 1938 were of children aged 
ten years or under. During the three years of recovery, 1934-36, 
it was 38%, despite the drop in the birth rate since 1923. CSO, 
op.cit., 1923-38, "Causes of Death - by Ages and Sex". 
76. Press, 8 July, 20 August, 1932. 
77. Sun, 12 March, 1934, 14 March, 1934. 
78. See p. 217-18. 
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the argument had gone on for some time, and an authoritative 
foreman would have put the antagonists into separate gangs. 
On the other hand, authority was difficult to maintain where 
dismissal only meant transfer to another relief job - and 
almost certainly one more comfortable and convenient than 
that up at Rapaki. 
Besides self-inflicted and violent deaths, there were a 
significant number of serious injuries as a result of attempted 
suicides and assaults. A total of fifty-nine persons were 
admitted to Christchurch Public Hospital between 1928 and 
1935 as a result of unsuccessful suicide attempts. 79 
Similarly, there were casualties amongst both police and 
rioters during the disturbances of 1931 and 1932, and a number 
of cases of assault were reported in industrial disputes. 
One former professional boxer from Australia was said to have 
earned the title "Basher Bill" for his persuasive ways during 
the relief work strike in March, 1932. 80 
The impact of psychological stress is known to have 
81 
subtler physiological effects as well. One of these is 
the incidence of peptic ulcer, which certainly rose sharply 
in Christchurch in the early 'thirties. From a total of 
seventy-three in 1927-28, the number of such cases treated 
in the public hospital rose to 124 in 1933-34. Economic 
hardship as well as stress probably contributed to this rise. 
More families were forced to buy cheaper meats which required 
longer cooking, yet they could not afford more fuel. Likewise, 
79. Christchurch Public Hospital, Diseases Treated, 1928-35. 
80. Star, 21 June, 1932. The freezing-works dispute of 1932-33 also 
led to violent outbreaks. Sun, 2 March, 1933. 
81. Brenner, op.cit., p.v. 
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the inability to pay for timely dental treatment or new 
dentures would have exacerbated stomach ulcers in many cases 
and might have compelled hospitalisation. It was often very 
difficult financially to maintain the then prevailing diets 
for ulcer sufferers, which tended to include a lot of eggs 
and specially prepared foods. 
It seems likely that the occurrence of other medical 
problems .associated with stress - notably heart disease -
was also affected by the depression. 82 Unfortunately such 
effects are difficult to isolate as their impact is delayed 
and appears to be bound up with other factors, notably the 
long-term increase in the consumption of animal fats, and 
cigarettes. There were strong rises in the national death 
rate from heart disease during the years 1928-30, 1933-34 
and 1937-38 (Table 6.5). Allowing for Brenner's rather open 
three to six year lag before cardiovascular and renal disease 
death rates respond to increased unemployment,83 these 
periods might reflect the stress of the downturns of 1926 
and 1930-31, and the cost-of-living pressures of the upturn 
84 
of 1933-36. The lag of up to two years allowed by Brenner 
for the response in the death rate from chronic nephritis 
appears to apply to the New Zealand figures, with a high 
level from 1929 to 1932 and small jumps in 1926 and 1936. 
The latter may once again reflect the stresses of the recovery 
period. However, too much should not be read into the 
relatively small changes. Some variation is to be expected 
in any population, and factors such as the weather may have 
82. Ibid., p.37. 
83. Ibid.,p.36-37. 
84. Ibid., p.41. 
TABLE 6.5: NEW ZEALAND DEATH RATES FROM HEART DISEASE AND CHRONIC NEPHRITIS, 1923-28 
1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 
Heart Disease (per million 
standardised population) 
Male: 1523 1694 1853 1753 1711 1795 1894 1913 1951 1987 
Female: 1349 1378 1563 1452 1522 1523 1594 1556 1505 1587 
Heart Disease (per million 
population) 1587 1431 1452 1522 1564 1665 
Chronic Nephritis (per 
million standardised 
population) 
Male: 269 295 309 326 286 312 295 264 300 272 
Female: 260 327 312 299 326 273 265 246 272 270 
Nephritis (per million 
population) 281 263 298 321 298 327 
Sources: CSO, Vital Statistics, 1932, p.28-29, "Principal Causes of Death - Numbers and Rates, 1923-1932; 1937, 1938, 
p.37-38, "Standardised Death Rates of Males and Females from Certain Causes at all Ages Per 1,000,000 of 
Population". 
1938 
2118 
1639 
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exerted a considerable influence in 1926 and 1930,85 
leading elderly people to succumb to these degenerative 
diseases a year or two earlier. 
The incidence of induced abortion was another area of 
public health which had some relation to the level of psycho-
logical stress and which was significantly affected by the 
depression. Judging by admissions to hospital on grounds 
related to abortion or miscarriages, there was a steady 
increase in the use of abortion as a method of birth-control 
throughout the inter-war period. This is clear even when 
allowance is made for the growth of the female population 
'h d t' 86 ~n t e repro uc ~ve years. Many factors lay behind this 
trend, not least being the desire to maintain a level of 
, , , 'dl d 1 ' , t 87 d~sposable ~ncome ~n a rap~ y eve op~ng consumer soc~e y. 
Nevertheless, it is notic~able that admissions on the grounds 
of abortion or miscarriage increased particularly rapidly 
during years in which the economic crisis was forcing adjust-
ment. This is clear from the national figures between 1926 
and 1927, and from Christchurch and national figures between 
1929 and 1930 {Table 6.6}. During this period the increase 
85. See above ~.291. 
86. Between 1926 and 1936 the number of women in the 15 to 50 age-group 
in the Christchurch Urban Area increased by 9% and those between 
20. and 40 by 12%. The number of abortions and threatened abortions 
at Christchurch Public Hospital rose by 85% between 1925 and 1935. 
Census, 1926, Vol.3, p.14-l5; 1936, Vol.4, p.5; Christchurch 
Public Hospital, Patients Treated, 1925, 1935. 
87. Increased reporting may also have magnified the totals. Another 
factor could have been an increase in sexual activity, possibly 
deriving partly from a long-term growth in the awareness of contra-
ception. P. Treffers, "The Role of Induced Abortion in the Changing 
Pattern of Family Planning in the Netherlands", in H. Moors, 
R. Cliquet, G. Dooghe and D. van de Kaa (Eds.), Population and 
Family in the Low Countries, Vol.l, Leiden, 1976, p.116-l31. 
TABLE 6.6: ABORTIONS 1923-37 88 
Christchurch 
Abortion and 
Miscarriage 
Complications 
New Zealand 
Abortion and 
Miscarriage 
Complications 
1923 
110 89 
437 661 
215 232 
1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 
96 129 136 
12 26 
774 821 947 882 963 
275 346 401 414 410 
Sources: Christchurch Public Hospital, Patients Treated, 1928-37; CSO, 
Public Hospitals". 
1930 1931 
125 136 
19 11 
1202 1825 
442 471 
1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 
154 175 171 178 187 
37 22 33 23 11 
2044 2187 1206 2132 2222 
415 353 394 370 402 
1923-37, Diseases Treated in 
88. "Abortion and Miscarriage" includes threatened abortion; "complications" include all puerperal sepsis cases in New 
Zealand hospitals as no specific category was used for septic abortion in the dominion totals before 1930. 
The 1928-37 figures for Christchurch Hospital are March years, all other figures are for calendar years. 
1937 
190 
30 
2352 
421 
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in the incidence of desertion would also have been 
compounding the effects of financial hardship due to 
unemployment and reduced incomes. These factors may also 
have persuaded more unmarried couples "in trouble" to 
consider 'abortion rather than a marriage which they believed 
they could not afford. The trough in the national totals 
during 1933 and 1934 was probably due to the same economic 
and social influences which improved the mental health 
statistics. These included the increase in real incomes 
due to the fall in prices, and the institutionalisation of 
the depression - "love on the dole" became commonplace. 89 
In addition to the rise in the abortion rate, there is 
considerable evidence of death and disease arising from 
recourse to self-induction or cheap abortionists during 
the early 'thirties. There were thirteen deaths in the 
Christchurch Urban Area in 1931 from causes associated with 
"the puerperal state". This was more than double the 
average of the previous ten years, during which time the 
birth-rate had been much higher. The totals peaked again 
( 
in 1934 and 1935, with nine of the eleven deaths in 1934 
'b d t t' b t' 90 attrl ute 0 sep lC a or 10n. Admissions to Christchurch 
Hospital for the treatment of septic abortion showed a 
broadly similar pattern,91 as did notification of puerperal 
fever to the Christchurch City council. 92 National admissions 
to hospital for the treatment of lacerations to the cervix 
89. By the middle of 1933 both the Essex and St, Helen's maternity 
hospitals were reporting problems with overcrowding. It was mentioned 
that the wives of relief workers constituted a large proportion of 
those confined. Sun, 28 June, 1933. 
90. csa, vital Statistics, 1926-38, Urban Areas - Causes of Death. 
91. Christchurch Public Hospital, op.cit. 
92. Christchurch City Council, Town Clerk's Reports, 1926-36. 
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increased dramatically in 1926, 1930, and 1934. The cost 
of the application of primitive and unhygienic methods 
during the depression was clearly very considerable. In 
addition to the immediate deaths and suffering, it seems 
probable that much permanent infertility resulted. Further-
more, as the overwhelming majority of those who died were 
married women, a substantial number of orphans were left 
93 
as a consequence. 
However, the long-term welfare of many more children was 
blighted by other health problems which had been magnified by 
the depression. The increase in the number of such problems 
was revealed by the officers of the School Medical Health 
Service. Staffed almost entirely by women doctors and 
nurses, the service possessed considerable experience of the 
health standards of the children in most schools. For 
example, the School Medical Officer for Canterbury during 
the depression, Dr. Eleanor Baker-McLagan,had held the 
position since 19l4. She was therefore well-qualified to 
judge changes in the average condition of those examined. 
The district nurses who assisted her also appear to have 
been well-established as the examiners of particular schools. 
This continuity largely overcomes the problems of the high 
degree of subjective judgment in the assessment of malnutri-
tion. 
As in several other areas of public health in New Zealand, 
the statistics on malnutrition amongst school children 
93. L. Smith, The Problem of Abortion in New Zealand in the 1930's, 
unpublished Auckland University long essay, 1972, p.14. See also 
B. Brookes, The Committee of Inquiry into Abortion in New Zealand, 
1936-37, unpublished B.A. (Hons), extended essay, Otago University, 
1976. 
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suggest that the depression halted an existing improvement 
rather than brought about a dramatic deterioration. The 
national incidence detected actually fell beween the 
relatively prosperous year of 1925 and the deepest depression 
years of 1931-35. 94 However, the 'twenties do not provide 
a suitable benchmark. Examining doctors observed repeatedly 
that a disproportionate number of the malnourished school-
children came from the primers and the lower standards. 95 
The "baby boom" which followed the Great War swelled the 
number of pupils in these classes for a decade thereafter. 
It~uld also have put severe pressure on the financial and 
physical resources of many parents, making ill-nourishment 
and other problems more common. Consequ~ntly, the falling 
birthrate of the late 'twenties and early 'thirties helped 
to alleviate and disguise the depression's effects by 
gradually reducing the average number of children in families 
and particularly the proportion of very young children in 
need of special care. 
Nor can the changing level of child-health between the 
wars be divorced from the housing crisis and high rents which 
" 96 developed after 1918. Thousands of men returned from 
overseas service to marry and occupy homes in a country 
where the construction industry was run down and there had 
been little building for four years. The resistance of many 
children to illness and their nutrition would have been 
affected by the resulting sub-standard living conditions and 
94. AJHR, 1933, H31, p.5; 1939, H31, p.42. 
95. Health Department, 35/70. 
96. CSO, Prices, Wages, etc., 1929, p.l. 
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need to pay a high proportion of family income in rent or 
mortgage. Fortunately there was a.lull in the demand for 
accommodation between the rapid formation of new households 
in the early 'twenties ,and its counterpart in the late 
'thirties as the post-war generation left home. 
Some account must also be taken of the widespread improve-
ment in ~ervices during the 'twenties such as piped water 
and sanitation, better transport, dental nursing clinics 
in many schools, and the School Medical Health Service itself. 
In addition, the work of the Plunket Society was making a 
significant contribution to child-health by th7 early 
'thirties. 97 In the year 1933-34 the society had thirteen 
suburban rooms and ten "outstations" in Christchurch, besides 
its central headquarters. Its activities included pre- as 
well as post-natal assistance and thousands of home visits. 
There were 1530 pre-school children under the society's 
"supervision", in March, 1934. This represented about a 
quarter of that age-group in Christchurch, and the proportion 
would have been much higher in the particularly vulnerable 
infant years. The local,sunlight League's health camps 
helped a small number of older malnourished children in 
98 
summer. 
However, underpinning all these development's was an 
historic change in the attitude of working-class parents to 
97. Sun, 22 June, 1934. 
98. However, in 1934 the League's Dental Health Committee excluded 
those without ItAl dental certificates", a measure which would have 
filtered out many of those in particular need. If parents could 
not afford enough good food for their children, they could hardly 
pay to have their teeth treated. Sun, 1 November, 1934. 
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the care of their children. In Christchurch at least they 
appear to ~ave become decidedly more "bourgeois" during 
the first quarter of the twentieth century. Looking back 
at the previous sixteen years from a vantage point at the 
end of 1929, Dr. Baker-McLagan was convinced of this "rise 
in standards". She claimed to be "startled at the improve-
ment not only in the condition of the children's teeth but 
in the care of their eyes and bodies generally.99 There 
are no vermin nowadays and skin diseases are almost unknown". 
Certainly her accounts of confrontations with some mothers 
during her early years as School Medical Officer contrast 
sharply with her official reports during the 'thirties. 
"I know my son ain't no rose, Learn him, don't smell him" 
was the alleged response of one Sydenham mother to a request 
that her offspring be washed. lOO Another is said to have 
given her children their weekly wash by lining them up 
against the fence and throwing a bucket of water over them. 
In 1934 Dr. Baker-McLagan reported that the same area had 
been "dreadfully affected by unemployment. Yet it is a 
satisfactory school as a rule, because the parents, though 
working-class, are self-respecting and interested in their 
children's welfare •.. The cleanliness of the children is 
surprisingly good under the circumstances though their 
101 
clothes are poor" Similarly, "more'attention is 
undoubtedly paid by the children to cleaning their teethll, 
99. Sun, 14 December, 1929. 
100.E.S. Baker-McLagan, Stethoscope and Saddlebags, Auckland, 1965, 
p.135. Also: flIf that doctor-woman wants my child's eyes (or 
adenoids or whatever it was) fixed up, she can jolly well pay 
for it ". (p .133) • 
101.Health Department, 35/70. Baker-McLagan to Paterson, 7 April, 1934. 
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surely evidence of greater parental supervision and inclina-
tion to spend money for the long-term health of their 
children. Nurse Maude, an observer with considerably longer 
experience of local standards also expressed surprise at the 
good condition of children of the poor in comparison to that 
102 
of their parents. 
The origins of this change of attitude are complex. New 
technology certainly gave some direct help in the form of 
cheaper soap, toothpaste and toothbrushes. The inexpensive 
celluloid toothbrush, for example, appeared about 1918. 
The sustained long-term rise in the standard of living since 
the early eighteen-nineties was an even more powerful factor 
enabling families to spend more on cleanliness and child-
care. But the two greatest forces for change were mass 
indoctrination and the fall in the birth-rate. 
Much of the work of indoctrination amongst women was 
carried out by institutions such as the Plunket Society and 
Nurse Maude's district nursing association. Military service, 
particularly during the war, may also have improved awareness 
103 
of household hygiene amongst men. However, universal 
compulsory education over two generations was the strongest 
machine for this and other forms of "embourgeoisement". 
There was little formal instruction in hygiene, including 
the educative work of dental nurses, but indirect influences 
were probably more important. The typical teacher was expected 
to be a model of white-collar neatness and cleanliness, and 
102. Sun, 21 July, 1932. 
103. The long-term trends to shorter working hours and less drunkenness 
may also have led to increased paternal assistance with child-care. 
Bathing the children and putting them to bed seems to have been 
sometimes father's domain. For an amusing example see "Random 
Reminder", Press, 2 July, 1983. 
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she undoubtedly sought to impose these values on her pupils. 
A whole gamut of techniques, from priase to public humilia-
tion, were available to encourage them to emulate her. By 
the 'thirties almost all mothers would have been conscious 
of the standards of cleanliness which were expected of their 
children at school, and the results if they failed to meet 
them. Certainly an increasing proportion of parents were 
making sure their children attended schoOI. 104 
On the other hand, parents were more likely and able to 
assist them in maintaining the required standards because of 
the fall in the birth-rate. lOS This left more money and 
time to be spent on each child. Moreover, metaphysics aside, 
it is doubtful that most parents felt as strong an interest 
in their seventh child as in their first or last. Above all, 
the maintenance of modern standards of child-care in a large 
family without gas or electrical appliances required a greater 
than normal capacity for effort and organisation. The 
Education Act may even have lowered standards temporarily 
by insisting that older girls attend school rather than help 
their mothers at home.106 In the circumstances the weekly 
bucket of water could well be regarded an unsophisticated 
compromise between the demands being made by the authorities 
and the pressure of raising a large family. Now mothers could 
devote far more energy and anxiety to their children's health 
and appearance. 
At least three effects of the economic crisis itself also 
served to reduce either the statistics or the real incidence 
104. 15 June, 1933. 
105. NZYB, 1931, p.lll. 
106. C.H. Williams (compil.), History of the Sydenham School, 1873-1933, 
Christchurch, 1933, p.ll. 
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of malnutrition amongst school-children. Firstly, the 
withdrawal of the early primers from school as an economy 
measure during 1932 removed those pupils most likely to be 
malnourished. Secondly, there was a strong tendency to keep 
their children at home during bad weather if their clothes 
or footwear were unsuitable. Dr. Baker-McLagan was certainly 
aware of this by 1933,107 and a survey carried out in five 
Christchurch schools in 1935 confirmed that the practice was 
108 
common. Moreover, the medical inspections were not 
impromptu. They were arranged with the school in advance and 
parents generally received some prior notifiation. No doubt 
many took the opportunity of keeping their offspring at home 
rather than risk the humiliation of a visit from the District 
Nurse. Such a reaction would have been particularly common 
amongst those parents made poor for the first time by the 
depression. Because most inspections only inyolved about 
half the pupils in any school, it is impossible to assess 
the impact of such absenteeism on the annual returns. 
However, in 1933 over one in every six of the pupils enrolled 
at Sydenham School managed to avoid a comprehensive survey 
109 
which must have taken a number of days. The elusive 
18% contrasted rather strikingly with the normal daily 
110 
absenteeism of 10% for the same winter term. 
Finally, one factor which may well have brought about a 
real improvement in child nutrition, at least in Christchurch, 
was the provision of milk in schools. By 1934 around eight 
107. Health Department, 35/70. 
108. Times, 22 June, 1935. 
109. See below p. 339. 
110. Calculated from Canterbury Education Board, Tabular Summary of 
Attendance, 1933. 
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hundred of the city's pupils were receiving half a pint of 
m~lk each day. 111 Itt 'd f  n mos cases paren s pa~ ourpence 
a week towards the cost, but by 1935 the Metropolitan Relief 
Association was providing a significant subsidy. Most of 
the drive behind this scheme appears to have come from 
teachers themselves, impressed by the deterioration in the 
nutrition of many of their pupils, and their vulnerability 
to ill-health. However, it seems unlikely that this 
important long-term contribution to child-health would have 
begun without the precipitate fall in the price of milk 
during the early 'thirties. 112 The provision of milk in 
schools might well have been even more valuable during the 
'twenties, when the level of malnutrition appears to have 
been higher. Then the need was at least as evident, but the 
cost of meeting it was so much greater. 
The fall in the rate of malnutrition detected amongst 
schoolchildren in the early 'thirties appears limited and 
erratic when balanced against all these influences which 
tended to a real or apparent improvement in its incidence. 
This is particularly evident when the rate between 1931 and 
1935 is compared with that of 1936 and succeeding years.113 
Between 1935 and 1936 the percentage of cases rep'orted fell 
by a third, and never rose to its former level again. Yet 
by 1936 the birthrate was rising again and five-year-olds 
were returning to school. Variations in the rate of malnu-
trition within the 1926-36 period also tended to reflect 
changes in economic conditions. The downward trend was 
Ill. Health Department, 35/70, Report by E. Baker-McLagan, 3 May, 1934. 
112. Local dairymen pressed hard for the extension of this scheme. 
Sun, 15 March, 1934. 
113. AJHR, 1939, H31, p.42. 
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reversed in 1929 and the rate rose again in 1931. Most 
significantly, there was a steady rise in the incidence of 
malnutrition between 1933 and 1935, despite the withdrawal 
of the youngest children after 1932. Inspections of 
these new entrants had been detecting signs of deteriorating 
nutrition by that time. Referring to 1932, the Director-
General of Health noted in his otherwise optimistic report 
that "there is a group of city children which is showing 
some evidence of malnutrition".ll4 
During the following winter Dr. Baker-McLagan carried 
out special surveys of the physical condition of pupils in 
two Christchurch schools. lIS These were Phillipstown, 
tla notoriously poor school", and Sydenham, situated in "an 
average working class area". In each case pupils were 
weighed and measured and their weights compared to the 
Health Department's scale for the average healthy child of 
the same age and height. However, these scales had been 
established in ~9I5, and a survey made in 1935 found that 
New Zealand schoolchildren were generally heavier than 
twenty years before. Consequently, the figures derived by 
Dr. Baker-McLagan tended to minimise the degree to which 
'the children she surveyed fell below the real dominion 
average. 
At Phillipstown the entire Standard VI, Standard II, 
and Primer classes were tested, a total of 332 children. 
Of these, 5.7% were found to be "slightly" and 1.8% "severely" 
underweight. This total of 7.5% was significantly higher 
114. AJHR, 1933, H31, p.5. 
115. Both in Health Department, 35/70. 
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than the figure of 5.64% for the whole country in 1933. 
In the pase of Sydenham (Table 6.7), the intention was 
to weigh and measure the entire school. In the event of 
82% of the pupils on the roll were tested. The results were 
recorded according to seven broad weight categories. They 
were also divided on the basis of whether the child's father 
was employed, unemployed, or deceased. 
TABLE 6.7: WEIGHTS OF CHILDREN AT SYDENHAM SCHOOL, JUNE, 1933 
Parental Percentage deviation of weight 
Status >+10% >+7% >+3% normal >-3% >-7% >-10% 
Employed 14.2 6.4 17.5 31.6 15.5 7.1 7.3 
Unemployed 11. 3 5.8 14.3 34.5 18.4 7.5 8.1 
Widows 13.5 11. 0 11. 0 19.0 21.6 11.0 13.5 
Total 13.0 6.4 16.1 32.2 17.0 7.5 8.0 
Source: E. Baker-McLagan, "An intensive Study of Sydenham 
School", 7/7/33, in H35/70. 
Number 
421 
293 
37 
751 
The overall total of those over ten per cent under average 
weight, a group which Dr. Baker-McLagan described as "mal-
nourished", was again much higher than the national average. 
~he rate amongst children with employed fathers was surprising-
ly high, possibly an indication of a large amount of short-
time and casua-l employment. The difference between the mal-
nutrition rate in that group and amongst those with unemployed 
fathers was remarkably small. It is' likely that the 
"unemployed" was the sector most affected by deliberate 
absenteeism. Nevertheless, there was a significant tendency 
for that group to be lighter than the weight assessed as 
"normal" in 1915. A total of 34% were recorded as over three 
per cent lighter than that standard, compared with 31.4% over 
three per cent heavier. The bias amongst the "employed" 
group was clearly the other way, with 29.9% under and 
38.1% over "normal". A more up-to-date yardstick would 
almost certainly have shown more of the children of the 
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unemployed to be below the average weight, and more falling 
into the malnourished category. The sample of children 
with solo mothers is rather too small to draw strong 
conclusions. However, the fact that almost half were 
recorded as underweight suggests that this group was suffer-
ing the most severely. Given the evidence of an increased 
rate of desertion during the depression, it seems likely 
that such enforced solo-motherhood contributed to the rise 
in malnutrition amongst schoolchildren as well as the growth 
in stress-related disorders amongst women. 
In 1935 a private survey of five unnamed Christchurch 
schools by the Chairman of the Canterbury Education Board, 
C.S. Thompson, claimed that 8.5% of the children examined 
"were not getting sufficient food" 116 The method of 
assessment was not described, but the figure suggests that 
the sJi..tuation had probably not improved since 1933. If a 
visual impression was the basis of judgment, conditions may 
even have worsened. Dr. Baker-McLagan had said of her 
Sydenham survey that "the children looked wonderfully well. 
I was surprised in many instances 'when their figures were 
worked out to find them below standard." 
There is also some evidence of an increase in the rate 
of malnutrition amongst infants, those most seriously in risk 
116. Times, 22 June, 1935. 
of long-term mental or physical damage. In early 1933 the 
Director-General of Health reported to the Unemployment 
Board that a number of babies born at the St. Helen's 
Hospitals in the four main centres had been underweight 
and S ;ckly.117 H tt 'b t d h' h 1 ' • e a r~ u e t ~s to t e rna nour~shment 
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of their mothers. There were also reports from Christchurch 
of mothers unable to feed their infants themselves or to 
provide them with cow's milk. The Matron at Essex Maternity 
Hospital, which catered mainly for working-class patients, 
noticed "an increase in serious cases due to ill-nourishment 
on the part of mothers" at the end of 1932. 118 The local 
Plunket Society reported "a tendency towards malnutrition" 
119 during the same year. These problems may have contributed 
to the reversal in the downward trend in the infant mortality 
rate in the city during 1932 and 1933. 120 Certainly the 
same number of children were admitted to Christchurch Public 
Hospital with malnutrition, marasmus or rickets in 1934-35 
as in 1927-28, despite a twenty-five per cent fall in the 
b ;rth-rate.121 A "1 b t h 1 d • s~m~ ar u muc ess pronounce resur-
gence occurred in the national infant mortality rate between 
1933 and 1935. A disproportionate amount of this increase 
took place in the post-neonatal age-group (one month to 
one year old). When economic conditions improved in 1936 
and 1937, it was mortality in this age-group which improved 
the most. This suggests that poverty may have been rendering 
some mothers less able to save their children after they 
117. Health Department, 35/70. 
118. Sun, 15 December, 1932. 
119. ~, 21 July, 1932. 
120. CSO, Vital Statistics, 1936, p.84-85. 
12l. Christchurch Public Hospital, op.cit. 
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returned from hospital, particularly during 1935. 122 
While s~rious in individual cases, the increased 
incidence of malnutrition does not appear to have affected 
a great number of people. On the other hand, the Health 
Department's School Treatment Returns indicate that a number 
of other long-term health problems were worsened by the 
d . 123 epressl.on. 
The most widespread of these was the loss of teeth due 
to dental caries. The high sugar consumption of all classes 
in New Zealand had led to a tradition of rapid tooth decay. 
In Christchurch this was probably exacerbated by a lack of 
natural fluoride in the city's water supply. Where teeth 
were left untreated, their early loss and replacement by 
dentures could be expected. Not only did this involve much 
pain and considerable expense, but repeated toothache or a 
failure to replace ill-fitting or broken dentures could 
restrict the individual's diet or lead to serious digestive 
troubles, such as an ulcerated stomach. Cost was a major 
122. MacDonald et al, op.cit., mention the significance of variations in 
post-neonatal mortality (p.45) but the figures used in their table 
(p.43) bear little relation to those in CSO, 
1940, p.29. The latter are correct. 
There was an increase in the post-neonatal mortality rate in the 
late 'thirties. This was almost entirely due to an extraordinarily 
high figure in 1938, a year of renewed economic difficulties and 
continued housing problems. However, the change between the two 
fi ve-year periods was more of a slight bump than a "hump" (p. 45. ) 
All 
for 
1930-34 9.59 per tho births 
1931-35 9.54 " " " 
1935-36 9.73 " .. II 
1936-40 9.32 " II " 
these figures are far below those of 
some reason, were left off the graph 
1925-29 
1926-30 
12.46 per tho births 
11.85 " " " 
the late 'twenties, which, 
in MacDonald et al. 
123. Three of the returns have survived in Health Department, 35/34/21, 
those for 1932/34 inclusive, numbered 8884-6. 
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barrier to preventive dental treatment, and the depression 
clearly made many parents less able or willing to pay for it. 
A number of school dental clinics had been established in 
Christchurch schools during the 'twenties, but they were far 
from universally available and fees were charged. These 
were low by the standards of private practice but still a 
significant disincentive to parents on low incomes in hard 
t ' 124 k h ~mes. Dr. Ba er-McLagan ad also referred a number of 
children to the Christchur"ch Public Hospital for cheap, and 
125 
occasionally free, treatment. However, this practice 
was disliked by the hospital authorites, particularly when 
they were trying to economise. In 1933 they reduced staff 
and "tightened up on fees,,126 following a twenty per cent 
127 increase in hospital dental work during the previous year. 
Some charitable assistance was still provided for younger 
children "but in the upper standards, and in the country, 
there is almost as little treatment for dental caries as 
in the old days". Unfortunately, the Christchurch School 
Treatment Returns do not accurately trace the resulting 
deterioration. Dr. Baker-McLagan confessed that "owing to 
the hopelessness of the situation, I do not notify nearly 
as many teeth as of yore". Nevertheless, there was a sharp 
fall in the proportion of notified dental problems actually 
treated. 
124. At least one school committee, that at Woolston, "tided over" local 
parents. A total of£45 was owed at one stage. Sun, 2 June, 1933. 
125. Baker-McLagan, Stethoscope .•• , p.137. 
126. Baker-McLagan to Paterson, Health Department, 35/34/21. 
127. Sun, 9 August, 1932. 
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The pattern of the notifications and treatment in 
different Christchurch schools tended to reflect the class 
composition of their intakes (Table 6.8). The Normal 
School, situated near the centre of the city, and Woolston 
School, in a working-class area roughly comparable to 
Sydenham, had twice the rate of notifications in better-off 
districts such as Beckenham or Sumner. However, as economic 
conditions continued to deteriorate, children in the wealthier 
areas were less likely to receive treatment for the defects 
detected during school examinations. Their parents tended 
to be from employing, white-collar, or successful skilled 
working class backgrounds. Such people tended to shy away 
from attending the outpatient clinic at the public hospital. 
Even where school dental clinics existed, as at Sumner, they 
apparently did seek assistance to pay the comparatively low 
fees charged. Such attitudes probably affected the treat-
ment of other defects. Thus in 1932 twenty-seven of the 
defects notified from Elmwood School, in a wealthy area, 
were treated by doctors and six were treated at the public 
hospital. These figures were almost exactly reversed in 
largely working-class Richmond, located very much further 
from the hospital. 
The depression may also have increased the incidence of 
poor eyesight amongst those growing up in the early 'thirties. 
Dr. Baker-McLagan noted that the return of treatment for 
vision defects in 1933 was "worse than it has ever been since 
our work got properly organised". She attributed this to 
the inability of parents to pay the fifteen to thirty 
shillings required for spectacles. Although free testing 
of children's eyesight was carried out at the Christchurch 
Public Hospital, glasses were generally not provided by the 
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Charitable Aid Board. As in the case of dental defects, 
there was a substantial fall in the proportion of notifica-
tions, from 4.2% to 3.1% over the twenty-six Christchurch 
schools. Nevertheless, treatment returns fell away. At 
Sydenham, for example, only a fifth of vision defects 
notified in 1934 were treated, compared with three-quarters 
in 1932. 
TABLE 6.8: DENTAL DEFECTS NOTIFIED AND TREATED (PERCENTAGES) 
School 1932 1933 1934 
Normal 
notified 33.6 53.6 33.8 
treated/notified 62.7 50.0 26.3 
Woolston 
notified 32.2 18.6 15.5 
treated/notified 57.7 59.6 52.6 
Beckenham 
notified 16.2 7.5 9.6 
treated/notified 53.1 60.0 18.2 
Sumner 
notified 14.0 6.7 9.9 
treated/notified 80.1 28.6 25.0 
Source: School Treatment Returns, H35/34/21, 8884, 8885, 8886 
Finally, there was a resurgence of the endemic problem 
of goitre amongst Christchurch schoolchildren. This disease 
had been brought under control by the use of iodised salt, 
and Dr. Baker-McLagan attributed its renewed rise to parents 
economising by purchasing untreated salt. Once again, the 
School Treatment Returns underestimate the problem, because 
by 1933 the Christchurch office was only notifying cases 
that required more than the simple addition of iodised salt 
to the diet. Despite this, the proportion of children 
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examined at Sydenham School who showed goitre problems 
increased from 17.6% to 27.0% between 1932 and 1934. This 
was one area in which the rise in the incidence of disease 
showed a strong class difference, perhaps because better, 
educated were more likely to be convinced of the advantages 
of iodised salt, as well as better able to pay for it. 
Sumner, Fenda1ton and Elmwood schools all showed significant 
decreases in the notification of goitre problems between 
1932 and 1934 whereas most working class, or "mixed" schools 
showed substantial increases. 
The severe increase in,the rate of goitre was not 
restricted to children. In 1928-29, eighty-one patients were 
admitted to Christchurch Public Hospital for treatment for 
goitre. This figure rose rapidly to a peak of 190 in 1935. 128 
Few of those involved were under sixteen years. 
Neither the treatment returns nor the reports of the 
School Medical Officer surveyed the short-term illnesses 
such as colds or mild influenza amongst schoolchildren. 
Such an increase would seem logical if the situation described 
at Woolston School in the winter of 1933 applied to other 
working class schools: "The facts are that in these chilly 
days, with frequent rain and frost, about a dozen children 
have to attend school barefooted; others have no stockings; 
some have no overcoats; a few are undernourished and a few 
scantily-dressed ll • 129 The reporter also noted that many 
128. Christchurch Public Hospital, op.cit. See also the remarkable 
statement by "a doctor" that there had been no increase in the 
incidence of goitre. Sun, 30 November, 1933. 
129. Sun, 2 June, 1933. 
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children were wearing sandshoesor sandals, and that others 
had holes in their shoes. However, the attendance figures 
collected by the Canterbury Education Board can serve as 
h 'd 130 1 h h h a roug gUl e, a t oug ot er factors would have 
influenced them besides ill-health. Some older chilren 
would have missed school to do casual work in order to 
supplement the family income, or to assist their over-
wrought or working mothers. Others were kept at home because 
their parents could not afford adequate clothing or c1ass-
room materials for them. Conversely, the exclusion of five-
year-olds after 1932 would have tended to improve the figures, 
as the youngest children were amongst the most likely to be 
absent from school. Nevertheless the effect of the depression 
does show through the attendance statistics. There was a 
marked fall in attendance during the winter term of 1932, 
particularly in working class schools. It was also notice-
able that the winter of 1934 witnessed a greater rise in 
absenteeism than the much harsher winter of 1930. 
Other age-groups appear to have been similarly affected. 
Social workers frequently mentioned the prevalence of less 
serious illnesses. They were often blamed on the lack of 
good food, or insufficient clothing - in particular, the 
wear ing of the cheap sandshoes which had become part. of the 
131 
uniform of unemployment. There were also claims that 
, , l' f 11' 1d 132 malnutrltlon was s oWlng recovery 0 norma y ml cases 
d h 't b" 1" 133 an t at 1 was rlnglng comp lcatlons. Most of this 
sickness was not serious enough to affect mortality or 
130. canterbury Education Board, Ope cit. 
13l. ~, 23 September, 1933, 21 April , 1934. 
132. Sun, 9 June, 1934. 
133. Sun, 21 July, 1932. 
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hospital statistics, but it was certainly part of the misery 
the depression brought for large sections of the city's 
population. 
(( '1 It 
Finally, changes in patterns of work due to the depression 
led to a wide range of health problems. The requirement of 
manual labour in return for unemployment pay was a clear 
instance. The placing of men from non-manual backgrounds 
onto labouring jobs undoubtedly led to many injuries, such as 
strains and sprains. This was especially likely where 
individuals from white-collar jobs were driven by their 
"work ethics" or shame at being unemployed. Such problems 
would have lessened as the survivors hardened up or adopted 
the labourers' "ca' canny" approach to such poorly supervised 
and lowly paid work. Men who remained in town on No.5 Scheme 
jobs had greater opportunity to adapt than those who went. 
out to the more closely supervised Public Works Department 
projects or No.4 Scheme farmwork. Even so, not all No.5 jobs 
were adjusted to the generally limited physical capabilities, 
restricted diet, low morale and poor clothing of most relief 
workers. In 1934 one of Dr. MCLagan's assistants commented 
that as late as the previous winter "many of the men in 
Christchurch IwereJ working in the open in bitter weather 
with inadequate clothing".134 The Unemployment Board's 
decision to allow the postponement of work on wet days was 
a belated recognition of the situation of the average relief 
worker. However, a vindictive or unduly conscientious 
134. Shaw to Paterson, 18 April, 1934, Health Department, 54/49/18. 
c.f. " .•• some of the enforced changes in living conditions 
(e.g. a change to outdoor work) may have resulted in improved 
health". NZYB, 1936, p.119. 
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supervisor could still threaten the health of the unemployed. 
One of the major complaints of the workers on the Rapaki 
section of the Summit Road in 1934 was that their supervisor 
required them to walk up to the job itself before dismissing 
them during bad weather. 135 
The same works had earlier witnessed some particularly 
. 
serious examples of the hazards of giving unemployed men jobs 
to which they were unaccustomed. In 1929, the New Zealand 
Workers' Union drew attention to the deaths of eight men in 
eight months resulting from the handling of explosives by 
, 'd l' f k 136 d t ' ~nexper~ence re ~e wor ers, on roa cons ruct~on. This 
was said to have been more than in the previous four or five 
years. At least two of these deaths had occurred on the 
Summit Road. Problems were also noted on local body relief 
works, with some of the unemployed lacking both the nourish-
ment and the skills for heavy manual labour. Many were 
"more used to the pen than the shove1 11 , according to the 
Curator of the Botanic~l Gardens, who had to supervise large 
rob f I , f k l37 nu ers 0 re ~e wor ers. The widow of one such worker 
claimed that his fatal heart-attack had been brought on by 
the strain of heavy labour. 138 Certainly the Christchurch 
City Council found relief workers to be rather expensively 
'd t l39 acc~ en -prone. 
135. Sun, 21 June, 1934. 
136. 6 December, 1929. Also similar incidents in Times, 
June, 1931, and Press, 27 August, 1936. 
137. Sun, 25 May, 1931. 
138. Sun, 27 July, 1932. A similar case was reported in the Press, 
9 September, 1929. 
139. Christchurch City Council, Minutes, 11 June, 1928, 15 June, 1931; 
Outward Correspondence, City Treasurer to Chairman of Works 
Committee, 12 April, 1933. 
TABLE 6.9: INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS PER HUNDRED THOUSAND MAN-HOURS WORKED, 1925_38140 
1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 ).937 1938 
Public Works Department 4.036 4.600 5.098 6.313 7.461 7.680 8.641 6.562 5.337 5.384 5.370 8.227 7.694 6.672 
Railways 4.900 4.665 4.624 4.622 5.155 5.585 3.908 3.482 4.107 4.056 4.420 4.755 5.573 5.911 
Post and Telegraph 
Department 1.316 1.140 1.596 1.138 1.168 1.385 0.881 0.877 0.953 1.194 1.132 1.336 1.343 1.789 
Factories 1.213 1.530 1.582 1.473 1.523 1.402 1.348 1.613 1.840 1.306 1.402 1.694 2.027 2.044 
including Meatworks 12.500 17.208 17.257 18.480 15.132 14.684 8.227 18.346 19.261 14.127 14.822 16.517 18.536 17.484 
Grand Total 1.821 2.114 2.262 2.213 2.503 2.557 2.378 2.195 2.391 2.111 2.373 2.683 3.050 3.108 
Source: CSO, Prices, Wages etc., 1925-38, "Frequency Rates and Compensation by Industrial Groups". 
140. There is almost certainly something wrong with the official figure for the accident rate in meatworks in 1931. 
The number of accidents recorded had actually increased slightly on 1930 but this was offset by an enormous increase 
in the number of hours worked. The latter figure was given as 166 million, compared with 92 million in 1930 and 
1932, and 102 million in 1933. CSO, Prices, wages, etc., 1930, p.60; 1931, p.24; 1932, p.25; 1933, p.24. w 
Ln 
o 
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Official figures on industrial accidents throughout New 
Zealand (Table 6.9) do not seem to support any suggestion 
that many more mishaps occurred during the early 'thirties 
because of "sweating" or the neglect of safety precautions 
by employers. Nevertheless, the depression does seem to 
have had some detrimental influences. For example, the 
effect of relief work shows up in the Public Works Depart-
mentIs statistics. From 1925 onwards there was a steady 
increase in the number of accidents per hundred thousand man-
hours worked as more and more relief workers were taken on. 
The peak reached in 1931 was more than double the level of 
1925 and matched the peak in employment on public works. 
When large numbers of men untrained or unused to the work 
were taken on in 1936, the rate of accidents soared again. 
Some increase was to be expected as pressure of work grew 
and there were more workers to get in each other's way_ 
However, many of these casualties might have been avoided 
if the depression and government responses to it had not 
forced often unsuitable men into hazardous work in large 
numbers and with little training. A similar trend was 
noticeable as numbers built up rapidly again on the railwayjs, 
in factories and in the Post and Telegraph Department. 
Finally, there was a significant increase in the accident 
rate in factories in 1932 and 1933. This was almost wholly 
due to a dramatic rise in the frequency of accidents in the 
meat-processing industry as untrained men were drafted in 
to break the freezing-workers strike and permit a reduction 
. 141 
~n wages. 
141. See p.149. 
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Did the ill-wind of depression blow anyone's health any 
good? There was the widespread, vaguely puritanical belief 
that it benefitted most those it struck hardest. Eminent 
profes~ionals were not alone in suggesting that the economic 
crisis had. improved patterns of consumption. In an 
editorial in 1932 the Star claimed that "the effects of a 
restricted diet seems to contribute to an improvement in 
general health through more intelligent eating forced on 
people by economic considerations".142 Its main competitor 
took a S ~m~lar l~ne.143 H d' d t . ~ . owever, a epress~on oes no ~n 
itself enforce "more intelligent" eating habits. On the 
contrary, "unwholesome", comparatively expensive foods are 
often an important source of consolation and colour to those 
suffering from economic and social stress: 
A millionaire may enjoy breakfasting off orange 
juice and Ryvita biscuits; an unemployed man 
doesn't .•. When you are unemployed, which is to 
say when you are underfed, harassed, bored, and 
miserable, you don't want to eat dull wholesome 
food. You want something a little bit 'tasty'. 
There is always some cheaply pleasant thing to 
tempt you. Let's have three pennorth of chips! 
Run out and buy us a twopenny ice-cream! Put 
the kettle on and we'll all have a nice cup of 
teaJ •.• A cup of tea or even an asprin is muc4 
better as a tem~orary stimulant than a crust 
of brown bread. 44 
While smoking cigarettes on ten bob a week might seem hopeless 
extravagance to those in comfortable employment, many unemployed 
treasured its soothing effect. "It gets on your nerves, this 
knocking around with nothing to do, and that's just the time 
a man wants a smoke".145 
142. Star, 4 November, 1932. 
143. Sun, 22 September, 1933. 
144. G. Orwell (E. Blair), The Road to Wigan Pier, Harmondsworth, 1972, p.86. 
145. Sun, 17 November, 1930 •. 
Nor is it immediately apparent that, say, stale bread 
distributeq free is healthier than a fresh, bought loaf. 
Indeed, less expensive food may well be less wholesome. 
Cheaper meat, for example, tends to be much fattier than 
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dearer cuts, and it is considerably more difficult to cook 
properly. Starchy foods likewise tend to be cheaper than 
fresh vegetables or lean meat. An assistant to Dr. Baker-
McLagan noted in 1933 that "some of the women ..• are getting 
over-fat from an excess of carbohydrates in the diet".146 
Eviction or the threat of foreclosure probably discouraged 
the home production of food - a major source of fresh 
vegetables in Christchurch working-class homes. The effect 
would have been strongest amongst the poorest people, those 
who came to rely on a "moonlight flit" to meet the rent. 
Backyard poultry-keeping, which had been a feature of 
Christchurch households in 1926,147 was severely curtailed 
by such insecurity and the need to pay for feed-grains. 
The official estimates of consumption per capita give 
little support to the theory of healthier eating by the 
1 1 t ' d ' th d ,148 genera popu a 10n urlng e epressl0n. Changing buying 
patterns tended to reflect comparative price-movements, and 
these were not always in the direction of healthier eating. 
For example, butter prices were steadily depressed between 
1924 and 1935 by ever-increasing dominion production and ever-
falling London prices. As a result butter consumption showed 
146. Shaw to Paterson, 18 April, 1934, Health Department, 54/49/18. 
147. In 1926 over forty per cent of households in Christchurch City 
kept poultry; in 1936 only thirty per cent. cso, Census, 1926, 
Vol.XVI, p.12-13; 1936, Appendix A, p.4-5. 
148. A three-year moving average of "Amounts Available for Home Use, 
per capita" were kept two years in arrears by NZYB, 1926-36. 
no failing tendency during the early 'thirties, despite 
having increased by a third during the late 'twenties. 
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The fruit market experienced a similar phenomenon. Local 
purchases of apples fell considerably between 1925 and 1935, 
as orchardists turned to supplying the higher-priced export 
market. This was partially off-set by increased consumption 
of fruits richer in vitamins - oranges, lemons, and bananas. 
With rapidly rising local citrus production and a world 
market glutted with exotic fruit, the average New Zealand 
consumer was able to buy far more of them than in the 
prosperous 1923-25 period. Of course most of the unemployed 
still could not have afforded oranges or bananas very often 
in preference to apples. 
The long-term decline in purchases of cereals and 
potatoes accelerated greatly in the late 'twenties. This 
was particularly so in the case of flour, whose price was 
increased by protective duties. These declines continued, 
albeit at a slower rate, during the early 'thirties. On a 
carcass-weight basis, total local consumption of meat 
declined by about a quarter between the two periods 1923-25 
and 1932-34. However, little of this decrease occurred 
during the early 'thirties, and a large part of it seems 
to have been related to a simultaneous switch from beef to 
sheep-meats. Beef contains a much higher proportionate 
weight of bone than mutton or lamb. Moreover, it seems 
likely that more of the fat was consumed during the later 
period. Conversely per capita eating of fresh fish, a much 
less fatty form of protein, established a significantly 
lower level during the depression. Cheese consumption, 
already negligible, declined by about a third in the early 
TABLE 6.10: ALCOHOL-RELATED DISORDERS 
1923 1924 192:5 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1'937 
Alcoholism: 
Christchurch Public Hospital 11 25 27 24 9 7 11 12 19 
Sunnyside Hospital 6 5 9 10 7 8 8 15 7 11 9 8 6 5 
New Zealand Hospitals 396 321 338 382 364 260 211 193 199 249 361 
New Zealand Mental Hospitals 40 50 50 42 50 41 48 55 29 33 25 26 17 23 
Cirrhosis of the Liver: 
New Zealand Hospitals 51 47 52 54 39 36 45 46 38 40 45 
Sources: Christchurch Public Hospital, Patients Treated, 1928-37; CSO, Vital Statistics, 1923-37, "Diseases Treated 
in Public Hospitals"; AJHR, 1924-38, H7, "Principal Assigned Causes of Insanity". 
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'thirties. At 104 lb. per head, sales of refined sugar 
were significantly higher in the 1932-24 period than in 
1926-28, when they stood at an average of 92 lb. Other 
'special' or 'tasty' foods showing little or no decrease 
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in consumption included tea, vinegar, and confectionery.149 
The consumption of tobacco, an area with strong implica-
tions for health, showed little change. Between 1923 and 
1925 the average annual consumption per capita was 3.13 lb., 
compared with 3.66 lb. between 1926 and 1928, and 3.5 lb. 
between 1932 and 1934. Eve~ the marginal benefit to health 
represented by this small decrease may well have been off-
set by changing habits brought by economic stress. It seems 
likely that the tar-filled tobacco in butts was more likely 
to be smoked for longer or recycled by the smoker. Cheaper, 
stronger blends, high in tar, made both the smoker's money 
and his sparse roll-your-own go further. Above all, those 
down on their luck would have savoured each valuable 
cigarette to the full, drawing each puff of smoke down into 
the lungs rather than carelessly allowing it to drift away~ 
However, the depression did bring substantial improve-
ments in two areas of public health. These were the over-
lapping problems of alcohol-related diseases and motor 
vehicle accidents. In each case the improvement was directly 
traceable to the economic crisis itself. 
The per capita consumption of alcohol dropped significantly 
during the early 'thirties. That of ale and beer fell from 
9.81 gallons between 1923 and 1925 to 9.47 gallons between 
1926 and 1928. It then plummetted to six gallons between 
149. Usage of salt also increased but most of the fifty pounds per 
capita would have been used in export freezing works. 
1932 and 1934. Consumption of spirits dropped even more 
dramatical~y, from .54 gallons to .51 gallons and then 
.2 gallons. Relative cost was again influential. Heavy 
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increases in customs duties on imported wines and spirits, 
and rises in beer tax were used by the United and Coalition 
Governments to attempt to balance their budgets. The 
resulting increases in the real price of alcohol reinforced 
the widespread fall in incomes in cutting purchases of 
commercial alcoholic beverages. Aspiring home brewers 
undoubtedly made up some of this reduction, at least in the 
150 
short-term. But the art of brewing requires sufficient 
application and luck to deter a large proportion of confident 
novices. Existing devotees may have stepped up production 
to some extent, but the fall in the consumption of hops 
within New Zealand suggests that there was no vast new 
151 
subterranean lake of beer. Distilling was even.more 
expensive and difficult than brewing, and it carried legal 
risks as well. Some acoholics did turn more to methylated 
spirits and other industrial products, sometimes with fatal 
results. 152 But the ordinary drinker appears to have cut 
his intake rather than take such risks. Consequently the 
total numbers of admissions to public and mental hospitals 
150. Local grocery shops experienced a sUbstantial increase in sales of 
hops, malt, yeast, and finings during 1931. Sun, 20 July, 1931. 
151. In 1932-33 there were 355 acres of hops planted in New Zealand, 
compared with 649 acres in 1927-28. NZYB, 1929, p.373; 1936, 
p.338. Imports in 1933 were 721 pounds, compared with over a 
thousand pounds in 1929. CSO, Trade and Shipping, 1929, 1933. 
152. Sun, 3 September, 1931, 13 January, 1933. The Salvation Army 
reported an increase in such cases, including "far more younger 
men". Numbers were said to be in the vicinity of twelve to twenty. 
Meths cost 1/11 a quart and was customarily consumed in Hagley Park, 
the city's traditional open-air dormitory for the down-and-out. 
Sun, 19 November, 1931. 
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on the grounds of alcoholism dropped sharply after 1930 
(Table 6.10). In fact, the public hospital figures show a 
nearly perfect correlation with the trend of economic 
conditions between 1926 and 1936. They reached their nadir 
in 1933, at half the level of 1929. Thereafter they rose 
again, particularly when the benefits of recovery were 
spread more widely in 1936 and 1937. The incidence of 
cirrhosis of the, liver, a much more long-term effect of 
alcohol abuse, also appears to have been affected by ~he 
depression. Admissions to public hospitals for the treat-
ment of this disease reached a peak in 1929. By 1937 
admissions were down by over a third. Whatever other 
damage the economic crisis was doing, it was not driving 
more people to drink, in the short-term at least. 
The decline in deaths due to motor accidents during the 
depression was almost as dramatic as admissions to hospital 
due to alcohol abuse. Between 1923 and 1930 the national 
mortality directly involving motor cars had increased from 
153 48 to 200 per annum. It then dropped sharply, reaching 
a low-point of 130 in 1933. It is likely that there was a 
roughly commensurate decrease in injuries due to motor-
vehicle accidents. With the gradual return of prosperity, 
and rising motor-vehicle registrations, the casualty rate 
mounted again. By 1936 the death toll had returned to 217. 
Department of Transport statistics on fatal accidents involv-
ing motor vehicles suggested that decreased alcohol consump-
tion had contributed significantly to the fall in deaths. 154 
153. CSO, Vital Statistics, 1926-38, "Death by Causes". 
154. AJHR, 1937, H40, p.40, Table No.14. 
Methods of assessing impairment due to alcohol were 
primitive and unsystematic. 1SS Nevertheless, "mild" or 
3S9 
"severe" intoxication was considered a factor in roughly 
13% of accidents in 1931, only 6% in 1933, and l6%'in 1937. 
Overall, it can be argued that the depression saved the 
lives of more than two hudnred potential victims of the /i 
-------
new technology. Methods of braking, suspension and steering, 
passenger protection, traffic control, law enforcement, and 
roadrnaking were clearly lagging behind the power and 
popularity of the motor vehicle. The economic crisis helped 
to reduce the carnage while some improvements emerged in 
these fields. 
Slightly counter-balancing this is the possibility that 
cuts in public and private expenditure may have slowed the 
adoption of some of these innovations. In partiuclar, some 
motorists continued to drive unsafe cars which they could not 
afford to repair or replace. A check on motor car brakes 
by the Christchurch City Council inspectors during October, 
1932, revealed "very serious" deficiencies. 1S6 
Aside from the significant exceptions of alcohol-
related diseases and road deaths, there is overwhelming 
evidence that the depression harmed public health. This harm 
was often masked by the improvements wrought by factors such 
as weather patterns, changing technology, a falling birth-
rate, and the decline in the health effects of the Great War. 
155. On the basis of studies in Britain and the United states the 
Department of Transport concluded that "there is every probability 
that sub-intoxication was present in a much larger percentage of 
the cases in New Zealand than is stated in the statistics". 
Ibid, 1936, p.37. 
156. ~, 15 October, 1934. 
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It was nonetheless real, and particularly striking in the 
areas of mental health and child development. On the one 
hand, the reality and the fear of poverty and lost status 
spawned a substantial increase in stress-re~ated disordeis, 
notably suicide, mental illness, and ulcers. On the other 
hand, decreased incomes reduced the ability of many parents 
to provide proper food and preventive medical treatment 
for their children. As a consequence large sections of 
New Zealand's population were denied the better health that 
new technology had made possible and which would soon be 
taken for granted. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS: 
THE CHRISTCHURCH CITY COUNCIL 
New technology and the depression both greatly increased 
the work of local government between the wars. On the one 
hand, local authorities were responsible for a number of 
areas profoundly affected by technological change: the 
distribution of electricity to consumers, the repair of 
roads, the construction of new suburban streets, the control 
of traffic, town-planning, and the provision of water supply, 
sewerage and harbour facilities. On the other hand, the 
allocation of official assistance to the destitute was still 
primarily a local responsibility. Regional hospital boards 
were charged with providing charitable aid to the unemployed, 
deserted families and those incapable of earning their keep 
due to sickness or old age. These were groups whose 
dependence tended to increase with the depression. Other 
local bodies had also traditionally provided social welfare 
assistance during times of economic crisis in the form of 
relief work to the unemployed. Despite some protests that 
unemployment relief should be the sole responsibility of 
central government, local authorities again assumed the 
major role in providing special works during the late 
'twenties, albeit with substantial and increasing financial 
support from Wellington. More generally, local authorities 
were major employers, especially in the "multiplier"fi;eld 
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of public works. They were empowered to recycle money in 
the commun~ty both through taxation on property, and 
borrowing. In many cases they also had funds accruing from 
profitable trading enterprises which could be used in 
providing work and promoting economic activity. 
However, the policies followed by local government were 
subject to popular approval at elections which were arguably 
more democratic than those for the House of Representatives. 
Locally, as nationally, there was universal adult suffrage, 
with both residents and ratepayers permitted to vote. But 
local authority elections were held every two years up to 
1935 rather than every three as with general elections. 
Furthermore, there was no equivalent of the country quota 
in the election of a major territorial local authority like 
the Christchurch City Council. Plural voting was permitted, 
with nominees of companies owning property being empowered 
to vote on their behalf - the so-called "bricks and mortar 
franchise". But such votes accounted for only a small 
proportion of the total cast, even in the fiercely contested ) 
municipal election of 1935. 1 No city council result was 
decided by them during this period. On the other hand, the 
determination of certain labour councillors to see the wishes 
of the voter more accurately reflected led to the use of a 
preferential voting system in the three city council elections 
between 1929 and 1933. Voting by crosses beside candidates' 
1. Only about five hundred of the forty thousand votes cast in the 1935 
election were plural votes, some of them almost certainly from trade 
unions. Christchurch City Council, Outward Correspondence, 10 April, 
14, 24 May, 1935. In 1927 it was estimated that there were only 
three or four hundred plural qualifications. Times, 29 March, 1927. 
For details of non-residential qualifications, Press, 11 March, 1930. 
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names, rather than the potentially confusing national system 
of crossing out those not wanted, also enhanced local 
democracy in Christchurch in 1935. 2 Above all, local 
elections in Christchurch in the 'twenties and 'thirties 
excited similar interest to national contests, with vast 
crowds of spectators blocking city streets to a late hour, 
often in pouring rain, to watch the posting of results outside 
the Town Hall. Here were regular and reasonably accurate 
tests of the popularity of policies adopted locally to meet, 
or to neglect, the problems created by technological change 
and economic crisis. Local election results can thus be 
seen as an indication of popular priorities during the 
depression, particularly the extent to which people were 
prepared to see resources transferred from themselves and 
from other areas of local body activity to the assistance 
of the less fortunate. 
The significance of local government politics in 
Christchurch between the wars was enhanced by the fact that 
the Labour Party dominated the city council for most of the 
period beween 1927 and 1935. Some of the foremost leaders 
of the New Zealand party headed the local council. Conse-
quently the city provides something of a case-study of Labour 
2. The 1925 Municipal election used voting by crosses on a "first-past-
the-post" basis. Two per cent of the vote was informal. In 1927 the 
"strike-out" system was used on the same basis and there was a 17.7% 
informal vote. The three preferential voting elections (1929, 1931, 
and 1933) required voters to number their chosen candidates, but 
informality remained relatively low at an average of 4.8%. The 1935 
election saw a return to the first-past-the-post and crosses - and an 
in:formal vote of only 1.65%, the lowest of the post-war period. 
Ibid., 31 May, 1935. Dunedin City Council had a similar experience 
during this period, with "strike-outs" leading to informal votes as 
high as 19.2% and crosses to a rate as low as 1.81%. K. McDonald, 
The City of Dunedin: A Century of Civic Enterprise, Dunedin, 1965, 
p.341-43. 
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leadership "in office " during the depression. Understandably, 
it has been inferred that Christchurch's reputed peacefulness 
during the depression was at least partly due to the city 
council following more enlightened policies than those 
adopted in municipalities controlled by conservative councils: 
Throughout most of the depression Christchurch had 
led the cities in their efforts to provide for 
the unemployed, raising numerous loans, proposing 
large public works programmes, and subsidising 
its relief workers' wages since 1931. 3 
The decision not to cut the wages of permanent council employees 
h 1 b t ' d' th' 4 ·11 h as a so een men ~one ~n ~s context. Overa, t e 
impression is one of a Labour council using its authority to 
promote activity and to "restore the purchasing power" of as 
many unemployed as possible. 
In common with the other main centres, the Christchurch 
Urban Area contained a patchwork of territorial and ad hoc 
1 1 h " 5 oca aut or~t~es. The city itself was predominant, embracing 
over eighty per cent of the population. Three independent 
boroughs remained on the fringes of the city; comparatively 
l 
wealthy Riccarton in the west and Sumner in the south-west, 
and relatively poor New Brighton in the east. Much of the 
extreme north and south of the built-up area, including the 
3. R. Robertson, The Tyranny of Circumstances: Responses to Unemployment 
in New Zealand, 1929-35, unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Otago University, 
1978, p.200. See also W. Scotter, A History of Canterbury, Vol.3: 
1876-1950, Christchurch, 1965, p.380; B. Roth and J. Hammond, Toil 
and Trouble, Wellington, 1981, p.126; and P. Oakley, The Handling of 
Depression Problems in Christchurch, 1928-35. A Social Study, 
unpublished M.A. thesis, Canterbury University, 1953. 
4. R. Noonan, The Riots of 1932: A Study of Social Unrest in Auckland, 
Wellington and Dunedin, unpublished M.A. thesis, Auckland University, 
1969, p.154; Oakley, op.cit. 
5. See map p. 365. 
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very wealthy suburbs of Fendalton and Cashmere, also lay 
outside the city in the counties of Waimairi and Heathcote. 
These Counties met in the east to cut Christchurch off from 
New Brighton. Drainage and tramways were provided by boards 
elected from throughout the urban area, but dominated by 
city representatives. Beyond these, there were regional 
authorities in the form of the North Canterbury Hospital 
Board, the Lyttelton Harbour Board and the Waimakariri River 
Trust. City members controlled less than half the seats on 
these bodies despite the fact that Christchurch contained 
around two-thirds of the area's population - effectively a 
sort of country quota. Finally, there were a few authorities 
with members seconded from territorial local bodies. These 
included the Christchurch Fire Board and a Domains Board, 
concerned principally with Hagley Park. 
In 1926 Christchurch City had the lowest rates and by far 
the lowest debt burden of the four main cities. The rate per 
thousand pound of rateable capital value was £10.26, compared 
with £12.15 in Auckland, £11.18 in Wellingtin, and £11.64 in 
d ' 6 Dune ~n. Even when the liabilities of the Drainage Board 
and the Tramways Board are taken into account, Christchurch's 
debt amounted to only £2.4 million, compared with totals of 
£ 6.2 million, £ 4.6 million, and £ 3.0 million in Auckland, 
, 
Wellington and Dunedin respectively.7 There were a number 
of reasons for this happy situation. Firstly, the city was 
built largely on flat land and was located near to good 
6. eso, Local Authorities Handbook, 1927, p.210-11. 
7. , p.191, 334, 
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sources of road metal and shingle. Consequently there was 
little damage to roadways from rushing stormwater and 
surfaces could be made and remade at lower cost. Secondly, 
many of the city's facilities had been established in a 
burst of progressive activity just after the turn of the 
century. This had enabled the city to pay for them at 
interest rates set before wartime inflation but with money 
devalued by that inflation. Finally, the city council had 
been controlled since 1911 by a very conservative Citizens' 
and Ratepay~rs' Association, strongly influenced by larger 
business interests and anxious to keep the rates as low 
as possible. 
By the mid-'twenties, however, this conservative policy 
was proving inadequate to meet the problems and the demands 
created by new technology. In particular, the development 
of motor transport was having a disastrous impact on 
existing road surfaces. The problem was compounded by the 
need to dig up roads in order to install the many new 
services that electrical technology and improved standards 
of living had made possible. These included electrical 
supply cables, telephone conduits, water pipes, sewers and 
gas mains. In the face of this combined assault, the 
council's policy of patching up the roads by existing methods 
proved totally inadequate. Yet in 1923-24 the Works Committee 
'8 
vote was actually cut. Wet winters in 1925 and 1926 
combined with an extraordinary growth in traffic completely 
destroyed the macadamised surfaces of several arterial roads. 
8. Press, 19 July, 1926. 
All four Christchurch newspapers called for urgent and 
large-scale measures to meet the crisis. In July, 1926, 
the Press, the staunchest supporter of the Citizens' 
Association, sent a reporter on a twenty-mile tour of the 
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city to inspect the quality of the roading. 9 He described 
some streets as "well-nigh impassable to motor traffic", 
others as "mud tracks", and others again as too risky for 
even lithe most enthusiastic motorist". Earlier in the 
year, the Sun had pointed out the effects of "local body 
parsimony and neglect" in the state of the city's roadways, 
claiming that other local bodies were maintaining their 
stretches of arterial road at a much higher standard. 10 
It hinted at some class bias in roadworks, with Park Terrace 
and Woodham Road well-maintained but Ferry Road and the 
eastern extensions of central streets badly deteriorated. The 
Star evoked the memory of the local patron saint of municipal 
progress, Thomas Edward Taylor, mentioning a plan of his in 
1910 to reconstruct the city's roads. ll Here was an issue 
on which both the wealthy and the humble could be discontented. 
Both had to use the roads. The working class cyclist risked 
injury in potholes and deep mud while the fact that his motor 
car was damaging the road did nothing to allay the motorist's 
concern at the damage the road was doing to his motor car. 
9. Ibid. 
10.Sun, 2 February, 1926. 
11.Star, 27 April, 1926. Later this newspaper contrasted Christchurch's 
roads with Auckland's, claiming that here there was "not a decent 
half-mile of road in the city". Star, 23 June, 1926. Also Star, 
15, 16, 20 July, 1926, and Times, 20 July, 1926. 
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New forms of traffic control were also needed. Revision 
of bylaws cost little but meant little until the city could 
provide motorised inspectors to enforce them. A report to ' 
the council at the beginning of 1926 recommended the employ-
12 
ment of officers on motor-cycles. This was strongly 
supported by one newspaper, which inveighed against 
the motor-cyclist with the sleep-disturbing cut-out, 
the motorist with glaring headlights flashing in all 
directions but on the road in front of him, the jovial 
and noisy dance party, disturbing quiet localities 
in the small hours of the morning, and the lightless 
cyclist, who is largely responsible for the use of 
glaring headlights •.. but above all the speeding 
motorist must be eliminated. The startling growth 
of street accidents demands that the strictest 
repressive measures should be directed against all 
those who show the slightest disregard for safety 
rules. 13 
Even a community so recently exposed to wartime casualty 
lists found it difficult to accept the almost daily reports 
of serious injury and death on its roads. Runaway horses 
had never caused problems on such a scale. Once again, this 
was an issue which served to unite different sections of the 
population. Pedestrians and cyclists tended to regard all 
motorists as requiring greater control. The majority of 
motorists returned the feeling while criticising many of 
their fellow drivers. 
The expansion in private motoring contributed greatly 
,to a massive growth in the consumption of oil-fuels during 
the 'twenties. Between 1923 and 1928 the quantity of fuel 
oil landed at Lyttelton increased from 19,000 tons to 
14 36,000 tons. This posed town-planning problems as 
12. Star, 16 March, 1926. 
13. Star, 12 May, 1926. 
14. CSO, Trade and Shipping, 1923, 1928, "Shipping by Ports". 
companies sought permission to construct new oil-stores, 
and caused considerable disquiet in some of the older 
working-class suburbs. These districts had generally 
tolerated the coal-yards, and even the gasworks, along 
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the railway line. But the prospect of having large 
quantities of highly explosive fuel nearby upset the locals, 
particularly as very few of them saw any benefit to them-
selves in the new fuel. The motor car was still regarded 
as the plaything of the rich and better-off white-collar 
15 
workers, whereas coal and gas had been used in working-
class homes. The proposal which excited the most opposition 
was that of the Vacuum Oil Company to construct underground 
tanks with a combined capacity of 80,000 gallons at the 
f 1d d k d dd ' 16 't corner 0 Haze ean an Par Roa s at A ~ngton. Desp~ e 
vigorous opposition from the Labour Party, with some support 
from Citizens' councillors, a permit was issued. 
The spread of electrical technology was also creating 
new demands. The increase in consumption threatened a power 
shortage, which many citizens believed could be best overcome 
by the construction of the city's own power station at Otarama 
th . k ' . 17 on e Wa~ma ar~r~. At the same time, the wiring of most 
city households for electric light and the advent of cheaper 
electric stoves led to pressure for lower domestic electricity 
. l8 
pr~ces. 
15. Press, 22 September, 1926. 
16. Press, 3 August, 28 September, 9 November, 7 December, 1926, 
1 March,S May, 1927, 30 November, 1926, 13 April, 1927. 
Also later debate over petrol tanks on the corner of Hutcheson 
and Colombo Streets - "Let us, as a Labour Council, see justice 
done to the small manu (Councillor C.Carr). 27 September, 1927. 
17. Star, 6,7,31 May, 1926; Press, 5,11 August, 1926. 
18. Press, 20 July, 1926. 
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Another, less publicised, promise by Labour concerned 
\ 
the construction of a "ladies rest-rooms' in the centre of 
th . 19 e cJ.ty. The development of the tramways, picture-
houses and large retail stores selling mass-produced consumer 
goods had drawn increasing numbers of suburban housewives 
into "town". While this fostered the growth of tea-houses 
and restaurants it also led to a pressing need for some more 
extensive and salubrious facilities than the existing 
underground lavatories in Cathedral Square. 
An assortment of other problems still faced the city 
council as a result of the demographic pressures created by 
the Great War. The post-war boom in marriages and births 
had greatly increased demands for housing, educational facili-
ties, playgrounds and "rest-rooms". Local politicians were 
sometimes expected and sometimes tempted to try to meet 
these demands. 
From its inception as the Independent Political Labour 
League in 1905, the Labour Party in Christchurch had advocated 
greater activity on the part of municipal authorities in 
order to improve life in the city.20 From the time that 
they first gained independent representation on the council 
in 19l1, Labour councillors had been instrumental in extend-
ing the scope of its work, often winning over a minority of 
their opponents to approve the change. Examples of such 
innovations included an independent insurance scheme for the 
council's workers, a system of housing loans to prospective 
19. Times, 13 April, 1926, Press, 5 May, 1927. 
20. Political Labour League of New Zealand, Canterbury District, 
Manifesto, March, 1905, Howard Papers 980/192. 
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homeowners and the provision of additional public reserves. 2l 
In its campaign for the 1927 municipal election, the 
Labour Party took advantage of dissatisfaction with the 
council's relative inactivity on a number of the new 
problems. Labour councillors were vigorous in their 
support for a roading scheme for the whole city, and were 
prepared to contemplate a large loan to finance it. 22 As 
in previous campaigns, the need for further municipal 
enterprises was emphasised. Improvements to the existing 
private system of milk distribution, dominated by the "can 
d d '" ' h' h ' 't 23 S b an 1pper, was g1ven a 19 pr10r1 y. ome La our 
candidates advocated a municipally controlled supply from 
a centralised pasteurisation plant. Other suggestions 
included a municipal produce market, municipal fish market, 
more loans for housebui1ding, cheaper home appliances from 
an expanded MED trading department, and a consolidation of 
the council's insurance policies - to be lodged with the 
State Insurance Office. 24 Many of these policies were not 
new, but they did confirm Labour's image as the party of 
change versus the cramped conservatism of their opponents. 
Yet the Labour Party's newspaper advertising also 
attacked its opponents for adding to the rates; "every 
increase in rates hurts the workers. The Citizens' 
Association majority have been responsible for every increase 
21. H.T. Armstrong praised the workers' insurance scheme in parliament 
and attributed it to Hiram Hunter, ~, Vol.209, p.913-14, July 21, 
1926. On housing, see Press, 30 March, 1926. On playgrounds, 
Press, 16 February, 1926. 
22. Sun, 8 June, 1926. 
23. Sun, 13 April, 1927; Times, 16, 21 April, 1927; Press, 27 April, 1927. 
24. Times, 23, 26 April, 1927. 
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in rates. Labour, if given a majority, will examine the 
whole position and reduce rates, if possible". 25 Such 
claims were not necessarily cynical. As with so many 
other economic miracles, the key to increased spending 
with decreased taxation was to be borrowing. It was hoped 
that the resulting debt could be serviced from consequent 
savings or from charges on the use of the new facilities. 
This combination of municipal activity and concern for 
the rates was in part a reflection of Labour's dual 
constituency in the city. The solid core of the party's 
support lay with the twelve hundred or so employees of local 
government in Christchurch and their families. To them 
Labour control promised not only increased job opportunities 
but the heady prospect of labour representatives negotiating 
their pay and conditions from both sides of the table. Trade 
unions containing significant numbers of local body employees -
the General Labourers' Union, the Tramway Employees' Union, 
and the Drivers' Union, provided a disproportionate share 
of the North Canterbury Labour Representation Committee's 
(LRC) funds 26 and candidates. In 1927, for example, at 
least six of the sixteen Labour candidates for the city 
council had been on. the executives of these unions at some 
time. Two of the city's four Labour M.P.'s, Hubert Thomas 
Armstrong (Christchurch East) and Edwin John Howard 
(Christchurch South) had been officials of the TEU and the 
25. Times, 16 April, 1927. 
26. In the March year 1930-31 the TEU alone provided 23% of the LRC's 
income. Figures calculated from North Canterbury Labour Representa- . 
tion Committee, Receipt Book, 1929-36. 
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GLU respectively. They had also served as city councillors 
and on other local bodies. But the prospect of Labour as 
employer attracted more than the existing local body 
employees and their families. Local government provided 
permanent work at award rates and with good conditions, 
organised from a small number of depots and therefore 
readily subject to union supervision. Employment by private 
contractors and landowners, on the other hand, tended to be 
casual, underpaid and not readily organised or inspected by 
union officials. "Socialism", viewed as the extension of 
local government working conditions to every job, had an 
obvious appeal to all unskilled workers who wished to attain 
the incomes and security of their skilled counterparts. 
A high proportion of the unskilled working class rented 
their accommodation and it is significant that the local 
Independent Political Labour League first won representation 
on the council during 1911, in the election following the 
extension of the franchise to residents as well as rate-
payers. Thereafter Labour had controlled roughly a third 
of the council seats. 27 However, unskilled workers tended 
to be very mobile and were often not in the same rented 
accommodation for two elections running. It was therefore 
essential to Labour's chances of winning control of the 
council that it motivate these workers, arrange their enrol-
ment and ensure that they got out to vote. As a result of 
the downturn of 1926, many of the unskilled were facing 
unemployment, a condition which in itself increased the 
attraction of a Labour council with its emphasis on greater 
27. Times, 28 April, 1927. 
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activity by local government. However, the Labour members 
on the co~ncil had also been very active in publicising 
the plight of the unemployed and had achieved something 
practical for them. As well as getting a £2000 subsidy 
for the relief works organised by the Christchurch Unemploy-
ment Committee, the party's councillors had managed to win 
over enough Citizens' councillors to approve a special £5000 
unemployment loan for roadworks in Barbadoes street. 28 
Finally, under Sullivan's direction Labour's customary drive 
to get its supporters on the roll was an outstanding success 
in 1927 29 and the vote increased disproportionately in 
1 b · 30 a ourl.ng areas. 
In order to achieve a council majority, however, the 
party had to continue to win a large section of the skilled 
and white collar vote. Such workers were much more likely 
to be ratepayers and therefore more chary of large increases 
in council spending. Yet in seeking their support, Labour 
did have a tradition of municipal improvement by businessmen 
to draw on. Tommy Taylor and his "radical" cohorts such as 
Harry Ell and L.M. IsiLL had been active in local as well 
as national politics at the turn of the century.31 Influenced 
to some extent by similar progressive movements in Brit~sh 
municipalities, they pressed for the rapid introduction of 
new technology to improve sanitation, drainage, public 
transport and power supply. These projects often necessitated 
borrowing, but much of the ratepaying electorate was prepared 
28. 1 October, 1926. 
29. 29 March, 1927. Press, 28 April, 1927. 
30. See Appendix D. 
31. Scotter, op.cit., p.280-85. 
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to entrust the management of the city's finances to such 
respectable citizens who WE!re often also successful 
businessmen. Prohibition ,"'as always high on their list 
of civic improvements. Furthermore, their activities had 
enjoyed considerable success in Christchurch. By 1926 
the council's electricity department (MED) was in an 
excellent financial situation, amassing large reserves 
32 despite a steady reduction in power charges. The city's 
tramway system was self-supporting. 33 Similarly, the 
council worker insurance sc:heme had operated successfully 
since before the war, the recently acquired municipal 
h ' f' 34 d h t f h ' quarry was s ow~ng a pro ~t:, an t e sys em 0 ous~ng 
loans by on-lending funds from the State Advances Depart-
men t was proceeding without: cost to the council. There 
were thus a number of encouraging precedents for a progress-
ive yet respectable regime in the council chamber. Further-
more, the scale of the problems facing the city clearly 
necessitated a move in that direction. 
Four of the party's lOGal leaders were particularly 
important in establishing an image of responsibility and 
respectability to complement and to render more widely 
credible Labour's progressive policies for the city. These 
were the Rev. James Kendrick Archer, Daniel Giles Sullivan, 
James McCombs, and Elizabet:h Reid McCombs. 
Of t.his quartet, Archer was probably the most significant 
in winning new support for Labour in the mid-'twenties. 
32. Press, 23 November, 1926. 
33. Sun, 1B May, 1926. 
34. Christchurch City Council, Balance-Sheet and Statements, 1926, p.1B. 
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He was a leading Baptist minister in the city and an ardent 
prohibitionist. Although prepared to espouse socialism 
to even the most conservative of audiences, his treatment 
of the subject as "applied christianity "35 often made him 
appear more of a determinedly outspoken pastor chiding 
sinners for their selfishness rather than as a bloodthirsty 
revolutionary. It was a style to which many respectable 
Christchurch citizens were accustomed by their ministers 
and they appear to have appreciated it in relatively mild 
doses. Archer's political creed was strongly fabian -
impatient with capitalists and the proletariat alike, and 
anxious to place society on a just and efficient basis. His 
background was in the respectable working class rather than 
in the professions, and this was reflected in an emphasis 
on conventional morality which was typically white-collar. 
An immigrant from England in 1909, Archer arrived in 
Christchurch in 1919 with some experience in the Labour 
Party in Napier, Wellington and Invercargill. He was elected 
to the Christchurch City Council and the North Canterbury 
Hospital Board in 1921, was President of the NZLP in the 
following year and its Vice-president from 1923 to 1931. 
In 1925 he was the party's mayoral candidate in Christchurch. 
With the non-Labour vote split between three aspirants he 
won relatively comfortably while taking around forty per 
cent of the poll, a similar proportion to that gained by 
1 · . h' 1 36 Su l~van ~n t e prev~ous mayora race. 
35. "Socialism is the application to economic affairs of the teaching of 
the Sermon on the Mount. Long before I became a student of political. 
economy I got my first lessons in socialism from the New Testament". 
Quoted in 26 April, 1927. 
36. Calculated from results published in Press, 28 April, 1927. 
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Archer proved extremely active and very popular in his 
first term as mayor. He showed considerable sympathy for 
the disadvantaged, especially the unemployed, and was 
clearly impatient to do more to help them. 37 At the same 
time he brooked no disrespect from "leaders of the 
unemployed" and favoured making able-bodied male applicants 
for charitable aid work for their assistance. 38 Citizens' 
Association councillors had few complaints about his treat-
ment of them and his standing in normally non-Labour circles 
was heightened by his speeches and general behaviour during 
the visit of the Duke of York in early 1927. 39 Far from 
taking advantage of the occasion to show a socialist 
indifference to royal pomp, Archer proved to be an extremely 
loyal and respectful subject. In the election campaign later 
intthe year, his opponents were reduced to claiming that they 
needed a majority on the council to keep him in line. 40 
Apparently they gave their own candidate little chance. 
D.G. Sullivan was younger than Archer but had been 
active in Christchurch politics for much longer. A native 
of the city, he had been a leading member of the Independent 
37. Times, 10 August, 10 September, 1926. 
38. Press, 25 November, 1926. "I have no time for the man who would not 
give 20s. worth of labour for 20s. in wages". Press, 3 February, 
1927. Also speech to deputation of unemployed, Press, 4 February, 
1927. 
39. An editorial in the Press, 13 April, 1927, remarked that his 
"admirable conduct during the Royal Visit" made "the duty" of turning 
him out particularly painful. Nevertheless it warned electors not 
to be swayed by his "personal popularity, his gift of bright and 
incisive speech, his versatility, or even his honesty". Archer's 
treatment of his royal visitor also drew praise from Coates (Times, 
31 March, 1927). 
40. Advertisement, Press, 21 April, 1927. Also edit~rial, Press, 
26 April, 1927. 
Political Labour League founded in Christchurch in 1905. 
Later he had played an active role in bringing together 
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the umoderate" and "militant" sections of the political 
labour movement in a national party. He was always deeply 
concerned to keep that party united on a course sufficiently 
moderate to appeal to respectable working class opinion. 
Initially a skilled worker in the furniture trade, later 
a secretary'of craft unions and a journalist, he had never 
been a "red fed", and was not closely associated with 
trade unions covering local body employees. He had long 
been an active supporter of the Temperance Movement, 
unusual for a male Roman Catholic, but an indication of how 
strongly he was, integrated into the respectable working 
class of his city. A born diplomat with a lively sense of 
humour and some command of blarney, Sullivan tended to take 
individuals as he found them, and he showed a remarkable 
ability to co-operate and even form friendships with a wide 
range of people. Serving on the city council since 1915 
and for the seat of Avon in parliament since 1919, he had 
proven an excellent committee man and had frequently won 
praise from his opponents. He was instrumental in the 
formation of a committee of Christchurch M.P. 's from both, 
Labour and Reform parties to advance the interests of the 
city in We1lington. 41 By 1927 he was clearly more 
concerned with immediate practical improvements in the lives 
of the working people of Christchurch than in class conflict 
or the application of socialist theories. For example, he 
had been largely responsible for the council's successful 
41. Press, 19 February, 17 March, 15 May, 1926. 
42 housing loans scheme, which had gone a little way 
towards a~eliorating the housing shortage in the city 
following the war. In order to get the scheme accepted, 
Sullivan had had to show that it would be run on "sound 
commercial lines ll and to win the support of a number of 
3~O 
his political opponents. Yet he was also very popular 
with the labouring class in Christchurch, perhaps in memory 
of his early years as a "soap-box orator". He was certainly 
successful in getting them to enrol and to. vote, and he 
was very active as the party's organiser in the city for 
the 1927 municipal elections. 
Although not standing for the city council in 1927, 
James McCombs, M.P. for Lyttelton, had constantly enhanced 
the local Labour party's respectable reputation. A strong 
prohibitionist and an erstwhile colleague of T.E. Taylor, 
McCombs had first stood for parliament as a Progressive 
Liberal in 1908. A well-read, very religious and respectable 
small businessman, he was the leader of the moderate wing 
of the parliamentary party. In 1919 he had tied with H.E. 
Holland in the election of party leader. 43 with Sullivan, 
he had publicly opposed Holland's friendly attitude towards 
the Soviet Union, and had strongly supported the exclusion 
of Communist Party members from membership of the Labour 
party.44 Amongst other party leaders, he was probably 
closest to Nash in character and politics - a scrupulously 
42. There was considerable popular acclaim for Archer's statement that 
"Dan Sullivan has done more for housing than all the rest of the 
councillors put together". Times, 13 April, 1927. 
43. P. O'Farrell, Harry Holland; Militant Socialist, Canberra, 1964, p.102. 
44. Ibid., p.129-3l. 
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honest bookkeeper notable more for his grasp of the 
intricacies of capitalism than his impatience to abolish 
it. 
Elizabeth McCombs was similarly important in widening 
the party's support amongst the respectable and the better-
off. Well-educated and confident, yet feminine, she had 
won a reputation for hard work and practical kindness from 
her service to private charities and as a member of the 
hospital board from 1921. She was Labour's most prominent 
surviving representative in the city of a tradition of 
well-to-do women, forcefully promoting reforms of special 
interest to women from the more respectable classes. These 
issues included at various times prohibition, eugenics, 
anti-conscription, domestic and motherhood training for 
girls, and a higher age of consent. A number of her erst-
while colleagues, such as Anie Elizabeth Herbert, now a 
Citizens' Association Councillor, had disassociated them-
selves from Labour. But whether in that party or another 
they continued to command a significant following amongst 
women voters. Mrs. McCombs' attitudes were not greatly 
different from the non-Labour lady politicians. Like them 
she could be rather impatient with working people, tending 
to represent their best interests and not necessarily their 
opinions. 45 Nor was the rest of the Labour ticket in 1927 
the collection of wild-eyed revolutionaries and impractical 
45. She called a deputation representing the unemployed "an illogical 
crowd" when they said they wanted work but criticised having to 
work for charitable aid. Press, 28 October, 1926. She appears 
to have failed to appreciate the strong feelings of many workers 
about award wages and payment in cash rather than kind. 
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dreamers that their opponents alleged them to be. Five 
of the candidates ran their own businesses or were married 
46 to successful businessmen and one was a clergyman. 
The outcome of the election demonstrated the popularity 
of Archer, seeing him capture over two-thirds of the vote. 
In contrast to the pattern in 1925, he won clear majorities 
in respectable working class suburbs as well as in labouring 
areas.
47 Twelve Labour councillors were elected to Citizens' 
four, more than reversing the previous line-up of five 
Labour to eleven Citizens'. Sullivan topped the poll by a 
clear margin, followed by Elizabeth McCombs and Armstrong. 
Of the successful Labour candidates, only five were known 
essentially as trade unionists. 48 
The jubilation which followed Labour's local success 
foreshadowed that which was to follow its national victory 
eight years later. During the remainder of 1927 and the 
first half of 1928 the new council approached the fulfilment 
of its election promises with enthusiasm. The city's 
labouring class had particular reason to be pleased with 
its performance during this period. Firstly, the council 
adopted a firm policy of doing work with its own labour 
force rather than letting it out to private contractors~49 
At the annual social for city council employees shortly after 
46. Clyde Carr was the clergyman; T.H. Butterfield was a grocer, 
P.W. Sharpe a retired cordial manufacturer, G.R. Hunter a coal 
merchant, F.M. Robson a boat manufacturer and the McCombs were 
in retailing. All except Carr had at some stage been involved 
in the industrial labour movement, however. 
47. See Appendix D. 
48. H.T. Armstrong, F.R. Cooke, R.M. Macfarlane, J. Roberts and 
G. Manning. The latter was now more involved in The Workers' 
Educational Association. 
49. Times, 29 June, 1929; Press, 31 March, 1930. 
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the election, Councillor Armstrong expressed the hope that 
many more workers would be eligible to attend the following 
50 year. His wish was amply fulfilled, with the council's 
permanent non-clerical workforce increasing by over 
seventeen per cent within that time. 51 Secondly, the 
wages of a number of categories of manual workers for the 
council were increased even though their award did not 
52 
expire for a further year. Thirdly, and most importantly,' 
the Labour administration moved rapidly to help the 
unemployed by providing casual work. By the midwinter of 
1927 the council was employing almost four hundred more men 
on its outside labouring staff than usual at that time of 
the year. 53 A few of these were employed on public reserves, 
but most worked on extensions to the city's water reticula-
tion or on roadworks. Much of the roading was financed by 
a special £25,000 Relief of Unemployment Loan floated three 
months after Labour's victory.54 In all, wages paid out 
to casual workers increased from £14,060 in 1926-27 to 
£33,662 in 1927-28. 55 The council's total payroll went up 
by almost a quarter. Additional funds were transferred to 
relief workers through subsidies on schemes approved by 
the private Citizens' Unemployment Committee (cue) .56 
Most of this work involved tidying up the banks and bed 
of the Avon River. 
50. 11 May, 1927. 
51. eso, Local Authorities Handbook, 1928, 1929, "Boroughs - Employees 
and Wages". 
52. Sun, 5 July, 1927; Press, 13 September, 1927. 
53. 19 August, 1927; Sun, 25 October, 1927. 
54. 19 July, 1927. 
55. eso, 0.12. cit. I loc.cit. 
56. Press l 10 May, 26 July, 1927. 
! 
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The development of new municipal services during the 
Labour councills first term was far less spectacular. 
Councillor Clyde CarrIs plans for the municipalisation of 
the cityls milk supply were strongly opposed by the councills 
two M.P.ls, Sullivan and Armstrong. 57 Both stressed that 
the government was unlikely to allow enabling legislation 
to pass, and suggested that sufficient improvement in milk 
quality could be achieved at much less cost by better 
inspection of the existing system. They seem to have been 
strongly conscious of the possible political costs of 
imposing a centralised system. Dairymen were working 
people, not capitalists, and were not normally prominent 
in the opposition to Labour. They were employed in a 
highly competitive field where it paid to keep on good 
terms with the customers. There was no exclusive "block 
system", so purchasers normally did not have to buy from a 
particular vendor. In all, around seven hundred persons 
were licensed to sell milk,58 and together with families 
and friends they constituted a potentially powerful voting 
lobby. With some indication that stricter inspection was 
improving quality and the election of Carr as M.P. for 
Timaru at the end of 1928, the decision on municipalisation 
was postponed. Significant concern had been created amongst 
a large section of the electorate to little end. 
The proposal for a city produce market, on the other 
hand, was implemented before the end of 1927. However, the 
reality proved to be a travesty of the ideal. A vacant 
57. Sun, 30 August, 1927; Times, 9 November, 1927. 
58. ~, 23 May, 1927. 
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section owned by the MED in Worcester Street just west of 
Cathedral Square was hastily cleared and licences to erect 
stalls were sold to a number of small entrepreneurs. 59 
This arrangement quickly attracted the attention of the 
local Medical Officer of Health, Dr. Fletcher Telford, 
and ice-cream and poultry stalls were closed almost 
. d' 1 GO ~mme ~ate y. Other improvements were also ordered in the 
interests of public health. Mayor Archer, a strong proponent 
of the market, repeatedly implied that Fletcher Telford ' 
was politically motivated. Gl However, it would seem to 
have been very unwise to open a makeshift market beside a 
busy central city street at the height of a Christchurch 
summer. Nor'westers, dust, exhaust fumes and flies afflicted 
the market as much as the machinations of vested interests. 
Nevertheless, opposition was considerable. Many small 
shoppers complained that the stallholders simply pocket ted 
their savings on overheads, and the whole project ran at 
a loss to the council. G2 The number of stalls soon dwindled, 
and despite a vigorous verbal rearguard action, the council 
finally closed the market and sold the section. G3 
The promise to provide a central city women's rest room 
led to even greater controversy. During 1928 the council 
proposed to incorporate the facility in a large new shelter 
59. Press, 23 December, 1927. The arrangement was initially supported 
by the Sun, 20 December, 1927, and savagely attacked by the Times, 
23 December, 1927. 
60 •. Press, 29 December, 1927. 
61. Press, 24 December, 1927. 
62. Times, 30 January, 4, 14 February, 18 December, 1928; Press, 11 
February, 1929; Sun, 14 May, 1928i 9 February, 1929. By the 
end of 1928 Sullivan was describing the site as "inadequate" after 
considerable discussion in the Labour caucus. Times, 10 December, 
1928. 
63. Press, 11 June, 1929. 
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for tram passengers on a section of Cathedral Square known 
as the Go~ley Plot. This had been bequeathed to the city 
some fifty years earlier by John Robert Godley, one of the 
"founding fathers" of Christchurch. A furore ensued as 
thousands of citizens, led by members of the colonial 
elite, mobilised to defend the legacy of the "pioneers ll • 
Large public meetings of protest were held and a petition 
drawn up as the local newspaper closely associated with 
the elite thundered against "the lavatory partyll which 
64 planned to turn Cathedral Square into IILavatory Square". 
Finally, a legal action was brought to contest the council's 
interpretation of the Godley Bequest, and the court's 
65 decision went in favour of the protestors. While the 
whole controversy turned Christchurch into a national 
laughing-stock as a sort of antipodean Clochemerle, the 
battle was fought with extreme bitterness on both sides. 
Archer's irascible attacks on his opponents appear to have 
been particularly wounding. He described one letter from 
the Canterbury Women's Club requesting the site be shifted 
as 
lI extraordinary, unwomanly, the sort of thing 
a 'hooligan' or 'silly young flapper' might 
write, ignorant, stupid, irresponsible, 
regardless of facts, deserving of the 
severest snub, inspired, propaganda, selfish, 
impracticable, hysteri~/ ••• insane, and 
worthy to be ignored". 66 
This was not the sort of treatment to win votes amongst 
politically active well-to-do women. Archer polled poorly as th( 
64. Press, 23 April, 2,3,19 May. For details of protests, Press, 28 
July, 21 August. An elderly independent member of the Tramway 
Board pointed out that the disputed area had been used as a lavatory 
during the time of lithe pioneers". Sun, 8 August, 1928. 
65. Press, 17 May, 1929. 
66. ~, 1 May, 1928. 
Labour candidate for the generally wealthy Christchurch 
North in the general election of 1928, which took place 
at the height of the controversy.67 
Although vested interests did do their best to 
obstruct these projects, Labour's efforts were all 
effectively blighted by the desire to fulfii the party's 
election promises as cheaply as possible. The use of 
existing council sections for the market and the rest 
rooms despite their unsuitability for these purposes, 
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the construction of ramshackle stalls by private interests, 
and the reluctance to match even the non-Labour Wellington 
City Council in the centralisation of the city's milk 
supply, all betray a reluctance to spend any more than 
the absolute minimum on new facilities. 
The growing burden of spending on aspects of new 
technology was one of the major reasons for this reluctance. 
For example, the council took on thirteen traffic inspectors 
between 1926 and 1929. 68 with salaries in excess of two 
hundred and fifty pounds, the purchase and maintenance of 
several motor-cycles, and the provision of uniforms and 
superannuation, this represented a sizeable new commitment 
for a council with a rates revenue of around £120,000. 
Likewise the problem of roading and the advent of legal 
responsibility for town-planning involved a large expansion 
in the council's salaried staff. Between 1925 and 1928 the 
number of such persons employed in the City Engineer's office 
increased from six to eighteen. 69 Between 1925 and 1931 
67. Press, 21 November, 1928. 
68. Press 29 April, 1927; 1 October, 1929. 
69. Times, 5 February, 1929. 
21. New opportunities and new responsibilities. One of 
Christchurch City Council's new traffic inspectors 
regards some of the city's numerous and rather 
anarchic cyclists. Note the diversity of modes of 
transport. The picture was taken at the intersection 
of Colombo, Armagh and Victoria streets. 
(Weekly Press and Referee, 2 June, 1927.) 
22. A substantial hazard to health. Brakes, road 
surfaces, traffic control, driver protection 
and driver education lagged far behind the potential 
of private motor transport for speed. 
(Weekly Press and Referee, 2 April, 1925.) 
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the total number of administrative staff employed by the 
council (including the MED) rose from 90 to 137 and the 
389 
amount expended on their salaries increased from twenty-
four to forty thousand pounds. 70 The growth in expendi-
ture on white-collar staff and their work narrowed 
significantly the council's financial room to manoeuvre 
if it was to avoid increasing the rates. Already facing 
the need to service a large roading loan, it had little 
scope for further spending on new municipal projects. 
After the first year of Labour control on the city council 
this emphasis on economy began to affect the degree of 
council assistance to the unemployed. Spending on outside 
workers increased by only two per cent during 1928-29, 
despite pay rises in a number of awards. 71 The number of 
casual workers employed in winter was about half that of 
the previous year,72 and there was no repetition of the 
unemployment loan of 1927. Once again the council 
co-operated with the CUC, and the largest part of its 
spending on unemployment went towards the construction of 
a boulevard along the banks of the Avon in the Linwood and 
Dallington areas. 73 Unfortunately a high proportion of 
the funds devoted to this project was used to purchase 
riverside property rather than to pay the unemployed them-
selves. The net amount expended by the council on unemploy-
ment relief, exclusive of grants from the government and 
private organisations, actually decreased from £9,000 to 
70. CSO, op.cit., 1926, 1932, "Boroughs - Employees and Wages". 
71. Ibid, 1929, 1930, loc.cit., and Press, 15 May, 4 July, 1928. 
72. Sun, 6 July, 1928; Press, 24 July, 4 August, 1928. 
73. Times, 23 July, 15 October, 1929. 
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under £7,400 from 1927-28 to 1928-29. 74 This was despite 
the fact that registered unemployment was tending to worsen. 
Labour acted relatively quickly on the question of roading 
in the city, floating a £220,000 loan during 1928 to 
construct the first stage of a plan drawn up by the City 
Engineer and projected to cost over two million pounds in 
allover seventy years. 75 Yet the extent to which the new 
works provided assistance to the unemployed was limited. 
Council officers and many members of the public had voiced 
their concern at the lack of fitness and slow work-rate of 
relief workers on existing jobs. 76 Furthermore, the roading 
plan called for substantial expenditure on equipment, 
including a large bitumen plant which required lorries to 
provide rapid transport for its immense production. Slow 
or careless workers could greatly increase the cost of a 
project when such methods were used. Consequently the 
council decided to take members of the unemployed onto the 
work only if they were "fully efficient".77 Many of them 
74. Calculated from Christchurch City Council, Balance Sheet and 
Statements, 1928, 1929. 
75. Press, 19 July, 1927. The plan envisaged a net saving within a few 
years as expenditure on road repairs (including much labour) was 
reduced. Sun, 19 October, 1927. Debt-servicing was to be paid 
entirely from the council's share of petrol tax. Times, 24 January, 
1929. Nevertheless, it was something of a surprise when the loan 
was approved by an overwhelming majority (3599 to 1363) of the 
small number of ratepayers who voted on it. The reason lay in the 
heavy support from the wealthy north-west of the city, normally 
strongly opposed to new expenditure, but now probably concerned 
for its motor cars. Star, 7 September, 1928. 
76. Press, 28 July, 1927; Sun, 11 July, 1928; 4 April, 1929. 
77. As Chairman of the Works Committee, H.T. Armstrong told a deputation 
of the unemployed bluntly that the council was not prepared to go 
into overdraft to help provide them with work and that the roading 
scheme called for more machinery rather than labour. He was seconded 
by the City Engineer and by Archer. Times, 28 November, 1928. 
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did not fall into this category, sometimes because of the 
hardships of being unemployed. 
Surprisingly, Sullivan appears to have been the 
individual most responsible for the council's parsimony. 
In his capacity as Chairman of the Finance Committee, he 
was strongly conscious of Labour's pledge not to increase 
the rates, and anxious to prove that both Dan Sullivan 
and the Labour Party could handle public finances 
"responsibly". Towards the end of his first year in office, 
he repeatedly expressed the hope that the council would 
achieve a budget surplus, and a profit of several thousand 
78 pounds was duly declared - but regrettably no dividend. 
Defending Labour's record shortly before the 1929 Municipal 
Election, Sullivan proudly maintained that the new council 
had won the approval of Capital: 
most significantly of all, perhaps, is the fact 
that, despite all the dismal predictions made 
by our enemies when we took office, the investing 
public have shown complete confidence in Labour's 
financial administration, have taken up our 
debentures, and given us all the money necessary, 
and at rates of interest lower than those 
authorised by the [Local] Government Loans Board. 
At the same time 
the rates have not been increased, but kept where 
they were, in spite of all the difficulties that 
such a course involved, and ways have been found 
to carryon without taking any extra money from 
the ratepayers. 79 
78. One calculation of the surplus was £14,000, as against the mere 
£6,500 achieved by the Citizens' Council the previous year. Sun, 
2 May, 1928. Some of the 180 "casuals" laid off at the beginning 
of February "due to lack of funds" may have looked askance at such 
figures. Press, 9 February, 1928. 
79. Times, 14 March, 1929. He had already claimed to have "actually 
turned the position to the advantage of the city, by securing 
from the various Governments in power large sums of money in 
subsidies which have been spent on the improvement of the city 
streets". Times, 4 April, 1929. 
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In playing the part of a Philip Snowden on the Labour 
council, Sullivan was not just betraying an innate conser-
vatism or succumbing meekly to the influence of council 
officers. It was rather his astute grasp of local politics 
that made him emphasise a conservative approach to expendi-
ture. He was after all the most successful and experienced 
Christchurch politician in the local Labour caucus. He 
knew his city and its electorate very well, and was aware 
of the importance placed by the respectable working classes 
on home ownership. This was an ideal which was particularly 
widely fulfilled in Christchurch. In 1926 only 29.5% of 
the city's dwellings were rented, compared with 34.1% in 
Dunedin, 43.9% in Wellington, and 44.4% in Auckland. 80 
Therefore, as Sullivan never tired of emphasising, the 
majority of ratepayers were working people. If Labour was 
to be assured of their continued electoral support, it had 
to avoid any large increases in the rates. Archer might 
advocate a special rate levy for the purpose of unemployment 
relief, but he stressed that this was "a personal policy"81 
and he was not supported by Sullivan. The latter was well 
aware that a pound on the average rate bill would soon 
evaporate much of the sympathy for the unskilled unemployed 
from the independent working classes. He was clearly 
conscious that cynical criticism of the labouring class was 
never far from the surface amongst them. After the 1927 
election he had joined the Mayor in warning council employees 
BO. Calculated from figures in Census, 1926, Vol.B, p.6. 
Bl. He noted that "you [the CUC] wouldn't like it and Christchurch 
wouldn't have it". Press, 20 September, 1929. 
that there should be no I s hirking" 82 and he strongly 
criticised those of the unemployed who continued to 
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refuse to work in return for their hospital board rations. 83 
He also claimed that relief workers were "forty per cent 
less efficient,,84 than ordinary council staff. 
The imposition of tight financial policies led to 
dissension amongst Labour councillors. Some years later 
Sullivan told of one clash between himself and Armstrong, 
then Chairman of the Works Committee and a strong champion 
of council workers. 
Mr. Armstrong wanted more money than we could let 
him have for his department and I had a hard task 
paring him down. At last his patience broke, and 
with a lowering frown, he positively yelled at me 
that there was no miser like an Irish miser and I 
could have his resignation if I liked. 8S 
The application of a little of the Sullivan charm appears 
to have overcome this "breeze". However, Armstrong did 
not publicly disown his son, Arthur Ernest (Tommy) when 
he stood as an Independent Socialist against the official 
Labour ticket in 1929,86 partly on the grounds that the 
87 
council was neglecting the unemployed. 
Sullivan's financial moderation was matched by his 
stands on each of the controversies that beset the Labour 
council. He consistently adopted a conciliatory role, 
82. 11 May, 1927. 
83. 16 January, 1928. 
84. Sun, 12 January, 1928. 
85. 11 February, 1936. 
86. 2 May, 1929. 
87. 18 May, 1929. A.E. Armstrong also called for a municipal 
washhouse, picture show, training farm, household fuel depot and 
gymnasium. Press, 24 April. 1929. Traditional proposals for 
municipalisation had been concerned with basic services - Armstrong 
belonged to a new generation which wanted cheaper entertainment 
as well. 
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attempting to find solutions acceptable to Labour's opponents 
rather than confronting them. As Archer became more abrasive, 
Sullivan stressed co-operation. He claimed to be merely 
invoking "this softening of the asperities of public life 
with personal friendship and respect [which] is much more 
characteristic of the people of the British Empire than of 
any other [sic] in the world".88 
Besides the question of the rest-rooms in Cathedral 
Square and the problems of the city market, a number of moves 
towards further regulating the city's aesthetic and moral 
life led the council into controversy. Some of these were 
related to aspects of the new technology. In recent years 
there had been a number of complaints about noisy motor cars 
and riotous, drunken and loose behaviour late at night around 
central city dance halls. 89 Two of these halls were closed 
by the Labour council in its first year - Sullivan included 
this action in a short list of its accomplishments to the end 
of 1927. 90 The remaining halls were obliged to prevent 
patrons from leaving the premises and then returning, possibly 
after drinking or "misbehaving" in cars outside. 91 Motor 
transport had encouraged the proliferation of advertising 
signs along arterial roads within and just outside towns. 
Archer, a vigorous opponent of roadside hoardings, regarded 
their closer regulation as an important achievement. He 
88. Times, 18 April, 1929. Also his belief that party differences on 
the Council had lessened since Labour's victory. Times, 20 December, 
1928. 
89. star, 17, 27 September, 1927; 6, 20, 28 March, 1928. Sun, 29 June, 
1927. 
90. Times, 8 December, 1927. 
91. Star, 31 January, 1929. "A by-law that arouses much hilarity amongst 
visitors, but is very humiliating to Christchurch people". 
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clearly saw them as a potential source of moral as well as 
visual pollution, declaring of one confiscated poster that 
"we could not even show it to all the employees in this 
[town hall]".92 Similarly, he and a number of other 
councillors, mainly from the Labour side, opposed the issue 
of permits for concerts or motion picture performances on 
Christmas Day or at Easter. 93 Such "wowserism" was increas-
ingly unpopular, especially amongst youthful citizens and it 
94 
may well have contributed to the support for Tommy Armstrong. 
The outcome of the 1929 Municipal Election proved 
disastrous for Labour. Archer's majority slumped from more 
than ten thousand to less than five hundred, and the number 
of Labour councillors was reduced from twelve to six. The 
Citizens' Association increased its representation on the 
council to eight, and the balance was held by Tommy 
Armstrong and another Independent, Dr. Henry Thomas Joynt 
Thacker, a former Mayor of the city, and Liberal M.P. for 
Christchurch East between 1914 and 1922. In the light of 
the united Party's victory in the previous year's General 
Election, it is perhaps significant that the Citizens' 
Association's nearly successful mayoral candidate, William 
Hayward, had also been associated with United and its 
92. Press, 11 October, 1927. 
93. Press, 27 April, 1928. Archer was also widely criticised for a 
message to Kingsford Smith on the eve of his trans-Tasman flight 
telling the aviator that he would not be prepared to greet him if 
he flew in on a Sunday. Sun, 3 September, 1928; Press, 6 September, 
1928. 
94. A rather different moral controversy may have alienated many older 
citizens. In March 1928, a number of older Labour councillors 
resurrected a longstanding debate about the presence of artillery 
pieces as war trophies on city reserves (Sun, 9 June, 1928). The 
question had arisen originally after the Boer War with the arrival 
of a captured "porn-porn". The number of such monuments to Canterbury's 
military prowess had increased after the Great War with the addition 
of a massive and particularly ugly german howitzer •••• 
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Liberal predecessors. 95 It has also been noted that within 
urban·areas the "Liberal revival" of 1928 was strongest in 
. 96 
working areas and Hayward certainly increased the non-
Labour vote in such suburbs. 97 At some booths it doubled. 
More importantly, the total vote tended to decline in both 
labouring and better-off working areas. Organisation appears 
to have been poorer than it had been two years earlier. 
Sullivan was not in charge this time and he was probably 
right, if a little immodest, in criticising the party's 
failure to increase enrolments on the same scale as in 1927. 98 
However, the most striking aspect of the election w.as a 
spectacular increase in the vote in the wealthy north-west 
and 'Vlest, and the commercial city centre. The sons and 
daughters of "the pioneers" had their revenge on Archer. 
Some electors may have been deterred or confused by the 
new preferential voting system in the voting for councillors. 
However, there were actually fewer informal votes than in 
1927 and little evidence of an alphabetical "donkey vote ll 
- those elected constituted rather less of an "ABC" council 
than their predecessors. Sullivan demonstrated his continuing 
popularity, winning almost twice the number of first prefer-
ences as the next highest polling candidpte and four times 
that of the next Labour councillor, Elizabeth Mccombs. 99 
95. Sun, 29 April, 1929. Previously there had been suggestions that a 
local Liberal Party of young businessmen might contest the election 
in opposition to the IITory" Citizens' Association. Star, 9, 11 
February, 1929; Sun, 11 February, 1929. 
96. R.M. Chapman, The Political Scene, 1919-1931, Auckland, 1969, p.55. 
97. See Appendix D. 
98. Press, 3 May, 1929. 
99. Christchurch City Council, Town Clerk's Report, 1930. 
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"Danny Boy" remained high on the local political hit-parade 
but the standing of his supporting artists had clearly slipped. 
Small business resentments towards Labour was personified by 
the election for the Citizens' Association of John Parlane, 
a dairyman. The dairymen of Christchurch had been particularly 
upset by the Labour Council's moves towards municipalisation 
of the City's milk supply_ They had held a parade of their 
milk carts through the centre of town on the eve of the 
election to demonstrate their opposition to Labour's plans. 100 
The manner in which this issue split the working class is 
exemplified by the fact that John Parlane's brother, Edward, 
was secretary of the Canterbury Drivers' union and one of the 
successful Labour candidates for the city council. 
The election was followed by a very considerable increase 
in council spending on the unemployed. The net amount expended 
.under the heading "Relief of Unemployment" more than doubled 
to £18,480. 101 This change of policy did not reflect any 
decision to adopt.permanently a greater responsibility for 
relief work. It was rather a result of the changed composition 
on the council and the unforseen increase in the. size and 
intractability of the problem during the year. The subsequent 
increase in spending and higher .rates were to create severe 
difficulties for the Labour council by irritating many of its 
traditional working-class supporters who were also ratepayers. 
If anything, they had expected a reduction in their rates 
assessments under Labour. 
In order to stay "in power", the Labour leadership now 
had to maintain the support, or at least the acquiescence, of 
lOP. Sun, 1 May, 1929. 
101. Christchurch City Council, Balance Sheet and statements, 1930. 
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the two independent councillors, Thacker and Armstrong, both 
of whom advocated greater 'spending on the unemployed. Further-
more, at least one member of the Labour caucus, Fred Cooke, 
was inclined to agree with them. l02 Thacker was persuaded 
to give his general support to Labour by the simple stratagem 
of electing him to the post of Deputy-mayor. l03 Not even 
his most ardent admirers could ever have described lithe 
Doctor" as a modest man, and he relished the opportunity to 
thumb his nose at a Citizens' Association that he now 
considered "Tory-dominated". However, he also proposed that 
the council employ more relief workers immediately, and 
delighted in his opportunities to side with deputations of 
the unemployed against Labour's financial conservatism. 104 
Thacker had not won parliamentary elections in Christchurch 
East without some appreciation of labouring attitudes. 
A.E. Armstrong's views on the need for increased relief work 
had been made clear during the election campaign. Labour's 
leadership on the city council was therefore faced with the 
alternatives of co-operating with the Citizens' Association 
councillors to keep unemployment expenditure down, or 
placating the Independents by increasing it. 
At the same time, developments during the first year of 
united's rule were revealing that the problem of unemployment 
was more deep-seated and serious than had been envisaged. 
The leaders of both parties on the city council had maintained 
that unemployment was a Il national problem ll and should be 
105 handled by the state. united had come to power with 
102. Press, 23 July, 1929. 
103. Press, 15 May, 1929. 
104. Times, 29 June, 1929. 
105. Press, 6 July, 1926. 
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promises to solve unemployment by government action. 
Sullivan and McCombs approached Ward as soon as the motion 
of no-confidence in the Coates Government was passed and 
requested that work on the extension of the South Island 
Main Trunk Railway should be put in hand immediately.l06 
Recognising that it would take some time for a significant 
number of the unemployed to be absorbed on such a complex 
project, they also requested interim assistance for 
Christchurch. Sir Joseph's delayed reaction was to offer 
£25,000 to each of the main centres, to be spent on the 
labour component of relief work on a £-for-£ basis. l07 The 
generosity of this very typical Ward gesture was more 
apparent than real as it involved a net reduction rather than 
an increase in the rate of government subsidy. Nevertheless, 
it gave urban local authorities the opportunity to continue 
their role in the relief of unemployment, if only for a few 
months. 
The reaction to the government's offer within the City 
Council was illuminating. In the first place, it was kept 
secret during the municipal election campaign. The reason 
h ' t f 11 l' d bl' 1 108 for t 1S secrecy was no u y exp a1ne pu 1C y. It may 
have been a precondition imposed by Ward so as not to 
influence the election in any way. However, this explanation 
was not advanced, and in the light of his later stance it 
seems equally likely that Sullivan did not want the question-
discussed before the poll. In the heat of the campaign there 
106. Times, 5 December, 1929. 
107. Times, 9 May, 1929. 
108. Archer said he had kept the offer secret because he did not want the 
old Council "to pass judgement on it". Press, 9 May, 1929. 
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would have been immense pressure on Labour councillors to 
accept an offer, which Sullivan apparently wanted renegotiated. 
Now the question had to be discussed. l09 Sullivan 
pointed out to the council that a very large sum would have 
to be raised locally if full advantage was to be taken of the 
grant. He suggested that as much as possible of the subsidy 
should be attracted by public subscriptions rather than 
burdening the council with another loan. Elizabeth McCombs 
maintained that little had changed, and that the council 
should tell the government that it did not consider unemploy-
ment a responsibility of local bodies. Citizens' councillors 
also opposed taking up the offer and were strongly critical 
of the cost, quality and "high wages" entailed in the relief 
works so far. Archer was, however, very anxious that the 
opportunity should not be lost entirely and it was finally 
agreed that negotiations with the government should continue. 
Meanwhile, the council took on approximately two hundred 
"extras", to be paid out, of revenue and existing loans. 110 
The Heathcote County Council, a much smaller local body, was 
employing a hundred and thirty such workers at the same time. lll 
However, the city was already overspending on work for 
the unemployed for which it had not provided in the estimates. 
Councillors began to take up positions on how much money 
should be allocated to relief work in 1929-30 andl.how the 
necessary funds should be raised. Inevitably, eyes turned 
to the MED's reserve funds. The continued rapid growth in 
sales of current had allowed the department to accumulate 
109. 
110. 
111. 
18 May, 1929. 
31 May, 1929; Times, 25 June, 1929. 
18 May, 1929. 
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over a hundred thousand pounds on fixed deposit.112 During 
the first term of the Labour council relatively small 
amounts of MED money had been transferred to other purposes, 
including unemployment relief. Both the Citizens' Association 
and Elizabeth McCombs, as Chairman of the council's 
Electricity Committee, had strongly opposed this procedure. 113 
They held to the view of the department's officers that such 
reserves should be built up further to give the Council the 
option of securing an independent supply of electricity if 
the government refused to renew Christchurch's favourable 
bulk contract with the PWD. 114 Mrs McCombs maintained that 
the MED should be run as a separate undertaking, operating 
in the interests of electricity consumers rather than those 
of all citizens. She was supported in her stand by other 
members of the Labour caucus, including Percy Sharpe, a 
wealthy local soft-drink manufacturer. He claimed that "the 
Labour Party has never done anything except on sound business 
I , " 115 J.nes. •• • 
The debate on the estimates took place in July, with the 
Finance Committee under the Chairmanship of Sullivan recommend-
ing that £15,000 should be transferred from the MED for 
unemployment relief rather than placing any further burden 
116 
on the ratepayers. Elizabeth McCombs opposed this, 
protesting that the majority of the users of electricity were 
small property owners and that the proposal was therefore 
112. Press, 23 July, 1929. 
113. Christchurch City Council, Minutes, 1 August, 1927. 
114. 5 August, 1930. 
115. 25 June, 1929. 
116. Press, 23 July, 1929. 
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"a class measure".117 She advocated a"£30,000 public loan 
instead. Fred Cooke overcame his antipathy towards money-
1 d 118' ff" 1 h' en ers su ~c~ent y to up t ~s amount to £50,000. On 
the other hand, Sullivan maintained that £25,000 was as 
much as the council should find. He too rose to the defence 
of the small property owner at the expense of the unemployed 
labourer; "the overwhelming majority of ratepayers are 
working people with mortgages on their properties, and it 
would be as unfair to rate them for unemployment as to rate 
the users of electricity". He suggested that £12,000 might 
be all that was necessary to employ three hundred men for 
six to eight weeks, after which the government had promised 
work would begin on the extension of the South Island Main 
Trunk Railway. Neither Sullivan nor Mrs McCombs rejected 
using the plight of the unemployed as a lever on the govern-
ment. The former observed that 
the money had to come from somewhere, and 
if it did not come from the Electricity 
Department, it would have to come from the 
ratepayers. If the electricity consumers 
found nothing and the ratepayers found 
nothing, the money would have to come from 
the Consolidated Fund. 119 
Nevertheless, he suggested that some of the funds should be 
borrowed from the MED and that the council should pay interest 
to its own department. 
117. Presumably she meant a measure in favour of the labouring class, 
which comprised the majority of the unemployed. Only a comparatively 
small proportion of property-owners - generally from the more wealthy 
- possessed electric heaters or cookers and were therefore substantial 
consumers of electricity. 
118. He had opposed the roading loan on the grounds that it would lead the 
council to pay large additional amounts to such people. A much smaller 
scheme from revenue, as Cooke wanted/ would have provided even less 
help to the unemployed. However/ a Keynesian compromise of Socialist 
principles did not come easily to men like Fred Cooke. Press, 
10 July, 1928. 
" 119. Times, 23 July, 1929. 
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Some of the strongest support for'the unemployed came 
from Archer. Referring to the MED's reserve, he declared 
angrily that it was "immoral to have all this money while 
people are starving". He would spend "every last penny of 
it" on the unemployed. Thacker and Armstrong also maintained 
that the amount transferred should be greater than £25,000. 
Sullivan rejected this suggestion and Elizabeth McCombs 
mercifully moved the discussion into committee. 
The outcome of these deliberations .was made public a 
fortnight later when the estimates were presented. 120 
Sullivan had largely got his own way. The council was to 
borrow only £12,500 from the MED for unemployment relief, 
and £8,000 for the building of a rest room in the Square -
well clear of the Godley Plot. One reason for Sullivan's 
anxiety not to increase the amount of rates money for 
unemployment relief was also revealed. The rate per pound 
of rateable property was actually reduced, but following the 
city's recent revaluation, the amount which the ratepayers 
had to find for the council increased by almost eighteen per 
cent. There was some consolation for most ratepayers, but 
little for the unemployed, when the Electricity Committee 
announced a few weeks later that its lighting charges to 
domestic consumers would be reduced to %d. per unit, the 
lowest in New zealand. 121 
The reaction to. the council's estimates illustrated 
Labopr's dilemma in Christchurch politics. There was little 
public praise for the decision to extend further assistance 
120. Press, 6 August, 1929. 
121. Times, 2 September, 1929. 
404 
to the unemployed and considerable criticism of the increase 
in rates. The star devoted a long, critical editorial to 
th I' h · t' II 122 e uge ra e lncreases • One correspondent styling 
himself "Labour Supporter of the Past" stated that his rates 
has risen three pounds and that the Labour Party was now 
discouraging working men such as himself from keeping vege-
123 table gardens. More ominously, Councillor Armstrong 
began to make difficulties for Labour on the council, 
apparently disgruntled by its level of spending on unemploy-
ment relief. To begin with, he persisted in making a 
statement on the sensitive question of the municipal market 
124 site despite being ruled out of order by Archer. This 
was to be a foretaste of several such confrontations in 
later years. The following month he joined with the Citizens' 
Association in voting down a Labour proposal for a consolid-
ated insurance scheme covering all New Zealand municipal-
itites. 125 He claimed that such an arrangement would lead 
to southern money being invested in the North Island by a 
northern-dominated association. Armstrong also scotched 
any further moves towards a municipal milk supply, arguing 
that it would jeopardise the jobs of hundreds of men. 126 
Nineteen-thirty was a bleak year in Christchurch, and 
a particularly difficult one for the Labour city council. 
The united Government's promise to give work to all the 
unemployed, accelerated adoption of new technology and 
increasing international economic difficulties all tended 
122. 6 August, 1929. 
123. Times, 11 September, 1929. 
124. Press, 3 September, 1929. 
125. Press, 31 October, 1929. 
126. 30 October, 1929. 
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to swell the numbers of men seeking relief work. Further-
more, a substantial proportion of the unemployed had rejected 
the offer of government work far from the city.127 The 
council was obliged to spend an additional thousand pounds 
on relief work over the Christmas period of 1929-30.. An 
attempt to get the government to meet most of the cost of 
local special work through the hospital board failed, and 
in February a further thousand pounds was allocated to provide 
work for the minority of unemployed men who were married and 
supporting mo~e than three children. 128 
Yet A.E. Armstrong, the maverick Independent Labour 
councillor, continued to attack the Labour council's 
contribution in this area. He echoed the Citizens' Associ-
ation criticism of the existing relief work as "unreproductive 
and temporary" and put forward a solution that was to become 
his hallmark in future years. 129 He moved that the council 
should reduce the weekly hours of work of its staff from 
forty-four to forty without reducing their pay. Sullivan 
seconded the motion pro forma, but claimed that the proposal 
would cost the council £8,000 for the employment of only 
thirty-five or forty extra men. The money would have to come 
from the rates or the MED, and the council was in no position 
to increase the rates again. Archer supported the motion. 
He maintained that the forty-hour week was coming anyway, 
and that if its immediate introduction would cost only £8,000 
it should be tried. Nevertheless Armstrong's proposal was 
defeated. 
127. Sun, 31 October, 18 November, 1929. 
128. Press, 5 February, 1930. 
129. Press, 18 February, 1930. 
23. Rev. John Kendrick Archer, Mayor of Christchurch, 1925-31. 
A prohibitionist, and proponent of legislation against 
gambling and for enforced Sabbath observance. A strong 
advocate of greater assistance to the unemployed, and a 
firm socialist who came to offend political conservatives 
and social liberals, not least by the force with which 
he voiced his opinions. 
{Official Christchurch City Council photograph, 1933.} 
24. Arthur Ernest Armstrong, Christchurch City Councillor, 
1929-35; MP for Napier, 1943-51. A young maverick who 
made enormous difficulties for Sullivan and the council 
"coalition". He advocated reduced hours for city council 
workers and cuts in higher salaries in order to provide more 
jobs for the unemployed. 
{Official Christchurch City Council photograph, 1933.} 
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On the other hand, Labour was still suffering from the 
political repercussions of the year's increase in rates, and 
when Councillor Sharpe died in March the party faced an 
awkward by-election. Despite the candidature of H.T. 
Armstrong M.P. and a vigorous campaign, the seat was lost to 
th C 't' , 't' 130 b e J. l.zens Assocl.a l..on. Now La our could no longer 
count on a Council majority even with Thacker's support. 
Sullivan announced that the party was relinquishing all its 
h ' h' d ld b " ' 't 't' II 131 c al.rmans l.PS an wou e gOl.ng l.n 0 OppOSl. l.on • 
The citizens' Association administration which controlled 
the council between the beginning of April, 1930, and the end 
of April, 1931, followed similar policies to those of its 
Labour predecessor. No move was made to consider another 
unemployment loan or to institute any large new public works, 
and no further inroads were made into the MED's record annual 
profit of £42,000.132 Net expenditure on unemployment relief 
was cut by almost half on the previous year, although this 
was off-set by an increase in public donations to the CUC 
and, more importantly, greater government assistance. 
Emergency charitable collections during 1929 had been largely 
directed towards helping the victims of the Murchison Earth-
quake; in 1930 local unemployment was again the central 
133 
concern. At the same time, the government moved to a full 
130. Press, 2 April, 1930. 
131. Press, 5 April, 1930. 
132. Press, 24 June, 1930. Now "in opposition" Elizabeth McCombs suggested 
floating a small public loan of £8,500 for unemployment relief. Even 
that was rejected. Times, 16, 24 June, 1930. Mrs McCombs suggested 
that a quarter of the MED's surplus could be devoted to reduced charges 
for users of heaters and cookers. Press, 25 June, 1930. 
133. Over two thousand pounds were donated from private services for city 
council relief work. Christchurch city Council, Balance Sheet and 
Statements, 1931. 
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E-for-E subsidy on local body relief works during the year,134 
and the newly established Unemployment Board improved on this 
by paying the full labour cost of such works. 135 This 
normally amounted to over two-thirds of the total expense. 
The council made some use of the board's first three schemes, 
which came into operation shortly before Christmas in 1930. 
Consequently, about nine hundred men received two weeks' pay 
to tide them over a holiday season which was anxious rather 
than festive. 136 The council leadership also joined in the 
initial enthusiasm for the No. 5 Scheme. Following a meeting 
of representatives from all the local bodies in and around 
Christchurch, the council took on a thousand relief workers.137 
This was only a few hundred short of the maximum it was to 
employ at any time during the depression. 138 Its contribution 
in early 1931 was again proportionately far less than that 
of the Heathcote County Council, which pledged itself to take 
on 350 men but which was employing over 550 relief workers by 
the end of February.139 Nevertheless, the City council's 
effort went a long way towards absorbing Christchurch's three 
thousand registered unemployed. 140 Furthermore, the Citizens' 
134. In June the government agreed to subsidise private donations for 
relief work materials and labour on a E-for-E basis and to provide 
28/- per E spent by local bodies on relief labour. Times, 12 June, 
1930. In November the Unemployment Board made the basis of local 
body subsidy £2 per E. Press, 29 November, 1930. 
135. Press, 16 December, 1930. 
136. ~, 6 January, 1931. 
137. Times, 27, 30 January, 1931. 
138. The maximum appears to have been between 1,300 and 1,350, in the 
depths of the winter of 1931. Christchurch City Council, Minutes, 
27 July, 10 August, 1931. 
139. Press, 25 February, 1931. At one stage in January, the Heathcote 
County Council had been employing 106 relief workers to the city's 
six. Times, 8, 10 January, 1931. 
140. CSO, Prices, Wages, etc, 1931, p.23. 
Association councillors who controlled the council played 
an active role, alongside Archer, in bringing together 
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Christchurch's local body leaders to ensure that the area's 
~ 
unemployed received the benefit of the Unemployment Board's 
141 
new scheme. They pressed their often very reluctant 
counterparts on other local authorities to commit themselves 
to rel1.'ef works.142 E '11 . t' th' d'ff' 1 spec1.a y prom1.nen 1.n 1.S 1. 1.CU t 
task were Councillor (later Sir) Ernest Herbert Andrews, who 
had been Chairman of the CUC for several years and who was 
now Chairman of the council's Finance Committee and effectively 
leader of the council, and John Walton Beanland, Chairman of 
the Works Committee and also active on the CUC. 
Sullivan had criticised the extent of the new council 
leadership's aid to the unemployed during 1930, comparing it 
unfavourably with that in other centres. 143 However, there 
was no concerted move by Labour councillors to advocate 
specific increases. On the contrary, the emphasis tended to 
remain on the protection of the MED reserves and the ratepayer. 
Sullivan proudly called attention to the fact that he had 
achieved another budget surplus during the 1929-30 financial 
141. A second conference was held at the end of April when the No. 5 
Scheme was reconstituted. Then the city Council agreed to provide 
922 - around a third - of the 2,728 relief work places pledged by 
local bodies in and around the city. Press, 28 April, 1931. 
142. Wealthy Riccarton Borough appears to have been particularly resis-
tant. However, it was persuaded to place 23 men in work late in 
April - thus shouldering rather less than one per cent of the local 
burden. Ibid. Over a hundred of its residents had to find work with 
the city Council. Press, 1 September, 1931. Unrepentant borough 
councillors suggested the unemployed find work in the country. 
Press, 7 September, 1931. 
143. Press, 28 October, 1930. 
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144 year. This time the profit amounted to over seventeen 
thousand pounds, roughly equivalent to the council's net 
expenditure on unemployment relief. But instead of suggest-
ing that the funds thus accumulated should be directed 
towards further spending on that rapidly growing problem, 
he implied that it had been earmarked for a reduction in 
rates. He regretted that with the change in council leader-
ship, "ratepayers were not going to receive the full benefit 
of the savings". 
Labour had lost another seat on the council following 
the death of Fred Cooke in July, 1930,145 but it had also 
discovered an issue: of principle that was to help carry it 
through the next election. In May Councillor Armstrong had 
come forward with another proposal to cut council working 
~ 
hours. 146 This time he won the Citizens' councillors support 
for a discussion with the council's permanent employees on a 
forty-hour, five-day week, entailing the loss of four hour's 
pay for those on wages and a five per cent reduction in 
salary for those earning over £250 per annum. This plan was 
144. Times, 22 July, 1930. Sullivan made a point of approaching the 
newspaper to explain that he was responsible for the surplus, 
"brought about in consequence of savings in expenditure effected 
last year". One of the savings he outlined entailed delaying the 
start of relief works. 
Nor had Elizabeth McCombs changed her views in the face of mass 
unemployment: 
The principle of using the funds of a department like the ~mD 
was wrong ••• when they dug into the funds for this, that and the 
other thing, they were going to wreck that department. She had 
wanted to reduce the domestic electricity rate, but councillors, 
chief amongst them Councillor Archer, had prevented her. Times, 
11 August, 1931. 
145. Press, 24 July, 1930. A. McLachlan, a popular local stalwart of the 
united Party who almost took the Riccarton Seat from Reform in 1928, 
stood as an Independent and defeated G.T. Thurston, secretary of the 
Engineers' Union. 
146. Press, 27 May, 12 June, 1930. 
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said to enable the creation of jobs for fifty adult workers 
and three apprentices. The council was to revert to the old 
system when the employment situation improved. Labour 
maintained that this scheme involved wage-cutting on a grand 
scale, and claimed that Armstrong had been IIbought over ll by 
anti-Labour forces. With his customary gift for hyperbole, 
Archer declared that such proposals IImust be treated as 
harshly and relentlessly as a threatening scourge of small-
pox ll • 147 The council employees understandably rejected the 
h t f h d d f ' 1 tt k d ;t 148 sc erne ou 0 an an ~erce y a ac e ~ proposer. 
The Citizens' council now proceeded to impose its own 
cuts. In February, 1931, it limited payments to relief 
workers to fourteen shillings a day, the same as on government 
works, rather than the 15/4d. of the council labourers' 
award. 149 Later in the month council salaries of over £600 
were reduced by fifteen per cent and those over £350 by ten 
·t 150 rper cen • These cuts were to save £2,505 from administra-
tion costs in order to enable twelve extra men to be employed. 
It was also decided that all council wages would be reduced 
to award rates. The United Government had announced that it 
would be seeking a reduction of ten per cent in all award 
rates a few days before. 
Labour had a clear stand against wage cuts when the 
council's policy was put to the electoral test in May. 
Hayward was again the Citizens' Association candidate for 
147. Sun, 28 May, 1930. Later he compared the proposal to "the crime of 
murder". Times, 10 June, 1930. 
148. Sun, 20, 21 June, 1930. 
149. Press, 3 February, 1931. 
150. Press, 17 February, 1931. 
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Mayor but Archer had stepped down and been replaced by 
Sullivan. Archer's displacement had been foreshadowed for 
some months. 151 His unpopularity was now well-established 
in wealthier areas of the city, he had repeatedly clashed 
with other Labour leaders over the use of MED funds and rate 
money for unemployment relief. Similarly, his continued 
conflict with deputations from the unemployed would not have 
, d h' t d' 'h 1 152 ~mprove ~s s an ~ng w~t many manua workers. Particular 
exception had been taken to a recent quotation of his from 
Scripture on the theme that men must work if they wanted to 
t 153 ea. Paradoxically, while Sullivan was definitely more 
conservative on policies such as council relief work, he 
was well-known and very popular amongst the city's labouring 
class. 154 Moreover, the appeal of his sympathetic person-
ality was enhanced by the difficult times. 
Citizens' Association candidates pr0mised strict economy 
and rate reductions,155 while their Labour opponents rejected 
wage cuts and maintained that they could reduce rates without 
them. 156 Sullivan was duly elected with a comfortable majority 
151. Late in 1930 one newspaper stated that it "understood" that Archer 
was not standing. Times, 29 November, 1930. Later it claimed that 
"there is said to be a strong feeling in the Labour Representation 
Committee that Mr Archer has had a sufficiently long term as Mayor." 
Times, 3 January, 1931". Elizabeth McCombs was mentioned as an 
alternative Labour candidate. 
152. Press, 29 April, 1930; Times, 29 August, 3 September, 29 October, 1930. 
153. Press, 10 September, 1930. 
154. One group of labourers at Rangitata Mouth wrote, to the Secretary of 
the local Labour Representation Committee declaring that "the time 
is over-ripe for our friend 'Dan', as we familiarly call him, to have 
the opportunity of securing this honour." Copy in Christchurch City 
Council, Outward Correspondence, 23 January, 1931. 
155. Press, 27 April, 5 May, 1931. 
156. Press, 21 April, 1 May, 1931. Sullivan assured electors that there 
would be a cut in rates and suggested than ten per cent might be the 
figure. Star, 29 April, 1931. 
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of three thousand after an unusually rowdy campaign in which 
Citizens' speakers had to contend with large groups of young 
hecklers - a foretaste of the problems non-Labour pOliticians 
were to face in the General Election campaign later in the 
year. lS7 The labouring areas of the city were the key to the 
new mayor's success. Not only did he increase the Labour 
percentage of the poll in such areas~ he appears to have 
inspired a substantial rise in the turnout there. lS8 Good 
IS9 
organisation again ensured a substantial rise in enrolments. 
In 'middling' areas there was also some increase in the 
Labour percentage of the vote, but in the wealthy suburbs 
the swing against "the Reds" was maintained. 
Sullivan's success in the mayoral contest was not, how-
ever, translated into Labour control of the city council. 
The party won seven seats to their opponents seven with the 
160 balance being held by A.E. Armstrong and another indepen-
dent, Francis Thomas Evans, a respected local schoolmaster. 
Amongst the Labour councillors elected were both James and 
Elizabeth McCombs, and the Rev. Archer. 
Following the acrimony of the preceeding four years, 
the period between the middle of 1931 and the beginning of 
1935 witnessed an extraordinary degree of agreement and 
co-operation between the two parties on the council. "The 
Coalition", as Dr. Thacker was later to term it,161 rested 
157. Press, 7 May, 1931; Times, 6 May, 1931. 
158. See Appendix 
159. Press, 21 March, 1931. 
160. Armstrong did not moderate his attacks on the local Labour leadership, 
declaring to a large election meeting in Sydenham that "they are 
ready to cry and shed tears with the unemployed when deputations 
wait on them, but when they are asked to do something decent- they are 
found wanting". Times, 29 April, 1931. 
161. Press, 23 May, 1933. Also statement by Beanland, Sun, 17 April, 1934. 
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on a number of principles; a sharing of administrative 
responsibilities, a shelving of the issue of wage cuts, a 
strong endeavour to reduce the rates, and a determination to 
keep the peace in the city. This unofficial arrangement 
appears to have developed progressively as leaders on both 
sides recognised the magnitude of the crisis facing the city 
and their overwhelming community of interest. It relied to 
a great extent on Sullivan himself; no-one else in the city 
possessed his combination of mana amongst working people, 
ability to co-operate with non-Labour sections of society, 
contacts with politicians and civil servants in Wellington, 
genuine sympathy for the distressed, and capacity to cope 
with an enormous and depressing workload. Perhaps the 
greatest evidence of the importance of his role, and tribute 
to his leadership, occurred in 1933 when the Citizens' 
Association apparently found itself without a credible 
Mayoral candidate - Andrews and Beanland, the foremost of 
the Citizens' Councillors, declined to stand against 
Sullivan - and only a somewhat eccentric Independent, 
1 t h 1 W lk d h ' 162 Th Lance 0 C ar es a er, oppose 1m. e reappearance 
of the conservative James McCombs on the council may also 
have smoothed relations with the main opposition after the 
1931 municipal election. However, it took leadership from 
both sides to make the arrangement work, and Andrews and 
162. An editorial critical of the leading citizens' councillors recorded 
that they were "too busy". Press 8 April l 1933. At least one 
businessman was prepared to announce publicly that he had voted 
Labour for the first time, although only in the Mayoral contest. 
Press, 12 May, 1933. However, Walker's rather grandiose schemes 
- normally anathema to Christchurch businessmen - were not suffic-
ient disincentive to the non-labour forces of the north-west, and 
several booths there gave him majorities over Sullivan. Times, 
11 May, 1933. 
25. Elizabeth Reid McCombs, Chairman of the Christchurch 
City Council Electricity Committee, 1927-3}, MP for 
Lyttelton, 1933-35. 
(Official Christchurch City Council photograph, 1933.) 
26. Ernest Herbert Andrews, Christchurch City Councillor 
1918-1941, Mayor, 1941-50. Chairman of the Citizens' 
Unemployment Committee and of the Tramway Board. 
A member of the city council "coalition", during the 
early 'thirties. 
(Official Christchurch City Council photograph, 1933.) 
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Beanland were instrumental in maintaining co-operation. 
Each side had to cope with hot-headed "backbenchers" at 
times. 
A determination to share power rather than to confine 
it to party members was evident from the first meeting of 
the new council. Citizens' councillors were elected to four 
chairmanships, including those of the Works and Reserves 
Committee, the bodies principally charged with unemployment 
relief. Even Armstrong was given the chair of a minor 
'tt 163 comm~ ee. However, Labour was to control the 'commanding 
height' of the Finance and By-laws Committee through 
J. McCombs. 
A truce on the issue of wage and salary cuts took longer 
to achieve. On the first of June, 1931, the same day as the 
Arbitration Court announced a ten per cent cut in all awards, 
the council restored the daily pay of its labourers to an 
above award rate of sixteen shillings. 164 It also decided to 
provide a total of £500 in back-pay to its workers for the 
period during which their wages had been cut. Relief workers 
employed by the council were to get 15/4d. a day, the general 
labourers' rate prior to the Arbitration Court decision, or 
14/- per day if engaged on gardening work. This restoration 
was achieved with the support of Armstrong. However, the 
latter did not consider that "trade union principles" applied 
to salaried workers - members of the white-collar class who 
were, generally not trade unionists. He ensured the passage 
of a Citizens' Association motion for the previously approved 
163.' The Public Baths Conunittee. Bean1and was made Works Conunittee 
Chairman and Anne Fraer chairman of the'Reserves Conunittee. Times, 
19 May, 1931. 
,164. Sun, 2 June, 1931. 
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cut in council salaries to be on a graduated scale from 
eight per cent on those between £350 and £400 p.a. to fifteen 
165 per cent on £1,000 p.a. or more. This move was said to 
enable the employment of twenty-six extra men. Despite some 
sympathy for the council officers affected on the part of 
some Labour councillors, they were clearly not anxious to 
add grist to Armstrong's mill by increasing salaries which 
already appeared astronomical to many working people. A 
further motion by the re?el to introduce a forty-hour week 
for council workers, thereby creating sixty-two extra per-
manent jobs "at no extra cost to the ratepayers", received 
the support of only three Citizens' councillors. During the 
next four years there was little or no support for numerous 
similar moves from Armstrong. 
Much of the high reputation of Christchurch's Labour 
city council during the depression rested on its defence of 
existing wage rates. While these seem to have been wise 
politically, its fairness was somewhat questionable. with 
the subsequent fall in the cost of living and the widespread 
use of short-time working, it turned council wage-earners 
into a privileged group, even more so than the employees of 
other local bodies. As in Labour-controlled councils in 
t I , 166 th' d 'lIt t'll 1 Aus ra 1a, 1S rna e counC1 emp oymen s 1 more eager y 
sought after and led to charges of corru9tion. Even Archer 
165. Times, 16 June, 1931. Armstrong claimed that "the ethics of Labour 
were to spread work over as many people as possible." This was hotly 
disputed by James McCombs. Despite the antipathy of Labour council-
lors and council officials, this cut remained in force at least until 
1935. Christchurch City Council, Outward Correspondence, 24 January, 
1935. However, it was limited to a maximum of ten per cent in 
August, 1931 (Ibid, 8 February, 1933) and averaged 7.5% (Ibid, 28 
June, 1932). 
166. W. Lowenstein, Weevils in the Flour, Melbourne, 1978, p.3ll. 
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expressed concern at the amount of "wire-pulling" that he 
believed to be taking place. 167 Furthermore, the council 
employees do not seem to have been enthusiastic about sharing 
their good fortune with their less fortunate fellow-labourers. 
They mocked a proposal from Sullivan that they should each 
168 contribute a shilling a week to the work of the relief depots. 
They agreed to a voluntary collection of threepence a week 
instead. Yet even a shilling represented only about an eighth 
of the boon granted to them by the Mayor and his colleagues 
at the expense of the ratepayer. Perhaps many of the workers 
felt that their contributions to Labour Party funds were a 
sufficient burden. 169 These payments were possibly regarded 
as more in the way of insuranc~ premiums on a higher wage-
rate than charitable donations. 
Some pride was also taken in the payment of award rates 
to relief workers by subsidising the Unemployment Board's 
labour allowance of 9/- per day for single men and 12/- per 
day for those married. However, the amount paid out in sub-
sidy was not as substantial as its conservative opponents 
feared because the council rapidly shed virtually all its 
. d l' f k 170 unmarr1e re 1e wor ers. Although this saved money while 
maintaining a principle, it was rather hard on those single 
unemployed men, not all of them young, who were consequently 
. 167. Sun, 19 october, 1934. 
168. Sun, 10 June, 1933. 
169. city Council employees collectively provided £1,677 or 31% to the 
LRC's funds between 1931 and 1934. North Canterbury Labour Repre-
sentation Committee, op.cit. Some may have provided more as 
individuals. 
170. This policy was outlined in a telegram to the Mayor of Dunedin. 
Christchurch City Council, Outward Correspondence, 25 September, 
1931. Also Sun, 11, 12 August, 1931. Times, 19 August, 1931. 
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forced to go into camps in the country if they could not find 
work with other local bodies. Moreover, the gap between the 
Unemployment Board's daily allowance and the amount paid by 
the city council further narrowed as roading work was increas-
ingly replaced by work under the gardeners' award.17l The rate 
under that award was 14/- per day. Most significantly, the 
wages subsidy was not paid on projects undertaken jointly 
with other local authorities, such as the McCormack's Bay 
Causeway, the largest relief" scheme undertaken by the city 
council between 1932 and 1935. The council paid ninety per 
cent of the non-labour cost but provided no subsidy because 
the Heathcote County Council and the Sumner and Lyttelton 
Borough Councils made minor contributions to the cost.1 72 
The same principle was applied to the construction of the 
Estuary Road, where the city was paid for its materials and 
supervision by a local landowner. 173 
As with the maintenance of the city council workers' 
rate of pay, the fairness of the wage subsidy is debatable. 
The Christchurch City Council consistently employed a lower 
proportion of the relief workers in its urban area than that 
174 
employed by the city councils in the other main centres 
and sent large amounts of its No. 5 allocation back to the 
171. ~, 28 July, 1931. 
172. To 31 March, 1935, the City Council provided £3,497 to the other 
authorities £345 and the Unemployment Board's £39,946. Sun, 
12 April, 1935. 
173. Christchurch City council, Minutes, 16 November, 1931. 
174. Sun, 18 February, 1932. 
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Board. 175 If the wage subsidy had been directed towards 
creating more work, substantially more relief workers might 
have been able to find jobs with the city council. This was 
because the local body contribution towards the cost of 
relief work was ordinarily less than a third of the total 
expense. Those workers who might have been employed within 
the city often had to travel long distances to their unsub-
sidised jobs. The time and effort required to cycle to the 
Waimakariri in a nor'wester or to climb Rapaki in a cold 
southerly was a heavy price to pay for other workers to 
receive a florin extra. 
On the other hand, there is no. guarantee that the council 
would have spent the amount of the wage subsidy on creating 
relief work, given its strong emphasis on the need to reduce 
the rates. Both parties had promised such a cut during the 
election campaign. Cr. J. McCombs declared that lithe work-
ing people, in common with the larger ratepayers, were 
expecting a reduction in the rates this year. The whole 
council was pledged to a reduction in the rates, and they 
must endeavour to give effect to these pledges". 176 His 
Finance Committee cut the estimates by around twenty thousand 
175. A local member of the Unemployment Board, P.R. Climie, claimed that 
£3,133 had been sent back from the Christchurch area over three weeks 
while seven hundred men were stood-down. Times, 22 February, 1933. 
This was disputed (Times, 14 March, 1933) but a letter from the 
Christchurch Town Clerk to the Mayor of Dunedin had made clear that 
"there is not sufficient work for all the men not only because of the 
small allocations but because there is not sufficient money available 
by the Council for materials, insurance and the making up of the wages 
to 14/- a day". Christchurch City Council, Outwards correspondence, 
11 February, 1932. 
176. Times, 14 July, 1931. Labour's opponents were even more considerate 
of the ratepayer - the Chairman of the Citizens' Association claimed 
that they could have doubled the cut. Times, 29 July, 1931. 
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pounds in order to lower the, general rate by approximately 
ten per cent. 
Like other local bodies, the city council was assisted 
in making these cuts by the use of relief labour paid for by 
the Unemployment Board. Now that a very substantial proportion 
of the city's labourers were unemployed and light \vork was 
available at Bottle Lake, ,there was less problem with "ineffic-
ient" relief workers on capital-intensive projects such as 
roadworks. There was also an incentive for the unemployed to 
work hard on city council works rather than risk suspension 
and transfer to more distant jobs with other local authorities 
which did not pay a wages subsidy. 
Nevertheless, the council floated only two new loans for 
road reconstruction between 1931 and 1935. The total amount 
of loan money spent on construction work in the city over that 
period was only £160,105. 177 This was considerably less than 
the comparable expenditure by the Dunedin City Council 
(£206,635) and under half that spent by the Auckland and 
Wellington city councils ,at £346,317 and £333,572 respectively. 
The comparability of these figures is only slightly affected 
by the number of ad hoc local bodies in this city. Like 
Christchurch, Auckland and Dunedin had separate drainage 
boards, and the Christchurch Tramways Board did not raise' any 
loans for construction work during this period. The 
Christchurch City Council's level of indebtedness, already 
much lower than that of the other main cities, rose by only 
7.4% between 1927 and 1935. 178 This compared with 8.5% in 
177. CSO, Local Authorities Handbook, 1932-36, "Boroughs - Payments on 
Construction of Works Out of Loan-Money". 
178. Ibid., 1928, 1936, "Boroughs - Liabilities and Assets". 
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Auckland, 12.4% in Wellington, and 15.6% in Dunedin. After 
1933 loan conversion operations and the compulsory cut in 
interest rates more than off-set the additional charges on 
debt held overseas as a result of devaluation. However, the 
net saving was not used to service new loans, even at the low 
rates of interest prevailing by then. The council's Labour 
leadership actually seemed to take a pride in not borrowing. 
Despite some acquaintance with the wor~ of Keynes - Sullivan 
made reference to his support of a "high wages" policy during 
1931179 - there was no drive to stimulate economic activity 
in Christchurch through public works financed by borrowing, 
the use of reserve funds or revenue from rates. On the 
contrary, James McCombs was to open Labour's municipal 
campaign in 1933 by announcing another "surplus", this time 
of £13,000. 180 Economy was the watchword for the Labour 
council almost as much as for conservative local authorities 
and the government. 
The same forces that made Sullivan anxious about the 
maintenance of law and order in Christchurch provided Labour 
with its fiercest political opposition between 1931 and 1935. 
The municipal election of 1933 saw three parties attacking 
Labour from the left - Socialists, Independent Labour and 
Communists. The Socialists were essentially a clique around 
A.E. Armstrong which had captured control of the local 
Socialist Party, one of the original components of the New 
Zealand Labour Party when it was formed in 1916. 181 Their 
campaign dwelt heavily on allegations of favouritism and 
corruption in council management and they strongly supported 
179. Press, 1, 4 May, 1931. 
180. Sun, 20 April, 1933. 
181. Press, 11 April, 1933.' 
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Armstrong's attempts to cut council wages and salaries in 
order to employ more permanent workers. l82 The ILP had 
similar criticisms but was led by E.L. Hills, a man who had 
been an organiser of the unemployed during the 'twenties. l83 
The Communist participation in the election was essentially 
prop~gandist, "to expose the futility of the Labour Party 
and the betrayal of the working-class by the Labour leadersll~84 
They were especially incensed by the fact that members of the 
Engineers' Union had helped to break the previous season's 
strike in the freezing works by installing chains. l8S 
Communism had a strong (tho~gh far from majority) following 
in the local meat industry, while G.T. Thurston, the Engineers' 
secretary, was a Labour candidate. In the event, Armstrong 
was the only non-Labour· candidate of the left elected, but 
his total of first preferences was only exceeded by two of 
the Labour candidates, Archer and E. McCombs. l8G Labour's 
other left-wing opponents did not poll heavily but the 
leakage of votes may well have cost the party one or two seats 
on the council. Only six councillors were elected on its 
ticke.t, as against seven on the citizens I. Thacker joined 
Evans as a non-Labour independent. Once again Labour was in 
182. 4, 6, 8 April, 1933" At one meeting several hundred people 
were said to have given the party's spokesmen "an attentive hearing". 
1 May, 1933. 
183. He displaced the previous Communist leadership in 1927 and led depu-
tations to the Mayor and various public bodies. Press, 16, 17, 18, 
19 February,S, 18 May, 1927. 
184. Times 2 May, 1933. "The Communist Party believes in shorter hours 
and pay for everyone. They did not come before citizens with 
any vote-catching phrases". Speech by A.J. Patterson. Press, 19 
April, 1933. Free rentals and free electricity were also promised 
to the unemployed. 
185. Ibid. 
186. 11 May, 1933. 
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a position where it could carry out radical 1endi~g and 
spending policies with the support of Armstrong if that 
was what it had wanted; but'once again such policies do not 
appear to have been considered. They were politically 
unacceptable because they raised the prospect of an increase 
in rates. 
Consequently Armstrong continued to bring forward 
motions for a cut in the pay of council employees and there 
were repeated fierce clashes between him and the Labour 
leadership. 187 On a number of occasions Sullivan or Archer 
were reduced to ringing the mayoral bell for silence while 
188 Armstrong shouted on regardless. Once, when Archer was 
in the chair, two policemen were brought into the chamber to 
escort the rebellious councillor outside. 189 Early in 1935 
the public gallery had to be cleared of Armstrong supporters 
by the po1ice. 190 The scene was set for a particularly 
bitter municipal election. 
This time a resurgent Citizens' Association opposed 
Sullivan with an eminent local surgeon and member of the 
l 't 191 D H T D A 1 d e ~ e, r... c an . Unlike the two leading Citizens' 
councillors, Andrews and Bean1and, he was not associated with 
Sullivan's "coalition". The Association's campaign was well 
organised by S.G. Holland, soon to succeed his father as M.P. 
for Christchurch North. In particular there was a great drive 
187. Times, 31 January, 20, 21 February, 1933. Press, 10 October, 1933. 
Sun, 24 April, 18 July, 11 September, 1934. 
188. Sun, 19 December, 1933'(Archer), Times, 24 April, 1934 (Sullivan). 
189. Sun, 26 March, 1935. 
190. Sun, 26 February, 1935. 
", / 191. see p. for explanation of this term. 
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to register white-collar workers living at home or in rented 
accommodation and therefore qualifying to vote as residents!92 
This status-conscious class was growing rapidly and tended to 
favour anti-Labour parties. The "social" dimension of the 
association had also been extended, particularly for young 
white-collar people. 193 · Even before.1935 Holland appears 
to have. grasped clearly what was necessary to build an anti-
socialist party in the society that changing technology was 
creating. These techniques were to be carried over into a 
new National Party with outstanding success. Nevertheless, 
the central plank of the.association's platform had a familiar 
194 look; a promise to reduce rates by a further ten per cent. 
It was admitted that this would probably involve shedding 
some more responsibility for the unemployed. 
In a heavy turnout of around two-thirds of the vastly 
augmented roll,195 Acland succeeded in reducing Sullivan's 
majority to less than four hundred and the Citizens' slate 
took twelve of the sixteen seats on the council. 196 A few 
months before its most crushing national victory, the Labour 
Party went down to defeat in its great municipal stronghold. 
Labour's support appears to have been squeezed from both 
left and right as the contradictions inherent in the dual 
nature of its support were heightened by the continuation of 
192. "Due to a comprehensive canvass of city shops and offices by members 
of the Citizens' Association, occupiers have been placed on the roll 
in huhdreds ••• never before have there been··somany occupiers I forms 
deposited as was the case this year ••• ". star, 11 April, 1935. 
193. Press, 18 July, 1931. W.S. Ma,cGibbon was another comparatively young 
man who helped to revitalis.e the organisation. Press, 16 March, 1935. 
194. Sun, 30 March, ;1.935. 
195. Enrolments had increased by ten thousand, or almost twenty per cent. 
Star, 11 April, 1935. 
196. Star, 9 May, 1935. 
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the depression in Christchurch. On the other hand, the same 
trio of parties as in 1933 took thousands of votes away on 
the left. Armstrong, now standing as an Independent Labourite, 
received over eleven thousand votes, but did not acquire a 
seat on the Council. It appears to have been the end of 
preferential voting that counted against him, rather than any 
shrinkage in his support. The seven non-LabOUr left-wing 
candidates may well have .taken sufficient votes from Labour 
to deny it up to four councillors and therefore bring about 
its defeat. This would have been the effect if their twenty-
six thousand votes were spread between the Labour candidates 
in similar proportion to those actually.cast for them. such 
a calculation also relies of course, on an assumption that 
votes cast for the rebels would have been polled anyway, and 
given to the Labour ticket. The turbulence preceding the 
election may have brought out labourers who might not have 
voted otherwise. 
On the other hand, the Citizens' Association won substan-
tial additional public support. Much of this can be put down 
to Holland's effective organisation. Nevertheless, the heavy 
increase'in the vote in "middling" areas - suburbs containing 
skilled and white-collar workers rather than labourers -
suggests that the association's promise of a ten per cent cut 
in rates may have garnered many votes. 197 These areas 
contained a high proportion of owner-occupied rather than 
rented homes. The separate election in the borough of New 
Brighton reinforces this view. There a recently formed 
Citizens' Association swept a largely pro-Labour council from 
197. See Appendix D. 
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office with· promises of a similar reduction in rates. 198 
The borough had employed hundreds of relief workers for 
several years, many of them temporary inhabitants of the low-
rent borough, and the strain on the rates had been severe. 199 
It is also noticeable that some of the Citizens' candi-
dates who polled remarkably well, had been strong advocates 
of new local projects which would take advantage of the new 
200 technology. A road tunnel to Lyttelton was the one pushed 
most vigorously, but the development of a civil airport at 
Harewood, already under discussion for some years, was also 
, h' h . . t 201 h bl' ,. g~ven a· ~g pr~or~ y. T ere was even some pu ~c a~r~ng 
202 of a plan for a seaplane port on the Estuary. As with 
Labour in 1927, the mantle of technological pro.gress appea!ed 
to rest much more with one party than the other. And once 
again there was a widespread and rising interest in the 
possibilities for such progress. Unemployment might still be 
the direct concern of six thousand working men and their 
families, but those who had suffered mucn less from the 
depression had declared it ended a year or more earlier. 
The youthful amongst them were looking impatiently to the 
future. On the other hand, the Labour ticket was dominated 
by individuals closely associated with unions representing 
198. Sun, 28 March, 1935; Times, 9 May, 1935. E. Smith, the successful 
mayoral candidate, was obliged to deny at one stage that he wished 
to "kick the unemployed out of New Brighton". Times, 2 May, 1935. 
199. In 1933 and 1934 the borough found work for over three hundred men. 
The city, with over ten times the number of ratepayers, employed a 
maximum of eight or nine hundred during this time. Press, 30 April, 
1935. 
200. At least three of the successful Citizens' candidates - T. Milliken, 
G. Jamieson, and F. Sargent, were closely associated with the Auto-
mobile Association. Press, 16 March, 1935. 
201. __ '-. 30 March, 1935; Sun, 27 April, 1935. 
202. Sun, 31 May, 1935. 
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local body employees, particularly the General Labourers' 
U . 203 nJ.on. They held little appeal to the growing army of 
white-collar workers who were looking to a bright new tech-
nological era. Furthermore, their presence on the ticket 
appeared to give further substance to Armstrong's charges 
that the Labour administration was a benefit for those lucky 
enough to work for the council. 
Labour was beaten largely by the problem of looking after 
the interests of both their labouring and ratepaying constit-
uencies when both felt they had been hard-pressed by economic 
circumstances. In a city where ratepayers and their spouses 
undoubtedly formed a majority of the adult population,204 
increases in property taxation to assist a minority - many of 
them not ratepayers - risked electoral defeat. conversely 
promises to reduce the rate substantially, even at the expense 
of such a minority, could command widespread support. This 
did not apply in national policies as yet. Most working men 
paid no income tax at al1205 - hence the strong protest from 
trade unions at the imposition of the "wages tax" to finance 
203. Four of the sixteen Labour candidates were on the executive of the 
GLU; M. Howard, W. Hickey, A. Beauchamp, and J. Carey. Two others, 
J. Mathison and H. Denton were associated with the Tramway Union. 
E. Parlane was secretary of the Drivers' Union, and his wife was 
also standing. R. Macfarlane was a prominent union organiser, 
particularly amongst the unskilled and semi-skilled. Four of the 
others were employed as union officials. Only Archer, T. Butterfield 
and G. Manning had largely escaped labelling as "unionists". Times, 
1 February, 1935. The latter three were amongst the five highest 
polling Labour candidates. Press, 9 May, 1935. 
204. A total of 25,580 ratepayers were recorded for Christchurch City in 
1926-27. CSO, Local Authorities Handbook, 1928, p.213. The census 
gave an adult population for that year of 51,752. Census, 1926, 
vol. 3, p.33, 37. 
205. Only 18,434 wage or salary earners paid income tax in 1925-26 (NZYB, 
1929, p.777), less than five per cent of those placing themselves in 
that category in the 1926 Census. Census, 1926, vol. 9, p.43. Most 
paying tax would have been salary-earners. 
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the work of the Unemployment Board. 206 It could still be 
assumed that proposals to spend more money on public works 
and social welfare would be financed by the wealthy and those 
on higher salaries, a clear minority of the population. But 
the spread of incomes in New Zealand was already relatively 
207 
narrow, just as the spread of property ownership was 
comparatively wide. with the growth of the welfare state and 
other activities of central government, the potential 
constituency of non-Labour parties was to expand again. More 
and more working people, particularly the skilled and self-
employed, were to find themselves faced with an annual bill 
for income tax very like that for their rates. The political 
genius of Sidney Holland was not the only hint of future 
trouble for Labour in the defeat of 1935. 
In September of the following year the new council cut 
the number of relief workers it employed from over 350 to 250, 
one hundred of them to be working full-time. 208 Although the 
total of registered unemployed in Christchurch had just 
209 
reached its depression peak, there was comparatively little 
protest at this move. It was, after all, only the continu-
ation ofa national policy which had developed since the 
introduction of sustenance pay in.1933. Most local bodies 
had responded well initially to the No. 5 Scheme, under which 
central government provided the total labour cost of their 
relief works for the first time. However, as mass unemployment 
206. Christchurch Tramway Employees' Union, Minutes, 10 April, 1932; 
Sun, 13 September, 1934. 
207. H. Lydall, The Structure of Earnings, Oxford, 1968, p.235. 
208. Christchurch city Council', Outward Correspondence, 22 September, 1936. 
209. The peak was 6,745, recorded on 1 August, 1936. CSO, Monthly 
Abstract of Statistics, 22 December, 1936, p.28. 
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became prolonged and many workers came to resist the low 
wages provided by going slow, local bodies increasingly 
resented the need to find employment for a vast number of 
unemployed men. They frequently used these workers to do 
unskilled maintenance jobs which would otherwise be done by 
regular employees, often with the assistance of machinery.210 
Nevertheless, the cost and organisation required to find 
employment for so many men hindered the resumption of work 
on local government projects such as new roading, waterworks 
and sewerage. These demanded large expenditure on materials 
and machinery. They also needed qualified and careful 
supervision, and an efficient labour force. Many local bodies 
had acquired labour-saving machinery in the 'twenties which 
could be used to carry out such projects economically and 
speedily. Consequently there was a progressive splitting up 
of the relief workforce following the advent of sustenance. 
Individual local bodies and government departments came to 
agreements with the Unemployment Board to employ limited 
numbers of the fittest unemployed on fUll-time work in return 
for a much higher wages subsidy •. The remainder of the 
unemployed was gradually shifted onto sustenance pay. Thus 
local bodies were able to carry out major capital works 
economically while being released from the. cost and trouble 
of finding or making work for reluctant part-time workers. 
210. The City Engineer reported that the No. 5 Scheme men "have been on so 
long now that the council's work is becoming to a certain extent . 
dependent on them". The Reserves Department expressed a similar 
view. Christchurch City Council, Minutes,.lO August, 1936. The 
Waimairi County Council claimed that it was able to reduce its 
rates by 25% in 1931 "owing to the amount of work done by the 
unemployed". Times, 31 March, 1931. It cut down on the amount of 
machinery in use. Times, 5 May, 1931. True to form, the Riccarton 
Borough Council abandoned the No. 5 Scheme entirely in 1934 when 
told by the Unemployment Board to cease using unemployed labour to 
man machines carrying out its regular work. Press, 30 March, 1935. 
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In Christchurchls case, many of the full-time relief 
workers were placed on the construction of Harewood Airport, 
a job undertaken with extensive use of earthmoving machinery.2ll 
It had been planned originally to p+ovide work for three 
hundred men for three years, apparently under No. 5 Scheme 
d 't' 212 con J. J.ons. It was the Labour government which came to 
the new arrangement with the Citizensl council to employ fewer 
men and more machinery. 
The Christchurch City Councills adoption of full-time 
relief work was decidedly belated - the Auckland council had 
lef~ the No.5 Scheme completely almost two years earlier. 2l3 
In October, 1934, it had selected five hundred relief workers 
for full-time employment at standard rates of pay, and allowed 
the rest to go onto sustenance. Half the retained workers 
were placed on a large new drainage project involving the 
expenditure of £116,000 in loan-money. During the winter of 
1935 the newly elected Labour city council in Dunedin trans-
214 ferred eight hundred men onto standard wages. To finance 
this it utilised £32,000 in trading department renewal funds, 
drawn principally from electricity sales. Such a spendthrift 
attitude was beyond its Christchurch counterpart; early in 
1935 that Labour council was holding out the heady prospect 
of a debt-free .city by 1955. 215 It was stated with pride and 
confidence that "it is unlikely that any fresh loan monies 
211. C.M. Brown and Co. won the private tender for much of the airport 
work and made extensive use of caterpillar earthmoving machinery 
supplied by Gough, Gough and Hamer. Christchurch City Council, 
Outward Correspondence, 8, 22 December, 1936. 
212. Star-Sun, 22 September, 1936. 
213. Times, 13 October, 1934. 
214. McDonald, 
-=---
I p.351. 
215. Sun, 25 March, 1935. 
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will be required for a considerable time". There was no 
suggestion of launching into a new phase of the 1928 roading 
plan even though the city's. mileage of first-grade roading 
continued to lag behind that of Auckland or wellington. 2l6 
During its last year in power the Labour Christchurch City 
Council spent a total of £15,563 out of existing loan-monies 
on construction. 2l7 The conservative councils in Auckland, 
Wellington and Dunedin spent £90,670, £66,115 and £56,764 
respectively. Furthermore, they all drew more funds from 
the Unemployment Board than Christchurch, almost twice as 
much in the case of wellington. 2l8 Nor had the representatives 
of the "lOrking-class frittered away the city's reserve funds 
on providing employment for the jobless or stimulating 
purchasing power. By the end of the 1934-35 year the MED's 
reserve stood at over £186,000, well up on the paltry £125,435 
of 1931. 219 The progressives' mirage of a municipal hydro-
electric power station at some time after the depression now 
seemed much closer - as close as it would ever get. 
Not that the new Citizens' council was less conservative. 
On the contrary, its ten per cent cut in rates restricted the 
scope for major spending on construction still further. 
Spending of loan-money on construction during 1935-36 increased 
by over a third. in each of the other main centres, but in 
Christchurch it was reduced by forty per cent to a mere 
£9,397. 220 MED reserves increased by almost fifty thousand 
216. CSO, Local Authorities Handbook, 1936, p.134-35. 
217. Ibid, p.122-23. 
218. Ibid, p.1l2-3. 
219. Christchurch City Council, Balance Sheet and Statements, 1931, 1935. 
220. CSO, op.cit., 1937, p.126-27. 
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pounds within the first year of the new city council. 22l 
It is difficult to be precise about the reasons for the 
extra-ordinary financial conservatism in Christchurch. 
Perhaps the city's comparative economic decline was exerting 
a powerful influence. After all, the period of Tommy Taylor's 
dominance in local government coincided with Christchurch's 
heyday as the dominion's great manufacturing centre. More 
likely, it was a measure of the outstanding success in 
Christchurch of the skilled working-class ideal of home owner-
ship. Householders on relatively low incomes, often paying 
off mortgages, feel the effect of an increase in rates more 
harshly than the rich or those who can pass on such costs to 
tenants or customers. Sympathy for the unemployed, for 
council employees or for spending to "increase purchasing 
power" tended to give way before the prospect of a real rise 
in the rate bill. 
Technological change and its effects exerted at least as 
great an influence as the depression over the operations of 
the Christchurch City Council between 1926 and 1936. Between 
1926 and 1932 the problems and opportunities created by motor 
transport and electricity supply greatly augmented the 
council's permanent staff and its spending. New demands for 
improved and more extensive roading, electricity connections, 
. town-planning, traffic control, and motor and electrical 
mach~nery all consumed increased amounts of time and money. 
From 1932 to 1936 the influence of the depression slowed growth 
in areas of new technology, particularly roading, but the MED 
continued to expand its operations and its reserves. Moreover, 
the setback to expenditure on aspects of the new technology 
221. Christchurch City Council, op.cit., 1936. 
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appears to have been more severe and prolonged in Christchurch 
than in the other main centres. In terms of the workload on 
the city council the burden of depression problems tended to 
fall mainly on the mayor himself, a small number of adminis-
trative staff who helped to supervise his charitable empire, 
and the overseers and paymasters who were involved in relief 
work. 222 
Contrary to the traditional assumption, the Labour-
dominated city council in Christchurch did not eschew retrench-
ment during the depression. This was true even of the period r 
when Labour had a clear majority. Between 1927 and 1929 
the Christchurch City Council spent £65,107 on unemployment 
relief, compared with £91,622 by Auckland City and £125,223 
by Well ';ngton C.;ty.223 E th .. f c t d ~ • ven e prov~s~on 0 un u awar 
rates of pay to pouncil employees and relief workers was not 
particularly equitable or expensive. In practice it meant 
that fewer of the city's unemployed received work within the 
city itself. The socialists of Christchurch had roughly as 
much success as their conservative counterparts elsewhere in 
keeping down the rates. In his first speech of the 1935 
municipal election campaign, Sullivan claimed that lIin 
Christchurch alone amongst the large centres we have reduced 
the rates n • 224 Figures he had produced on the same theme a 
few months earlier suggested that the gap between Christchurch's 
low rate per £1,000 capital value and that of the other main 
222. Clergymen, local Church organisations, religious social service groups 
and unemployed workers paid under the No. 5 Scheme staffed the relief 
depots as well as providing much of the material distributed. 
223. Press, 27 February, 1930. 
224. Sun, 3 April, 1935. 
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centres had actually increased (in the case of Auckland) or 
narrowed only marginally since 1927. 225 They were actually 
f 1 . . d' b . 226 more success u ~n avo~ ~ng orrow~ng. Such policies 
catered for the interests of the ratepayers in the city, 
most of them working people. Sullivan had set this policy 
at the beginning of his period in power - "the great majority 
of the ratepayers are workers and they would have to find any 
increase in rates" - therefore there could be no "loose or 
227 extravagant II spending to employ all the unemployed. 
To the extent that it permitted reductions in electricity 
charges and the accumulation of vast reserve funds, the 
restriction of council spending on the unemployed encouraged 
the greater use of electrical appliances. Decreased charges 
benefitted those who could afford electric heating connections 
and equipment, largely the better-off. The build-up of 
reserves gave them the possibility of security against 
increased state electricity charges in the future. Many of 
those who were gaining in this way were progressive profes-
sionals, white-collar workers and capitalists, the 
technologically aware Fabian fringe of the Labour Party. In 
the process of satisfying these overlapping groups the inter-
ests of the unemployed were neglected. Unstinting personal 
charitable efforts, especially by Sullivan, tended to be 
outweighed officially by concern for present and future rate-
payers and electricity consumers. The result of the 1935 
municipal elections suggests that this is what a majority 
225. Times, 24 December, 1934. 
226. See above p. 178-79. 
227. 31 May, 1927 
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of politically active people in Christchurch wanted - the 
Labour Council was just not ,conservative enough. One council 
officer later described how the mayor had had to be restrained 
f "h" k ttl' t f 't 228 rom glv1ng 1S, Jac e a'\'my 0 app 1can s or aSS1S ance. 
An extra farthing on the rates would have done much more to 
help the unemployed than Dan Sullivan's entire wardrobe. But 
that was not possible i though personally generous to a faul't 
he was still a democratic politician. 
228. Told to R. Greenaway by J. Eames, retired Assistant Town Clerk, 
in 1976, and passed on to author. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
DISORDER 
The outbreaks of public violence in the main centres of 
New Zealand during 1932 have tended to become a symbol of the 
importance of the depression in the nation's history. They 
have sometimes been regarded as so foreign to such a settled 
country as to presage a civil war between capital and labour. l 
Judging by the traditional account of Christchurch's 
experience of the depression, the city does not present a 
fair test of this proposition. By far the most frequent 
reference to Christchurch in general histories concerns its 
alleged lack of violence in comparison to the other main 
centres. 2 This local peacefulness is usually put down to the 
wise and careful leadership of a Labour-dominated city council 
and generous public support for relief depots. Mayor Sullivan 
himself cultivated this image of his beloved city assiduously, 
both locally and in Wellington. An interview given shortly 
after the announcement of his retirement from the mayoralty 
furnishes a typical example; 
But that our city has come through without the 
disastrous outbursts by a greatly suffering 
people, such as those experienced in Auckland, 
Wellington and in a much minor [sic] degree, 
1. W. Sutch, The Quest for security in New Zealand, 1840-1966, wellington, 
p.130; G. Brown, The International Economic position of New Zealand, 
Chicago, 1946, p.76; K. Sinclair, Walter Nash, Auckland, 1976, p.100. 
2. p.136; B. Roth and J. Hammond, Toil and Trouble, wellington, 1981, 
p.126; W. Scatter, A History of Canterbury, Vol.3: 1876-1950, 
Christchurch, 1965, p.380. 
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Dunedin, is overWhelming ly due to the unparalleled 
generosity of our Christchurch people in subscrib-
ing money to assist those in distress and especially 
those who sacrificed themselves in the work of 
assisting me to raise and distribute the funds. 3 
However, this image is open to considerable question. 
In particular, there was significant unrest leading to 
violence and the destruction of property in Christchurch at 
various times between 1929 and 1935, notably during the angry 
autumn of 1932. As in the other main cities, groups of the 
unemployed fought with police. One man died as a result of 
injuries sustained in such a fracas, another in an alter-
cation over a relief work strike. "Specials" were enrolled 
in Christchurch and were put into action against rioters. 
The fact that these events were given the focus of a strike 
by tramway workers has tended to mask their essential 
similarities to the disorders elsewhere. There also appears 
to have be.en at least as much violent unrest in Christchurch 
as in the other main centres during the years 1930-31 and 
1932-35. 
Furthermore, Labour's control of the government of the 
city during most of this period actually posed some special 
difficulties for the maintenance of order. This was espec-
ially so after the party had promoted mass demonstrations of 
its own throughout the country during 1932. Although devoted 
to keeping the peace and preserving property, the local 
Labour leadership could not align themselves publicly with 
the government and simply ban all open-air meetings and 
marches. Such action would have offended Labour principles 
and might have alienated many working people. It raised the 
3.' Press, February, 1936. 
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possibility of further defections like that of the rebellious 
In~ependent Labour Councillor A. E. Armstrong, .and a serious 
drop in electoral support. Yet the party wished to keep 
control of public agitations, both to forestall possible 
violence and to limit opportunities for theConununist Party 
and other radical groups to win support away from Labour. 
The methods used by the Labour leadership to confound its 
opponents were often devious and extended far beyond the 
provisioning of relief depots. 
Nor were those depots always an asset in maintaining the 
peace. They were actually well-organised and were particularly 
valuable in supplementing the hospital board's assistance 
especially to the destitute who were elderly or ill. However, 
on a number of occasions, most notably during 1935, they were 
actually the focus of violent agitation. 
The danger was not one of revolution but of an outbreak 
of rioting directed primarily against property, as in the 
other main centres. Problems arose in those cities where 
large gatherings of mainly unskilled working class people 
were frustrated in some way and were then able to escape the 
control of the police because of weight of numbers or because 
the constabulary were preoccupied. 4 In Dunedin trouble 
developed following the closure of a relief depot; in Auckland 
and Wellington when large demonstrations were kept waiting -
and in the former case were provoked by .a police over-reaction 
- and an unruly element found there were no policemen between 
themselves and the shops of the city. The Communist Party, 
4. R. Noonan, The Riots of 1932: A Study of Social unrest in Auckland, 
Wellington, and Dunedin, unpublished M.A. thesis, University of 
Auckland, 1969, passim. 
440 
like the Labour Party, condemned such outbreaks of what it 
termed Ihooliganism". 5 However, both parties, greatly 
increased the chances of these incidents occurring by their 
efforts to mobilise large crowds of workers and the unemployed. 
Nor were the fiery speeches of some party leaders calculated 
to promote public calm. 
There had been some political agitation amo~gst the 
unemployed in Christchurch from at least as early as 1926. 
Much of it was led by members of the local Communist Party, 
of whom the most prominent were H. Dunkley and S.F. Fournier. 
The latter was a particularly well-known figure, a stone-
mason of French extraction with a penchant for colourful 
bombast. 6 Members of the Communist Party had been active 
in the trade union movement during the mid-'twenties, apd 
some, including Fournier, had worked alongside the leaders 
of the Labour Party during the strikes of 1913 and the wartime 
anti-conscription campaign. At least one large local union, 
the Canterbury General Labourers I, had withdrawn its support 
from the Labour Party in protest against the total exclusion 
of communists from party membership in 1925. 7 But Labour 
supporters were generally successful in reducing communist 
influence during the late I twenties. In 1929, Fred Cooke, 
a Labour c~ty councillor and trade union secretary in 
5. Letter from Organising Secretary of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of New Zealand to the Christchurch Local Party Committee, 
25 May, 1935, Jack Locke Papers, Item 16, Part 2. 
CJ"-'h' 
6. "Sidney Huguenot Fournier d'Albe", in New Zealand Monthly Review, Vol.l, 
December, 1960 - January, 1961, p. 21. Herbext Dunkley was also a skilled 
man and an immigrant - a fitter who had worked for some time for the 
New Zealand Railways Department before being dismissed. Times, 
2 March, 1928. 
7. Press, 18 June, 1926. There was also support from the Trades and 
Labour Council, the Christchurch East Labour Party Branch and the 
Christchurch Printing Trades Union. Times, 26 February, 1926. 
Christchurch described the. local conununistsas 
Just a bit of loose fluff on the surface of the 
ocean ..• a few years ago there were a few of them more 
or less prominent in the trade unions, but their 
activities at the present time are nil. They 
have been gradually weeded out and ••. are not 
receiving any support, unless from a section of 
the unemployed. 8 ' 
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The conununists had even had difficulty in establishing 
their leadership amongst the unemployed. The latter were 
generally desperate for work and looked to businessmen and 
th 't '1 t 'd 't 9 e c~ y counc~ 0 prov~ e ~ • Consequently they were quite 
ready to reject Fournier and Dunkley when first Owen and then 
Mayor Archer refused to co-operate with them. 10 Archer and 
the non-conununist leaders of the unemployed forestalled a 
conununist move to hold demonstrations during the visit of. 
the Duke of York to the city in 1927. 11 
There were only minor threats to public order between 
1926 and 1930. Dunkley and Fournier were involved in con-
frontations at the hospital board and at the relief depot set 
8. Star, 10 April, 1929. 
9. In 1922 and from the beginning of 1926 much relief work at award 
rates was organised by R.B. Owen, a Christchurch retailer. He was 
the main force behind the Citizens' Unemployment Committee (CUC) 
which raised funds for this purpose. One of his main interests was 
in "beautifying" the city, especially along the Avon, and most of the 
CUC's money was spent on such work. Owen gained the nickname "River 
Bank" as a consequence. 
10. Owen took strong exception to some communist talk at a meeting with 
the unemployed. Press, 18 June, 1926. The city's leading trade union 
secretaries were also disturbed - not least by requests for a dole 
rather than work. They formed a Trades Hall Unemployment Committee 
(THUC) almost exclusively of union officials to act as "the mouthpiece 
of the unemployed". A few days later Owen objected to Fournier's being 
in charge of distributing goods to the unemployed at Trades Hall -
"dishing out bread and jam and other goods and making communistic 
sandwiches out of them". The THUC hastened to placate him and Archer 
summed up their decision - "the objectionable creatures will be 
removed". Press, 17, 25, 26 June, 1926. Dunkley and Fournier were 
rejected as leaders by an unemployed meeting because they were seen as 
"detrimental to securing work". Press, 15 February, 1927. 
11. Press, 21, 22 February; 8 March, 1927. 
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up under the auspices of the private Citizens' Unemployment 
Committee. 12 There were also some fisticuffs between rival 
leaders of the unemployed. 13 In 1928 a member of a deputa-
tion to Archer talked of the possibility of the unemployed 
breaking shop windows and·helping themselves "as had been 
14 done in other towns". 
The first substantial outbreak of trouble occurred 
towards the end of 1930 and it was strongly communist-
inspired. During the previous year the Communist International 
had declared western Labour parties and associated moderate 
trade union movements to be "social fascist ll • 15 They were 
alleged to be diverting the working class from its revolu-
tionary role and thus propping up the capitalist system. 
Hence it was seen as the duty of the communist parties 
throughout the world to attack such reformists unmercifully 
in order to expose their true nature and role. 
As the dominion's foremost Labour city, with a Labour 
mayor and Labour city council, Christchurch was a prime 
target for this campaign in New Zealand. The first subs tan-
tial public evidence of the new communist offensive came with 
a ser.ies of verbal and physical attacks on non-communist trade 
. 1 d 16 unlon ea ers. Most of the action centred on a go-slow 
12. One cause of confrontation was that Councillor A.E. Herbert, who was 
in charge of the depot, initially refused assistance to the Fourniers 
and Dunkleys on instructions from Trades Hall. Apparently the two 
agitators had refused offers of work. Press, 4 April, 1927. See 
also Press, 19 March,S July, 1927; Times,S October, 1927. 
13. Star, 31 March, 1927. 
14. Press, 25 May, 1928. 
15. H. Seton-Watson, From Lenin to Krushchev, New York, 1960, p.107. 
16. There was an incident in July, 1929, when the police were called to 
evict Fournier from Trades Hall in accordance with the union secre-
taries' previous decision to keep him out. Press, 24 July, 1929. 
This may have been an attempt to "confront" the Labour union leader-
ship. 
443 
organised in a number of South Island freezing-works during 
the first quarter of 1930. According to the seCretary of 
the Canterbury Freezing Workers· Union, H.C. Revell, the 
action was "unofficial" and was being directed by communists 
who were organised into a,Propaganda Committee to gain 
support for their ticket in the forthcoming elections to the 
N Z 1 d ' kid . 17 ew ea an Freez~ng Wor ers Fe erat~.on. He claime.d that 
the campaign was greatly assisted by an influx of Australian 
seasonal workers. However, local works withdrew from the 
dispute following an ultimatum from the freezing companies 
and strong opposition from union leaders. At Islington the 
majority against continued action was 320 to 20. 18 The 
Canterbury nominee on the militant ticket was subsequently 
defeated by 105 votes to 1125. 19 But before the dispute 
ended, both Revell and C.E. Baldwin, secretary of the New 
Zealand Workers' Union, had been assaulted. 20 
About the same time a rather grandiosely named Organised 
Unemployed and Relief Workers' Committee was formed in 
Christchurch, containing a number of communists. 21 It directed 
increasing criticism at Labour trade union leaders, set up its 
own relief depot and collected public donations in competition 
with the official Citizens' Unemployment Committee. At the 
beginning of September they directed a strong campaign 
against the hospital board's policy of demanding work in 
f t ' 22 return or ra ~ons. B. O'Donnell, a leader of the OURWC 
who had recently arrived from Dunedin, claimed that the 
17. Press, 26 August, 1929; Sun, 17 April, 1930. 
18. Sun, 17 April, 1930. 
19. Star, 2 May, 1930. 
20. ~, 16, 19 April, 1930; Sun, 17 April, 1930'. 
2l. Times, 4 April, 9, 10,.13 May; Press, 27 May, ;3 ;:rune., 1930. 
22. Times, 10, 12 September, 1930; Press, 11 September, 1930. 
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unemployed in that city had gained large. quantities of goods 
from the otago Hospital Board by approaching it "en masse ll • 
That afternoon fifty of the unemployed marched three-deep 
from the Government Labour Bureau to the hospital. Following 
threats to help themselves, they were ejected forcibly by the 
police. 
The possibility of violent action increased again a fe'l.'1 
weeks later with the arrival of a young conununist from 
23 Wellington named A.F. Marshall. By the middle of November 
he was secretary of the local branch of the Conununist Party 
and of a newly formed Unemployed Workers' Union, established 
to displace the OURWC which had become side-tracked into the 
24 irrelevancies of providing food and work for the unemployed. 
Marshall aimed his attacks directly at the Labour Party, 
describing it as a "third capitalist party ".25 Ironically, 
it was Archer, the great supporter of more council spending 
on the unemployed, who bore the brunt of these attacks. The 
Mayor was an irascible i.ndividual, unprepared to suffer such 
insolence, and he repeatedly called in the police to remove 
the irritant. 26 ' . ' 
23. The first report of his presence resulted from a speech he gave in 
Victoria Square - the Christchurch's Hyde Park. Press, 4 October, 
1930. A letter from the city council addressed him as secretary of 
the Canterbury District Committee of the Communist Party of New 
Zealand on 15 October. At his trial in December he described him-
self as secretary of the local UWM as well. Times, 13 December, 1930. 
24. They had formed a company entitled the Unemployed Relief Association 
Ltd. which intended to operate a fishing launch, a depot and a cafe. 
Its Managing Director, Herbert Barnsley, was an accountant but had 
recently faced a charge of theft from Dannevirke. Press, 22 May, 
31 October, 1930. 
25. Press, 29 October, 1930. 
26. Times, 29 October, 2, 3 December, 1930. 
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By December Marshall was holding meetings in Cathedral 
Square in defiance of the by-law requiring council permis-
sion. 27 He talked of forming "Workers' Defence Corps" a 
so that "if the police attack us then, we shall be able to 
deal with them". 28 Four days later there fierce was a 
stru<;Jgle at the Muni.cipal Chambers after Archer had once again 
ordered Marshall out. 29 The·detachment of police present 
drew their batons and some were knocked down in a rush by a 
section of the crowd. It was estimated that over a hundred 
of the unemployed were present. Later the same day there 
was an attempt to prevent the eviction of a local communist. 
However, whereas the crowd called upon to help the evicted man 
was forced to travel out to the scene on foot or bicycle, the 
police were able to use motor transport. They confronted the 
late arrivals in force from within the property. 
The next day Archer announced that permission would not 
be granted for any processions because they interfered with 
traffic, but lias far as the squares are concerned, I do not 
think meetings there should be stopped altogether, provided 
30 they are not used for sedi.tious purposes". Sulli van 
claimed in his regular newspaper column that North Island 
'papers were "making the most ll of the agitation in 
Christchurch. 31 Evidently the city had become the national 
centre of unrest. 
27. Times, 4, 8 December, 1930. 
28. Press, 6 December, 1930. 
29. Times, 10 December, 1930. 
30. Times, 11 December, 1930. 
3l. Ibid. 
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The police arrested Marshall and four other members of 
the unemployed on the following day. The young Wellingtonian 
was detained during a 'meeting in which he had claimed that 
"the mayor is a scab and a fascist, and we should run him out 
of town".32 He received six months hard labour for those 
"insulting words", for organising a procession without 
Archer's permission and for inciting lawlessness by encouraging 
the attempt to prevent the eviction. Two other young members 
of the unemployed received three months hard labour, one of 
them for assaulting a police sergeant. 
Following this temporary loss of a number of their 
leaders, the local militants moderated their campaign. Never-
theless, threats of physical violence continued. For example, 
one member of a deputation to the CUC declared that "the men 
are getting restless, and if you value the peace of the city 
you will do as I ask". 33 A strike of relief workers, called 
, 34 in April, gained little response. Similarly, a campaign 
against eviction does not seem to have enjoyed any great 
35 
success. 
The most violent incident during 1931 occurred on the 
First of August. That date had been designated a day of 
32. The policeman listening to Marshall drew on his own limited political 
experience and interpreted the term as "pacifist". It was, however, 
the use of the word "scab" that led to Marshall's conviction. The 
latter's choice of language appears to betray the influence of the 
cinema - was the Rev. Archer to be offered the option of a shootout? 
Times, 12, 13 December; Press, 12, 13 December, 1930. 
33. Sun, 3 February, 1931. 
34. Star, 1, 6, IS, 22 April, 1931. 
35. During March, 1932, however, several hundred unemployed did succeed 
in persuading F. Archbold to give a tenant a month's grace when they 
paraded outside the former's furniture warehouse and factory. Press, 
30 March, 1932. The tenant had apparently earnt the goodwill of the 
unemployed by carrying relief strike pickets in his car. Star, 29 
March, 1932. An Anti-Eviction Committee had previously been formed 
but may not have been involved in this incident. Sun, 2 March, 1932. 
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demonstrations against war and fascism by communist parties 
throughout the world. A request for permission to hold a 
march was sent to the city council from the appropriate front 
organisation in Christchurch, but was rejected by the Labour-
dominated Finance and By-laws Committee. This refusal was 
later variously ascribed to the "rudeness" of the application, 
its informality, lack of a signature and the possibility of 
disruption to Saturday morning traffic. 36 However, there 
must remain a strong suspicion that the decision was at 
least partly a reaction to the anti-Labour politics of the 
marchers. Replying to a letter of protest about the events 
of the First of August from the Auckland Unemployed Workers' 
Movement (UWM), Archer quoted with indignation one of the 
proposed banners for the march a,s reading "No Trust in the 
Labour Partyll. He maintained that 
the action of the police was not, as you seem to 
suppose, an attempt 'to break up a working class 
demonstration', but was simply a clash between 
the police and the communists of the city. What 
your attitude towards communists is I do not know, 
neither do I know whether they have caused any 
trouble in the city of Auckland, but they have 
made themselves a great nuisance here, and have 
more than once brought themselves into conflict 
with the police. 37 
The major responsibility for the violence which occurred 
must lie with the tactics adopted by the police. The attempt 
to "test the by-law" by public defiance, a tactic used by 
some Labour leaders in their younger days, was widely advert-
ised. One newspaper noted an announcement of the march 
chalked on the pavement outside the Labour Bureau during the 
. k 38 prevJ.ous wee • Furthermore, it was held on a Saturday, the 
36. star, 3 April, 1931. 
37. Archer to R.L. Lucas, secretary, Auckland UWM, Christchurch city 
Council, Outward Correspondence, 27 August, 1931. 
38. . 3 April, 1931. Also Sun, 25 July, 1931; Times, 4 August, 1931. 
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busiest shopping day of the week. Consequently there were 
some hundreds, perhaps thousands, of by-standers when the 
small band of marchers collected outside the Christchurch 
railway station, their advertised starting-point. 39 Yet 
only four policemen attended, and instead of merely 
observing proceedings, they attempted to prevent the march 
by force. In an incident not dissimilar to that which 
sparked the main Auckland riot in the following year, a 
policeman knocked A.F. Marshall off the chair from which he 
was trying to address the gathering. Members of the crowd 
then set upon the small band of police and beat them up so 
badly that some were still being treated for their injuries 
eight months later. 40 The two or three dozen idealists of 
the Committee Against War and Fascism persevered with their 
protest, marching down Colombo Street followed by a large 
and inquisitive crowd. Many were arrested and the rest 
dispersed by a much larger group of police as they approached 
Cathedral Square. 
A total of only eleven men were charged as a result of 
this incident, almost all of them communists or on the 
fringe of the party. However, the police appear to have 
concentrated on such persons and even the participation in the 
procession of a number of them was doubtful. 41 None was 
charged with assault despite the fact that the policemen 
attacked could identify them on other charges. Evidently it 
39. Sun, 1 August, 1931; Times, 3 August, 1931. 
40. Star, 15 April, 1932. One bystander maintained with some justice 
that "the way in which the man was handled started the whole row. If 
the police had used tact it might not have happened. It was like 
throwing a match into a barrel of gunpowder." (Times, 5 August, 1931) 
41. Times, 21 August, 1931. 
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had been non-party members in a genuinely incensed crowd that 
had carried out the assault. 
A dramatic change in the relationship between the local 
Labour and Communist Parties appeared to develop within weeks 
, 
of these events. By the end of August H.T. Armstrong M.P. 
was speaking at a meeting of the UWM presided over by J.A. 
McCullough, a Labour stalwart, but including other speakers 
who had previously taken up the cry of· "social fascism". 42 
A fortnight later Armstrong and McCullough were again promin-
ent at a meeting of several hundred unemployed in Victoria 
Square to protest at the Unemployment Board's proposals for 
43 
single men's camps. R.M. Macfarlane, a youthful trade 
unionist, former Labour city councillor and a rising star 
in the local party, took part in the meeting as a member of 
the Socialist Party, one of the components of the New Zealand 
Labour Party. He proposed "a united effort against the 
attempt to reduce ~he standard of living to below the pre-war 
level of indentured coolie labour". This proposal was 
seconded by C.F. Riley, a local communist, and Macfarlane was 
joined by A.B. Blance, a very active member of the Communist 
Party. Blance and Macfarlane declared that socialists and 
communists were now prepared to speak from the same platforms. 
The reasons for this rapproachement are obscure. 
Certainly the Commintern had not yet changed its policy to 
one of promoting a "united Front". possibly there was a 
local arrangement. At this time Mayor Sullivan was going to 
42. 31 August, 1931. It is possible that this rapproachement was 
influenced by the decision of the local Communist Party on 18 August 
to contest three Labour seats in the coming general election. Labour 
would thus have faced the prospect of having its own vote divided at 
the very time when its opponents' was united. Sun, 20 August, 1931. 
43. Star, 14 September, 1931. 
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some lengths to help the individuals imprisoned after the 
clash of the First of August. He telegraphed the Minister 
of Prisons to allow one of them, described in the wire as 
"Riley Communist", to be visited by the secretary of the 
UWM. 44 The latter, H.E. Barnsley, was described in the 
message as "reliable despite a conviction against him", and 
does not appear to have been a member of the Communist Party. 
It is possible that he had agreed to help to persuade all 
members of the UWM to suspend their attacks on the Labour 
Party. While earning the gratitude of those in prison Sullivan 
was also able to thin the ranks of Labour's opponents. For 
example, he referred one individual to a local member of the 
Unemployment Board on the basis that he was now prepared to 
45 
accept work in the country. Another was recommended to the 
local Labour Department for work because it was "in the 
interests of the city ••• to separate him from those with whom 
he has been assOcii=lted".46 
A growing militancy within the Labour Party, particularly 
amongst the leaders of the unskilled unions which supported 
it, gave communists and labourites a lot of rhetoric in 
common. The party of revolution may well have felt in danger 
of being outflanked when a strong Labour supporter such as 
C.E. Baldwin of the New Zealand Workers' Union called for 
a bold front, even if it comes to revolution. 
It is no use revolting in small coteries. 
Get together, and if a revolution must come, 
revolt as one man at the one time, and 
throughout4~ew Zealand. A revolution must 
come soon. 
44. Christchurch City Council, Outward Correspondence, 8 July, 1931. 
45. , 12 September, 1931. 
46. Ibid., 21 October, 1931. 
47. 16 September, 1931. 
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There was talk from Reform and United M.P. 's of postponing 
the approaching election, and the two anti-Labour parties 
were clearly moving towards fusion. Despite widespread 
discontent at the recent wage-cuts, it looked as if Labour 
would be denied power once again. Worse still, the labour 
movement might well find itself confronted with a government 
containing its arch-enemy,J.G. Coates. In that case the 
whole system of industrial arbitration seemed doomed and 
further wage-cuts inevitable. Overseas it appeared that the 
Labour parties in Britain and Australia were to be deprived 
of government at a time when their support should have been 
at its height. The Forces of Capital appeared capable of 
manipulating democracy everywhere. 
The next outbreak of public violence in Christchurch 
probably involved youthful Labour supporters as much as 
young communists. On 23 Noyember an election meeting was 
held for the Prime Minister, George Forbes, at the Caledonian 
Hall. 48 The police appear to have been successful in 
restricting entry largely to government supporters, despite 
the manufacture of a number of fake tickets. Just as the 
meeting was about to begin a concerted rush was made on the 
doors by a large section of the crowd of two or three thousand 
waiting outside. Iron gates were forced open and the detach-
ment of twenty-five policemen guarding the building felt 
compelled to use their batons. After the meeting the Prime 
Minister left by a side-entrance and was obliged to climb 
over the back-fence. 49 These events led one prominent 
48. Press, Star, Sun, Times, 24 November, 1931. A few stones were 
thrown outside coates' meeting two days later. Sun, 26 November, 1931. 
49. Times, 24 November, 1931. 
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businessman to call, unsuccessfully, for the formation of a 
"bla6kshirt" organisation to protect political meetings. 50 
The fact that no UWM leaders were arrested in the days which 
followed suggests that they were not prominent in the attempt 
to storm the hall as they were now well-known to the police 
and would almost certainly have been singled out. 
The first half of 1932 was to be one of the most turbu-
lent in Christchurch's history as well as in those of the 
other main centres. Labour's defeat at the elections 
appeared to foreshadow further attacks on workers' organis-
ations and their standard of living as Coates and the Reform 
Party exerted their influence over government. At this time 
the New Zealand Labour Party executive decided to promote a 
programme of demonstrations throughout the dominion. 5l A 
major aim appears to have been to make the government fearful 
of the consequences of introducing further "anti-worker" 
legislation. 52 References to the possibility of a revolution 
began to sprinkle the speeches of some Labour politicians, 
notably those of John A Lee. Just before the Christmas of 
1931 a new organisation called the Canterbury Industrial 
Association was formed from amongst the more militant Labour 
trade unions in Christchurch. 53 Its aim appears to have been 
to promote concerted action, probably in the form of a general 
strike, in the event of further wage-cuts. In February the 
50. Star, 26 November, 1931. Thacker claimed to be the "prime mover" 
b~hind the suggestion (Sun, 26 November, 1931) but it is unlikely 
that he would have been described as a "prominent businessman". 
51. E. Dlssen, John A. Lee, Dunedin, 1977, p.56-58. 
52. Ibid., p.56, and remark by Semple to a meeting at Sydenham Park that 
he did not advocate violence "but would say that there was a breaking 
point beyond which people could not be driven". Times, 27 June, 1932. 
53. Star, 23 December, 1931. 
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North Canterbury Labour Representation Committee (NCLRC) 
organised a march along the same route as the 1 August pro-
cession of'193l, from the railway station to Cranmer Square. 
It attracted "upwards of 500" people. 54 The subsequent 
meeting had an audience of some fifteen hundred, and was 
presided over by H.T. Armstrong M.P .• Amongst the speakers 
were representatives from the Communist Party and the UWM. 
The latter was also a communist, Alex Blance. In addition 
to a number of Labour trade unionists, these revolutionaries 
shared the platform with three local Labour M.P.'s, Armstrong, 
Howard and J. McCombs. Truly the lions were lying down with 
the lamb! 
Aside from the collection of fourteen pounds for the UWM, 
the principal outcome of the meeting was the formation of a 
United Front Against Capitalism. The committee empowered to 
draw up its constitution appears to have contained three 
communists and two members of the Labour party,55 but the 
executive elected in early March appears to have been at 
least evenly balanced between the two parties with a Labour 
t d .. t 'd t 56 ra e un~on~s as pres~ en • A number of meetings and 
54. star, 19, 22 February, 1932. 
55. A. Blance, C. Saunders and T. 1'1artin were the communists alongside 
J. Mathison and R.M. Macfarlane of the Labour Party. Star, 25 
February, 1932. 
56. E. Snow was president, the vice-president was H. McCaw of the Drivers' 
Union and LRC, Saunders and Blance represented the UWM, Martin the 
Seamen's Union. C.H. Cole of the No More War Movement was almost 
certainly a communist and A.C. Elliott of the Islington Freezing 
workers' Union may have been. Macfarlane, Mathison, and McCullough 
swung the balance to Labour. 
The absence of A.F. Marshall from the events of early 1932 can be 
explained by his arrest in March in Ballarat. He had changed his 
name to "Arthur King" and described himself as a "communist organiser"~ 
He succeeded in an appeal against a vagrancy charge and maintained 
that the forces of the law were much stricter in New Zealand. Sun, 
16 JlIlarch, 1932. 
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demonstrations were organised by the front, including one 
on the 20 March at which Mayor Sullivan presided, alongside 
the usual mix of Labour and Communist speakers. 57 
During early April there was some tension between Labour 
and the communists after a strike of relief workers employed 
by the Waimakariri River Trust. The cause of the dispute 
was a decision to transfer three hundred men onto full-time 
relief work. The UWM and representatives of the men on the 
job maintained that all those employed should be paid the 
same hourly rate rather than the relief rates which varied 
according to the number of dependents they had. 58 The 
strikers had some success in keeping relief workers away from 
the job and the trust eventually agreed to employ the men on 
a nine or twelve day fortnight according to the amount of pay 
they would receive. 59 Despite this success, there were 
complaints from some Waimakariri workers that the strike 
funds had been largely absorbed by the UWM. 60 It is also 
possible that the triumph of an organisation so closely 
allied to the communists worried many Labour leaders. What-
ever the reason, Labour supporters formed a separate Relief 
Workers' Union under the leadership of R.M. Macfarlane. 61 
57. 21 March, 1932. 
58. 5 April, 1932. 
59. Sun, 26, 29, 30 March, 5, 6 April, 1932; 
~5, 11 April, 1932. 
60. Sun, 16 April, 1932. 
28, 29, 30 March, 
61. It was claimed that "a large number of relief workers" had approached 
the Waimakariri Strike Corrunittee to appoint a "relief workers' union 
••• entirely separate from the UWM". Sun, 9 April, 1932. A UWM leader 
was probably close to the mark, though unduly optimistic, when he 
claimed that "For years Trades Hall secretaries have been endeavouring. 
to divide the unemployed and more recently they have tried fruitlessly 
many times to form a relief workers' union". 16 April, 1932. 
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Nevertheless, the two organisations continued to co-operate. 
Marfarlane addressed the secretary of the UWM as "my dear 
comrade lt • 62 
Meanwhile the riots of 15 April in Auckland had raised 
the political temperature in.Christchurch as well. At the 
Central Police Station an inspector was engaged in enrolling 
volunteers prepared to act as special constables in an 
63 
emergency. Within two days a thousand had signed up, , 
many of them university students, many others young white-
collar workers, and others again returned servicemen. 64 The 
city awaited the local culmination of Labour's campaign of 
demonstrations in the form of a march and mass meeting on the 
First of May. Simultaneously a long-simmering industrial 
dispute involving prominent members of the CIA and the UFC 
was suddenly brought to the boil. 
It is tempting to regard the tramway strike of May, 
1932, simply as an outcome of the depression, one of the few 
examples of direct action by a union against officially 
sanctioned wage-cuts. Certainly the economic crisis 
exacerbated the causes of the dispute, gave it an extra air 
of desperation and supplied most of the militant manpower in 
the clashes which occurred. However, the root causes of the 
strike lay primarily with the effects of technological change 
and attempts by the tramways board to avoid them. 
62. Letter in Saunders Papers, undated but probably from early in May, 
1932. 
63. Sun, 16 April, 1932. 
64. H. Roth, liThe Christchurch Tram Strike of 1932", New Zealand Monthly 
Review, vol.14, no.147, August, 1973, p.13. 
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The Christchurch Tramways Board (CTB) had been founded 
in 1902, thanks largely to the efforts of the ubiquitous and 
dynamic Tommy Taylor. It had taken over an existing, limited 
network of horse and steam tramways, converted them to 
electricity and greatly extended their permanent-way.65 
From the outset the board faced some special problems 
related to the level topography of most of the city. The 
consequent suburban sprawl meant that the board had to build, 
maintain and service a much greater mileage of rail to the 
number of passengers carried than in other New Zealand towns. 66 
As a public body with the legislative responsibility for 
public transport within a defined geographic area, it felt 
obliged to continue to support loss-making lines which ran 
across sparsely populated districts. The route to North 
Beach was a particularly large drain on the board's finances. 67 
At the same time, the flatness of the terrain encouraged the 
use of bicycles. The traffic surveys carried out by the city 
council in the 'twenties and 'thirties indicated that the 
number of bicycles in use was growing faster than other forms 
68 
of transport. 
However, it was the rise of motor transport that shat-
tered the board's optimism during the 'twenties and reduced 
it to desperation during the 'thirties. Although the total 
number of passengers carried by the trams only reached its 
peak in 1926-27, the number of passengers as a proportion of 
the population served by the Tramways Board had been dropping 
65. G. Stewart, The End of the Penny Section, Wellington, 1957, p.199-203. 
66. Press, 21 June, 19 July, 1927. 
67. Press, 1 February, 1926. 
68. See Appendix C. 
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since 1919-20. 69 Most of this was not due to competition 
to the tram from its eventual usurper, the motor bus. Such 
competition was delayed by legislation passed in 1926 which 
placed the licensing of urban public transport in the hands 
of territorial local bodies. 70 In Christchurch's case this 
drastically reduced the challenge from private operators as 
both the Labour Party and the Citizens' Association wished 
to preserve the tramways. The sole survivor of the new 
licensing system was the quaintly named Inter-city Bus 
Company, which ran services through the eastern suburbs to 
New Brighton and North Beach. 71 Its local popularity and the 
fact that it served Dan Sullivan's electorate appear to have 
rescued it. This one private company remained to irritate 
the board and further reduce its returns on some already 
hard-pressed routes. 
It was, however, the spread of the private motor car, 
and to a lesser extent the motor taxi, that bit most deeply 
into the patronage of the trams in Christchurch. The effect 
was felt not so much in commuter services - concession 
tickets and the convenience of a service running into the 
centre of the city sustained its attraction. Rather the 
major loss occurred in the carrying of holiday-makers to the 
-. 
beaches or the races. 72 The freedom from timetables and 
fixed routes, and the comparative lack of overcrowding lent 
motor transport added appeal. The cost might be somewhat I 
69. Christchurch Tramway Board (CTB), Abstract Statement of Income and 
Expenditure with Balance Sheet, 1918-36. 
70. The Motor-omnibus Traffic Act, New Zealand Statutes, 1926, No. 67, 
p.7l4-22. The CTB secured a special empowering Act to allow it to 
buyout most local bus services, Ibid., 1927, No. 21, p.806-l0. 
71. Press, 8 November, 1927. 
72. Press, 18 September, 19 October, 1926; ~, 7 December, 1926. 
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greater, but lIafter all, we're on holiday". The loss of 
family groups and parties on such occasions was especially 
severe on the revenue of the board, particularly as it 
normally involved two return journeys (home to Cathedral 
Square to recreation and back) or an extra long return trip. 
Furthermore, families who could afford a car were increasingly 
taking their holidays well outside the urban area, beyond the 
reach of the trams. 
Besides the loss of passengers, the board faced a greater 
charge for maintenance as a result of the spread of motor 
transport. Under its empowering legislation it was obliged 
to maintain a strip of roadway on either side of the tram 
tracks. 73 This strip suffered to much the same extent as the 
rest of the road surface from the impact of heavy traffic. 
Consequently the board was forced to spend large amounts in 
repairs and on the purchase of new machinery, including a 
bituman plant. In effect, the board was being required to 
subsidise its competition. 
In order to reduce costs and meet this competition the 
board was driven to acquire its own fleet of buses. As early 
as 1926 it was using petrol buses on the St. Martins line 
and as II feeders 11 at Northcote. 74 By 1932 the board had nine 
buses and seven trolley-buses. 75 Not only did this change-
over increase the flexibility of the fleet, it reduced the 
expense of road maintenance to the board while actually 
73. Press, 31 January, 1929. 
74. CTB, Abstract ••. , 1926. The board also began to farmout services to 
private contractors with the revenue going to itself. The Templeton 
bus service was run on this basis from 1930. Non-Citizens· Associ-
ation members alleged that this was an attempt to evade the 
jurisdiction of the Arbitration Court. 4 November, 1930. 
Also Times, .18 September, 1931-
75. Ibid. t 1934. 
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increasing the wear on the roads. But these purchases cut 
further into the board1s revenue and its reserves at a time 
when it was facing massive loan repayments within a few 
years. Frank Thompson, the tramways I General Manager, dis-
played his anxiety about this prospect in a booklet published 
in 1930. He noted that lithe Day of Reckoning ••. will be on 
the 1st. of October, 19J4, when debenture holders to the extent 
of £778,750 will demand their money back".76 He hoped to have 
£546,500 in sinking fund and renewal reserves to off-set the 
charge, II provided that no further withdrawals for renewals 
are made". Even in that case, the board would have to have 
a sufficiently profitable balance sheet and outlook to 
convince investors to reinvest a quarter of a million pounds 
in the tramways. The pressure to reduce costs and restore 
profitability was therefore urgent, especially as most of 
the members of the board regarded the imposition of a rate as 
politically unacceptable. 77 
This was also the view of the local press. As the 
board1s problems had mounted during the late I twenties, it 
had received little or no sympathy from the city's newspapers. 
As early as 1926 the Sta'r was asking impatiently "when will 
78 the tramways be scrapped?". It favoured a wholesale move 
to buses but considered any suggestion of the imposition of 
a rate as "a final confession of incompetence". Even the 
comparatively favourable Press called on the board repeatedly 
76. F. Thompson, Christchurch Tramways: Official Review of Progress and 
Development, 1872-1930, Christchurch, 1930, p.42. 
77. Sun, 6 December, 1926. W.J. Walter, an Independent member from 
Waimairi County was the only individual on the board to advocate 
a rate openly until one was actually levied in 1934. 
78. Star, 9 April, 1926. 
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for greater determination in cutting unprofitable services. 
It also totally rejected any need for a rate. 79 
The tramways' management attempted to meet its growing 
financial problems through the adoption of new labour-saving 
technology and the curtailment of existing services. The 
introduction of.one-man trams, new motorised machinery for 
laying tracks, concrete and bitumen road surfaces, and Lake 
Coleridge power to replace steam generation all led to a 
decline in the number of tramway employees. The total number 
i 
of such workers dropped sharply from a peak of 731 in 1927 
to 465 in 1932. 80 The traffic staff suffered less redundancy 
than other sections, but as "the elite" amongst the employees 
and as strong and active trade unionists they found their 
helplessness particularly galling. Good industrial relations 
could not flourish in this atmosphere of retrenchment during 
a period of growing unempLoyment. The friction was compounded 
by management attempts to reduce costs in petty ways, to 
detect any peculation, and to sort out who should be next 
rendered redundant. 81 
In its pursuit of economy the board proposed a wage cut 
82 
of five per cent as early as August, 1930. Rebuffed on a 
technicality by the conciliation commissioner, the board's 
representatives pointed out that they were not bound by the 
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act under their 
empowering legislation. Frank Thompson, the General Manager, 
put this point of view particularly brutally; 
79. Press, 22 October, 7 December, 1926. 
80. eTB, Abstract ••• I 1927 I 1932·. 
81. The Traffic Manager, W. Dick, appears to have been particularly active 
in maintaining pressure on the staff. Tramway Employees' Union (TEU), 
Executive Minutes, 24 September, 1929. See also Sun, 5 May, 1932; 
14 November, 1933. 
82. Times, 26 September, 1930. 
The Christchurch Tramways Act gives the 
Tramways Board power to employ workers on 
whatever terms it thinks fit. We can go 
outside the Arbitration Act tomorrow. 
Surely you don't want the board to be forced . 
to smash your agreement •.. You don't think we· . 
would be frightened by direct action, do yoU?B3 
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Industrial relations in the tramways became da~gerously 
inflamed during the autumn of 1931 when the board attempted 
to use its legal freedom to. go beyond the ten per cent wage 
cut being made under the I.C. and A. Act. Facing a loss of 
around ten thousand pounds, it proposed only a 2~% wage cut 
but very substantial changes in conditions, including the 
abolition of double ti~e on Sundays and paid annual holidays.B4 
The union offered to accept a ten per cent wage cut if con-
ditions remained unchanged. Thereupon the board gave all its 
employees notice and advised them to reapply on 30 April 
under new rates of pay and conditions. BS The Acti~g General 
Manager, H.E. Jarman, boasted that there were many experienced 
men applying from amongst those previously retrenched - "some 
of them will do almost anything for a job".B6 Two days later 
the President of the TEU, John Mathison, addressed a packed 
public meeting at the Civic Theatre with the warning; "If 
any 'scab' in Christchurch wishes to take our jobs (cries of 
'shoot them') then Christchurch will witness the. greatest 
catastrophe, such as Christchurch has never seen before".B7 
83. 27 September, 1930. 
84. 21 April, 1931. 
85. 21 April, 1931. Four members of the board wanted the union-s 
accepted: E.M. McCombs, the sole Labour representative, Walter, 
and two Liberals who stood as Independents, A. McLachlan and W. Sykes. 
2 May, 1931. 
86. Press, 2 May, 1931. 
87. 4 May, 1931. 
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Following appeals for negotiation from local clergymen,88 
arbitration led the board to accept a ten per cent cut in 
wage rates 'in return for unchanged conditions. 89 This was 
no more than they would have achieved under the I.C. and A. 
Act. Nonetheless, they continued to reject registration 
under that a.ct. Clearly the majority of the board was looking 
to further opportunities to improve the profitability of the 
tramways by cutting into the complex network of working 
conditions which had grown up during their first two decades 
of operation. 
One aspect of these conditions that the TEU was partic-
ularly anxious to defend, and the board to alter, was the 
system of continuous eight-hour shifts to be followed by 
overtime at time and a half. This helped to give the 
"trammies" steady and comparatively high weekly earnings. 
On the other hand it hindered the management's efforts to 
cut out services at unprofitable times. Crews called in to 
cope with a few hours of heavy passenger numbers would have 
to be paid for a full eight-hour shift, thus obviating most 
of the saving to the board. When the union was offered the 
option of work rationing during the winter of 1930, 
ostensibly to prevent further redundancies, it rejected the 
proposal. 90 The TEU feared that men rostered off would be 
called back at will by the management to do work at ordinary 
rates which would normally have been carried out by other 
tramwaymen on overtime. However, a power shortage during 
the spring led to an agreement to accept rationing ~ Mathison 
88. Methodist ministers were specially mentioned. Times, 5 May, 1931. 
89. Times, 10 June, 1931. 
90. Press, 10 June, 1930. 
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himself moved that its organisation should be IIleft entirely 
in the hands of management ll • 91 But the motion was rescinded 
after six weeks and a rejection of lIany system of work 
rationing II was passed overwhelmingly.92 Apparently members 
had become thoroughly dissatisfied with the manner in which 
the tramways' management was operating the scheme. 
This rejection remained in force' throughout 1931, 
reinforced by a ba.llot in which 181 tramwaymen supported the 
status quo of redundancy where work was not available, 68 
advocated shorter hours instead, but only 58 favoured 
rationing. 93 By the end of the year the greatly depleted 
permanent-way section was prepared to accept rationing along 
with the board's coachbuilders, storemen and labourers. 94 
But the militant elite of the traffic section disassociated 
itself from these decisions. 95 
Early in the new year, however, they decided to allow 
rationing on the basis of one day per man in every three 
weeks for a trial period of two months. 96 This was in order 
to postpone fourteen threatened redundancies created when the 
new Coalition Government passed an Order in Council removing 
the requirement for the board to employ conductors on trailers 
as well as tramcars. At the end of the trial period there was 
again very great dissatisfaction amongst the members of the 
TEU with the way the rationing had been operated. Mathison 
91. TEU, Minutes,,21 September, 1930. 
92. Ibid., 4 November, 29 December, 1930. 
93. TEU, Executive Minutes, 10 February, 1931. 
94. Press, 7 May, 1932. 
95. TEU, Executive Minutes, 3 November, 1931'. 
96. TEU, Minutes, 26 January, 1932. 
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declared that the union had IIfallen in badly" with the 
management contriving to save a large amount in wages while 
calling men back on all but two of the rostered days off. 97 
It seemed clear there was no IIsurplus ll of men after all, 
that work was available for all the traffic staff under the 
normal conditions of their award. The union therefore rejected 
an offer of a continuation of the rationing system to save 
eleven jobs. Rather than await the expiry of the award in 
June, the board decided to issue dismissal notices to twelve 
of its employees, the number now considered redundant. The 
list of men chosen included Mathison. 
It was this action which precipitated the strike, being 
regarded by most tramway employees as a clear case of 
, t' . t' 98 v~c ~m~sa ].on. Moreover, by the time of his dismissal 
Mathison had become very prominent on the radical wing of 
the wider Christchurch labour movement. He had been instru-
mental in forming the CIA, along with Ernest Snow, the 
99 
secretary of the TEU, and. a number of other tramwaymen. 
He had also participated in the formation of 'the UPC and had 
b 1 d 't 'd t 100 h d' , 1 f h een e ecte ]. s pres]. en • T e ].sm~ssa 0 suc a man 
would clearly arouse suspicions and create trouble. 
No real explanation was ever. given as to how those to 
be dismissed were chosen, beyond a decidedly ambiguous claim 
101 
that their "services were of least value to the board ll • 
The service records of those selected were apparently not 
outstandingly bad, and this was never given as the basis for 
97. Ibid. , 10 April, 1932'. 
98. Ibid. , 1 May, 1932 
99. Star, 29 January, 1932 •. 
100. ~, 10 March, 1932. 
10I. Press, 3 May, 1932. 
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1 t ' 102 se ec ~on. It was not a question of "1ast on, first off", 
as some of those given notice had over twelve years service 
with the board. 103 · Mathison had been employed for seven and 
a half years, more than one of the conductors arrested during 
th t 'k h h d t b d' , d 104 e s r~ e w 0 a no een ~sm~sse. Nor were these 
premature retirements - Mathison was a young man whereas one 
of the non-strikers had only fifteen weeks service to go. lOS 
Furthermore, six of those chosen, including Mathison, were 
motormen. Such employees were a grade above conductors, and 
it was apparently the accepted practice to demote them to the 
latter position and to shed conductors in their stead. Thus 
the employer retained men with superior qualifications and 
employees were rewarded for attaining them. H.A. Y~ung, 
the chairman of the Tramways Appeal Board, stated later that 
he had expected an appeal on that basis right up tv the start 
of the strike. l06 He maintained that he could not then 
intervene because the law had been broken by the calling of 
a strike without twenty-one days notice. A "word to the 
wise" some time earlier might have been more statesmanlike, 
given the dangerous social atmosphere. The officers of the 
union were apparently under the impression that an earlier 
ruling had taken. away the tribunal's jurisdiction in cases 
, l' t h t 107 ~nvo v~ng re renc men • 
Speaking to a meeting of the union three years later, 
Thompson denied responsibility for Mathison's dismissal, and 
102. Sun, 28 April, 1932. 
103. One had seventeen years service, most had seven to twelve years. 
Press, 3 May, 1932. 
104. Sun, 4 May, 1932; Press, 7 May, 1932. 
105. Times, 6 May, 1932. 
106. Sun, 1 March, 1934. 
107. Sun, 16 March, 1934. 
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this denial was evidently accepted. lOa HDwever, the minutes 
Df the meeting Df the bDard's Traffic and WDrks CDmmittee Dn 
18 April, 1932, state that the General Manager was to. select 
thDse men to. be dismissed. 109 The Traffic Manager, W. Dick, 
made the initial selectiDn,110 prDbably in cDnjunctiDn with 
Dther Dfficers. It is pDssible that SDme bDard members 
attempted to. exert an influence Dver the decisiDn. One Df 
them, W. WilliamsDn, a lDcal building cDntractDr renDwned fDr 
his fiery temper, had been adDpting a particularly prDvDcative 
attitude tDwards the uniDn's Dfficials. He had, fDr example, 
tried to. have their special tram passes withdrawn and sDught 
to. prevent them talking to. members during wDrking time. lll 
ShDrtly befDre the strike he tried to. persuade the bDard nDt 
to. see a deputatiDn frDm the uniDn. 112 Nevertheless, ultimate 
respDnsibility lay with ThompsDn. 
A dedicated, sDmewhat persDnally isolated and irascible 
individual, he had devoted mDst of his wDrking life to' the 
management Df Christchurch's tramways. It seems likely he had 
d h h ' d' 113 C t ' 1 h CDme to. regar t em as ~s Dwn Dma~n. er a~n y e was 
prepared to intercede strDngly when he felt the board was 
108. TEU, Executive Minutes, 1 April, 1935. Also ___ " 1 December, 1933. 
109. CTB, Works and Traffic Committee Minutes, 18 April, 1932'. The list 
of "surplus men to be discharged", including Mathison, was presented 
to the board without comment. CTB, Reports, 26 April, 1932. 
110. Ibid., Report 2881, 2 June, 1932. A.T. Donnelly, the eventual 
arbitrator in the dispute, noted that the charge of victimisation 
"was most strongly pressed against the Traffic 'Manager and less 
strongly and in fewer instances against the General Manager". 
Labour Department Files, 14/2/196. Remarkably, Thompson claimed that 
he had not known who Mathison was, even though he, had met him in 
negotiations in previous years and had surely seen him in recent 
deputations to the board. Roth, op.cit., p.14. 
Ill. CTB, Works ••• , 7 December, 1931. 
112. Ibid., 2 May, 1932. 
113. It is also possible that he was unwell, CTB, Minutes, 2 April, 1931. 
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taking a wrong approach. 114 There is some evidence of a 
conflict of personalities - a feeling that an immigrant 
upstart was threatening the good running of his tramway. lIS 
His pestering. of the Labour Department to prosecute the union 
long after it had been settled, largely in the board's favour, 
suggests an element of vindictiveness. 116 Thompson had 
dealt with Mathison as president of theTEU over three years 
and clashed with him publicly on a number of occasions. Some 
of his comments suggest he believed the union officials did 
not enjoy the support of a majority of members. 117 This 
belief may well have prompted a desperate attempt to use 
unemployment and a sympathetically reactionary government to 
break union resistance to cost-cutting and thereby restore 
profitability before the board's main debts fell due. What-
ever the motive, his decision to dismiss without clear 
justification a man who was very active in militant circles 
in Christchurch was, at best, foolish, given the atmosphere 
of the time and the recent rioting in other cities. 
On thefirstbf May the TEU decided to preserittheboard 
with an ultimatum threatening a strike on the third if the 
114. When public discussion arose about how the board would dispose of 
its new non-union staff as part of a settlement, Thompson brought 
forward on his own initiative a report favouring the retention of 
as many of them as possible. Repeated references to other officers 
(limy brother officers", "myfe11owofficers") suggests that they 
may have urged him on. CTB, Reports, Report 2879, 9 May, 1932. 
115. Thompson is said to have referred to the TEU leader as "that 
Communist Mathison", Roth, op.cit., p.14. 
116. Bailey to Chief Inspector, 24 June, 1932; Chief Inspector to Bailey, 
27 June, 1932; Thompson to Chief Inspector, 30 June, 1932; Memorandum 
from Minister of Labour to Secretary of Labour, 13 July, 1932; 
Deputy-Chief Inspector Moston to Minister, 19 July, 1932, Labour 
Department Files, 14/2/196. 
117. Times, 27 September, 1930. 
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dismissed men were not reinstated. 118 The activists within 
the union appear to have over-reacted in giving such short 
notice of a stoppage, rather than providing the twenty-one 
days required by the Labour Disputes Investigation Act. 119 
There had been and continued to be, considerable public 
sympathy in non-Labour circles for the trammies' case. 120 
Even the editor of the determinedly anti-Labour Press, 
Oliver Duff, criticised the board as well as the union, an 
action which was eventually to cost him his job. 12l If the 
118. TEU, Minutes, 1 May"1932. 
119. N.H. Graham, an Inspector under the Labour Disputes Investigation 
Act, gave his opinion that the TEU had breached the law. Report, 
4 May, 1932, Labour Department Files, 14/2/196. 
120. The evening newspapers, those catering for a predominantly working-
class audience, were particularly sympathetic: "we do not condone a 
strike in any way, but we do say that the Tramway Board should be 
magnanimous enough to reopen the case at the eleventh hour and ballot 
for the twelve men to be dismissed". Star, 3 May, 1932. Later the same 
newspaper described the dispute as "a very undignified domestic dis-
agreement that should never have been allowed to threaten the tran-
quillity of the community" (5 May) and claimed that it could have been 
settled quickly "with a little more tolerance" (6 May). The Sun 
opposed the strike (2, 3 May) but criticised both sides for break-
down of talks (4 May). It noted the popularity of the "trammies", and 
while condemning the lawlessness of the 6 May, it claimed that prob-
ably most responsibility "lay not with the strikers, but with one or 
more of the semi-political organisations which flourish among the 
general unemployed" (6 May). 
121. Not that Duff favoured the strike. Initially he hoped that the men 
would not be so "foolish" as to initiate a strike "more definitely 
foredoomed to failure than almost any other strike that could be 
imagined". He warned that the union's "chief asset is the goodwill of 
the public, and' that the day it makes open war on the public this asset 
will disappear". Press, 2 May, 1932. Also similar editorial, 3 May 
1932. The next day the line was more controversial: "It is a stupid and 
quite unnecessary conflict and the longer it continues the more impat-
ient the public will become with both sides" (4 May). Then he returned 
to upbraiding the TEU, but called for the board to reopen negotiations 
(5 May). He criticised the board for giving "pledges, which mayor may, 
not have been necessary, to the volunteer workers ••• " (6 May). He also 
disliked the board's initial insis~~ce that the jobs of the new men 
should not be subject to arbitration (9 May). Duff then returned to 
calling on the community "to crush ••• those who begin or encourage 
strikes" and attacking Sullivan for not thanking the "specials" (l0, 
16, 18 May). The crucial editorial appears to have been written after 
the strike. Duff referred to a statement by the irascible W. Williamson 
in very strong terms: 
the haste which can make a man utter so stupid a charge 
as that the newspapers had blamed the Board "for being 
the whole cause of the trouble" must always reflect 
upon his fitness for public affairs. Press, 24 May, 1932. 
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sole issue was one of victimisation, as Snow and Mathison 
claimed, the board would have found difficulty in justifying 
Mathison's dismissal before a mediator. In the meantime the 
support of other unions and the Alliance of Labour could have 
been properly mobilised while the board was obliged to continue 
to honour its award, which did not expire for another month. 
As it was, the board was able to claim that the award had 
already been broken by an ill~gal strike. The government 
accepted this argument and provided the board with an Order 
in Council which permitted it to employ uncertificatedworkers 
122 
as motormen. 
It is possible that the leaders of the TEU had been 
carried away by the success of the united Front's May Day 
Demonstration. A march of at least five hundred people from 
Trades Hall to Cranmer Square had been followed by a meeting 
which drew a crowd of five to ten thousand. 123 Sullivan, 
Archer and other local Labour Party leaders delivered speeches, 
along with a representative of the Communist Party and another 
communist representing the UWM. Mathison spoke on behalf of 
the trade unions. That evening J.A. Lee continued his nation-
wide speaking tour with an address to a packed Grand Theatre. 
One of his themes was "the system must work or the system 
should go".124 Interest in the gathering was so h~gh that 
an overflow meeting of several hundred persons was held in 
122. Press, 5 May, 1932. The minister was Adam Hamilton. 
123. Eight to ten thousand was the figure reported for the meeting in 
Press, 2 May, 1932. However, another newspaper claimed that there were 
only five to six thousand. Sun, 2 May, 1932. Yet another believed 
there had been four or five thousand. Times, 2 May, 1932. All agreed 
on around five hutldr-ed for the procession. The Sun noted that it ran. 
into a rather larger march of evangelical youth. 
124. He also claimed that "society was falling to pieces". Times, 2 May, 
1932. 
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V· t . 125 ~c or~a Square. Mathison spoke on the same platform as 
Lee and more than matched the fierceness of his rhetoric; 
"within a week or two in this district - the first in New 
Zealand - we will be plunged into the first instalment of an 
industrial war".126 Against such a background an impulsive 
miscalculation could easily have been made. 
It is also possible that some leaders of the TEU were 
worried .that opposition to a strike could build up within the 
union over three weeks. With only about half the membership 
voting, the decision to strike was far from unanimous at 106 
in favour and 68 against. 127 The irrepressible rebel city 
councillor A.E. Armstrong, employed on the workshops staff, 
strongly opposed direct action. He pointed out, quite 
correctly, that the union had lost other presidents during the 
prolonged period of retrenchment since 1927. His proposal to 
put the question to a postal vote was only defeated by 84 
votes to 73. It is possible that Thompson had judged the 
attitude of the staff as a whole reasonably correctly. But 
he had reckoned without the possibility that militants of the 
Traffic Section would act separately on a ballot at a meeting 
rather than a ballot of all members of the union. 
The Order in Council permitting uncertificated motormen 
formed the basis of the management's drive to break the strike. 
Only the Traffic Section, around.two hundred and forty men, 
had been called out initially, although A.E. Armstrong, never 
one to take orders from any quarter, dis~egarded the union's 
125. ~, 2 May, 1932. 
126. Press, 2 May, 1932. 
127. TEU, Minutes, 1 May, 1932' •. 
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instructions and joined them. 128 On the second day of the 
strike, Ernest Snow, the secretary of the TEU, said that all 
branches would now strike. 129 Of the 44 staff in the carsheds, 
29 struck; the four men of the overhead department struck for 
one day and then returned; and only 17 of the 44 permanent-'vay 
employees came out. 130 Thirty-nine motormen. and conductors 
defied the call to strike and there were twenty-three 
inspectors to help replace the strikers. 13l Clearly the 
board required sUbstantial numbers of recruits from outside 
the tramways, and the depression helped to push hundreds of 
them forward. The management claimed that around a thousand 
applications were received in all, some from as far afield as 
Dunedin and Auckland. 132 Both employed and unemployed men 
were strongly attracted by the high earnings to be made on 
the trams. 133 F th th f t hm t . ur ermore, e years 0 re renc en ~n 
Christchurch and elsewhere as motor transport squeezed the 
tramways had left a significant pool of outside labour with 
128. Star, 4 May, 1932. 
129. Sun, 5 May, 1932. 
130. CTB, Works and Traffic Committee Minutes, 16 May, ~932. It is there-
fore incorrect that "of the union's 368 members all but 39 joined 
the strike" •. Roth, op.cit., p.13. 
131. The Press talked of thirty-eight "loyalists" after one day, Press, 
6 May, 1932. But five days later thirty-nine had become the accepted 
figure. Times, 11 May, 1932; Sun, 10 May, 1932. 
132. Sun, 5 May, 1932. 
133. One "volunteer" declared: "I am in a job, the first lIve had for two 
years that looks like a job. I've got work, and lim too busy to worry 
about strikes. Get me?" Sun, 5 May, 1932. Paradoxically - but not 
surprisingly, given their working conditions - some of the strike-
breakers were said to be taxi-drivers. A total of 12 or 14 of the 
117 new men had given up steady employment. For descriptions of high 
earnings (and long hours) for the new staff, see Times, 10 May, 1932. 
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some experience of manning trams. 134 By the end of the second 
day of the strike the board was providing roughly half its 
usual services and would clearly be able to do better shortly 
as its new employees completed their training. 135 
Meanwhile the response from other unions had not been 
very heartening for the beleagued tramwaymen. A number of 
organisations had provided monetary as well as material 
support, and there were many decisions to boycott the trams. 136 
However, other unions did not go even that far, and the 
Alliance of Labour proved unable to call a one day strike of 
't ff'l' t t d l' th d' t 137 ~ s a ~ ~a es, as sugges eear y ~n e ~spu e. 
An angry desperation appeared amongst some of the strike 
leaders as they faced the prospect of humiliation. By 5 May, 
the third day of the stoppage, barracking of passing trams 
by strikers and unemployed had given way to more forceful 
action. Fifteen incidents of interference with the operation 
f th t t d on that day. 138 o e rams were repor e None was 
especially vi9lent or destructive, but they signalled the 
changing mood of the strike. On the same day one of the 
evening newspapers carried a statement from Thompson that 
"there is no chance whatever of the whole of the old staff 
being taken on again".139 
134. This is evident from descriptions of the experience of "volunteers" 
which the later Labour-controlled Tramway Board tried to demote. 
Press, 27 February, 19 May, 1934. Of those taken on, 29 were former 
Christchurch tramwaymen and 11 had gained experience elsewhere. CTB, 
Works and Traffic Committee Minutes, 9 May, 1932. A total of 12 or 
14 of the 117 new men had given up steady employment. 
135. Press, 5 May, 1932. 
136. Sun, 5 May (Drivers' Union), 6 May (Addington Workshops and Freezing 
Workers' Union), 1932; Times, 9 May (Trades and Labour Council, and 
Alliance of Labour), 12 May (Painters' Union), 13 May (Bootmakers' 
Union), 1932. 
137. Sun, 29 April, 1932. 
138. ~, 5 May, 1932. 
139. Ibid. 
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That night the TEU and the United Front Against 
Capitalism Committee (UFC) held simultaneous meetings and 
journalists reported considerable"movement between them. 140 
One of the officials of the TEU, probably Mathison, moved to 
widen the scope of the dispute by handing it over to the UFC. 
This emerges from an exchange of letters in the Sun two months 
after the strike. An unemployed striker, styling himself 
"One of the Mugs", fiercely attacked Snow and other TEU 
leaders. He claimed that they had failed to ascertain the 
true level of support from other unions and that the result 
of the strike ballot "should have shown the officials that 
a strike was going to fail". He maintained somewhat obscurely, 
that "a certain club of gentlemen in Christchurch stepped in 
and gave the union to understand that it was prepared to do 
anything for the intending strikers". The anonymous corres-
pondent added the city council employees to his targets, 
criticising their refusal to accept rationing when fifty 
tramwaymen were unemployed. He concluded bitterly: "I am 
waiting for the next strike. I know what I will do after the 
wonderful support I have. got from union secretaries, gentle-
merif.s.clubs, council employees, Labour M.P. 's and the rest"~41 
Archibald Brewster Grant, a member of the UWM, later its 
local chairman, and later ~gain a Workers', Representative on 
the Arbitration Court, replied with a strong defence of the 
UWM: 
When Mr Snow found he was unable to run the strike, 
he handed his troubles over to a body comprising 
the Associated Trade Unions, UWM, and various other 
organisations, which collective body was grandilo-
quently named "The United Front Against Capitalism". 
140. Sun, 6 May, 1932. 
141. Sun, 9. July, 1932. 
The only organisation in all these collective 
bodies which allowed itself to be used in 
assisting the strikers was the UWM. The members 
of this movement turned up loyally in order to 
assist the strikers and while the police picked 
up three tramwaymen, they also picked up over a 
dozen unemployed workers and one woman •.• if the 
unemployed men had not turned out ready and 
willing to assist the "trammies", the so-called 
strike would only have amounted to about a 
hundred men walking out of their jobs and being 
replaced by other men. 142 
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Snow immediately replied that "if anything were handed 
over it certainly wasn't I that did it".143 Grant accepted 
the rebuke and said he should have used the term "striking 
tramwaymen" instead -"then I would have been sure to have 
included the responsible one".144 Mathison had been working 
for a Christchurch newspaper since early in the strike and 
would have been well aware of this correspondence, but he did 
not step in to contradict Grant as Snow did. 
Labour supporters on the UFC, the Relief Workers' Union 
and the Alliance of Labour appear to have combined to counter 
any move to more violent action. There was particular bitter-
ness with the UWM at the role played by Jim Roberts and 
Arthur Cook of the Alliance of Labour. 145 When the UWM 
attempted to mobilise local relief workers in a strike that 
might have brlought large numbers of them into town, the 
142. Sun, 13 July, 1932. 
143. Sun, 14 July, 1932. 
144. Sun, 16 July, 1932. 
145. "There is evidence of a shocking betrayal of the Christchurch workers 
in their struggle. The paid parasites have run into their holes". 
National Secretary, UWM, to A. Blance, 7 May, 1932, Saunders Papers. 
" ••• the Tramway men have lost their fight through the class collabor-
ation of officials, abetted by Roberts and Cook of the Alliance of 
Labour". Acting-Secretary, Christchurch UWM to National Secretary, 
UWM, 27 May, 1932, Saunders Papers. Grant claimed that "the only 
militant organisation in Christchurch was split by the Trades Hall 
coterie, because that organisation would have in the near future 
threatened the safety of the secretaries". Sun, 19 July, 1932. 
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Alliance leaders condemned such a move. 146 A significant 
number of letters from relief workers rejecting the strike 
call were published in the newspapers. 147 
Even the Communist Party appears to have held back from 
t ' '1 t t' 148 1 h suppor ~ng v~o en mass ac 1on, a tough a number of its 
members did take part in the 'subsequent outbreaks, possibly 
as members of the UWM. Only the willing and frequently 
youthful labourers of that organisation came forward to 
provide physical assistance to stop the trams. As early as 
the first day of the strike about fifty members of the 
unemployed had waited on the TEU under UWM leadership to 
149 
offer their full support. In March the trammies had been 
particularly generous in their support of the Waimakariri 
relief work strike. Now as the crowd emerged from the UFC 
meeting "oyster" was the watchword and most of those present 
f d t lk t · l' t 150 re use to a 0 Journa ~s s. The latter had been ordered 
out of the meeting earlier and one reporter had been assaulted 
as he left. Now one individual leaving the hall was heard to 
maintain that no tram would leave the depot the next day_ 
The militants had their usual level of success in keeping 
their plans secret from the authorities. Consequently the 
police were well-prepared for the attack on the first tram to 
leave the depot in the morning. The attackers were met by some 
146. Sun, 12 May, 1932. Roberts told the CTB that he had been "sent down 
by the Alliance of Labour because of the fear of the trouble spread-
ing". CTB, Works and Traffic Committee Minutes, 9 May, 1932. 
147. Sun, 16 May, 1932. 
148. M. Graham, The Christchurch Tramway Strike, 1932, unpublished 
University of Canterbury extended essay, 1978, p.45. Based on a 
letter from J.J. Porter, a member of the Communist Party at the time. 
149. Star, 4 May, 1932. 
150. Times, 6 May, 1932. 
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hundreds of regular police and IIspecials ll and were rapidly 
d ' d lSI d " ~sperse • A more angerous s~tuat~on developed in 
cathedral Square later in the day after another meeting at 
Trades Hall and a statement from Mathison lias much as to say 
that if any woman started anything in the square, they would 
be right behind us ll • lS2 A crowd estimated at three thousand 
milled about to watch the efforts to stop the trams. lS3 A 
few were arrested and hurried away in commandeered taxis. 
The police appear to have wisely avoided arresting any of the 
women present and kept their reinforcements of "specials" in 
lS4 the King Edward Barracks, well away from the square. The 
latter decision was possibly influenced by the events of the 
previous month in Auckland, where the presence of special 
constables in Karangahape Road appeared to provoke the crowd. 
There was similar activity the next day outside Lancaster 
Park. This followed a rugby match in which some "specials" 
were playing for the Christchurch Club. ISS As the crowd 
swarmed around the gates and the waiting trams three men 
151. Press, 7 May, 1932. 
152. A. Simpson, The Sugarbag Years, Wellington, 1974, p.130. 
153. Times, 7 May, 1932. 
154. Press, 8 May, 1932. Scotter, op.cit., p.381. A woman was later arrested 
in the Square. She had been in Wellington at the time of the disturb-
ances there and the police were able to quote some of her approving 
remarks on her return. Press, 25 May, 1932. 
155. According to one account (Press, 9 May, 1932) there were seven thousand 
people in the ground - a large number, but far from a record crowd for 
an important inter-club match in Christchurch. It claimed that two 
thousand gathered outside the gates after the game, most of them just 
curious. Tramcar windows were smashed. The Times, 9 May, 1932, main-
tained that only five hundred people congregated outside the gates. 
It noted "hooting and booing" when kicks were taken - not yet standard 
behaviour at Lancaster Park. Both newspapers and the Sun, 9 May, 1932, 
described how the Christchurch team had left the park in a Black 
Maria with a doubtless rather subdued demonstrator in their midst. 
The 'Varsity Senior team was also declared black. Times, 16 May, 
1932. There had been booing at its game at Addington on 7 May. 
Sun, 7 May, 1932. 
27. John Mathison, President of 
the Tramway Employees' Union, 
whose dismissal sparked the 
1932 strike. 
(Official Christchurch City 
Council photograph, 1933.) 
28. Frank Thompson, General 
Manager of the Christ-
church Tramway Board in 
1932. 
(Christchurch City 
Council, Sixty Years 
of Progress, Christ-
church, 1928, p.97.) 
29. Taxis were extensively used 
by the police during periods of . 
di~order in the early 'thirties, 
both to carry away those arrested 
and to provide rapid transport to 
trouble spots. 
(Star, 6 May, 1932) 
30. Large numbers of ordinary or special 
police travelled quickly about ~he 
city by motor transport. 
(Star, 6 May, 1932) 
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ERllATA 
RF. CONCLUDING SENTENCES OF FOO'1'NOTE 121 : 
Duff had already resinged by 24 ~1ay. Therefore it must have been his more than 
usu8~l1y even-handed editorials during the strike which led to cd. ticism of him, 
and his subsequent r es ignat ion. 
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climbed aboard one of the railcars and assaulted the conductor. 
The latter, William Laing, continued working but died three 
k 1 t f l ' t' "f h' , , , 156 wee s a er rom comp 1ca 10ns ar1s1ng rom 1S 1nJur1es. 
An unemployed painter was charged with manslaughter but was 
found not guilty on the direction of the presiding judge 
because of doubts about eye-witnesses' identification of the 
accused. 157 
On the same day as the Lancaster Park disorder, there was 
an attempt by a number of unemployed to attack a Riccarton 
tram beyond Hagley park. 158 The car proved to be heavily 
manned by police, clearly alerted to the planned assault, 
and the attackers were rounded up. Aside from continued 
sporadic night-time raids to break the windows of shopkeepers 
who helped to break the strike, no further violence occurred. 
h ' h t' f th 1 1 U ,,159 By now a 19 propor 10n 0 e oca WM was 1n pr1son. 
When it came to sentencing those found guilty of illegal 
activity during the strike the magistrate, E.D. Mosley, 
indicated some possible sympathy for the tramwaymen's case 
and certainly favoured the few of them who had been arrested 
over their hapless allies from the unemployed. He claimed 
that "these men are in an entirely different category from the 
others who have appeared today. They are ex-employees of the 
Tramways Board who, I know from my own experience, are a very 
160 decent set of men". He fined them three pounds and costs 
156. Times, 31 May, 8 July, 1932. Laing had iIllIlligrated from Ireland in 1931. 
157. Press, 20 September, 1932. 
158. Press, 9, 10 May, 1932. "Trouble was feared at Riccarton".Times, 7 
May, 1932. 
159. "Some of our bravest and best are in for long sentences ••• " Saunders 
Papers, Acting-Secretary, Christchurch UWM (C. Saunders), to Secretary, 
Dunedin UWM, 27 May, 1932. "Both the C.P. and the U.W.H. have lost 
some of their best fighters who now lie in gaol". Ibid., Acting-
Secretary, Christchurch UWM, to National Secretary, UWM, 27 May, 1932. 
160. Press, 13 May, 1932. 
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while sending several of the unemployed down for three months 
hard labour on the same charge. The same attitudes appear to 
have been prevalent amongst the police. It is sometimes 
maintained that there was immense sympathy for the unemployed 
'th' th l' f 161 w~ ~n e po ~ce orce. If so, this did not appear to 
extend to the activists amongst the unemployed in Christchurch. 
One was apparently beaten up after his arrest at the tram 
sheds. 162 An account written shortly afterwards by another 
details repeated physical and verbal assaults on the way to 
the police station and later. 163 Another wrote in a private 
letter of being dragged for two hundred yards by the head and 
ft b ' t d 164 arms a er e~ng arres e • It is possible that local police 
attitudes were somewhat influenced by the outcome of the rail-
way station clash less than a year earlier when some of them 
had suffered serious injuries and had been humiliated. 
Negotiations for a settlement of the strike continued 
meanwhile. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the 
officials of the TEU grossly overestimated their strength 
early in the dispute and forfeited the chance of a settlement 
which would have kept the union intact. In addition to 
Elizabeth McCombs, there were a number of board members who 
appear to have wished to avoid a head-on confrontation with 
the union. These included Sykes, McLachlan, Walter and, 
possibly, Hayward and Andrews (the Chairman}.165 On 3 May 
161 •. Graham, op.cit., p.60; Simpson, op.cit., p.llO. But see p.108 for 
mixed feelings from one of the Christchurch unemployed - ItI don't 
remember a sympathetic policeman ••• " 
162. Selwyn Devereux, Times, 13 May, 1932. See also Simpson, op.cit., p.130. 
163. Undated statement, written in May, 1932, Saunders Papers. 
164. Letter from "Watson" to "Joe and Mrs" [indescipherable] 15 May, 1932, 
Saunders Papers. 
165. Judging by the positions they took on various issues, CTB, Works and 
Traffic Committee Minutes, 18 April to 11 May, 1932. 
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the board and the union's officials gathered in separate rooms 
with Sullivan, Archer and J. McCombs mediating between them!66 
Andrews moved substantially from the board's initial position. 
He proposed that the notices of dismissal should be withdrawn 
in return for the strike being called off and a rationing 
scheme accepted until 8 June, when the award expired. 
According to his recollection two years later, this suggestion, 
written out by Hayward, appeared for a moment to have settled 
the dispute: 
Mr Hayward was writing and Mr Sullivan looked over 
his shoulder and said something like: "I think 
Hayward has got it". He then read the resolution 
drawn up by Mr Hayward and said "that will do me". 
The late Mr McCombs then had a look at it and he 
said: "It does not go quite as far as I wanted, 
but I think it will do," or words to that effect. 
Mr Archer then said, "All right. I will tear up 
my papers," and this he proceeded to do. The 
Labour men then went into the room where the union 
representatives were, apparently quite confident 
that the resolution would be accepted by the men 
as a fair basis of settlement .. A little while 
later, they came back quite cressfallen, saying 
the men would not accept it. 167 ~--
Still maintaining that the board has used rationing as a 
"cheap stand-by system", the union was insisting that members 
called back when rationed off should be paid at time-and-a-
half rates. This "demand" appears to have incensed at least 
one of the moderates on the board and led to the collapse of 
the talks. 168 Rather than accept a maximum reduction of less 
than three per cent in the wage bill of the traffic staff169 
the TEU kept its neck in the. noose which the board's extremists 
and its senior staff were only too happy to pull tight. 
166. Ibid., 3 May, 1932. 
167. Sun, 30 May, 1934. 
168. Sykes was the moderate. Times, 27 May, 1932. Sixty-one tramwaymen 
had voted on 1 May (96 opposed it). TEU, Minutes, 1 May, 1932. 
169. TWelve men called back continuously at ordinary rates rather than 
time-and-a-half would lose the equivalent of six men's wages or about 
2.5% of the traffic section's wages. 
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Two days later the board met again. McLachlan emphasised 
that as few new men as possible should be taken on because the 
strikers would eventually have to be re-employed. 170 However, 
the board hardened its position following conciliatory dis-
cussions with Archer and agreement that the local Anglican 
Bishop, West-Watson, should be appointed as mediator. 
Significantly, it was a "suggestion" from Thompson after Archer 
had left which embodied this hardening. He proposed that all 
suitable new men should be kept on, that this would necessi-
tate more rationing and that the strike should be called off 
before negotiations on rationing could commence. Talks during 
the next five days (6 May to 11 May) involved a wide range 
of mediators - notably Bishops West-watson and Brodie (the 
Roman Catholic incumbent), representatives of other major 
churches, Archer, H.T. Armstrong M.P., Sullivan, Hally and 
Jim Roberts of the Alliance of Labour. 17l They centred on 
the membership and terms of reference o.f a tribunal of arbi-
tration and the main sticking-point was whether the continued 
employmant of the "volunteers" was negotiable. Finally both 
sides agreed that A.T. Donnelly, a local lawyer, should be 
the sole arbitrator with powers to decide all matters. On 
the board only the extremists Williamson and Pearce opposed 
h ' d " 172 t ~s ec~s~on. 
On 16 May Donnelly delivered his judgement. He proposed 
that only sixty of the 117 new men should be kept on. 173 
Although he recommended rationing to keep on as many of the 
170. CTB, Works and Traffic Committee Minutes, 5 May, 1932. 
171. Ibid., 6, 7, 9 May, 1932. 
172. Ibid., 11 May, 1932. 
173. Sun, 16 May, 1932. 
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old staff as possible, a large number remained unemployed or 
were gradually declared redundant. Donnelly found the charge 
of victimisation against the board "unproven" but the dis-
missal of Mathison "unwise". On 17 May the TEU called the 
strike off. 174 
Although the strike resulted in further job losses, 
175 rationing and reductions in conditions during the next year, 
it cannot be counted as a complete failure. There can be 
little doubt that it contributed significantly to the election 
of a Labour majority, including Mathison, onto the Tramways 
Board in 1933. There was a particularly heavy turnout in 
labouring areas and a high level of informal voting, as in 
Labour's city council success in 1927. 176 Clearly the memory 
of the strike and the efforts of the dismissed strikers (who 
formed a very active association) had got out the vote. It 
faced a lacklustre board which had previously relied upon a 
low Labour polIto ensure the success of its own relatively 
meagre and unenthusiastic support. 
The Labour ticket which won the election had claimed that 
there would be no need for a rate and Mathison had declared 
its slogan to be IIback to the trams".177 The first of these 
174. Times, 18 May, 1932. 
175. At the end of May seven members of the TEU lost their jobs. TEU, 
Minutes, 31 May, 1932. Many redundancies were clearly planned by the 
tramways administration before the strike on the basis of the move to 
one-man trams and buses. Elizabeth McCombs told the board that the 
men were well aware of such plans. CTB, Works and Traffic Committee 
Minutes, 5 May, 1932. Thompson spoke of a plan to reduce employee 
numbers by 52 over three years on the same day. 5 May, 1932. 
176. Press, 1 December, 1933. The total vote was double that in the 
previous election. 
177. Star, 1 December, 1933. Also denial of possibility of rating. ~, 
2 November, 1932. Archer described Sidney Holland's claim that Labour 
would levy a rate as "too silly for words". Times, 29 July, 1933. 
He also termed the one-man cars "death-traps". Sun, 1 December, 1933. 
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promises had to be broken at the end of the first year when 
the election of the new board and experiments with fare 
reductions proved insufficient to reverse the downwards slide 
in the tramways' finances. However, E.H. Howard, the Labour 
M.P. and member of the board was driven to exasperation 
before his colleagues agreed to his proposal. for a rate. 
On 9 March, 1934, he noted in his very intermittent diarYi 
Tramway meeting. Every day in every way getting 
worse and worse. Our board is a poor board. 
Mathison obsessed by hate, Manning obsessed by 
his M.A. and not to offend the master class 
because of support to WEA, Parlane a chair warmer 
and Lizzie [Elizabeth McCombs] a woman. 178 
The rate was finally set at .07d in the £.179 Two years 
later this was doubled, not least to help finance the purchase 
of further one-man cars and more buses. 180 In March, 1936, 
there were thirteen buses and eleven trolley-buses in the 
board's fleet, as against nine and seven respectively in 
1932. 181 In 1937 the new board was to float a major loan, 
with the approval of a loan poll, to purchase a large number 
182 of new buses. Despite the obvious move away from its 
pledges of opposition to rating and buses, Labour had won an 
even more convincing victory in the tramway election of 
1936. 183 Not only did the ex-tramwaymen (some of them now 
re-employed by the board) maintain their mobilisation of the 
Labour vote, the old board was greatly discredited by a report 
from two prominent accountants strongly criticising its policy 
178. Entry for 9 April, 1934. Howard Papers, 980/8. 
179. 21 May, 1934. 
180. 1936. 
18I. 1936. 
182. Ibid. I 1938. 
183. 27 November, 1936. 
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f . d th th l' t 184 o runn~ng own reserves ra er an evy~ng a ra e. .The 
non-Labour forces could not even play on a reputation for 
"sound business management" against alleged socialist 
incompetence. Furthermore, the rate increase was small 
compared with the total consolidated rate paid by each house-
holder. Within the city it was hidden by the rate reduction 
provided by the new Citizens' council 
The generally bleak history of the Christchurch tramways 
between 1926 and 1936 was essentially the record of a hope-
less and harmful struggle to escape the consequences of 
technological change. The economic and political environment 
of the depression certainly exerted a considerable influence 
on the course of this struggle, but its origins and outcome 
clearly lay with the rise of motor transport. A majority 
of the old board sought to fight this development primarily 
by lowering the earnings and altering the working conditions 
of its employees. In the meantime- it attempted to purchase 
the necessary new technology piecemeal out of a shrinking 
revenue. This policy led eventually to a rather squalid 
confrontation with its traffic staff which proved both 
financially and politically expensive. In opposition Labour 
would have assailed the board unmercifully had it imposed an 
"unnecessary" rate. In power most Labour members were 
eventually brought to accept the need for greatly accelerated 
technological change and for a tramways rate, both to finance 
the new capital expenditure and to sustain public transport 
as motor cars proliferated. The politicians moved timidly 
and belatedly to accommodate economic reality and were no doubt 
surprised that this did not carry a heavy electoral price. 
184. Press, 24 April, 1934. 
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Labour's provocative tactics during 1932 sat poorly with 
leaders such as Sullivan, James McCombs and Archer. They were 
not men who regarded the prospect of a revolution with 
exci tment or equanimity, as did the iconoclastic John A.' Lee. 185 
Revolution meant a challenge to values which were an integral 
part of their view of socialism; the appeal to reason, 
decorous behaviour, respect for authority and the preservation 
of public and private property. On the one hand, it could 
lead to savage repression and the loss of the enormous 
advances made so far by parliamentary and moderate trade 
union methods. On the other, it might well allow a transfer 
of power to people whom they considered irresponsibles with 
no knowledge of its constructive use. The latter were mostly 
self-confessed atheists who seemed to threaten not only 
private property but the established churches. A Baptist 
minister, an Anglican lay-preacher who had trained for the 
ministry, and a devout Roman Catholic could only be worried 
by such a prospect. They believed that socialists should 
uplift and educate the labouring class, not appeal to its 
"baser instincts", its physical strength and its capacity for 
personal violence. McCombs and Sullivan had condemned the 
'Russian Revolution; they were hardly likely to welcome one in 
New Zealand. 
McCombs and Archer had taken little part in the demon-
strations of early 1932, except to stress the large numbers 
assembled and their orderly behaviour. 186 Sullivan had 
presided at a number of rallies. He had talked of the 
185. Olssen, op.cit., p.56. 
186. Times, 21 March, 1932. However, Sullivan had to rebuke one speaker 
for criticising the Governor-General. 
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"dangerous" nature of the government's attacks on the 
Arbitration court,187 but in much the same way as the local 
evening ne~spapers.188 Similarly he had raised the possi-
bility of a reduction of New Zealand standards of. living to 
those of "the coolie and the kaffir". 189 Unlike Labour 
leaders from elsewhere, he had left out remarks about 
revolutions or speculation about how long the sufferings of 
th 1 ld 1 t 'th t l' f d' d 190 e peop e cou as w~ ou an exp os~on 0 ~sor er. 
Sullivan had not been listed to speak at the May Day demon-
stration, but had done so, partly to contradict a communist 
191 
emphasis on a struggle for free speech. He assured the 
crowd that there was complete free speech in Christchurch 
under the Labour council. Archer also stood to state that 
the government had no moral authority in the city as the 
majority of the population and the council were united against 
it. The implication was that there was no need to call for 
a revolution in Christchurch. 
187. Sun, 6 February, 1932. 
188. Editorials in Sun, 12 March, 1932; Star, 23 February, 3, 8 March, 
1, 4 April, 1932. The Star condemned the abolition of compulsory 
arbitration as a "blunder of the first magnitude" on 8 April. On 
1 April it warned that the 
unscrupulous and needy employer will exact the lowest 
possible wage from whatever classes amongst his workers 
are least strongly organised and logically there can be 
no condemnation of the worker if, by the strike method, 
he is forced to use the only weapon by which he can 
protect himself from exploitation. 
On 4 April the Star supported the Labour Party's position on the 
I.C. and A. Amendment Bill. 
189. Press, 2 May, 1932. 
190. Sullivan's attitude to his own party's campaign may have been revealed I 
in his response to proposals to the creation of a local "New Guard": .) 
I am not shutting my eyes or burying my head in the 
sand, but I feel strongly that, in a quiet community 
like ours that the less we talk about trouble or 
expect trouble the less likelihood there is that we 
will get it. Times, 18 April, 1932. 
191. Press, 2 May, 1932. 
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Some of the statements made by Sullivan and Archer were 
misleading. For example, banners to be carried at protests 
were subject to council approval, and, like applications to 
hold meetings, were secretly referred to the police, local 
representatives of the government's authority. Amongst 
banners rejected during the previous month had been signs 
calling for "Free Speech and Assembly", "No Rationing of 
Work" and "Around Lenin's Corner Not Coates , ,,.192 Rather 
than risk an outburst of rioting amongst Latin scholars, 
the police and council thought it best to ban IISummun Jus 
Summa Injuria". However, they apparently judged "Hands Off 
the Chinese Soviets" sufficiently esoteric not to. arouse 
savage passions amongst the citizens of Christchurch. 
Sullivan worked hard to settle the tramway dispute and 
strongly attacked the more extreme examples of actions in 
support of the strike. 193 He accepted the need for special 
police but regretted that in the event they were recruited 
"from only one class". 194 He also appeared to defy a police 
ban on open-air meetings after 4 p.m. by allowing gatherings 
in the council yard behind the Civic Theatre. 195 However, 
the dispensation was only intended for times when the crowd 
could not be accommodated in the theatre itself. 196 This was 
a wise precaution in view of the fact that the Auckland riot 
192. Sullivan to Secretary, United Front Committee, Christchurch. City 
Council, Outward Correspondence, 26 April, 1932. 
193. Informed in Wellington that gelignite had been discovered on some 
tram tracks, Sullivan talked of "savage inhumanity" and maintained 
that "nothing justifies rioting and attempted murder". Press, 
7 May, 1932. 
194. Times, 17 May, 1932. 
195. Press, 18 May, 1932. 
196. Sullivan to Superintendent of Police, Christchurch city Council, 
Outward Correspondence" 17 May I 1932. 
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had started when a large. group of unemployed had proved unable 
to fit into the Town Hall. At least one gathering was held in 
the yard,197 but permission was refused to the Labour Defence 
League (LDL) on the grounds that the offer extended only to 
the unemployed. 198 A renewed application through H.T. 
Armstrong ~1.P. rather than the communist secretary of the LDL 
was accepted but the event was then transferred to a hall. 199 
Winter evenings in Christchurch soon cooled the enthusiasm for 
open-air meetings. 
The police ban did much to relieve the pressure on the 
Labour city council. Now they had only to take responsibility 
for daytime meetings. In fact the city by-laws only required 
council permission for demonstrations along city streets or 
in Cathedral Square. But Sullivan and other Labour leaders 
fostered the illusion that all open-air meetings had to be 
approved. In this way they were able to keep in touch with 
what the radical element was doing and to move to counter any 
dangerous developments. They were also able to keep the 
police informed as all applications were secretly referred to 
them and their advice was usually accepted. This practice also 
no doubt gave the police confidence in the council and gave the 
mayor some influence over them. 
Sullivan outlined the policy on meetings in a letter 
marked livery confidential II to a Labour supporter in Auckland.200 
He described how IIpermissionll was normally granted. But in an 
apparent reference to events at the time of the railway 
197. Times, 19 May, 1932. One hundred and fifty were said to be present. 
198. Sullivan to Riley, Christchurch City Council, Outward Correspondence,. 
18 May, 1932. 
199. Sullivan to H.T. Armstrong, Ibid., 19 May, 1932. 
200. Sullivan to A. Rosser, Ibid., 11 September, 1934. 
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station clash he noted that "circumstances may arise, as they 
have in the past, which may make impossible these easy 
tolerances". In general he favoured providing a safety-valve 
for the steam which events engendered; 
we must never forget that Great Britain, in 
contra-distinction to most of the continental 
countries, has proved that, by letting people 
speak freely and give expression to their 
grievances, disorderly action is stalled off. 
Nevertheless, he was very aware of the danger of allowing 
crowds of the unemployed to gather near shopping areas. He 
mentioned that the council had made permission for one march 
conditional on its route being shifted away from the city 
centre and he believed that Christchurch was better able to 
accommodate a relaxed policy towards meetings than Auckland, 
which lacked "open spaces un surrounded by business buildings". 
Sullivan concluded his letter with a strong injunction 
to mak.e no reference in any discussion which 
may take place either to my reference to the 
Police in any shape or form or to the fact 
that we have no specific by-law unger. which 
public meetings can be prohibited. 
The advantages of this policy were demonstrated during 
the agitation which followed the announcement in 1934 that 
married men would also be drafted into work camps. Sullivan 
replied to a request from militant leaders to hold a Friday-
night demonstration by pointing out that the police ban on 
, , th' 'h . t'll' f 201 n1ght-t1me ga er1ngs 1n t e open-a1r was s 1 1n orce. 
Simultaneously he stated that he was preparing a mass meeting 
at the weekend and that the applicants were welcome to take 
part. In this way they were assured of a large audience while 
Sullivan was able to stack the platform with religious and 
201. Sullivan to R. Macdonald, Ibid., 5 June, 1933. 
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community leaders who also denounced the. government~s plan 
but who could be counted on to attract respectable people to 
the crowd and to rouse no rabble. 202 
Publicly Sullivan always emphasised the role of charity 
in forestalling trouble. It was not so much that depots pre-
vented riots by starving people, rather it was that their 
closure due to lack of goods might have led to angry outbursts 
by a crowd of disappointed applicants. 
In order to avoitd such an outbreak, Sullivan sought to 
encourage and coordinate the charitable efforts of citizens 
with the time, means and inclination to help. In doing this 
he demonstrated a great knack of winning the respect, even 
the friendship, of wealthy members of the community who were 
opposed to the Labour Party politically. H.G. Livingstone, 
a prominent local member of the Reform Party articulated this 
regard during 1933: 
we know how much it means to have the adminis-
tration of relief in the hands of one who can 
meet all sections of the community and leave 
a feeling with them all that he is doing his 
best for them. 203 
Sullivan enthusiastically promoted a "pound scheme ll as 
a means of stocking the depots during the winter of 1931. 
District committees which were typically based on the local 
elected school committees organised door-to-door collections, 
commonly using boy scouts as collectors. 204 Householders 
were asked to donate parcels weighing a pound, and anything 
else they could spare. The proceeds were then sent in to a 
central store and distributed through eight depots run by 
202. Sullivan to various organisations, Ibid., 5 June, 1933. 
203. Press, 30 May, 1933. 
204. Press, 9, 20, 23, 25 June, 1931. 
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. 205 clergymen throughout the working class areas of the c~ty. 
In this way assistance was transferred from wealthier to 
poorer areas, although the process was somewhat hampered by 
the fact that the well-heeled suburbs of Riccarton and 
Sumner operated separate schemes. New Brighton, which 
contained a large number of the city's unemployed, also had 
its own scheme but had to rely on increasing amounts of 
assistance from the city collection. 
Sullivan sponsored the creation of a citizens' Relief 
Association (CRA) to supervise the pound scheme. This drew 
together several social workers and local notables, most of 
205. There is something of a misapprehension that the established churches 
played only a limited role in the relief effort in Christchurch: 
In Christchurch, however, the churches were less 
organised. A vigorous Labour city council had 
aroused public sympathy at an early stage, off-
setting the need for large-scale church action ••• 
what individual moves there were remained confined 
to small activities such as the Anglican doss-house 
in St. Martins in 1929 and a Salvation Army soup 
kitchen in 1928. Such activities did not expan~ to 
any great extent until unemployment was near its 
height and then only in fields which did not con-
flict with the major work of the Metropolitan 
Relief Association. R. Roberston, The Tyranny of 
Circumstances, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Otago, 1978, 
p.106. 
On the contrary, clergymen and their wives, church social organis-
ations and church property were essential to the Central (later 
Metrolpolitan) Relief Association's effort. The distribution depots 
for the pound scheme in the central city were run by the Salvation 
Army (at the Scottish Society Hall in Manchester Street) and Rev. 
P. Revell (the Anglican-based St. Martin's House of Help in Salisbury 
Street not St. Martins). Further afield, Mrs A. Fraer (the wife of 
an Anglican minister) ran a depot in Phillipstown and a presbyterian 
minister, Rev. L. McMaster, had his st. Peter's Helping Hand Depot 
in Woolston. Both the Methodist and Anglican churches in Sydenham 
operated depots. The Anglicans had a depot in Addington and there 
was a small depot in Richmond. The St. Martinis and Salvation Army 
"doss-houses" operated throughout the depression. The Rev. L.B. 
Neale (Methodist) ran a popular relief depot in St. Albans until 
1930. Other clergymen to operate depots supplied by the Relief 
Association included Rev. L.M. Rogers (Presbyterian, Sydenham), 
Father Maguire (Roman Catholic, Eastern Central City) and Rev. 
Haynes (Anglican, Papanui). Christchurch City Council, Outward 
~==~~~~~, 8 July, 10 October, 1931; 25 Septemper, 1934. 
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them not friends. of the Labour Party.206 However, he retained 
overall control through the Mayor's Relief of Distress Fund 
(MRDF) which helped to support a number of other charities 
besides the CRA. These included the long-established Mayor's 
Coal and Blanket Fund. Sullivan also interviewed thousands 
of applicants for assistance himself, providing some practical 
help as well as sympathy, and often referring the individuals 
t 'f' h 't' 207 o specl lC carl les. 
I 
Money for the MRDF came from a 
variety of sources including street appeals, band and variety 
concerts, and donations from the city council and the MED. 
Lunchtime "community sings" which were held in the Civic 
Theatre between 1931 and 1935 represented another substantial 
source of income. They were also broadcast over one of the 
local radio stations •. Sullivan frequently attended these 
sessions (the Civic Chambers were next door) and on occasions, 
apparently mercifully rare, was bribed into demonstrating his 
own limited musical talent. Such concerts, may have served 
a psychologically helpful role by providing a comparatively 
cheap distraction and a chance to participate in a cheerful 
community activity. The overwhelming majority of the 
208 
audiences were women. There were also some very well-
attended community dances held in the open-air in Cranmner 
and Victoria Squares during the summer of 1931-32. In the 
following year the MED provided around quarter of the MRDF's 
income with a donation of £2,500 out of its total profit of 
206. Press, 20 May, 1931. George Harper was chairman and was later 
knighted by the Labour Government. 
207. On one day in the winter of 1931 Sullivan carried out 120 interviews, 
an achievement of which he was understandably prou4. Star, 28 
July, 1931. 
208. Times, 23 September, 1931, 31 November, 1932, 8 June, 1934; Press, 
8 August, 1933. 
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over £32,000. 209 Other major sources of finance for the fund 
included an "All Nations' Fair" and a "Come to Christchurch" 
carnival w~ek.2l0 The latter featured a "venetian Night ll 
with a waterborne torchlight parade on the Avon. 2ll There 
was no lack of circuses to provide bread. 
The extent of Sullivan's ability to mobilise the rich 
and powerful in Christchurch in support of charity was most 
fully demonstrated in 1933. Early in the year hecalled.a 
conference of local bodies and persuaded most of them to sup-
port the conversion of the CRA into a Metropolitan.Relief 
Assoc~ation (MRA), covering almost the whole urban area. 212 
In May he launched a Businessman's Relief of Distress Commit-
tee which was to raise. most of the money and goods distributed 
that winter. 2l3 The memory of the riots of the previous year 
and some disorders at the city's relief depots at the 
beginni~g of the year spurred Sullivan on and may have influ-
enced some of the businessmen involved. However, the main 
impetus behind the very widespread participation of business 
people in the year's operations appears to have been the 
shock of the devaluation in January. The same disenchantment 
with the government, sense of crisis and desire to take 
positive action that spawned the New Zealand Legion also 
inspired the Businessman's Committee. The two movements 
actually shared some of the same personnel, including Sidney 
George Holland, later to be Prime Minister. There were 
209. Times, 28 June, 1932. 
210. Press, 9 April, 25 August, 2, 15 September, 1932'. 
211. R. Lamb, From the Banks of the Avon, Wellington, 1981, p.lOO. 
212. Times, 15 March, 5 April, 1933. 
213. Press, 24 May, 1933. 
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similar comparisons to the crisis of the Great War, invoking 
"the spirit of 1918" and deprecating party politics. 2l4 The 
work of the committee was divided into sections under the 
supervision of "Group Captains". 2l5 
A total of around £14,000 was raised through the efforts 
of the committee and very large quantities of goods and cloth-
ing were also collected. Distribution was made through ten 
depots and the weekly number of applications (one per 
family) peaked at over three thousand. 2l6 The community 
sings developed an enormous popularity during the year, with 
some attendances exceeding two thousand, in addition to a 
1 d ' d' 217 very arge ra ~o au ~ence. 
After such a massive effort, it was understandable that 
public enthusiasm tended to wane in the following year. The 
\ 
amount raised through donations diminished sharply and the 
MRA was compelled to rely on transfers from the MED profits, 
the community sings, and a share of the proceeds of national 
t ' 218 ar un~ons. This latter source had been earlier rejected 
by Sullivan on the grounds that its acceptance would alienate 
the sympathy of some citizens who objected to gambling. 2l9 
214. Press, 3 June, 1933. One Citizens' Association councillor very 
active in the movement, M.E. Lyons, talked of "a war-time job" and 
a drive "amounting to conscription". 
215. Press, 24 May, 1933; Times, 7 June, 1933. 
216. Times, 25 July, 1933. 
217. Times, 28 July, 1933. Many queued outside and the crowd overflowed 
onto the stage. Press, 21 July, 8 August, 31 November, 1933. 
Criticism of the "sings" by a correspondent to the Times provoked a 
flood of letters in support. Times, 31 July, 1933. 
218. Times, 6 September, 1934. 
219. "In view of division public opJ.nl.on in city on morality and desir-
ability on Art Unions for any purpose am not disposed at present to 
concur." Sullivan to Black (telegram), Christchurch.City Council, 
OutWard Correspondence, 5 August, 1931. 
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Presumably he was particularly concerned about the attitude 
of some of the clergymen involved in the relief effort. The 
demand for assistance remained high in 1934 and 1935, at an 
average of well over two thousand applications a ,week. 220 
Increases in relief work pay, allowances of rations, clothing 
and blankets, and the growing availability of casual work 
removed some of the pressure from the able-bodied unemployed. 
The MRA became more and more involved in supplementing hos-
pital board allowances, sustenance and pensions. Sullivan 
also directed more of his funds towards specific needs such 
as subsidising milk in schools where parents could not 
afford it. 22l Footwear and clothing were also provided for 
indigent school children. 
Throughout his years as Mayor of Christchurch, Sullivan 
sought to maintain personal control of part of the money 
collected. With this he was able to meet emergencies and 
deal with individuals who would only confide in him. More 
importantly, he was able to extend assistance in situations 
where the conservative members of the relief association would 
have refused, possibly thereby precipitating a riot. For 
example, he allocated some funds to the would-be revolution-
aries of Lewis Pass Camp No. 2 when they arrived in the city 
destitute. 222 On another occasion Sullivan provided assistance 
to some workers from the Rapaki section of the Summit Road who 
had declared their own "wet day". This prompted one Fendalton 
citizen to protest that collections had been made for indigent 
220. Times, 11 September, 1934. 
221. Times, 11 May, 1934; Secretary of MRA to Sullivan, 25 September, 1935 i 
Christchurch City Council Mayoral Correspondence. 
222. ~, 12 March, 1934. 
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families, especially those affected by sickness, not for 
strikers. In reply Sullivan emphasised what he saw as the 
dual role of the relief effort - to keep the peace as well 
as to relieve distress; 
Danger has threatened on many occasions and I 
have tried both tact and concession to ward it 
off and thus preserve the peace and the people's 
property. Surely the expenditure of £25 or £50 
is worthwhile to avoid such trouble. Revolution-
aries amongst the unemployed do not thank me for 
this but, on the contrary, declaim me as their 
greatest enemy, but I do feel that I am entitled 
to recognition of my motives by responsible 
citizens and those motives are recognised and 
approved by the highest national authorities in 
the country. 223 
In meeting possible threats to order in this way, 
Sullivan was able to draw on a wide range of resources as 
mayor, member. of parliament and the patron of several 
charities. By remaining open to approaches by publicly 
hostile individuals he was able to encourage their reform-
ation. For example, R. MacDonald, a young communist, proved 
a considerable nuisance to Sullivan during 1933 and 1934 by 
organising demonstrations and campaigning against Labour in 
the municipal elections. Nevertheless, he was provided with 
"a good deal of help ••• for reasons connected with the main-
tenance of peace in the city ".224. With an eye to mutual 
advantage, Sullivan approached a number of private and public 
employers outside Christchurch when the young rebel confided 
in him that he wished to find a job and save to get married. 
"After a good deal of effort and trouble" MacDonald was found 
a place in a PWD camp near Wairoa. A council officer saw him 
223. Sullivan to Newton, Christchurch City Council, outward correspondence, 
25 June, 1934. . 
224. Letter marked IIConfidential". Sullivan to Niven, Ibid., 3 July, 1934. 
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on his way with his ticket paid for and a small sum for 
expenses. Some months later the Mayor was rewarded for his 
generosity with the news that the lost sheep had "returned 
to the Labour fold!! and was working hard for the party's 
victory in the coming general election. 225 
Another strategy which tended to limit the influence of 
radical leaders of the unemployed was the sponsorship of 
rival organisations by Labour supporters. The formation of 
the RWU in April, 1932, and the Canterbury Unemployed Workers' 
Association (CUWA) during 1933 were clearly attempts. to weaken 
the radical UWM. 226 However, members of that organisation 
were not excluded from the CUWA and were to become active 
within it. 
Efforts to mobilise workers in support of unemployed 
organisations sometimes involved violence. One former boxer 
from Australia was said to have earned the title "Basher 
Billll for his persuasive ways during the relief strike of 
1932. 227 During 1933 a man died as a result of a confront-
ation over industrial a.ction on the Rapaki section of the 
Summit Road, a job notorious for its radical element and lack 
f .. 228 o superv~s,l.on. An unemployed farm manager punched a 
colleague who called him a "scab!! for continuing to work in 
defiance of a UWA decision to knock off for the day, probably 
to hold an unofficial stopwork meeting. The unionist, an 
unemployed bricklayer and former seaman named Banks, fell 
over a low wall and several feet down the hillside, breaking 
225. MacDonald to Sullivan, 12 August, 1935, Christchurch City Council 
Mayoral Correspondence. 
226. 4 March, 1933. 
227. Sun, 21 June, 1932. 
228. Times, 5, 6 May, 1933; Sun, 13, 14 March, 1934. 
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his neck. His assailant was found guilty of manslaughter but 
was sentenced to only a month's imprisonment. There must be 
considerable doubt whether the sentence would have been so 
light had the role in the assault been reversed. 
Bans on outdoor demonstrations appear to have removed the 
opportunity for a repetition of the riots of 1932 in other 
main centres. The Labour council did not impose such a ban 
in Christchurch and it was repeatedly faced with gatherings 
which might have led to disorder. This possibility became 
particularly grave early in 1935 when an agitation centred 
on the system of providing charity from depots became 
directed at Sullivan himself. 
Strong and organised criticism of the relief system had 
begun as early as 1933 with the formation of an Anti-charity 
League. This movement gained significant support amongst 
relief workers. 229 There had also been repeated allegations 
of corruption against staff at the central relief depot. 230 
These led to formal inquiries into the operation of the depot 
and some changes. From the winter of 1934 up to the municipal 
elections of 1935, demonstrations against the personnel and 
the existence of the depot system again became severe. This 
agitation was largely inspired by an alliance of Independent 
Labour, Socialist and Conununist leaders operating through the 
229. Press, 7 August, 1934. 
230. Some of these allegations appear to have had strong foundation. See 
Simpson, op.cit., p.74, on pilfering by staff. Also MacIntosh to 
Sullivan, 26 June, 1935, Christchurch City Council Mayoral Corres-
pondence. There were also persistent rumours of sexual misconduct. 
Simpson, op.cit., p.72; SulliVan to Secretary, Christchurch Branch 
of National Council of Women, Christchurch City Council, Outward 
Correspondence, 13 March, 1934. Also Eames to Sullivan, Ibid., 
14 March, 1934, on "unpleasant rumours" and interviews on the 
provision of women's clothing. 
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CUWA, an organisation which they had come to dominate. In 
October, 1934, two hundred relief workers managed to invade 
.the deserted Council Chamber. They burlesqued Sullivan's 
reported attempts to bring A.E. Armstrong to order by ringing 
the bell and draped a red flag over the Mayoral chair. 23l 
Early in the new year, A.E. Armstrong and his allies led a 
drive to destroy the relief system and thereby force the . 
. government to provide increased pay and rations. 232 They 
succeeded in detaining the Prime Minister, George Forbes, 
in Government Buildings at a time when he wanted to rejoin 
the visiting Duke of Gloucester and his party.233 Desperate 
to get away, Forbes appears to have promised additional help 
to the unemployed - possibly in the form of a transfer of 
funds from the MED. 234 In the event only £850 was distrib-
uted to the relief workers and then the central depot was 
effectively closed for three weeks. 235 When it reopened, 
relief workers were no longer supplied, but the MRA had £2,000 
from MED funds to carryon 't k 236 ~ s wor • During the council 
debate on these transfers,. Sullivan was roundly abused by t'tvo 
h d d d 'h 11' 237 h l' un re men an women ~n t e ga er1es. T e po 1ce were 
231. Press, 20 October, 1934. 
232. Times, 17, 19 January, 1935. 
some Rapaki relief workers. 
233. Times, 22 January, 1935. 
The shock-troops appear to have been 
Sun, 17 January, 1935. 
234. Sun, 22 January, 1935. The reported request from Forbes was very 
vague - "asking that the men be given any food or money which could 
be spared". 
235. Sun, 25 January, 1935. The MRA was reimbursed from the ~mD. Times, 
29 JanuarYt 1925. 
236. Times, 23, 31 January, 1935; Sun, 23 February, 1935. 
237. Press, 26 February, 1935. Armstrong had been proposing that control 
of the funds be transferred to a committee with three members of the 
CUWA and three members of the Council. Times, 26 February, 1935. 
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called in., As the crowd left, many sang the Red Flag. 
Armstrong called Sullivan 'lHitLer" and his supporters added 
terms such'as "traitor", "twister" and "lia,rn. 23B Sullivan 
was nobviously deeply moved". 239 It is difficult to escape 
the conclusion of one newspaper that this was a base form 
f . . d 240 o ~ngrat~tu e. In March a large outdoor protest was held 
in Latimer Square with strong communist involvement. 241 There 
were also demonstrations by. groups of women at the central 
relief depot and the council chambers. 242 
Shortly after Labour's defeat in the municipal elections, 
a shock which in itself helped to rally the party's sympath-
isers, the radicals were removed from their positions of 
influence in the CUWA. The manner in which this ousting was 
achieved, and the role that Sullivan played in it, is hinted 
at in a somewhat disingenuous letter from the organiser of 
the coup to the Mayor. Having explained that he is in bed 
suffering from lumbago, this individual requests an allo-
cation of coal - noting that one unemployed leader not in 
his group received some the day before. He continues: 
Things are moving fast now with the unemployed 
organisation. Armstrong and co. all resigned, 
this was due to tactics and methods. Fractious 
meetings are held in bedroom daily. As Chair-
man of the trade union committee along with 
[the committee] we [sic] will direct the organ-
isation until things are finalised. I will be 
dealing with Braithwaite on Friday he is going 
for keeps we have the goods. Would you make 
238. Sun, 26 February, 1935. 
239. 26 February, 1935: 
240. ~, 26 February, 1935. 
241. Press, 14 March, 1935. The Press claimed that "no more than 2000 were 
present". The Times said one thousand, with Rapaki men again promin-. 
ent. Times, 14 March, 1935. One of the demands was "the immediate 
release of Ernest Thaelmann, leader of the working class. in Germany". 
242. Times',12, 22 March, 1935. 
enquiry to see that my name is on the pay sheet, 
st. Albans council [yard] for tomorrow •.. Hence-
forth we will have a clean organisation. Could 
you ,arrange for the coal today?243 
501 
Sullivan also approached the Labour Department confid-
entially to persuade them to put another of his CUWA allies 
t th th d h · 244 on sus enance ra er an sen ~m to camp. The department 
complied with his request. 245 
In reality there was never any question of a "revolu-
tionary situation" in Christchurch. The local Communist Party 
numbered perhaps twenty members and contained several older 
men with established homes and families - the tribunes rather 
than the troops of revolution. Sometimes the party acquired 
a following, even a leadership, of young men seeking direct 
action and confrontation. But their numbers were small. 
Once they were arrested and effectively isolated in Paparua 
Prison, the moderates took control again. There was no 
monolithic communist trade union movement to provide an 
alternative administrative structure as in some continental 
countries. Nor was the wider trade union movement prepared 
to support any revolutionary move - there was no general 
strike against the wage cuts or at the time of the tramway 
dispute. Furthermore, there was no arsenal for a revolution. 
Most of the civilian firepower in the city lay in the homes 
of the wealthy who could afford to shoot ducks and hares for 
sport. A few of the politically active unemployed had served 
in the Great War. However, most returned servicemen remained 
243. West to Sullivan, 26 June, 1935, Christchurch City Council Mayoral 
Correspondence. 
244. Sullivan to Bromley, Christchurch City Council, Outward Correspondence, 
19 July, 1935. 
245. Sullivan to Bromley, Ibid., 9 September, 1935. 
fairly conservative and there was no body of trained, let 
alone armed, men to effect a takeover of the city. On the 
other side of the imaginary barricades, the forces of the 
state were never really stretched in Christchurch. The 
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defence of dozens of trams travelling throughout a sprawling 
urban area posed enormous difficulties during .the tramway 
strike, yet it was generally successful. Over a thousand 
special constables came forward to supplement the local police, 
but neither the territorials nor the regular army were called 
upon to operate as units within the city. 
The impact of new technology on this balance of forces 
should not be ignored. For example, the police were able to 
. gather several hundred "specials" within a few hours on 6 
May, 1932, without alerting those planning to attack the 
tramway sheds. It is difficult to see how that could have 
been done without the use of telephones and private motor 
vehicles. They were also able to rush arrested men away 
during the later confrontation in Cathedral Square before 
little tussles could turn into a riot. Lacking regular patrol 
cars, the local police used taxis for this work and to hurry 
246 to places where trouble was reported. Motor vehicles 
enabled reinforcements to be brought to Lancaster Park very 
quickly and the police Black Maria played an important role 
in removing the main focus of that demonstration. Generally, 
the authorities could move their forces at a modern pace while 
their opponents were largely restricted to travel by foot and 
bicycle. 
246. Many of the taxis were owned by W. Hayward, a member of the eTB, 
Times, 8 May, 1935. 
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Nevertheless, the absence of a revolution in Christchurch 
in the 'thirties was above all due to a lack of revolution-
aries. On'13 May, 1932, .the crowd outside the hospital board 
offices was warned to stop hooting at passing trams. These 
individuals were amongst the most destitute in the city, 
presumably with nothing to lose by going to prison. And yet 
they complied. 247 
• 247. Times, 13 May I 1932. 
CHAPTER NINE 
CLASS 
The study of class is concerned with the relationship 
between the separate economic roles of groups within the 
community and their distinct social attributes. The term 
504 
"class" is used to denote a section of society with a common 
economic base and a shared set of values, ambition, behav-
, 
iours and institutions which reflect and reinforce that base. l 
These soc~al attributes are explained and justified by each 
class's ideology.2 This special view of the world in turn 
explains and justifies the attitude of the class towards 
other classes. It legitimises those parts of the economic, 
social and political status quo which are in the interests of 
the class and serves as a basis for rejecting those aspects 
which are not. For a class with little power and recognition 
in a society, ideological rejection of the existing structure 
1. R. Bendix and S. Lipset, "Marx's Theory of Social Classes", in 
R. Bendix and S. Lipset (eds.), Class, Status, and Power, London, 1967, 
p.8, and M. Weber, "The Development of Caste", in Ibid., p.31. Also 
T. Bottomore, Classes in Modern Society, London, 1965, p.l6. 
It is not intended to argue .that class is the only dete~~inant of a 
person's behaviour and beliefs. other influences such as religion and 
personal relationships may also shape an individual's responses. Even 
class influences may be "fossilised" from a previous situation or 
generation - as in the case of "distressed gentlefolk". However, the 
linkage between class and economic forces makes the former particularly 
relevant to a study of depression and technological change. 
2. K. Krauss, Stratification, Class and Conflict, New York, 1976, p.22. 
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can be extremely sweeping. 3 In most cases, the ideologies of 
other classes are regarded as misguided or deliberate distor-
tions of reality - the products of ignorance or greed. 
While there are normally a number of levels of status 
within a class,4 it is possible for an individual to rise 
through them without changing his basic economic role or 
discarding his class values, Movement between classes, on 
the other hand, is generally restricted, either because it 
entails the acquisition of extraordinarily large amounts of 
capital or education, or because it involves the rejection of 
at least some learned values, and some of the people with whom 
the individual has grown up. Movement into more powerful 
classes normally requires a lifetime's work, or the launching 
of a new generation into a different class. Marriage partners, 
close friendships, and social activities tend to be restricted 
to one's own class although residual connections may remain 
when a person has crossed a class boundary. 
Paradoxically, class conflict arises because different 
classes must co-exist and co-operate. No class could maintain 
its separate identity or its standard .of living by dispensing 
3. • •• it is apparent that people on the bottom are not happy with 
their situation. This is true even in those social orders where 
great inequality has been institutionalized and where the deprived 
show public acceptance and appropriate differential [sic] behaviour. 
Yet in private they exhibit strong feelings against the existing 
arrangements and deny their legitimacy. Krauss, op.cit., p.189. 
4. "At the intra-class level, however, the emphasis upon competitive 
struggle gives way to a rather blander concern with the niceties of 
social differentiation." F. Parkin (ed.), The Social Analysis of Class 
Structure, London, 1974, p.l. For a strong critique of the value of 
occupational status rankings for overall social analysis, see A. Coxon 
and C. Jones, The Images of Occupational Prestige, London, 1978. The 
authors stress the class bias of most standard rankings and the tendency 
for different classes to rank occupations differently. See also Chapter 
Six in Class and Hierarchy, New York, 1979, by the same authors. 
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with all other classes because that would entail a return to 
a purely subsistence economy. Nevertheless, the precise 
distribution of social goods between different classes cannot 
be fixed permanently. Cyclical economic crises and techno-
logical changes are particularly likely to upset any balance 
before long. For example, the first wave of the Industrial 
Revolution led to a decline in the relative economic power 
of Britain's landowning aristocracy. By the end of the nine-
teenth century it was having to share its political power and 
social institutions with a substantial influx of people from 
successful capitalist backgrounds. S 
Political decisions may also exacerbate class conflict 
as individuals in powerful positions wholeheartedly believe 
in the universal justice of their class values. They natur-
ally wish to see them more amply rewarded economically and 
socially. Similarly, classes tend to try to impose their 
ideals on the rest of society through religion, education, 
the mass m~dia and the law. Hence, for example, the often 
fierce conflict in nineteenth century Britain between an 
established church iargely dominated by the aristocracy and 
a capitalist and working-class non-conformity.6 
The customary division of modern societies into two 
distinct classes, capitalist and workers, appears inappro-
priate to the case of Christchurch between the wars. The 
ownership of income-earning property was so widespread that 
individuals who described themselves as "working men" or as 
the proper representatives of the working class, and who were 
5. H. perkin, The Origins of Modern English Society, 1780-1880, London, 
1969, ch. 7, 8, 9. 
6. Ibid., p.347-64. 
apparently accepted as such by other working people, could 
let houses, speculate in land, hold mortgages or have a 
thousand pounds in the bank. 
Percy Wilson Sharpe, a leading Labour city councillor 
from 1927 until his death in 1930, had been a successful 
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cordia1.manufacturer in Australia and New Zealand up to his 
retirement in 1922. 7 He lived in a large house in fashionable 
Bank's Avenue and had visited Britain in 1924 to take an 
active part in the General Election. The son of a coal-miner 
and a coal-miner himge1f for a while, no-one seems to have 
questioned his integ+,ity in attacking capitalism while drawing 
a large income from investments. Yet he was recognised as a 
man of firm labour principles and was active in the No More 
War Movement. Four years before his death in 1930, he had 
acquired property in Richmond for subdivision. S The man 
with a thousand pounds in the Post Office applied for relief 
work but was rejected. 9 This was regarded as a case where 
a working man was penalised for his thrift. Another member 
of the unemployed was shocked to be prosecuted for collecting 
fifty shillings worth of relief from a depot while having 
£345 in the Post Office. 10 It was not unknown for 
relief workers to be letting houses to others. 11 Amongst 
7. Information from Press, 5 March, 27, 30 June, 1930; Times, 13 Marchi 
1930; 29 March, 1930; Sun, 5 April, 1930. 
S. Christchurch City Council, Outward Correspondence, 25 January, 1926. 
9. Sun, 30 June, 1931. 
10. 20 September, 1927. 
11. Some wrote to their Labour representatives asking for guidance. 
Christchurch City council, Outward Correspondence, 19 October, IS 
November, 1931; Howard Papers 9S0/28, 980/39. 
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those people holding mortg~ges in Christchurch in 1925 were 
a young trade union secretary prominent in the Labour Party, 
and a number of 1abourers. 12 
Clearly these individuals did not reject the cardinal 
principle of capitalism, the right to make money by investing 
money rather than by working. They remained "working people" 
by continuing to follow their trades, by the way they talked 
and behaved, and probably by the way they voted. True, the 
image of a society split between the archetypal capitalist 
and the stereotyped worker was evident, particularly at 
election meetings in working areas. It served. to dramatise 
politics, turning the contest into a clash between the forces 
of Good and Evil. A precise definition of the "capitalistic 
principle" being rejected in these political soap operas 
would have been counterproductive. Large numbers of workers 
and many of Labour's representatives would have had to change 
their ways to remain on the side of Right. In the workplace, 
the area where the economic interests of different classes 
met most clearly, the most constant conflict was between 
white-collar employees and wage-earners, both skilled and 
unskilled. 
At least five classes can be discerned in interwar 
Christchurch society in accordance with the above definition: 
capitalists, professionals, white-collar workers, the indepen-
dent working class and labourers. 13 Each had its own economic 
12. Mortgages registered with the Christchurch Supreme Court during 1925, 
bundles numbered 163 and 164. 
13. The concept of a number of classes in modern society, rather than just 
two or three, has a strong pedigree. Marx himself talked of "wage-
labourers, capitalists and landlords" as "the three great social 
classes", not the only ones. K. Marx, Capital, Chicago, 1909, vol.III; 
ch. xlii, p.l038-40, quoted in Perkin, op.cit., p.253. Marx himself 
apparently used the term "class" to describe nine different social 
groups while analysing political and economic developments in various 
countries during his lifetime. S. Ossowski (translated by S. Patterson) 
Class Structure in the Social Consciousness, London, 1963, p.81-2. 
base and typical values associated with that base. Each 
seems to have recognised a number of status levels within 
its own ranks, based not on specific occupations but on 
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the achievement of class ideals. Each class appears to have 
been concentrated in certain suburbs, though with substantial 
overlaps between classes with roughly similar incomes and 
generally compatible values. 
Stated occupations is a general rather than precise 
indication of a person's class in this scheme. This is 
partly due to imprecision in contemporary occupational des-
criptions. The title "engineer" could, for example, denote 
membership of a number of classes; probably skilled, possibly 
professional and conceivably capitalist. That of "accountant" 
was generally applied to a white-collar occupation, roughly 
equivalent to book-keeper or accounts clerk, but could 
describe a professional public accountant. A similar ambi-
, guity arises when trades such as those of grocer, boot-maker 
or confectioner'were applied to the owners of large enterprises 
rather than tradesmen. Luckily the major employers are 
generally well-known as most large enterprises were still 
practically, as well as nominally, family firms. Nevertheless, 
some major capitalists may have been hidden by the growing 
tendency for the wealthy to have salaried positions, such as 
manager, as well as their investment incomes. More import-
, 
antly, a doctor or lawyer could be a large landowner, with 
income from the practice of his profession only a small part 
of his total income. Similarly, it is very difficult to 
judge whether a manager employed for a long time in an 
industry should be regarded as a white-collar worker or a 
professional. Classification on the basis of occupation is 
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best regarded as descriptive in the mass rather than for all 
individuals so described. 
The capitalist class may be roughly defined as those 
who drew most of their income from the possession of capi tal 
assets rather than their own labour. Typically they had 
other people working under their authority, either directly 
or indirectly through the ownership of company shares. For 
this reason workers tended to refer tO'it as the "employer" 
or "employing" class. However, some capitalist received 
their income from rents, mortgages or trading in property 
without employing anyone permanently. Retired working people 
living on the income from savings accumulated during a life-
time's labour can generally be excluded from this definition. 
Far from "going up in the world", they had normally taken 
b t t ' 1 d ., t' t 14 a su s an ~a rop ~n ~ncome on re ~remen • Similarly, 
many tradesmen and shop-keepers could employ few staff without 
changing class because they continued to work alongside their 
employees. Within the urban workplace the most obvious 
feature of movement into the capitalist class tended to be 
separation from the work process itself, the retreat into a 
separate office and a purely supervisory role. Such a with-
drawal marked a practical as well as a symbolic separation 
from the experience of working people. 
Ironically an emphasis on work pervaded the ideal which 
the capitalist class cherished and which it had, to a large 
extent, succeeded in imposing on the rest of society. It was 
based on the myth of the "self-made man". lS Allegedly 
possessing only his labour and his wits, this individual was 
14. Census, 1926, vo1.XI, p.2, 36. 
15. Perkin, 
----
, p.221-30. 
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supposed to have used both to the full and to have deprived 
himself of present pleasures in order to reinvest his income. 
Interest and dividends were thus presented as a reward for 
hard work and self-denial which had benefitted the whole 
community be permitting investment in new productive capacity. 
vJage and salary earners were exhorted to follow the same 
path. Most proved somehow to lack the necessary qualities 
to achieve wealth, but their readiness to work hard, to 
accept self-deprivation and to acknowledge the superior 
social value of their employers could make then model employees. 
The capitalist ideal had gained a considerable currency 
in New Zealand during the nineteenth centruy. Not only was 
---------
it becoming the dominant ideology in Britain, the principal 
source of immigrants and culture, it was fostered by local 
conditions. The rapid economic development of the country 
had presented great opportunities to individuals with entre-
preneurial drive, even those with little capital. In 
particular, the value of assets cheaply acquired often 
quickly appreciated as the population increased rapidly and 
as improved transport facilities and technological change 
opened vast new markets overseas. 
Rural and frontier New Zealand provided the greatest 
range of opportunities, particularly for unskilled workers. 
Land development and land speculation, new forms of farming, 
gold-mining, timber-milling and labour contracting all offered 
chances to begin small and grow. The sub-division of land 
holdings by the Liberal Government had also contributed to 
the quota of rural "self-made men" who moved into land owner-
ship and often then into politics. Such success stories were-
more common in the North Island, where the development of 
farming had been more spectacular since the eighteen-
,i 
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eighties. 16 William Massey himself, Prime Minister between 
1912 and 1925, had been employed as a "servant" on a 
Canterbury estate prior to finding his fortune as a land-
owner in Auckland. 17 Nevertheless, Christchurch's rural 
hinterland could also furnish a number of famous examples. 
The most prominent of these was undoubtedly George Forbes, 
M.P. for Hurunui, leader of the Nationalist Party in 1925 
and Prime Minister from 1930 to 1935. He had built up a large 
and profitable farm near Cheviot after winning a section in 
one of the Liberal Government's land ballots. Forbes' family 
background was hardly poverty-stricken - his father was a 
sUbstantial ships' chandler and merchant in Lyttelton - but 
the image of a progress from shop-boy to sheep farmer and 
from a tent to the House of Representatives was cherished. 
George Witty, Liberal M.P. for Riccarton between 1902 and 
1925, and then Member of the Legislative Council, was another 
local example. Arriving from England in 1875 with only a 
village school education and apparently little capital, he 
"started milking and with threshing machine". Twenty years 
later the development of a series of farms had left him with 
sufficient leisure to serve on a wide range of local' bodies 
and then in parliament. Jeremiah Connolly, Independent 
Coalition United M.P. for Mid-Canterbury between 1931 and 
1935, rose from a relatively humble farming background to 
acquire large estates and the Cheviot Homestead. The legend 
that a hard-working individual could make his fortune and not 
just provide cheap labour for farmers by going into the 
") 
16. Unless otherwise specified the following biographical accounts are 
derived from G. Scholefield,Who's Who in New Zealand, Wellington, 1932. 
17. S.Eldred-Grigg, A Southern Gentry, Wellington, 1980, p.136. 
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country was still widely held, especially amongst older men. 
In the late 'twenties the unemployed were frequently exhorted 
to follow this path, and in 1928 both United and Labour 
candidates were pointing to their parties' land settlement 
policies partly to appeal to these sentiments. 18 
However, examples of entrepreneurial success were not 
limited to the rural hinterland. within Christchurch itself 
there was a continuing demand for the services of builders 
and contractors as the city grew. Improvements in communica-
tions during the late nineteenth century, particularly the 
construction of railways and roads, combined with population 
. growth to create a substantial market for Christchurch manu-
facturers within a relatively short period. Distance from 
overseas producers and customs duties, initially for revenue 
purposes, further widened the opportunities for local indus-
trialists. Consequently many of the city's most prominent 
citizens had been able to rise from comparatively humble 
beginnings - typically as skilled or white-collar rather than 
unskilled workers - to become major employers •. They could 
be cited (and frequently cited themselves) as living proof of 
the capitalist ideal. Henry Holland, mayor of the city 
between 1911 and 1918, and Reform M.P. for Christchurch North 
from 1925 to 1935, was a machinery merchant and owner of an 
engineering works who was reported to have begun his business 
pushing a cart about the city.19 He had been elected to the 
mayoralty as a Labour candidate. John Anderson, the pioneer 
blacksmith who had built up a large foundry and whose son was 
sufficiently accepted by the elite to become a director of the 
18. Times, 18 May, 1928; Sun, 22 August, 1928. 
19. Information from the late Leo Greer, of Bryndwr. 
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the Christchurch Press Company, had also become one of 
Christchurch's "self-madeu legends. 20 George Penfold, another 
blacksmith who founded a large engineering works, was said to 
have carried his own anvil over the Bridle Path from 
Lyttelton. 21 Thomas Edmonds, the baking powder magnate and 
prominent civic benefactor, had begun business in Christchurch 
as a self-employed grocer. 22 In common with many other manu-
facturers, he appears to have been regarded with a .special 
respect by Christchurch working people, not just for his 
success and his public generosity,23 but for the manner in 
which he had provided steady and well-paid employment for so 
many of them. 
The capitalist class a~d capitalist values were clearly 
dominant in Christchurch society by the 'twenties. Editorials 
in all four local newspapers were consistently strongly 
critical of trade unions which went on strike and they were 
strongly opposed to the Labour Party. The presence of endemic 
competition between classes, and sometimes even their separate 
existence, were frequently denied. 24 Industrial disputes were 
20. John Anderson, the only tradesman blacksmith among Canterbury's 
first four shiploads of settlers, possessed a rare combination 
of technical knowledge and ability. Such talent, coupled with 
tremendous energy and character, manifested itself within seven 
short years ••• G. Tait and A. Samuel (eds.), Industry and Commerce 
in New Zealand, Auckland, 1961, p.119. 
21. Information from the writer's mother t Mrs I.E. Watson, who lived opposite 
the Penfolds as a child. 
22. "The success story of T.J. Edmonds blends well with the history of New 
Zealand. It typifies both the growth of a robust young country and 
faith in its economic future." G. Tait and A. Samuel (eds.), Manufac-
turing in New Zealand, Auckland t 1959, p.13-l5. 
23. Amongst his gifts to the city were a clock tower, a park, a telephone 
booth and a band rotunda. He was also a major contributor to relief 
funds during the 'twenties and 'thirties. 
24. See criticism of the term "idle rich". Press, 6 February, 1926. "We 
are all workers and labourers in these days", declared Dr H.D.T. Ackland 
in 1935. 27 April, 1935. 
commonly blamed on professional troublemakers, supposedly 
supported by Russian Gold. 25 Pronouncements from the 
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Canterbury Chamber of Commerce, Employers' Association, Indus-
trial Association or the North Canterbury Farmers' Union were 
generally treated as authoritative. All the newspapers 
criticised government "interference" in business and were 
l 
generally unhappy about proposals for further state or muni-
, 1 t ' 26 c~pa en erpr~ses. Their chos~n targets tended to vary 
according to the particular sector of the economy it repre-
sented. Thus government intervention to assist the farming 
industry was generally welcomed by the Press while it attacked 
the protection of "artificial" secondary industries. 27 The 
S d th "t' 28 un reverse ese pr~or~ ~es. 
25. Press, 12 January, 25 November, 1926. In 1932 the Star blamed the 
Auckland disturbances on "agitators in New Zealand who are paid with 
Russian gold to organise syndicalist ebullitions of this nature". 
Star, 15 April, 1932. 
26. The Press was strongest on this subject: "In every direction one sees 
State Departments moving towards the enslavement of an unreflecting 
people". Press, 6 January, 1926. See attacks on the Post Office 
Savings Bank (19 June, 1926), the Public Trust (21, 29 June, 14, 20 
July, 1926) and Railways Department (24 November, 1926). The Times 
strongly criticised dairy control (21 July, 1926), and government by 
regulation (2 February, 11, 13 May, 1926) and "state interference" 
generally (24 March, 1926). The Sun took a similar line. Sun, 27 
September, 1927. The Star attacked the Coates Government for its 
numerous regulations. Star, 11, 15 May, 1926. 
27. This paradox can be most clearly seen in the debate over proposed duties 
on wheat and flour in 1926. The Press advocated protection for the 
wheat-grower. When "one of the newspaper organs of urban radicalism" 
mentioned that one miller had threatened to close his mill if duties 
were imposed, the Press suggested that that would lead to demands for 
"the establishment of a State flour mill on a large scale". Press, 
11 January, 1926. For typical attacks on protection for secondary 
industry, see Press, 13 January, 16, 17 February, 27 April, 1926. 
28. Sun, 6 September, 1926. Earlier the same newspaper had talked of 
"bucolic politics ••• sweetened propaganda from Tory pleaders, erudite 
professors, converted bankers, and itinerant expert". It called for 
development of secondary industries on the Australian model, i.e. with 
high tariff protection. Sun, 29 June, 1926. The Times took a similar 
line in milder terms. Times,S, 17 February, 23 April, 1926. The Star 
agreed on the need for greater "national self-reliance". Star, 
1 April, 1927. 
with a few notable exceptions such as the Rev. J.K. 
Archer, most churchmen concentrated on improving personal 
morality, and behaviour, and dispensing charity rather than 
criticising the distribution of income and power in their 
society. Wealthy capitalists were often leading members of 
their churches, helping to supervise the income-earning 
investments which supported them. 
Prominent social and service organisations like the 
Plunket Society, the Red Cross, Freemasons, Rotary, YMCA, 
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YWCA, Automobile Association, Progress League, and the local 
Jockey and Trotting Clubs were all dominated by capitalists. 
The latter were also prominent on the boards of governors of 
the Canterbury University College and Christchurch Technical 
Institute. They were particularly likely to be appointed 
Justices of the Peace and to serve on government-appointed 
committees inquiring into aspects of their industries. The 
highest ceremonial honours were sometimes accorded to them; 
as in Britain, New Zealand knights now tended to win their 
spurs in the bank, or the brewery rather than on the battlefield. 
Capitalists dominated the two political parties, Reform 
and Liberal (Nationalist, United), which won a majority of the 
votes cast in the Christchurch Urban Area throughout the 
'twenties. They held most of the parliamentary seats in the 
province and an overwhelming majority of those in the dominion 
as a whole. Up to 1927 those with business interests had 
controlled all the local authorities in Christchurch, as in 
every other city in New Zealand. Their greatest challenge had 
come in city council elections since 1911, but candidates 
standing in their interests had consistently won two-thirds of 
the seats. 
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During the nineteenth century there had been substantial 
resistance to the growth of capitalist power and prestige from 
large landowners with some claim to membership in the British 
aristoc;atic class. 29 By 1926, however, they appear to have 
largely melted into the·upper ranks of the local capitalist 
and professional classes. 30 Others had returned to Britain 
or moved to other parts of the Empire where prestigious 
military, diplomatic and judicial posts - the strongholds of 
the aristocracy - abounded. with Canterbury they still set 
the tone (and the accent) for the leading elements of the new 
31 
+uling classes. However, the mythology of their early days 
in the settlement had a strongly entrepreneurial flavour. 
The cult of "the pioneers ", preserved cob huts and former 
homesteads no bigger than cottages helped to establish a 
history of genteel hardship which justified the present wealth 
of their descendants. 32 The implication tended to be that the 
early runholders had done most of the physical labour of land 
development themselves, a decidedly misleading picture. 
Similarly, stationowners and runholders had generally taken 
29. "There was a significant dash of blue blood among South Island land-
owners". S. Eldred-Grigg, A Southern Gentry, Wellington, 1980, p.75-79. 
The economic interests of the large landowners lay primarily (though 
not exclusively) with exporting, importing or investments overseas. 
Ibid., p.lll-l7, 143-45; and S. Eldred-Grigg, "Whatever Happened to 
the Gentry", in NZJH, vo1.II, no.l, April, 1977, p.24. For this reason 
the term "colonial elite" has been used to describe them in this thesis. 
30. Ibid., p.2l. However, popular memories were not short. Making her 
first public speech during the 1935 municipal election campaign, Mrs 
E. Parlane l a Labour candidate declared that Dr H.D.T. Acland IIwould 
be the lord - he is'the lord now - of an aristocratic council". She 
described him as "a member of your aristocracy". Sun, 4 April, 1935. 
31. They still tended to be by far the wealthiest people in the province. 
For example, the estate of G.D. Greenwood was declared at "under 
£750,000 in 1932". Sun l 29 August, 1932. 
32. See series of articles on "The pilgrims" and "The Early Days", beginning 
Press, 30 June, 1930. 
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to.describing themselves as "s heepfarmers" or even just 
"farmers". These terms had previously been shunned by the 
gentry in New Zealand, as in Britain, and had been used to 
describe working farmers, typically tenants. Now the title 
was being used as a rallying-point against the forces of trade 
unionism and socialism. The most obvious and most conscious 
opposition to the capitalist ideal was now coming from within 
the working class. 
Despite its apparent dominance, the capitalist class was 
already losing ground in Christchurch well before the depres-
sion. The pace of economic development in New Zealand had 
slowed, restricting opportunities for entrepreneurs. This 
was particularly true of Canterbury and most of the South 
Island - would-be capitalists were well-advised to go north. 
At the same time, the larger population, increased urbanisation 
and improved technology had opened alternative avenues for 
young men who aspired to power and prestige. Government 
service was the greatest of these, but there was now also a 
firmly based trade union movement and a political party open 
to ambitious working youths. Moreover, whereas fifty years 
earlier a man was best advised to accumulate as much capital 
as possible if he wanted economic security, now there were 
many more "safe" jobs with central and local government, and 
with big private organisations. Furthermore, firms which had 
been built up by "self-made men" during Christchurch's 
industrialisation from the eighteen-seventies onwards were 
being passed on to their children by the nineteen-twenties. 
Those of them who took an active interest in the family business 
might retain some of their father's kudos as they continued 
with the mysterious but obviously prodigiously difficult and 
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inadequately rewarded work of keeping the firm profitable. 
However, it was clearly their inheritance of capital that had 
given them their wealth and authority. 
The new electrical and motor technology did create new 
opportunities for entrepreneurs. Amongst those in Christchurch 
who successfully rode the new wave was Harry Urlwin, who 
founded a large local business manufacturing and selling cheap 
domestic electrical appliances during the 'twenties. 33 An 
immigrant who had arrived in New Zealand as a teenager before 
the Great War, Urlwin had only had a limited education and 
had worked in a variety of unskilled occupations, including 
a stint as boot-boy in a hotel. Starting from a more finan-
cially secure background, Tracy Gough began to build his 
Christchurch based machinery empire during the early 'thirties. 
In 1933 James Hay floated a company to purchase the local 
34 
assets of MacKay, Logan and Co., his erstwhile employers. 
He then developed a department store whose popularity soon 
rivalled all others in Christchurch and formed the basis for 
a South Island chain. Miller, a Christchurch textile and 
clothing merchant, introduced mechanised mass-production into 
the local "rag trade" between 1930 and 1934, utilising the 
35 
speed of electrical sewing machines on a large scale. All 
these entrepreneurs appreciated the value of vigorous promo-
tional campaigns. Gough, for instance, made use of films 
supplied by Caterpillar Ltd., the American manufacturers of 
most of the machinery he sold. 36 Hay's store became famous 
33. Press, 9 July, 1983. 
34. Sun, 25 November, 1933. 
35. Star, 12 May, 1934. 
36. Sullivan to Manager, Gough, Gough, and Hamer, Christchurch city Council, 
Outward Correspondence, 4 November, 1936. 
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for the entertainment it provided for the children of its 
customers with a playground on the roof, an annual christmas 
parade and IIAunt Hayslll playing the role of a perennial 
Mother Christmas. 
Nevertheless, much of the new technology was controlled 
by large international firms such as Shell, British Imperial, 
Ford, General Motors, Caterpillar, McCormick-Deering and 
Electrolux. These either set up their own New Zealand oper-
ations or looked for local entrepreneurs with established 
distribution networks or sufficient capital to create them 
rapidly. The second wave of industrialisation here was 
inclined to be less spontaneous, more managed by its overseas 
creators. 
other pre-depression developments tended to shake the 
prestige of the capitalist class and their ideology. Many 
capitalists, particularly those owning farms, had done very 
well out of the Great War. IICost-plus li requisitioning and 
the commandeer on New Zealand's pastoral exports had guaranteed 
profits and greatly increased the value of land. Simultane-
• 
ously, working people faced a substantial fall in their real 
wages. This seemed to undermine the traditional capitalist 
argument that they worked to benefit all society by increasing 
production and profits. That such gains were made during a 
war in which so many local sons enthusiastically volunteered 
or were conscripted and died overseas added to the sense of 
outrage. These sentiments appear to have contributed 
substantially to the New Zealand Labour Party's electoral 
breakthrough in 1919. 37 The scope of central direction during 
37. E. P1umridge, Labour in Christchurch: Community and Consciousness, 
1914-1919, unpublished M.A. thesis, Canterbury University, 1979, 
p.191-93. 
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the war effort, its financing and its success also gave its 
socialist opponents powerful new ammunition. The inevitable 
objection to their schemes, "but where's the money to come 
from", could now be answered, effectively if imprecisely, 
"there was plenty of money for war". This parallel became a 
recurring theme in Labour calls for government action to 
combat unemployment. The immediate post-war boom in farm 
properties, fueled by government loans to returned servicemen, 
probably made a few fortunes and certainly drew speculators 
from a wide section of society. However, the disappointment 
which followed brought much disillusionment, particularly for 
soldier-settlers who were forced to walk off the properties 
in which they had invested their hopes as well as their 
capital. Some speculators and those landowners who had sold 
at the height of the boom made money while new producers were 
fortunate to struggle on under a load of debt. 
But it was the depression itself which shook the moral 
leadership of capitalism most severely. Instead of the trad-
itional sharp cyclical downturn of twelve months or so, the 
economic crisis proved to be exceptionally intractable. The 
self-righting mechanisms of capitalist theory appeared to be 
no longer operating. Conservative economists might blame 
this on undue government interference in finance and trade, 
but in the absence of international co-operation and the 
presence of democratic governments their laissez-faire 
solutions were largely irrelevant. In most countries there 
were loud calls for more protection, deflation or inflation 
through the manipulation of government spending, state sub-
sidies for producers and special arrangements to control prices 
by limiting "overproduction". Leading capitalists were amongst 
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the most enthusiastic advocates of these policies. 38 
The cherished capitalist image of "private enterprise" 
had long been compromised in New Zealand. The new country 
lacked the accumulated capital and the population to make 
the provision of many modern services possible privately. 
Consequently whereas railways, gas, electricity, water-supply 
and even roading had been promoted by private capital in 
Britain, here they generally fell to central and local 
government. The building and construction sector looked 
anxiously for government contracts in these fields and had 
benefitted greatly from state advances to workers, while the 
dominion's manufacturers jealously guarded their tariff 
protection. Now New Zealand capitalism produced easily its 
fair share of "currency cranks" and other folks who simply 
wanted to crank up the currency. 
Canterbury's farmer-capitalists were generally enthusi-
astic supporters of devaluation. At a meeting in the 
Addington Saleyards in 1932 a large number of them debated 
the size of the proposed depreciation in something akin to 
an auction. They eventually agreed that a forty per cent 
. . h' . Id f' 39 lncrease ln t elr monetary lncomes wou seem alr. No 
attention appears to have been paid to the possible effects 
on the rest of the community. Other capitalists, rural and 
urban, looked to Douglas Social Credit to correct anomalies 
which they believed had arisen in the capitalist system. 
Often "the Major's" supporters were progressive young 
38. D. A1dcroft, The Inter-War Economy: Britain, 1919-1938, LOndon, 1970, 
ch.9. The Sun recognised this trend when it took the Canterbury 
Chamber of Commerce to task for continued attacks on "State interven-
tion": "It knows, or should know, that private traders the world over 
are forced, because of the changed situation, to depend increasingly 
on government championship and support". Sun, 14 July, 1934. 
39. Sun, 23 November, 1932. 
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businessmen enthusiastic about the development of new tech-
nology. For example, the president of the local Douglas Social 
Credit League was Alan Allardyce, a radio enthusiast who 
broadcast New Zealand's first commentaries of rugby matches 
and horse races. Such people wanted to see the development 
of a modern monetary system to encourage the spread of new 
technology and to exploit the increase in productivity it 
promised. However, despite Social Credit's unequivocal support 
for the capitalist producer against the banks, it signified a 
further compromise on capitalist ideology. The creation of 
a Credit Authority, whatever its composition, meant central 
control of the very life-blood of capitalism. 
Other forward-thinking capitalists who refused to enlist 
in the army of Major Douglas were sometimes prone to do a 
little economic engineering of their own. Having played an 
active role in the public condemnation of the coalition's 
manipulation of the exchange rate, Sidney Holland proceeded 
to devise a whole new monetary system for the subsequent 
parliamentary inquiry into banking and finance. 40 His scheme 
was based on the issue of coupons in return for labour. The 
coupons were to be destroyed once they had been cashed for 
goods. Similarly, the argument that the government should 
"do something" to i,ncrea,se the purchasing power of ordinary 
people found strong support with businessmen such as James 
41 Hay who were selling goods to those people. 
40. W. Sutch, The Quest for Security in New Zealand, 1840-1966, Wellington, 
1966, p.174. 
41. Times, 25 July, 1933. Hay took a strong line on the need for the 
churches to investigate social questions in an address to the presby-
terian Social Services Association of which he was a very active 
member: 
No longer can the Church dissociate itself from the urgent 
problems that confront us •.• and it should be concerned with 
the causes which have brought about this distress rather than 
dealing solely with the effects. Star-Sun, 31 October, 1935. 
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The capitalist class in New Zealand became bitterly 
divided over the extent and direction of government interven-
tion. In Christchurch the Sun and the Star, newspapers which 
generally represented the interests of city capitalists, 
lambasted the farmer-dominated government steadily between 
1931 and 1935. 42 Similarly, the extent of the coalition's 
electoral disaster in the latter year can be partly ascribed 
to the rise of the Democrats. Their appeal was principally 
to those capitalists, such as mortgagees and importers, who 
had suffered most from the government's benevolence towards 
43 its farming supporters. Such figures and self-interested 
disunity amongst capitalists was not a spectacle calculated 
to increase their public prestige. 
Meanwhile, the depression was tending to undermine 
confidence in capital accumulation as the avenue to security. 
While mortgagees saw the value of their investments shrink 
and even disappear, mortgagors lost their equity. Income from 
mortgages, debentures and savings were arbitrarily reduced. 
At the most basic level some people lost most of their capital 
stock of goods - house, furniture and even clothes. The 
42. See, for example, the criticism of the New Zealand Meat Producers' 
Board's evidence to the Tariff Commission: 
The farmers come first. It does not matter what happens 
to any other section of the community as long as the 
farmers are protected to the utmost. 
Now, there is a widespread feeling in the country that 
enough has been done already for the farmers. They have 
had an extraordinarily fair deal from the Government ••• 
The result is that there are now intense feelings of 
hostility against the farming interests. Sun, 19 October, 1933. 
The Star could be even harsher - "Once again it is the backbone of the 
country that needs propping up. Only farmers are to benefit". ~, 
9 February, 1935. It called the increased exchange rate "a surrender 
of cabinet to the agricultural interests" (20 January, 1933) and 
claimed that "Mr Coates' brand of socialism, like high exchange, aims 
at an unequal distribution for the benefit of a section" (26 October, 
1934), 
43. There was particularly loud applause for H. Hislop, the Democrat leader, 
when he declared at a Christchurch meeting that the Sales tax would go 
when his party came to power. star-Sun, 1 November, 1935. 
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wisdom of "saving for a rainy day" seemed to be vanishing in 
the face of an economic Little Ice Age. Government assistance 
appeared increasingly more relevant than capitalist self-
reliance. 
The professional class was well-positioned to occupy 
much of the ground which capitalism had proven unable to fill. 
Despite its essentially protean nature, the characteristics 
of this class, its interests and its ideology were evident in 
New Zealand by the I twenties. 
Precise definition of the term "professional" is diffi-
44 
cult. Some of the attributes traditionally ascribed it to, 
such as self-employment and the use of a fixed scale of 
charges for services, were already outdated in the 'twenties 
as increasing numbers of doctors and lawyers were taking up 
salaried positions in the state services. As with the 
skilled trades, the ultimate allegiance of the professional 
is theoretically supposed to be to the principles of his 
profession rather than to self-interest or to an employer. 
In most cases, but certainly not all, his work is open to 
judgement by a tribunal chosen from amongst distinguished 
fellow members of the profession and legally empowered .to pre-
t h ' t" 45 ven 1m prac lslng. The special legal status often accorded 
44. Much of the definition described below derives from H. Perkin, op.cit., 
p.252-270, a section entitled appropriately "The Forgotten Middle 
Class". Also Professionalism, Property and English Society Since 1880, 
Reading, 1981, the Stenton Lecture delivered by the same author. 
45. Perkin stresses the "fiduciary" nature of professionalism: 
••• the essence of a profession is the provision of an esoteric, 
evanescent, fiduciary service - salvation, litigation, medical 
advice, education, financial control, administration, or even 
engineering (when the final test involves loss of life) - which 
is beyond the immediate judgement of the non-professional, 
cannot easily be pinned down or faulted even when it fails to 
achieve the desired result, and must therefore be taken on 
trust. Perkin, Professionalism ••• , p.8. 
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such tribunals and the stress on authoritative rather than 
majority decisions separates these proceedings from those of 
trade unions. Probably the most obvious factor typifying the 
modern professional is a prolonged formal education, usually 
including full-time attendance at an academy where both the 
I 
written knowledge and the ethics of the profession are 
supposed to be imparted in a controlled environment. 46 At 
the very least a professional needs a good command of written 
language; an illiterate professional is as difficult to 
envisage as an illiterate clerk. He must also be able to 
grasp abstract concepts and principles, the existence of 
which are a hallmark of professionalism. Finally, unlike the 
entrepreneur, the professional always claims to represent the 
interests of someone or something other than himself; the 
doctor his patient, the lawyer his client, the clergyman his 
congregation, the public servant the government, the architect 
and the engineer those who commission them, the professor his 
students. 
It is often tempting to try to judge when a politician or 
a trade unionists ceases to be representative of the class from 
which he springs and becomes a professional representative 
instead, reluctant and perhaps unable to return to his origins. 
Faced with the loss of their positions or the prospect of 
professional advancement, such individuals may well abandon 
their erstwhile colleagues. Perhaps the best-known New Zealand 
example of this during the 'thirties was the career of Walter 
Bromley. An English coalminer with only a primary school 
education, Bromley rose through positions on the New Zealand 
46. Professions have tended to become more academically based. It would 
be wrong to exclude many solicitors, journalists, military and ships' 
officers, and engineers from this class between the wars because they 
had not attended a professional academy. 
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Amalgamated Engineers' Union to become secretary, then pres-
ident, of the Wellington Trades Council, assistant secretary 
of the New Zealand Labour Party and a Labour parliamentary 
candidate. He was appointed as a workers' representative to 
the Unemployment Board in 1930 and became its secretary. 
The force behind much of the board's work, Bromley at times 
rivalled his mentor Gordon Coates for the title of most hated 
man amongst the unemployed. 47 Significantly, he retained a 
prominent position in the Labour Department following the 
change of government in 1935. A local example of the same 
process can be seen in the case of Hiram Hunter, secretary at 
various times of a number of local unions included the Drivers', 
Timber Workers' and Tramway Employees'. He represented Labour 
on the Christchurch City Council between 1911 and 1923, and 
contested the Mid-Canterbury seat for the party in 1931. By 
1938, however, he had drifted so far from his class background 
that he was prepared to contest the Avon seat in opposition to 
Dan Sullivan, a former colleague on the United Federation of 
Labour and no Bolshevik. 
Because their role is to articulate and-represent the 
interests of others, it is also difficult to isolate the 
common interests of the professional class with precision. 
Professionals are traditionally the formulators and purveyors 
of the ideals of other classes, and amongst the strongest 
believers in those ideals. For example, professional econo-
mists produced the classical economic theories which raised 
the entrepreneur to the stature of economic hero. 48 Further-
more, the children of the rich and powerful had long dominated 
47. T. Simpson, The Sugarbag Years, Wellington, 1974, p.60-62. 
48. Perkin, The Origins ••• , p.22l-29, 319-20. 
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certain professions, most notably the law and the established 
church. Except for a fortunate:·,few who won scholarships and 
gained state or academic appointments, the cost of several 
extra years of full-time education and of purchasing a 
practice tended to restrict entry to most professions to 
persons with wealthy backgrounds. Individuals with profes-
sional qualifications might well find themselves managing the 
family's business interests rather than practising. Finally, 
in the absence of medical benefits and legal aid, a dispro-
portionate amount of the work of doctors and lawyers, as well 
as that of other professionals such as architects and engineers, 
was transacted with wealthy clients. 
Nevertheless, the bases of the professional and capitalist 
classes were different, and potentially in conflict. The 
professional ideal was based on intellectual intelligence and 
education, that of the capitalist on success in the marketplace. 
Left to itself the market often provided quacks and charlatans 
with good livings, sometimes better than those of honest 
practitioners. Professionals therefore re~uested and received 
Acts of Parliament so that they could purge their own 
t ' 49 voca l.ons. There was little direct profit to be made by 
businessmen in improving urban sanitation or educating the 
mass of the population, so the professionals urging such 
innovations worked through local and central government. 
Although sel~om socialist, they tended to respond to problems 
with suggestions for new legislation and regulation under the 
control of property, i.e. professionally qualified people. 
After all, the major professions of law, the civil service and 
49. Ibid., p.254-55. 
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the church all had their origins in the imposition of central 
authority. During the nineteenth century other professions 
had benefitted from compulsory schooling, public health 
regulations, official standards in engineering and laws 
controlling the presentation of company accounts. The power 
and the prospects for expansion of the professional class lay 
increasingly with the expansion of governmental authority. 
Some recognised this openly and came to constitute a Fabian 
element within working-class political movements. However, 
they tended to stress the efficiency that would come with 
socialism, which to them meant government by qualified and 
disinterested professionals. This was not at all the millen-
nium that most w?rking-class socialists envisaged, with its 
heavy emphasis on democracy and egalitarianism throughout 
society. 
As with the Capitalist Class, the first wave of the 
Industrial Revolution had brought about a substantial expansion 
of the professional class in terms of size, importance, reput-
ation and self-confidence. Much greater numbers of people 
could now afford the services of doctors, lawyers and arch-
itects. Society could support many more non-conformist 
clergymen, popular writers, mass political organisations, new 
private schools and academies, and assorted "social cranks". 
In short, almost the whole professional gamut. Consequently 
the nineteenth century witnessed great advances in legislation 
protecting professional standards, imposing "rational" 
improvements at the behest of professionals and leading to the 
state and local body employment of large numbers of profes-
sionally-trained experts. 
The second wave of industrialisation was even more fav-
ourable to the professional class and comparatively less so 
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for the capitalists. This was because the growing complexity 
of technology was making the scientist an increasingly import-
ant figure and the individual entrepreneur of limited 
education much less significant. with a few exceptions, major 
technical progress was now the result of theoretical research 
and laboratory investigation rather than the products of 
empirical experimentation by self-taught "inventors" or 
factory-owners seeking to overcome production problems. 50 
Large corporations which could afford to employ numbers of 
university-trained specialists in expensively equipped lab-
oratories·came to be the great founts of progress. It is 
estimated that in the United states $80 million was spent on 
research and development in 1920, $130 million in 1930 and 
$377 million in 1940. 51 Universities themselves became 
recognised as great centres of immediately or ultimately pro-
ductive research rather than just the training-grounds of 
clerics, lawyers and gentlemen. 
The Great War had given a fillip to this development as 
governments sought to produce new weapons and synthesize 
materials·at short notice. The British government in partic-
ular came to believe that its industrial capitalists had not 
matched the investment of their German counterparts in many 
areas of research with strategic implications. One result was 
the establishment of the Department of Scientific and Industrial 
Res,earch in 1916. Moreover, the organisation of "total war" in 
an industrial society demanded access to a vast range of 
50. L. Hannah, Electricity Before Nationalisation, London, 1979, p.l; 
L. Mumford, Technics and Civilisation, London, 1947, p.217; P. Drucker, 
"Technological Trends in the Twentieth Century", in M. Kranzberg and 
C. Pursell, Technology in western Civilisation: vol.2, Technology in 
in the Twentieth Century, New York, 1967, p.16. 
51. E. Ginzberg, Technology and Social Change, Columbia, New York, 1964, 
p.47. 
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professional skills. Nutritionists, meteorologists and 
mathematicians were often as valuable as industrial chemists. 
Economists were.called in to manipulate money and psychologists 
to manipulate minds. The welfare of millions of previously 
neglected subjects suddenly became a primary concern of the 
state and the demand for medical and psychiatric services 
multiplied rapidly. "The expert" emerged from the war with a 
greatly enhanced reputation. 
The authorities and public opinion in New Zealand gener-
ally shared this changing perception of professionalism. The 
results of the dominion's enthusiastic participation in the 
Imperial war effort helped to make some local doctors cele-
brities. Dr H.,rr.D. Acland, a member of a colonial elite 
family, gained a great reputation as a surgeon during the war 
and it was this rather than his family background which enhanced 
his electoral appeal. He not only polled highly as a member 
of the North Canterbury Hospital Board, but nearly unseated 
Dan Sullivan 'as mayor of Christchurch in 1935. Other local 
doctors who converted their professional reputations into 
political ~ssets during the same election were John Guthrie 
and Antony Sandston. Campaigns to raise money for new medical 
facilities were major events during the 'twenties, outstripping 
appeals to assist the unemployed. Such campaigns included one 
for the provision of new radium to the public hospital,52 the 
. . l' . 1 53 construction of St. George's Pr1vate Hosp1ta 1n Mer1va e, 
. h . t 54 and a nation-w1de appeal to support researc 1n 0 cancer, 
an i~creasingly evident killer. 
52. F.O. Bennett, Hospital on the Avon, Christchurch, 1962, p.203. 
53. L. Averill, st. George's Hospital: The First Fifty Years, Christchurch 
1978, p.18-35. 
54. Press, 22 February, 1929. 
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Medicine was only one of the professions expanding rapidly 
in numbers and prestige, both locally and nationally. In 
particular,' the farming industry was becoming increasingly 
aware of the benefits of scientific research to production~ 
According to one farm adviser, who was later to become 
Director-General of Agriculture, it was during the 'twenties 
that 
research gave impetus to advisory work and the 
reorganisation and expansion of agricultural 
education ••• provided qualified people to carry 
out expanding programmes. In short, research 
and advisory work in agriculture became a 
recognised profession. With its expansion, 
recruitment of students to enter courses became 
an important matter of Government policy.55 
A second agricultural college (Massey) was founded in 1923, but 
this did not prevent the continued growth of the first, at 
Lincoln, set up four decades earlier. A Master of Agricultural 
Science degree was introduced at both. In 1926 the Coates 
government established the Department of Scientific and 
Industrial Research (DSIR) on the British model, and it soon 
became deeply involved in wool, soil and plant research. In 
1927 a separate Wheat Research Institute was established in 
Christchurch under the direction of F.W. Hilgendorf. A sim-
ilar Dairy Research Institute was setup in the North Island. 
other sectors were. likewise turning increasingly to 
scientists to solve their problems. The DSIR was involved in 
research for secondary as well as primary industry, and also 
played a growing role in providing forensic evidence for the 
police. The latter were particularly enthusiastic about the 
assistance which finger-printing had given them since the 
Great war. 56 The State Forest Service greatly expanded its 
55. P. Smallfield, The Grasslands Revolution in New Zealand, Auckland, 
1970, p.98. 
56. ~, 1930, H 16, p.4. 
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research into the suitability of ~arious exotic trees to New 
Zealand conditions. 57 Similarly, the explosive development 
of the Electricity Division of the Public Works Department 
and the proliferation of electrical supply authorities rapidly 
increased the demand for qualified electrical engineers during 
the 'twenties. The Health Department's medical inspection 
of school children expanded and the Hospital Act of 1926 
extended its control over local hospital boards. A Eugenics 
Board was created in 1929 to investigate ways of introducing 
this method of "improving the race",58 something of a bee 
in the professional bonnet for the past hundred years. 
Approaching similar problems from a different direction, the 
Education Department commenced its psychiatric service in 
1927. 59 
The bureaucracy of central government was also becoming 
increasingly professional. The passage of the Public Service 
Act in 1912 greatly assisted this process by removing the 
appointment, disciplining and dismissal of civil servants from 
political control. The Public Service Commissioner appointed 
in 1922, P.D. Verschaffe1t, appears to have been particularly 
effective in building up this professionalism. The proportion 
of professionally qualified individuals within the public 
service increased substantially during the early 'thirties. 60 
57. A. Poole, Forestry in New Zealand, Auckland, 1969, p.2l-26. 
58. AJHR, 1930, H 7, p.3. 
59. Star, 2, 3 March, 1927. 
60. Verschaffelt put this down partly to reduced recruiting, which enabled 
the public service to select only the best-qualified. Simultaneously, 
older off·icers - those less likely to be professionally qualified -
were retiring or being retired. By 1934, 1,041 out of 7,400 public 
servants had tertiary qualifications. Star, 27 April, 1934. . 
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This was partly due to premature retirements, which reduced 
the number of older, unqualified staff, and to the restricted 
intake of new officers, which enabled the better-qualified to 
be chosen. However, there was also a strong trend for 
existing staff to acquire university training part-time. The 
Reichel-Tate Royal Commission on University Education in New 
Zealand in 1926 was surprised by the extent of such training 
and regarded it unfavourably. It noted that only just over 
half the 190 law students at Victoria University College were 
employed in law offices - "the remainder were mainly state 
servants,who had little chance of gaining practice in law 
in their employment". 61 This seems to have partly accounted 
for the fact that New Zealand had three times the number of 
law students for its population as New South Wales and 
Victoria. The Royal Commission's narrow and elitist view of 
university education - that its aim should be to produce a 
few brilliant specialists and a large number of gentlemen with 
a liberal education - ran counter to the trend. Yet the-extent 
of part-time education in New Zealand arguably did more to 
extend respect for academics and academic education amongst 
other classes, especially white-collar workers, than a more 
selective system. Verschaffelt himself appears to have gained 
his Bachelor of Laws degree while in paid employment. 
professionally qualified engineers and administrators 
were also beginning to appear in local government positions. 
probably the most striking Christchurch example was that of 
A.R. Galbraith, who took up the position of City Engineer in 
1926. His influence was soon noticeable, with the Works' 
Departme~t Annual Report expanding ten-fold in size to become 
61. H. Parton, The University of New Zealand, Auckland, 1979, p.47. 
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a careful survey of the department's resources and needs as 
11 't k 62 d h ' , , we as ~ s wor. He ensure t at fac~l~t~es and staff 
numbers in the Engineer's office improved at an even faster 
rate than the volume of the council's outside work. 63 The 
Town-planning Act of 1927, the beginnings of professional 
control and direction of development, was partly responsible 
for this. The Tramways Act of 1926, which gave the council 
the power to licence bus services within the urban area, was 
another example of such limitations on the play of market 
forces in the city. 
Those nurseries of the professional class, the universities, 
were also expanding rapidly, largely in response to the 
increasing demand for their graduates. Between 1900 and 1925 
. . 
the number of undergraduates in New Zealand universities had 
increased from 800 to 4000, and the number of staff (including 
part-time lecturers) from 50 to 170. 64 This.trend does not 
appear to have been reversed by the depression. In fact, the 
number of full-time university lecturers in New Zealand . 
increased from 97 in 1926 to 148 in 1936, roughly triple the 
65 
overall rate of increase in the workforce. The incentive to 
excel was also increasing. In 1900 less than one in five of 
those on university staffs had been trained in New.Zealand; 
in 1925 over half. 66 Qualifications gained overseas were still 
62. Christchurch City Council, City Surveyor's Report, 1925, and city 
Engineer's Report, 1926. 
63. In July, 1925, the Works Department had an office staff of five and an 
annual salary bill of £2,389. A year later it had ten office-workers 
costing a total of £4,532 per annum. By 1929 the staff totalled twenty 
and the overall administration cost was £6,089, compared with £2,370 in 
1924-25. Christchurch city Council, City Engineer's Reports, 1926, 1929. 
64. Parton, op.cit., p.42. 
65. Census, 1926, vol. IX, p.48; 1936, vol.X, p.49, 58. 
66. Parton, op.cit., p.42. 
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a t a premi urn, however, and opportuni tie s to gain them \vere 
growing as well. In 1931 six out of the seven dominion-based 
postgraduate and travelling scholarships available tQNew 
Zealand students had been instituted since the Great war. 67 
The development of educational and discussion groups open 
to the wider public but dealing with academic questions was an 
important symptom of, and contribution to, the growth in 
professional prestige. The Workers' Educational Association 
(WEA) was the most prominent of these. Its Christchuroh branch 
was founded on the eve of the Great \var and provided a pla t-
form for local professionals, principally university lecturers, 
68 
secondary schoolteachers and clergymen. It drew in people 
from a surprisingly wide social and political range. In 1931 
the local and dominion president was H.D. Acland, the lawyer 
son of a colonial elite family, also president of the New 
Zealand Sheepowners' Federation and the Christchurch Citizens' 
Association, and a prominent member of the Reform Party. The 
dominion and local Organising Secretary was George Manning, 
a trade union official and a past and future Labour Party city 
councillor~ Others active in the Christchurch association 
included M.E. Lyons, a Citizens' councillor and nearly 
successful Reform candidate in Lyttelton in 1925, and Mrs 
Fournier, wife of the city's most prominent communist. By 
67. G. Scholefield, Who's Who in New Zealand, Wellington, 1932, p.44-46. 
68. Star, 6 May, 1927. 
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1927 the Christchurch WEA was running twenty-six classes, the 
majority of them outside the urban area. 69 
Economics was a popular subject amongst WEA students in 
the late 'twenties as well as in the darker days of the early 
'thirties. Public interest in the subject was also reflected 
in the formation of an Economics Society at Canterbury 
70 College. The study of other "social questions" was taken 
up by the Christchurch Practical Psychology Club (CPPC), 
founded in 1928. 71 During 1926 one local newspaper with a 
large working-class readership looked to psycho-analysis and 
sociology to eventually overcome the problem of crime. 72 Three 
years later it was discussing lIcrime as a university subject" 
and was quoting with favour Miss B.E. 'Baughan B.A., of the 
CPPC on the need for more professional treatment for criminals.73 
But this attitude was radically revised during the public hys-
teria which accompanied the Gray brothers' spree of robbery 
and arson. Miss Baughan claimed that the youths should not be 
punished but referred to the Mental Defectives Board because . 
they were "clearly abnormal" and their "social sense evidently 
infantile".74 The Star dismissed such arguments, maintaining 
69. Times, 8 April, 1927. Of the 464 men enrolled, 226 were described as 
"manual workers". The remainder were classed as office workers (102), 
sales employees (60), professionals (45), or teachers (31). Of the 
755 women enrolled, 391 were "at horne" Le. not in. paid employment, 
70. 
7l. 
72. 
73. 
74. 
120 were teachers and 90 office workers. The progressive professionals 
of the WEA were clearly carrying their message to sections of the white-
collar class, normally strong supporters of capital in their disdain of 
the labour movement. Admiration for one's "betters" in education and 
intellect could be a powerful counterweight to admiration for the 
"better born" or "better-off". 
Star, 8 June, 1929. 
Star, 12 October, 1928. 
Star, 2 June, 1926. 
Star, 12, 16 April, 1929. 
Star, 21 February, 1930. 
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that "New Zealand is suffering from an orgy of leniency" and 
that it "could do with a few birchings ll • 75 In short, the 
newspaper returned to the values of individual responsibility 
and deterrence of and retribution for crime through vigorous 
punishment. These were values held aLmost universally in 
every other class except the professional. 
Leading local professionals repeatedly demonstrated an 
awareness of their growing social and political role as well 
as their. increasing economic importance. In a speech at 
Canterbury College early in 1926, Professor H.G. Denham, head 
of Chemistry, envisaged the professionally-trained'as the 
arbiters between other classes: 
The scientific worker, isolated in his laboratory, 
was often in a far better position to solve an 
industrial trouble by reason of his unbiased 
judgment, and by his knowledge of kindred problems 
revealed in literature, than was the industralist, 
or even his own scientific staff. 
There was a need to 
increase the supply of trained investigators, 
fitted with the proper outlook towards truth, 
trained in the scientific method, and, above 
all, imbued with the scientific spirit. 76 
Similarly, James Hight, Professor of History and Rector of the 
College, maintained that lithe war stressed the social and 
political value of higher education ll • 77 One DSIR scientist, 
F.R. Callaghan, went so far as to suggest that the government 
should provide cheap loans to those educated at an agricultural 
college. 78 He claimed that a lack of education was now the 
main brake on production. 
75. Star, 24, 27 February, 1930. Later it opposed the Howard League's 
request for a psychiatric clinic in Christchurch: "we still have mental 
hospitals and gaols as an absolutely necessary feature of the social 
order". 4 November, 1930. 
76. Star, 19 March, 1926. 
77. ~, 23 March, 1928. 
78. ~, 18 July, 1927. 
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The expression of this professional class confidence 
through direct participation in politics was still limited, 
but it was 'growing. Labour's successful ticket in the city 
council elections of 1927 included the Rev. J.K. Archer, a 
university-trained Baptist minister; the Rev. Clyde Carr, 
who had attended three of the country's university colleges; 
and George Manning M.A., a trade union secretary who had 
gained his degree at CanteJ::1bury College. James McCombs, M.P. 
for Lyttelton and re-elected city councillor in 1929, had 
trained for the Anglican ministry. Although not herself 
professionally-trained, his wife Elizabeth espoused a Fabian 
ideology which emphasised education and efficient government. 
Their son Terence, a secondary schoolteacher and Doctor of 
Science, was to be the second university graduate elected to 
parliamerit for Labour when he succeeded his mother as M.P. for 
Lyttelton at a by-election in 1935. 79 A British medical 
practitioner, Dr Frank Birkinshaw, was virtually assured of 
the Labour candidacy for Hurunui during the General Election 
80 
of 1935 but for some reason his nomination did not proceed. 
Nationally, Labour had a significant new echelon on intellec-
tuals as a result of its victory, including Dr D.G. McMillan, 
the Rev. A. Nordmeyer and Ormond Wilson. With the defeat of 
both T.K. Sidey and W.D. Stewart in Dunedin, the only M.P. in 
the National Party with any university training was Adam 
Hamilton. Labour was clearly becoming the party of the politi-
cally active intellectual as well as that of the working classes. 
79. Henry Greathead Rex Mason, M.A., LL.B., M.P. from 1926 for Eden and 
then Auckland Suburbs, was the first. Fred Schramm, M.P. for Auckland 
East from 1931, had studied at Canterbury College and worked as a 
solicitor. However, he did not possess a degree. 
80. Times, 1 May, 1935. 
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Within Canterbury College and in public, the Economics 
lecturer George Lawn voiced support for Labour and socialism 
. 81 1n a vague way. He was appointed to the Reserve Bank Board 
following the change of government. University staff who 
took a firmer socialist line during the early 'thirties 
included Professor F. Sinclaire and Helen Simpson, both of 
the English Department. 82 Sinclaire had edited a journal 
called Socialist in Melbourne. Winston Rhodes, an outstanding 
scholar, arrived at the university college in 1933, also from 
Melbourne. He had a considerable influence on the opinions of 
some of the more thoughtful students. 83 
The selection and election of a number of Labour candi-
dates with professional qualifications during 1935 was partly 
a manifestation of the way that the depression further 
enhanced the prestige of the professional class. It also 
showed how the determination had grown within that class to 
make government work better, more professionally, if necessary 
by entering it themselves. 
There were many other indications of these trends. with 
capitalism apparently failing, public interest in possible 
alternatives and in economics generally was running high. This 
was indicated by the heavy demand at the Canterbury Public 
Library for books dealing with economics, or life within the 
Soviet union. 84 Unemployment gave many more people both the 
81. See for example lecture blaming the depression 
and maintaining that it would not cure itself. 
He was also associated with the Friends of the 
26 September, 1932. 
on "the economic system" 
Press, 29 April, 1931. 
Soviet Union. Times, 
82. See interview with Denis Glover in Simpson, op.cit., p.124. 
83. Information from Jim Gardner, a student at the time. 
84. Sun, 17 August, 6 September, 1932. 
541 
time and the incentive to investigate such sUbjects. Debating 
and economics societies flourished alongside the Social Credit 
League and the Friends of the Soviet union. 8S Long letters to 
the four Christchurch newspapers explored the by-ways of the 
various economic theories. Persons with professional qualifi-
cations in economics attracted considerable public attention. 
For example, the Canterbury Chamber of Commerce commissioned 
Professor A.H. Tocker of Canterbury College to write a monthly 
report on economic conditions within the dominion and inter-
national economic developments. 
The remarkable, if short, career of the New Zealand Legion 
furnishes a further example of professional attempts to find 
rational solutions to depression problems. Pugh has rightly 
described the rise of the Legion as largely a conservative 
response to the devaluation of 1933. 86 In Christchurch the 
organisation grew out of public meetings held to condemn the 
t ' t' 87 governmen s ac 1on. But there were many stands in the /\ 
conservative protest. Certainly many capitalists, particularly 
importers, felt themselves to have been unfairly and cynically 
penalised for the benefit of another sector. However, a 
surprising amount of the outcry came from professionals, most 
of whom would not have had a great financial interest in the 
issue. Rather they seem to have felt that principles of 
economics, honesty and national unity were being sacrificed 
for political gain. At least one contemporary observer noted 
the heavy representation of professionals within the Legion: 
85. Sun, 29 August, 1933. 
86. M. Pugh, The New Zealand Legion and Conservative Protest in the Great 
Depression, unpublished M.A. thesis, Auckland University, 1969. 
87. Times, 2 February, 4 August, 1933. 
The New Zealand Legion was led by a man called 
Dr Campbell Begg and he gathered together men 
of a professional nature, or people who were 
self-employed (not trade unionists and not 
businessmen so much as semi-professional people) 
and they formed organisations through New 
Zealand to advocate the running of New Zealand 
in a businesslike way, making the show work and 
having integrity, as they used to say, in poli-
tics ••• they remained a movement of the middle-
class semi-professional •.• 88 
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Pugh has described the typical Legion member as a town lawyer 
in his early forties. 89 In Wellington Evan Parry, "a well-
known solicitor", led the way;90 in Christchurch K.G. Gresson, 
a lawyer from a prominent local landowning and professional 
f '1 h d k' 1 1 t' 91 d' am~ Y was a ar -wor ~ng oca cen ur~on; an ~n Oamaru 
Frank Milner, the headmaster of Waitaki Boys' High School, 
lent his considerable prestige to the movement. 92 
The professional dominance within the Legion was a major 
reason for its rapid demise. Most of the organisation's 
capitalist supporters appear to have envisaged it as a means 
of putting pressure on the government to reduce state and 
local authority spending and cut down on political interference 
in business. But professionals tended to take a more radical 
view of the Legion's function and instinctively began to think 
of ways that action by central government could ameliorate the 
depression through intervention. As one disgruntled rural 
capitalist remarked, Dr Campbell Begg was "fond of proposing 
new schemes". 9 3 It seems likely t.ha tit was his proposal to 
88. T. Simpson, The Sugarbag Years, Wellington, 1974, p.132. 
89. Pugh, 
90. Simpson, 
, p.91. 
~.::-=::...:::.._, p.134. 
91. Press, 10 May, 10, 23, 24 June, 4 July, 4, 15 August, 1933. 
92. Pugh, op.cit., p.9S. Milner was also a strong supporter of the League 
of Nations Union. Press, 28 November 1932. 
93. Sun, 19 October, 1933. Campbell Begg himself claimed that the New 
Zealand Legion opposed "the shibboleths of insularism and progress-
killing conservatism". Sun, 4 May, 1934. 
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form a new political party rather than a single boring speech 
in the Dunedin Town Hall which provoked the mass resignation 
of the Otago executive of the Legion. 94 Exposure to ninety 
minutes of bottom-numbing boredom was one of the hazards of 
contemporary public life, to be borne stoically by those 
seeking prominence. Furthermore, canny Dunedin businessmen 
were not likely to abandon the large investment of time, money 
and prestige involved in organising a public meeting on the 
strength of one such performance. 
There was initially some criticism of a lack of policy 
from the Legion. When one emerged, just over six months after 
the organisation's initial rise, the doctor and his cohorts 
put many of their followers in grave danger of apoplexy. The 
proposals included the issue of a "stamp scrip" instead of 
money and the nationalisation of land to overcome mortgage 
problems and increase production by encouraging more productive 
farmers. 95 At a meeting of the Hororata branch of the Legion 
shortly afterwards, the local secretary, J.W.D. Hall, pointed 
out that "all present" had joined the crusade "partly to assist 
in the achievement of a more economical form of government and 
partly to help in the political education of the people ll , aims 
dear to most capitalists. 96 G.H. Grigg, another landowner, 
then moved that "Dr Begg should not be allowed to make such 
statements ll as he had just made on policy. H.T. Reeves, 
94. In Simpson, op.cit., p.134, a member of the Dunedin executive of the 
Legion claims that this was what led to the resignation of the entire 
local executive. However, that did not happen until almost eighteen 
months after the Legion had been formed, and its radical course set. 
Press, 20 September, 1934. 
95. ~, 29 July, 1933. 
96. ~I 19 October, 1933. 
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apparently sensitive to constitutional niceties, attempted to 
add an amendment pointing out that the doctor was not being 
"gagged" as an individual. This was rejected out of hand, 
Mr Grigg declaring that Begg should be gagged. A horse-
whipping was not officially proposed, but would probably have 
been passed by acclamation. 
The L~gion was certainly the most famous of the organis-
ations led by professionals trying to find a way out of the 
depression and then to popularise it. But there were others. 
One example was a body known variously as the National 
Reconstruction Association or the National Recovery Associ-
ation. It was founded by an Auckland solicitor, J.D. McMillan, 
in July, 1933, and claimed to be "non-political".97 It 
certainly gained a wide range of support, with Dan Sullivan 
agreeing to become chairman of the Canterbury branch and the 
chairman of the Associated Banks also giving his support, 
initially at least. The Rev. J.K. Archer was also involved 
locally. The most active local member of the association 
appears to have been its deputy-chairman, J.E. Strachan M.A., 
B.Sc., the innovative headmaster of Rangiora H~gh School. 98 
The provincial secretary was H.A.C. North, a prominent local 
public accountant. 99 The movement described itself as "a 
voluntary association of New Zealand people who believe that 
there is a way out of the depression of our times if we had 
intelligence enough to find it, and the integrity of purpose 
to pursue it".lOO The inunediate aim was to get lithe best 
97. Press, 20 September, 1933. 
98. Sun, 25 November, 1933. 
99. Sullivan to Secretary, National Reconstruction Association, Christchurch 
City Council, Outward Correspondence,· 13 December, 1933. James Hay, the 
retailer~ was also an active member. 
lOO.Press, 20 September, 1933. 
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people possible thinking and working towards a plan of national 
recovery". This was intended to lead to research, public 
consideration and finally a dominion conference. By the end 
of 1933 the association was advocating a nationally planned 
101 
economy. As with the New Zealand Legion, an attempt to 
meet the problems of the depression by professionals had led 
to proposals which were at loggerheads with qapitalist doctrine. 
Even before the exchange crisis and the launching of the 
New Zealand Legion, a "For New Zealand Society" enjoyed a 
brief vogue amongst those seeking radical, centrally-imposed 
solutions to the economic crisis in 1932. Speakers for the 
society included a Dunedin WEA tutor, Lloyd Ross, M.A., LL.B. 
He stated that "if you asked me for a simple way out of the 
slump I would say send for J.M. Keynes and make him dictator 
for three years. ,,102 L.C. Walker, a somewhat eccentric local 
bacon manufacturer, declared at the next meeting that 
there is only one way to get democratic govern~ 
ment as we understand it and that is to elect 
an autocrat .•• That is the only way to do things 
expeditiously and to plan. l03 
He was particularly emphatic on the need for a central bank, to 
be run by "experts". A fellow Friend of the Soviet Union, 
N. Morgan Williams, the future Labour M.P. for Kaiapoi, spoke 
h t ' 104 at t e next mee ~ng •. 
Meanwhile the influence of centralising professionalism 
was becoming increasingly evident in government itself. In 1925 
101. Times l 24 November, 1933. 
102. Times, 29 February, 1932. It was this sort of professional impatience 
with democracy and eagerness to reshape society "for its own good" that 
led the Webbs and Shaw to praise the dictatorships of both Stalin and 
. Mussolini. 
103. Times, 7 March, 1932. 
104. Times, 14 March, 1932. 
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and 1928 elections the well-worn American slogan of "less 
government in business and more business in government" had 
been frequently used by both the major non-Labour parties. 
However, as the interwar economic doldrums got steadily worse, 
government appeared to feel a growing need to call in economic 
experts, if only to put a gloss on what they already wished 
to do for political or ideological reasons of their own. In 
1930 the United Government requested Sir otto Niemeyer to 
visit New Zealand to advise them on how to deal with the 
d ..• . .. t . 105 om~n~on s worsen~ng econom~c s~ uat~on. Two years later 
the Coalition called on a committee of economists, including 
Professor Tocker, to tell it how th~ state could intervene 
to help business. 106 Few politicians now seemed to believe 
that the economy could simply be left to itself and the 
businessmen to come right. Part of the way in which Coates 
established his dominance over the government was his ability 
to use intellectuals to supply the arguments he needed. His 
"Brains Trust" was vigorously criticised by the Democrat 
107 Party and by some newspapers. But given the extent of the 
cult of the expert throughout so much of New Zealand society 
by 1935, it is doubtful whether this group of the best educated 
men in the country was truly an electoral liability. Whatever 
effect they had on the election, and it was probably minimal, 
these men were destined to exert a growing political influence 
in Wellington while most of the Democrats carried their free 
market rhetoric off into the political wilderness. 
105. Times, 22, 23 September, 1930. 
106. Sun t 12 February, 4 March, 1932. 
107. See letter by individual styling himself "Democrat" well before the 
Democratic Party was formed. ~, 8 October, 1934. Also editorials, 
~, 29 October, 27 November, 1934. 
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Substantial numbers of professionals and some capitalists 
were recruited from the white-collar class. This class consis-
ted principally of clerical and sales employees, along with 
some auxiliaries such as primary school teachers. It was 
characterised by obedience to rules and orders, respect for 
authority and adherence in public to a relatively strict code 
f d h d b h · 108 o ress , speec an e av~our. These features reflected 
the white-collar worker's economic situation as essentially 
the servant of those more wealthy and powerful than himself. 
He was frequently entrusted with his employer's money, and 
could acquire considerably knowledge of the workings of his 
business and his financial standing~ A reputation for loyalty 
and honesty was therefore essential for such an employee. 
Employment in an office often entailed working in close 
proximity to the boss, who would understandably normally prefer 
clean, unobtrusive and agreeable individuals for such a post. 
As most employers who could afford office staff were capital-
ists, it was wise for their clerks to hold, or at least express, 
capitalist views. Furthermore, an employer was more likely to 
feel his own reputation affected if any scandal or even 
unorthodoxy was detected in his office staff than it if was 
seen to exist in his more distant wage-workers. Sales staff 
often enjoyed similar privileges and responsibilities, and were 
therefore required to be equally reputable. They were, more-
over, frequently selling to people from the ruling classes who 
expected cleanliness, respectability and a degree of servility. 
These habits persisted in the profession during the interwar 
108. Much of the description of the white-collar class employed in this 
section derives from D. Lockwood's brilliant pioneering work The 
Blackcoated Worker, London, 1958. This work is provocatively 
subtitled Ita study in class consciousness". 
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period, even though it was catering increasingly for a mass 
rather than a select market. Woolworth's was already operating 
in Christchurch, albeit on a fairly modest scale, but the 
supermarket was a thing of the future. Most department stores 
aspired to the tone now.on1y to be found in an emporium like 
Ballantyne's. 
The incomes of white-collar workers were not far below 
those of skilled workers in a good year and probably better 
during bad years because they were in the form of a fixed 
salary. 109 However, the white-collar workers was norm~lly more 
dependent on his employer. His services increased in value 
as his experience of the firm, department or individual emp1oy-
ing him grew, and he was rewarded with extra job security and 
perhaps a rise in pay. But in the event of his dismissal or 
redundancy his "added value" largely vanished and he was equipped 
mainly with the generalised and now very widespread skills of 
. 110 literacy and numeracy. Whereas very many skilled workers 
could ply their trade on their own account for a reduced 
income during a depression, there was little scope for 
piecework or part-time employment in white-collar occu-
pations. Furthermore, while most skilled working men could 
adjust fairly readily to labouring work if they had to take 
it, most white-collar workers faced severe physical, social 
and emotional problems in making such a transition. This 
109. The mean income for Clerks in the 1926 Census was £195, compared with 
£215 for a Cabinet-maker and £190 for a sawmill hand. Census, 1926, 
vol.XI, p.8-38. In 1936 the comparable figures were £136, £127 and 
£109. Calculated from Census, 1936, vol. XII, p.88-99. 
110. "The market had very little to do with it. When he was put on the 
market he was an unskilled specialist". Lockwood, op.cit., p.83. 
Also G. Crossick, "The Emergence of the Lower Middle Class in 
Britain", in G. crossick (ed.), The Lower Middle Class in Britain, 
London, 1977, p.23. 
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increased the latter's sense of dependence on their employers 
and identification with their interests. It also tended to 
lead to a preparedness to put up with poor pay and working 
conditions, even cuts in salary, rather than risk dismissal 
by complaints or threats. White-collar occupations therefore 
provided only barren ground for trade unions, which had the 
additional handicap of being associated with the rough-spoken 
and the unclean. They tended to form organisations like the 
Commercial Travellers' Association, which was closer to a 
social club and contained employers in its membership. 
White-collar workers were often active in church and supporting 
groups, again frequently in contact with the employing class. 
The white-collar worker has been the individual most 
persistently accused of possessing a "false consciousness" of 
his economic position. Even leaving aside the lack of 
objectivity implicit in this concept - consciousness surely 
simply exists or does notlll - the idea that white-collar 
workers were acting against their own economic interests is 
incorrect. Whereas other employees could threaten to take 
their skills elsewhere, even onto the open market, most white-
collar workers could not. To keep their jobs and to gain 
promotion they had to be conformable to the employer's wishes. 
In return they got more money, more authority and, within their 
own class at least, more prestige. In a few cases they might 
. even acquire sufficient expertise and public confidence to 
float a business of their own, as did James Hay. Above all, 
they represented the authority of outside interests - private 
capital, the state or the local authority - in -their dealings 
Ill. See Lockwood, op.cit./ p.212-13/ for a powerful presentation of this 
argument. 
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with working people. Then, as now, they tended to maintain 
or enhance their positions by increasing the size or efficiency 
of production. Such a process almost invariably entailed a 
relative or absolute decline in the income, comfort, job 
satisfaction or independence of production workers. At the 
same time the latter tended to regard office and sales staff 
as largely parasitic because they produced little that was of 
tangible value and did not exert themselves physically.112 
The white-collar class had a number of features in common 
with the professional class. Both relied on education, 
albeit at very different levels, and dealt in abstract concepts 
through numbers and words. Some white-collar workers may be 
said to have attained professional status in the upper reaches 
of administration~ although by the 'twenties they had normally 
acquired some academic or professional qualifications along 
the way. The essential difference between the two classes can 
be illustrated by the experience of Dr Baker-McLagan, the 
School Medical Officer in Christchurch -between the wars. In 
visiting primary schools she was repeatedly amused by the way 
that teachers and school inspectors reacted to her spelling 
mistakes, use of slang and "bad grammar".113 As successful 
white-collar workers striving to turn their pupils into good 
white-collar workers, they were alternatively shocked or 
smugly delighted that an individual whom they considered to 
be superior to themselves should make such mistakes. They 
112. Crossick, op.cit., p.37,writes of "skilled workers whose pride in 
their own craft produced some degree of contempt for the puny and 
parasitic clerks". 
113. E. Baker-McLagan, StethOScope and Saddlebags, Auckland, 1965, p.126, 
140. 
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imagined that lithe best people" spoke "perfect English" and 
sought to emulate them. Coming from a professional background 
(her father had run a private school in Akaroa for the child-
ren of gentlefolk) and having experienced a professional 
education, Dr Baker-McLagan saw speech as a means of conveying 
ideas and feelings. She had no need to keep it within rigid 
rules in order to emphasise her class status or to get a 
clerical job: "They themselves were all products of conventional 
state school educations, something I never had; I was a bird 
114 of a different feather from those they knew". 
The origins of the white-collar class probably derive 
from personal service - the personal secretaries of kings, 
noblemen, high churchmen and merchants. By multiplying the 
number of powerful men and the scale of commercial operations, 
the ·first wave of the Industrial Revolution greatly magnified 
the size of the class. The second wave continued this growth, 
particularly as the size of firms tended to increase and 
international enterprises flourished. The steady growth of 
central and local government bureaucracies added to the 
opportunities as did the expansion in sales opportunities and 
advertising that came with higher general standards of living. 
Consequently skilled working class parents were increasingly 
anxious to see their sons, and occasionally their daughters, 
do well at school. They often strove to support them through 
the extra years of high school. Between 1914 and 1926 the 
percentage of Standard VI boys going on to high school in 
Christchurch increased from 45% to 69%.115 with the growing 
. d d' ., f t' h' 116 insecur1ty an ecreas1ng opportun1t1es 0 appren 1ces 1PS, 
114. I p.126. 
115. Star, 22 April, 1926. 
116. 4 August, 1926. 
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educational qualifications were more and more regarded as the 
passport to the secure, above-average income which brought 
respectability and a home of one's own. Newspaper editors 
might deplore an education system which threatened to "create 
, an abnormal number of penmen, in opposition to workmen".117 
They might criticise the rush to "clean-collar" occupations. 
and blame it for high unemployment. 118 But mum was soon 
proven right and the pundits wrong as office and shop work 
absorbed a massive influx of employees, most of them youthful, 
despite the depression. Matriculation, a fews years at high 
school, ten bob a week as an office-boy and studies at night-
school were to set the sons of cabinet-makers and coachmakers 
on the road to powerful management positions after 1945. 
The depression tended to enhance the attraction of white-
collar occupations. In general the pay in such positions did 
not fall as far as in other jobs and there was much less 
119 
unemployment. Those who were employed by central or local 
. government .wereparticularly •. secure, as were most of those 
who worked for international firms in the new industries, 
which were generally less hard-hit. Just as capitalism no 
longer seemed to provide security, so the independence of a 
trade or a small business appeared hazardous. A safe job with 
the government or a large firm was now more than ever the aim 
of bright young people from the working classes. 
117. star, 3 April, 1926. 
118. Star, 17 November, 1926. 
119. Unemployment amongst "clerks, not otherwise indicated" was 7.2% in 
1936. It was 0.6% amongst public service clerks and 0.7% amongst 
bank clerks. Cabinet-makers had a 9.1% unemployment rate and spent 
an average of 12.8 weeks off work, compared with 9.6 weeks for the 
"clerks, n.o.i.", Census, 1936, vol.XI, p.lO, 14, 24, 27. 
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The white-collar class was not politically inactive. 
Sections of it appear to have given strong support to the 
Temperance Movement and to other organisations concerned with 
public morals. White-collar workers were often anxious to make 
their communities cleaner and Itnicer". However, it was wiser 
for them to avoid public activity which might offend their 
employers and there were strictures against political involve-
ment by public servants. The typical politically active 
white-collar worker tended to support non-Labour parties. 
This was not just out of fear or admiration for the employing 
class, it also reasserted his class identity - "above" manual 
work and trade unions. Nor should the political value of the 
white-collar vote be underestimated. Democracy had potentially 
provided working-class activists with a parliamentary majority. 
The white-collar class gave anti-Labour forces their own mass 
vote, frequently located in the marginal electorates between 
labouring and capitali§t districts. This vote was by nature 
diligent and loyal, remembering to enrol and to vote, generally 
unfazed by official forms or instructions. It was not gener-
ally as mobile as the .unskilled working class and was likely 
to appear automatically on local body rolls by reason of home 
ownership. White-collar workers often owned the motor cars 
necessary to get out the vote. The big influx into this class 
between the wars brought in some children of working-class 
parents who remained loyal to Labour. Under that party's rule, 
legislative compulsion brought the real beginnings of white-
collar trade unionism. But overall the growth in the white-
collar class swelled the ranks of anti-Labour, bringing in 
large numbers of modern young men and women, well-dressed and 
confident. They detested the "commonness", the compulsion and 
554 
the old-fashioned stuffiness which they associated with the 
Labour Party. They joined their older counterparts in attack-
ing "heavy taxation" imposed to help people who lacked their 
own capacity or inclination to save or invest in superannuation. 
Such young white-collar workers were to be the backbone of 
Sid Holland's organisation in urban areas120 and the foundation 
for the National Party's dominance of politics in the post-war 
years. 
The independent working class, which supplied so many of 
the young recruits to the white-collar class, combined skilled 
tradesmen, small businessmen and small farmers. Its basic 
ideals revolved around concepts of freedom and of work, and, 
as with other classes they reflected its economic position 
and interests. 
The freedom that the independent working class sought and 
treasured was primarily economic. In the case of a shopkeeper, 
self-employed tradesman, market gardener or dairyman the nature 
of this freedom was clear. After mortgage and debt payments, 
if any, the product of their labour was their own and they 
owned the means of production. They were not subject to the 
discipline of a capitalist or white-collar boss. Skilled 
working men, the largest section of the independent working 
class in Christchurch, were less obviously independent. 
However, their skills were a jealously guarded means of 
asserting a considerable degree of freedom from employer auth-
ority. A skilled man normally supplied his own tools - and 
120. See report on meeting at F.W. Freeman's house during which Sidney 
Holland spoke on "Labour's Appeal to Youth". Press, 1 September, 1931. 
Also the targets of the Citizens' Association enrolment drive in 1935. 
11 April, 1935. 
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had traditionally carried them away in his bag or "sack" when 
dismissed. Historically at least, the long period of on-the-
job training - five or seven years - had been necessary to 
provide workmen able to take raw material such as wood, leather 
and iron through to finished products. In addition, the 
skilled man almost invariably belonged to a trade union, a 
token of his skilled status. Trade solidarity could be mobil-
ised if an employer dared to put unskilled men onto work 
traditionally belonging to tradesmen. Action might also be 
taken where an employer cut pay rates, forced the pace of 
work or ordered jobs to be botched rather than completed to 
the traditional standard. Speaking in 1930 a Christchurch 
coachbuilder noted the degree of independence that his trade 
had enjoyed at the turn of the century; "we did not have to 
work against time as we do now and the builders were able to 
spend almost as long as they liked on their work".12l In 
practice there was a kind of balance of authority, with some 
tacit concession to the boss's wishes, particularly during hard 
times. A skilled man might be appointed foreman, but he had to 
be a good tradesman himself to command the respect of his 
fellow workers. 
The much sought-after independence could also be achieved 
by going into business on one's own, although the need for 
large amounts of capital made it almost impossible in some 
trades such as boilermaking. A successful move into self-
employment, where a man could "be his own master" was regarded 
as desirable and creditworthy. 
121. Star, 7 March, 1930. 
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Dan Sullivan's background and attitudes clearly illustrate 
this. His father had worked as a labourer but had managed to 
achieve independence by becoming a labour contractor. He 
launched Dan into a skilled career as a cabinet-maker. 122 
When the latter went overseas in search of work and personal 
experience, he was accompanied by a friend and fellow trades-
man named Webster, whose family had their own furniture-making 
business. On his return, Sullivan married Webster's sister. 
Three decades later he was attempting to find his own son a 
skilled or white-collar job but was obliged to set him up as 
. t d 123 a greengrocer ~ns ea • It was the uncertain economic 
prospects of the latter course, rather than any class repug-
nance, that made it less desirable than permanent employment. 
When Dan Sullivan reminisced about his early trade union days, 
he had particularly warm praise for Andrew Rea, a President 
of the Trades and Labour Council who had gone into his own 
business. Sullivan treated this mentor's success in business 
in the same favourable way he regarded the achievements of 
another colleague, W. Newton, who had risen to a high post in 
the Labour Department. 
Other examples of the linkage between skill and business 
124 
ownership include that of C. Renn. In 1926 he was executive 
secretary of the Canterbury Federation of Unions and an offic-
ial of a range of unions from the Journalists' to the Traction 
and Stationary Engine-drivers. A compositor by trade, he had 
arrived in New Zealand in 1910 and three years later he was 
122. The following details of Sullivan's life come mainly from two news-
paper columns he wrote under the heading "Labour News and Views" in 
Times, 9, 16 January, 1930'. 
123. Christchurch City Council, Outward Correspondence, 26, 31 October, 1933. 
124. Star, 12 March, 1926. 
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president of the Canterbury Trades and Labour Council and 
vice-president of the United Federation of Labour. In March, 
1926, however, he returned to London to take over the manage-
ment of his family's firm, manufacturing pianos. Fred Cooke, 
a Christchurch leader of the Socialist Party and Labour city 
councillor, had come to New Zealand .in 1900 "to take up fand" .125 
He took a job as a tailor instead, but at one time owned a 
small farm in Marshlands. Of his four sons, one became a 
builder in the Waikato, two became fruit-farmers, and one 
t t d b ·· . ht 126 k t . s ar e a US1ness 1n New Br1g on. Coo e was W1ce a 
parliamentary candidate for the New Zealand Labour Party and 
served on its executive. He had been imprisoned for sedition 
during the Great War. 
A move into business on one's own account could lead 
eventually to a shift into the capitalist class, as in the 
cases of Christchurch industrialists such as John Anderson, 
Henry Holland, John Aulsebrook, George Scott and Thomas 
Edmonds. However, such success was not the aim of most - it 
would be wrong to see people such as the Websters or Reas as 
embittered failed entrepreneurs, Andersons or Edmonds who could 
not "make the grade". They fitted instead into the description 
of the "small shop-keeper or local master ll provided, with more 
than a hint of a sneer, by E.J. Hobsbawm: 
His ideal was the secure dream of all "little 
men" ••• a small-scale society of modest property-
owners and comfortably-off wage-earners, without 
great distinctions of wealth or power; though 
doubtless, in its quiet way, getting wealthier 
and more comfortable all the time. 127 
125. Press, 27 June, 1930. 
126. 30 June, 1930. 
127. Hobsbawm, op.cit., p.13; 
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By establishing a secure little business to work in, the inde-
pendent working class man had fulfilled his class ideal. 
The independent working class ideal of freedom was, 
however, a limited concept. Parental, particularly paternal, 
authority tended to be strong within families and there was 
usually little toleration of cultural, sartorial, dietary or 
sexual deviation. Racism was endemic, particularly where 
other races were thought to threaten opportunities for indepen-
dence by "locking up" land or competing for markets. Many 
local workers had gone to the North Island to take adv~ntage 
of Maori land "opened up for settlement". Harry Ell, a local 
Radical and champion of skilled working class liberty, could 
still proudly recall his service with the Armed Constabulary 
at parihaka. 128 
However, as the local Maori population was small and had 
long since been largely dispossessed of its land, it was 
complaints of unfair competition that were most frequently 
heard. These were directed principally against Asiatics, and 
in particular the Chinese. Although small, the Chinese 
community within the Christchurch Urban Area in 1926 was larger 
than that of the Maori. 129 Its work was concentrated in,market 
gardening, and the Auckland-based White New Zealand League 
received some local support from Europeans in that sector. In 
May, 1926, a motion from the local Fruitgrowers' Federation 
referred the question of Chinese immigration to the Trades and 
Labour Council. It saw the council as 
128. Times, 28 June, 1934. Ell had been president of the Christchurch 
Tailoresses' and Pressers' Union. 
129. Both were very small. There were 143 Maoris included in the Census, 
as against 158 Chinese (part of a total of 278 "race aliens"). 
Census, 1926, vol.I, p.12; vol. VI, p.2. 
an amalgamation of all the white workers of 
New Zealand .•• supposed to look after the 
interests of the white workers of the country. 
We as a branch of the workers can send a 
recommendation to the Trades and Labour Council 
to take the matter up for us •.• 130 
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Isolated Chinese were often subject to attack from working-class 
youths. 131 The Christchurch evening newspapers, those directed 
primarily at a working-class readership, could be counted on 
to support further extensions of the already draconian immi-
gration laws against Chinese. One editorial declared that 
"Asiatic penetration in any degree is objectionable" and 
claiming that previous immigrants had erected "hovels ••• so crude 
and insanitary that no white man could ever descend to the 
1 1 f 1 " , h II 132 eve 0 ~v~ng ~n t em • The same newspaper printed a flood 
of letters, most of them clearly from working people, expressing 
hostility and disgust towards the Chinese. 133 The racism was 
far less evident in the morning newspapers, which catered more 
for capitalists, professionals and white-collar workers. 
Skilled workers were equally fearful of manufactured 
imports from Asian countries where "cheap labour" lived "on 
the smell of an oily rag". They saw tariff protection as an 
essential means of keeping the White Race - specifically them-
selves and their families - above the standard of living of 
130. Star, 3 May, 1926. The semi-skilled members of the Tramway Union 
took a similar line: 
That we the Christchurch Tramway Employees Union urge 
upon the Government the immediate necessity of preventing 
Asiatics from settling in this country as we are of the 
opinion that their mode of life and standard of living is 
[sic] an absolute menace to the white population and further 
that we request all trade unions endorse our action in this 
matter. TEU, Minutes, 14 December, 1926. 
131. 4 April, 1927. 
132. Star, 18 November, 1926. On the other hand, it did warn against immi-
gration from "the lower-grade nations of Europe". star, 27 October, 
1926. 
133. See letters from "Whitebait", "White Parent", "A White New Zealander", 
Star, 1 May, 1926. 
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"coolies" and IIkaffirs". They suspected that capitall.ists would 
I 
have no hesitation in so degrading them in order to/make more 
I profit. The parallel with the situation of the whiite working 
I 
class in South Africa was often made explicit by EiH Howard, 
the Labour M.P. for Christchurch South. 134 He had visited 
South Africa in 1924 as New Zealand delegate to the Empire 
Parliamentary Association, and he clearly regarded the white 
South African Labour Party as having similar motives as his 
own; the securing of white working-class aspirations first. 
As with the capitalist class, work was central to the 
independent working class ideal, not least because it enabled 
a man to gain his independence. However, this was not a vague 
notion of past work which had been fossilised in order to 
provide a retrospective justification for present riches. It 
meant actual physical labour, heavy or intricate, with a 
tangible product. An able man was expected to work to earn 
his living and virtually to justify his existence. Work was 
seen as the primary source of legitimate economic or social 
success, not birth, academic qualifications or capital. Those 
who enjoyed an income higher than the hardest or most skilled 
worker simply because they had capital, and those who subsisted 
off charity in. good times were alike regarded as parasitic. 
Both the rich and the poor tended to be prejudged as idle. 
For example, when a church organisation proposed putting a 
properly managed night shelter for casual labourers in Waltham 
there was a strong outcry from within that overwhelmingly Labour 
suburb. The leader of a deputation from the area to the city 
council pointed out that "Waltham has always been a working 
134. Star, 22 June, 1929. 
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man 's dl.'strl.'ct".135 Itl.'ner t I b I an a ourers were apparent y not 
to be classed as "working men". Labour councillors sympath-
ised and the proposed resthouse was shifted to the central 
city area. Similarly, part of the resistance to attendance 
at the Charitable Aid Committee was the deeply ingrained 
feeling that it was where "no hopers" went to get their 
"handouts". Such disparagement of those in other working 
classes helped to give an added moral force to their own skill 
and independence, and helped to justify a much higher rate of 
pay for work that was normally much less physically demanding 
than labouring. 
other aspects of the independent working class ~alue-
system also complemented and enhanced their drive for 
independence. Both permanent employment and the learning of 
a trade required a certain degree of application and relia-
bility. Drunkenness, carelessness, dishonesty and immorality 
which might lead to an early marriage all threatened the 
ability of the young man to serve out his apprenticeship, 
learn his trade and find a secure niche. Failure could mean 
falling into the uncertain and often poverty-stricken world 
of the casual labourer. Consequently there was some emphasis 
on respectability and careful behaviour, although not nearly 
to the same extent as in the white-collar class. 
135. Archdeacon Haggitt argued that the men to be accommodated were "a 
decent type ••• not wastrels". They were now having to sleep in parks. 
However, the deputation replied that "Waltham was a working men's 
district and did not wish to have its property depreciated by the 
erection of such a place". Press, 28 April, 1931. Few areas of 
the city were more staunchly pro-Labour. In the Municipal Election 
a few days later the Waltham Library recorded a 77% vote for that 
party. Press, 7 May, 1931. 
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Home ownership was also given a high value. 136 It meant 
freedom from the burden of rent and from fear of eviction. 
It also enabled the independent working man to supply his 
family with vegetables and frequently eggs and poultry as well. 
An individual who failed to cUltivate his garden was likely 
to be regarded as lazy and spendthrift. Owning one's own home 
also conferred some greater privacy and, above all, a sense of 
independence. It had the side-effect of providing legal rights 
and a status which was respected by their social "betters" in 
the capitalist class, whose own power rested so heavily on 
the principle of private property. 
Furthermore, the prudent working man was expected to put 
by as much as he could for his retirement. The Old Age 
Pension was little better than a pittance when compared to 
the average wage, which a middle-aged skilled working man 
would almost certainly be receiving. As interest rates were 
low, a fairly substantial amount had to be saved before retire-
ment. This might be placed in a bank (especially the Post 
Office Savings Bank), a friendly society, a building society 
or money club. In some cases it was lent out on mortgage or 
invested in rented houses. 
The Industrial Revolution had greatly augmented the number 
and size of skilled occupations and hence the extent of the 
136. Sullivan was particularly enthusiastic about the System of Advances 
to Workers through the State Advances Department and he praised Ward 
for it in fulsome terms: 
It is doubtful whether any Single Act of Parliament placed 
on the Statute Book of the country has brought more happi-
ness to the people of New Zealand. 
But the minute scale of defaulting showed that they had deserved it: 
What a truly amazing record! What wonderful tribute to the 
honesty, the stability of character of the workers of this 
country! ••• One wonders whether anywhere else in the world 
there is to be found a class or community to whom it is 
possible to advance large sums of money almost without 
security and almost without fear of loss. Times, 12 September, 1929. 
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independent working class. The construction industry, the 
traditional home of many trades, had experienced an enormous 
growth in the demand for its services as factories and cities 
proliferated. New trades such as boilermaking, moulding and 
engineering appeared to provide and to service the new 
machinery. Old trades like printing, coachbuilding and black-
smithing found their industries changing as well as expanding. 
Trades concerned with consumption, such as tailoring, cobbling 
and watchmaking began catering for a much larger, less elite 
market. 
As Christchurch grew, and particularly as it industrialised 
during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, these trades 
became firmly established here. Railway stock required main-
tenance and replacement; agriculture demanded traction engines, 
farm implements and harness; the new freezing-works wanted 
boilers; and a growing and increasingly prosperous population 
purchased its biscuits and its boots. In many ways the city 
became a haven of independent working class New Zealanders who 
were rather cut off from a countryside dominated by capitalists 
and labourers. Even after two generations there was much about 
this class ana its city which harked back to the "Old country", 
albeit a very different old country than that idealised and 
frequently experienced by the capitalist and professional 
classes. With its numerous brass bands, many non-conformist 
churches, active Salvation Army, strong prohibition movement, 
money clubs, cycling, cricket and soccer, this section of 
Christchurch would not have been out of place in an industrial 
town back "Home". Inflows of skilled immigrants reinforced 
this while helping to meet the constantly growing. demand for 
tradesmen. At the same time many skilled New Zealanders 
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"went Horne" to learn more of their trade. The furniture trades 
in particular seem to have drawn men overseas. Dan Sullivan 
followed this path as a young french polisher. Another who 
made this journey at about the same time was a cabinetmaker 
named Frank Hill. 137 Having served his apprenticeship here, 
he went to England at the age of twenty to gain further train-
ing. Returning some years later he became one of the leading 
cabinetmakers in Christchurch and was specially commissioned 
to furnish the local royal suite in 1953. 
The early concentration of independent working people in 
Christchurch helped to make it a stronghold of political 
labour. The city had elected Pember Reeves and I labour' 
during the eighteen-nineties; Taylor and progressive Liberalism 
in the early nineteen-hundreds. In the General Election of 
1911, Labour and Socialist candidates captured forty per cent 
of the votes cast in the Christchurch Urban Areas. The 
independent working class vote also formed the basis for 
continuous Labour representation on the city council from that 
year. The stamp of this class can be seen in the moderation 
of the most successful Labour politicans in Christchurch. 
Here it was a generally prosperous class, anxious to assert 
and protect its interests, even to impose its values on the 
country, but not a downtrodden group, struggling by any means 
to escape an intolerable situation. Consequently Christchurch 
was the home of the United Labour Party and the Social Demo-
cratic Federation. After the formation of the New Zealand 
Labour Party its M.P.ls, particularly McCombs and Sullivan, 
placed themselves on the "moderate II wing of the parliamentary 
137. "Frank Hill!! in Woodworker: Journal of the British Guild of wood-
workers I . June I 1983. 
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party. The election of four Labour M.P. 's from 1922 and a 
Labour city council in 1927 enabled Christchurch to keep the 
title of New Zealand's "labour city" throughout the 'twenties. 
However, the continued success of the labour movement as 
a whole concealed the fact that technological change was 
largely undermining the dominance of the independent worki~g 
class within it. Many proud trades such as wheelwrighting, 
saddlery and harnessmaking virtually disappeared during the 
decade following the Great War. In 1930 an old maker of 
saddles and horse-collars claimed "it is a question of which 
will die first., the men or the trade". 138 Other skilled work 
such as blacksmithing and boilermaking, experienced a severe 
decline as oil and electricity took over from horsepower and 
stream. More generally, the use of electrical machinery tended 
to de-skill many jobs, particularly in woodworking and the 
metal trades. New tradesmen such as panelbeaters, motor 
mechanics and electricians appeared, but the development of 
mass production and the interchangeability of parts had 
severely reduced the real amount of skill involved in such 
jobs. Even though products were often more complex, there was 
less call for the trademan to build from raw materials. The 
fitter with his file was being increasingly displaced by the 
mechanic with his spanner. 
The decline in the importance of skill and the power of 
the class largely dependent on it can be seen in the increasing 
movement of women into the trades. 139 It was also revealed 
in ,the growing tendency for employers to take on "learners" 
138. Star, 8 March, 1930. 
139. See Ch. 4. 
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th th t ' 140 ra er an appren ~ces. In 1934 the Sun attacked the whole 
apprenticeship system as an "archaic survival" and criticised 
the Apprenticeship Act of 1922 which had attempted to move 
against the tide; "it has had the effect of imposing. such 
serious obligations on employers that whenever possible they 
will avoid entering into apprenticeship contracts".141 The 
newspaper specifically mentioned the motor trade as one area 
where the traditional period of apprenticeship was far too 
long. Similarly, the fact that employers could impose time 
restrictions on skilled workers such as coachbui1ders indicated 
that the latter's power had declined. 
A further example of the decreasing value being placed on 
skill can be seen in the reorganisation of the Addington 
Railway Workshops between 1925 and 1929. This was accompanied 
by the installation of large amounts of electrical and motor 
machinery. Previously the complex had been divided into 
departments on the basis of skilled trades - fitters, b1ack-
smith~,· moulders, carpenters, painters and boilermakers. Now 
there were to be only two departments, locomotive, and car and 
wagon shops, with the individual tradesmen placed where they 
d d ' h d ' l' 142 h' " t' 1" were nee e ~n t e pro uct~on ~ne. T ~s was a ra ~ona 
division of labour, a concept which appealed to the white-
collar, professional or capitalist manager who was interested 
primarily in production and efficiency. In the process, the 
traditional skilled workshop where an elite of tradesmen worked 
together as equals and jointly exercised their authority over 
140. Sun, 21 April, 1933. 
141. Sun, 12 september, 1934. 
142. AJHR, 1926, D 2, p.vi. In 1933· there were protests at Addington 
against the new machine methods which had "Americanised" the job. 
Sun, 26 September, 1933. 
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labourers and apprentices was largely destroyed. The change 
not only reduced their power and prestige, it revealed how 
much technology had already undermined their influence. 
The depression heightened the anxiety of many independent 
working class people, both for their own futures and those of 
their children. The decline in the number of apprenticeships, 
initially supported by some unions to protect the jobs of 
members, was particularly worrying. 143 Writing to the Railways 
Department on behalf of a nephew of his who had been dismissed 
from his apprenticeship after two years, Mayor Sullivan 
maintained that lithe dismissal of the boy leaves him without 
a skilled occupation and threatens to force him into the gen~ 
eral labouring class ll • 144 This could "destroy his prospects 
for his entire life". In the year to March, 1926, many very 
skilled occupations such as cabinet-making, engineering and 
baking already enjoyed incomes which were below those in 
many unskilled and semi-skilled occupations. 145 This was 
usually particularly so when the skilled man was working on 
his own account. Even some independent working-class people 
who had achieved the status of employer (in terms of the 
census) earned less than semi-skilled workers in steady jobs. 
For example, greengrocers, orchardists, restaurant-keepers, 
market-gardeners and agricultural farmers with that status all 
have average incomes below those of locomotive engine-drivers, 
143. Labour Department Files, 17/25/466. There were 9586 male apprentices 
in New Zealand in 1926 but only 7064 in 1936 despite a 15% increase 
in the male workforce. Census, 1926, vol.IX, p.9; 1936, vol.X, p.iv. 
144. Sullivan stated that he was not threatening but that he regarded "it 
as my duty to concentrate public attention on such cases". Sullivan 
to Wellington Manager, ~ailways Department, Christchurch City Council, . 
Outward Correspondence, 16 January, 1933. 
145. Census, 1926, vol.XI, p.8-27. 
568 
motormen or conductors. 
By 1935 there had been a still greater narrowing of the 
advantage in income that the independent working class had 
. d 146 enJoye • The average income of bakers had dropped by 38%, 
that of cabinet-makers by 40%, tinsmiths' 44%, painters' 46% 
and tailors' 47%. In comparison, the incomes of storemen had 
declined by only 28% and those of a wide range of other semi-
skilled jobs by less than twenty per cent. Furthermore, most 
of the skilled occupations either showed significant decreases 
in total numbers or increases far below the increase in the 
, male workforce. White-collar occupations, on the other hand, 
tended to show either much smaller drops in income - for 
example commercial travellers lost only 18% on average - or 
they experienced vast influxes of workers - as with the 89% 
increase in the number of shop-assistants. Many skilled men, 
such as cabinet-makers, tailors and plumbers, now brought 
less money home than mere clerks. Previously they had exceeded 
the latter's average income, in some cases by SUbstantial 
amounts, and had tended to look down on "pen-pushers ll • 
Given that some degree of economic recovery was under 
way by 1935, it seems likely that the shift in income and 
numbers away from the independent working class was evidence of 
technological change rather than just the depression itself. 
This class survived the shift in the more expensive workshops, 
in a number of new "skilled" jobs such as electrical work and 
motor mechanics, and whereever self-employed tradesmen and 
shopkeepers continued to operate. However, it also had a 
significant legacy in the attitudes it bequeathed, and some-
times took with it, to other classes. 
146. Unless otherwise indicated, the following figures are calculated from 
Census, 1926, vol. XI, p. 8-27; 1936, vol. XII, p. 88-99. 
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While many of the children of the independent working 
class went on to find security and good incomes in the white-
collar class, others found them in sections of the labouring 
class. For technological change was improving the opportun-
ities for members of this class to achieve a standard of living 
roughly comparable to those of many skilled and white-collar 
workers. 
Traditionally the labouring class had been the mainstay 
of commercial agricultural production with "landless labourers" 
providing the necessary seasonal workforce. It had also done 
the fetching and carrying for skilled workers, but lacked the 
security and higher rates of pay that derived from skill and 
the ownership of the means of production. The Industrial 
Revolution had supplied this class with a much wider range of 
job opportunities and probably on balance a higher standard 
of living. The "navvy" was as indispensable as the great 
engineers to the construction of the new networks of railways 
and canals, and the whole revolution would have been stillborn 
without the movement of vast numbers of labourers into the 
coal-mines. Expanding world trade necessitated more seamen, 
stokers and watersiders, while the industrialisation of war-
fare and the expansion of strategic interests required large 
forces of soldiers and sailors. Factories needed stokers, 
draymen and storemen. They also had to employ many semi-skilled 
operatives - "labourers who worked machines" - as the skilled 
147 
regarded them. 
The European development of New Zealand during the nine-
teenth century provided great scope for the immigrant labourers. 
147. E. Hobsbawm, Labouring Men, London, 1964, p.283. 
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Droving, shepherding and shearing competed with bush-felling, 
timber-milling, and railway construction. Urban building, 
coal-mining and industrial openings for labourers similar to 
those overseas had developed by the turn of the century. 
Export processing industries including freezing works, wool-
scours and dairy factories added an important additional 
dimension. The rapid pace of development tended to lead to 
a shortage of labour and consequently relatively high wages. 
Some labourers were thereby able to save enough to acquire 
land or a business and thus gain their independence. A few 
rose further, into the capitalist class. 
However, it would be easy to overestimate the labourer's 
chances of emerging from his class. The aspiring labourer 
was beset by many dangers and temptations. Although wage rates 
were higher than in the chronically oversupplied British labour 
market, they were still low and employment intermittent and 
seasonal in comparison with those enjoyed by urban skilled 
labour. It took a particularly strong-willed individual to 
save for long enough to buy his independence and then to 
persevere with the habits necessary to maintain it. Harsh 
and often dangerous working conditions, little female company, 
insanitary living quarters and extremely hard physical work 
encouraged excessive drinking, gambling, fighting and a tendency 
to uncontrolled celebration when finally released from the 
discipline of work and camp. The very survival of the casual 
worker was often seriously in doubt, let alone his will to better 
himself. When work was not available in the country, board and 
lodgings had to be paid for in town while work was sought on 
-
building sites, warehouses and on the wharves. Unfortuntately 
employment in those areas tended to have a seasonal pattiern " 
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as well. Furthermore, travelling out to work in the season 
usually entailed either expenditure on fares and accommodation, 
or several days journeying with no income. A dependable and 
efficient worker might well be assured of a job at farms or 
mills he had visited in previous years,148 although even then 
the weather, the state of the crop and the market could 
deprive him of his normal employment. Then he would have to 
join the numerous others who were spending their time 
searching for work rather than earning money. During periods 
of economic depression, when work was particularly hard to 
find in town but crops still had to be harvested in the 
countryside, larger numbers of labourers left the city and 
many more travelled on foot because they could not afford the 
cost of transport. Hence the popular measurement of the 
severity of a depression by counting the number of "swagmen" 
on the road or calling at the farm. 
In addition, much of the labouring class was bound into 
a vicious circle of deprivation. The children of larger-
than-average families with lower-than-average incomes tended 
to lack an adequate diet or living conditions. They were 
therefore often exposed to the debilitating effects of mal-
nutrition and respiratory, parasitic and infectious diseases. 
Drunken or violent parents were also liable to damage a child 
mentally or physically, before or after birth. Despite the 
effectiveness of the Temperance Movement in restricting the 
sale of alcohol, it was still not unknown for a mother to send 
a young child to buy gin. The frequent absences of a labouring 
father (actual or de facto) in search of work placed an added 
148. Information from Mrs R. Righton of Burwood, whose husband worked as 
a labourer· during the I thirties. 
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burden on the mother, compounded by the constant fear that he 
would not return, or at least would not send money. Absence 
of a father, combined with an ethos which emphasised male 
physical strength often meant that only a mother with 
exceptional psychological power and concern could keep her 
sons out of trouble. Their resort to criminality might bring 
in extra income or at least reduce the burden on family 
finances. Lack of money, reading materials, privacy, adequate 
lighting, any family emphasis on formal education, and 
respectable background, speech and dress, deprived the vast 
majority of the children of the labouring class of any chance 
of entry into the white-collar class. Their best opportunity 
lay in acceptance into the skilled trades through an appren-
ticeship. But even in that case a personal knowledge or 
recommendation was frequently necessary, and that favoured the 
sons and daughters of the more respectable working classes. 
Often an apprenticeship or even "an opportunity to learn" had 
to be purchased, and the prospective tradesman had to be 
supported during his long period of training at miniscule rates 
of pay. Moreover, a high level of concentration and responsi-
bility was required of the skilled worker and the background 
of most children of the labouring class would not be conducive 
to this. Educ,ation at school or through an apprenticeship 
required a determination to postpone present pleasures and 
immediate chances to earn money in favour of long-term security 
and earning power. with opportunities limited to a few and 
both families and neighbours relatively close-packed, pressure 
from siblings and peer~groups for the exceptional youngster to 
conform to labouring rather than other class values was doubt-
less strong. 
573 
The physical nature of the labourer's work was reflected 
in an emphasis on physical strength and a tendency to violence. 
There was generally little emphasis on the social respectabil-
ity sought by other classes. Employers tended to hire men on 
the basis of their physical fitness or known capacity for work 
rather than their personal values or reputation - unless, of 
course, they were suspected of troublemaking by defying 
authority. Workers were often hired in batches and there was 
a tendency to regard them automatically as amoral and dis-. 
honest. But this mattered little so long as overseers were 
chosen carefully. Labourers were not entrusted with their 
employers' cash. Gambling, on cards, horses or coins ("two-
up") was a very widespread practice, probably because of the 
lack of alternative forms of affordable entertainment. Most 
forms of gambling could be set up quickly and played under 
cover during breaks in work due to wet weather - often the 
only substantial breaks in a labourer's day. Both gambling 
and drinking helped to relieve the boredom, and also served 
as important types of formalised social and personal inter-
action. 
There was also a great disproportion in the number of 
labourers appearing in court compared with individuals from 
other classes. Labouring was the given occupation of much of 
the stratum designated the "lumpenproletariatll by Marx. 
Whereas many terms are said to suffer in translation, this one 
has tended to suffer through lack of translation. In English 
the work appears to connote a lack of intelligence" even 
idiocy, in an undifferentiated mass, as in the term "lump" 'or 
IIlumpish". But the German work 1I1umpen" denotes rascality, 
with the implication of an excess of cunning rather than stup-
idity. The Victorian term "the criminal classes" seems to 
capture the meaning of the term better, and Marx was, after 
all, a Victorian. 
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It is unlikely that many criminals were totally dependent 
financially on illegal activities for long periods, except 
perhaps in the cases of bookmaking and sly-grogging. Rather 
there appears to have been a more relaxed attitude towards 
crime, particularly robbery, within the labouring class as a 
whole. Given frequent bouts of unemployment and reduced 
income, a preparedness to lie and to steal could be necessary 
to avoid homelessness and hunger. This could be rationalised 
by an ideology which regarded the existing distribution of 
resources as unjust. With their economic interest focussed on 
securing a basic living and some very simple distractions, 
the awareness of people with far more than this doubtless 
reinforced the feeling of injustice. Irhe dismissive attitude 
towards them from classes which talked a lot about work but 
did comparatively little physical labour themselves also bred 
hostility. Then again, much of the labouring ,class came -from 
backgrounds where the legal system and the rich were considered 
part of a system of oppression and unfair dispossession. A 
large section of the unskilled were from an Irish Catholic 
background and nursed an obvious grievance. They had little 
reason to change their attitude in a land where the ruling 
classes were heavily Anglican or Presbyterian, often Anglo-
Irish or Scotch-Irish, and the law was English. Other groups 
with a history of dispossession included many Highland 
Scottish and English country labourers. The encroachment of 
landowners:on conunon rights was a live, issue in rural England 
149 throughout the nineteenth century. Emigration to a country 
1~9_ R. Samuel, II I Quarry Roughs': Life and Labour in Headington Quarry_ 
1860-192011 , in R. Samuel (ed.), Village Life and Labour I London, 
1975, p.207-27. 
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where such rights had been pre-empted entirely by other classes, 
particularly the most wealthy, was not in itself likely to make 
labourers regard the legal system as fairer. A sense of alien-
ation from the law would have been heightened by the increasing 
tendency of those that "had" to make rules regarding the per-
sonal behaviour of those that "had not". Licensing and gaming 
laws, arrests for drunkenness, compulsory education, child 
protection, and sanitary legislation were. examples of such 
rules. As a School Medical Officer, Dr Baker-McLagan was at 
the forefront of one of these impositions. She recalled that 
in the early days of her work the reaction of many mothers was 
"if that doctor-woman wants my child's eyes (or adenoids 'or 
whatever it was) fixed up, she can jolly well pay for it".150 
The police continued to be equipped with, and to use, vagrancy 
laws against itinerant labourers who remained in town during 
the summer. The normal "defence ll to such a charge, as in 
cases of drunkenness, fighting or petty dishonesty, was for 
the labourers or domestic to state that they were prepared to 
"go into the country" to get work. lSI 
While the initial urban and industrial development of 
New Zealand increased the size of the independent working class, 
it also gave large sections of the labouring class greater 
income and security. It did this by providing many more steady, 
150. Baker-McLagan, cit., p.l33. 
""-"'-..;....;..-
151. Star, 1 April, 1926. Long distances were often travelled in search 
of work. One shearer claimed to have walked a hundred miles for a 
job in 1929. Star 7 June, 1929. There was even something of a 
trans-Tasman market. In 1930 an Australian shearer claimed 
compensation for the loss of a finger, which had prevented him from 
"jumping a ship" home. He claimed to travel back and forth free each 
year: "it is quite a c.ommon thing. You just jump on board the boat 
when it is leaving and live with the crew while you are on board. 
Plenty of men do it". Star, 13 June, 1929. Not all got away with 
this - three Australian stowaways were charged the following year. 
Sun, 3 May, 1930. 
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semi-permanent jobs such as operating machines, stoking boilers, 
shovelling coal into gas retorts, and collecting and disposing 
of rubbish. Local bodies and the government began to employ 
permanent labouring staffs, reasonably fit individuals who 
could be counted on to turn up for work throughout the year 
rather than seeking variety and temporary high wages elsewhere. 
It was even more important for factories to be able to rely 
on their operatives. Even the latter's "semi-skills" required 
a period of training in order to reach optimum efficiency. 
The failure of any large number of them to turn up for work 
meant expensive machinery lying idle. Similarly, drunkenness 
at work might result in costly losses of materials and time, 
and damage to machines. 
These factors also improved the bargaining power of this 
section of the labouring class and facilitated the growth of 
trade unions. However, a wide range of people, including 
less fortunate members of the same class, could take over their 
work during depressed economic times. This was evident during 
the tramway strike. There was therefore a strong emphasis on 
solidarity in their trade unionism and more than a hint of 
violence in their disputes. By coming out all together, by 
picketing, by threatening and, if necessary, by using violence, 
"scabs" could be discouraged and employers might be forced 
into a more favourable agreement. As a class, labourers were 
prone to physical violence and an industrial dispute gave this 
tendency some coherent direction. 
By the 'twenties technological change was tending to pull 
the labouring class in opposite directions. On the one hand, 
new labour-saving mach,inery and methods were obviating the 
need for vast gangs of pick-and-shovel labourers with barrows 
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and drays, for stokers and for harvesters. On the other hand, 
they were increasing the demand for semi-skilled machinery 
operators and drivers. The unions of the labouring class such 
as general labourers', drivers' and tramway workers' gained 
strong memberships and severed as springboards for Labour 
politicians both locally and nationally. In Christchurch both 
E.H. Howard and H.T. Armstrong entered parliament by this 
route as did M. Howard, J. Mathison and R.M. Macfarlane in 
later years. Savage, Fraser and Semple also came to prominence 
through such labouring rather than skilled unions. Some, such 
as Fintan Patrick Walsh, were never able to shake off the 
reputation for violence. 
However, just as their leaders gained in respectability, 
so those sections of the labouring class to secure steady jobs 
adopted many of the ways of the independent working class. 
In particular they were able to purchase homes on mortgage on 
the strength of their more stable incomes. The need to meet 
mortgage commitments was given by officials of the Tramways 
Employees' Union as the reason their members could not accept 
reductions in pay thrqugh rationing in 1931 and 1932. 152 In 
1926 wage-earning drivers, tram conductors, motormen and even 
porters were earning on average £233 or more. Such incomes 
were at least as much, and usually more, than many independent 
working class individuals, including market-gardeners, cabinet-
makers, stonemasons and watchmakers. This was regardless of 
whether the latter were on wages or working on their own 
account, and it included employers in the case of market-
gardeners. Similarly, clerks employed in banks, insurance 
152. The Secretary of theTEU claimed that "75% of the men were purchasing 
their homes". CTB, Works and Traffic Committee Minutes, 18 April, 
1932. 
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companies, law practices and general office work had to uphold 
their dignity on average incomes lower than that of porters. 
In th~ light of this it is not surprising that one of the 
tramwaymen arrested during the 1932 dispute owned some acres 
of land on the edge of the city,153 or that another ex-
tramwayman was able to purchase a shop as a going concern when 
h d·· d 154 e was ~sm~sse. 
Like technological change, the depression had mixed 
effects on the labouring class. Certainly the economic crisis 
brought severe shocks in the short-term. Labourers were dis-
proportionately represented amongst the registered unemployed, 
and faced additional competition for much of their normal work 
from displaced members of other classes. Most fit men could 
become labourers when they could find nothing else. Similarly, 
the No. 4 Scheme and the Coates "Over the Fence" variation on 
the No. 5 Scheme led to much ordinary labouring work being 
done at relief rates of pay whereas skilled relief work 
retained some award protection. Even some labouring class 
men with previously secure jobs found themselves unemployed 
and consequently unable to maintain their mortgage commitments. 
This was exemplified by the retrenchment from the Railways 
Department of large numbers of Christchurch "permanent casuals" 
who had been in steady employment for many years. 155 The 
decisions of central and local governments not to augment their 
staffs also constricted the opportunities for labouring class 
youths to find secure employment. 
153. Press, 13 May, 1932. 
154. Sun, 20 February, 1934. Several purchased commercial agencies, two a. 
fish shop and one a sharemilking contract. Sun, 16 July, 1932. 
155. Press, 4 April, I, 8 July, 1930; Star, 12 December, 1931. 
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Nevertheless, the depression certainly did not reverse 
the trend already established by technological change and even 
appears to have reinforced it. This trend was to improve the 
standing of very large sections of the labouring class as 
against that of its nearest rival, the independent working 
class. Most of the unskilled and semi-skilled employees of 
local government, such as labourers and drivers, kept their 
jobs. Their ordinary pay was cut by only the general ten 
per cent in 1931, and in most cases at least half of this was 
restored by the middle of 1935. Consequently their real 
incomes had tended to increase since 1929, even allowing for 
cuts in overtime. Such local government jobs came to be 
eagerly sought, particularly in Christchurch city where no cuts 
in wages were made. Overall, the semi-skilled appear to have 
gained ground financially between 1925-26 and 1935, usually in 
real terms and almost invariably in comparison with indepen-
dent working class occupations. For example, the incomes of 
motormen, tram conductors and locomotive engine-drivers fell 
by only nine, eight and seven per cent respectively. Those of 
linemen declined by under five per cent (although their numbers 
fell by over a fifth), locomotive firemen by eight per cent and 
postmen by eleven per cent. Even 'the incomes of railway sur-
facemen dropped by only twenty-one per cent, and their numbers 
increased by almost a tenth. The average incomes of motor 
drivers fell by thirty-five per cent, but there ~as a massive 
increase of fifty-seven per cent in their numbers. with a 
few exceptions, such as the new occupations of motor mechanic 
and electrician, skilled jobs whose incomes dropped by a 
comparable amount also showed large decreases in total number. 
Overall, income accruing to semi-skilled occupations, on the 
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basis of average income times number of those recorded in the 
occupation, fell by much less than that accruing to skilled occur 
pations. It was more comparable to the situation in the white-
collar class. 
The section of,the labouring class which showed a truly 
enormous loss of income over this period was that in which. 
wage-earners gave their occupations as "labourer" or "farm 
labourer". This group contained a high proportion of the 
unemployed. The average income of labourers dropped from 
£176 to £81, or by over a half. Even this probably under-
estimated the fall for the average labourer as the total con-
tained a large number of permanent employees of local bodies. 
The average income of farm labourers fell by only 44%, but 
from the extremely starting-point of £107. Once again, however, 
the later figure was almost certainly somewhat exaggerated 
respondents to the census were requested to include board 
and perquisites in their estimated income in 1936 but not in 
1926. 156 
Despite these great falls in income, which could be 
attributed to technological change as well as the economic 
crisis, it could be argued that the depression advanced even 
this section of the labouring class. The misery which the 
crisis inflicted on people from "better" classes was a powerful 
spur for the provision of a much higher and more comprehensive 
safety net. In the process of coping with the depression's 
effects, the authorities provided the basis for a long-term 
improvement in the living standards, security and even the pride 
of a section of the population which would otherwise have 
15,6. Census, 1926, vol. XI , p.l; 1936, vol.XII, p.i. 
suffered increasing hardship due to technological change. 
The opinion of a number of social workers that some of the 
S81 
poor were better off in 1932 than they had been prior to the 
depression may well have been more than smug glibness. 1S ? 
The depression certainly exacerbated tensions between 
classes. This was demonstrated most dramatically at the time 
of the tramways strilce, when labourers and tramwaymen faced 
II specials" drawn, if nO,t from lI one class II as Mayor Sullivan 
suggested,lSS at least from classes to which they had an 
established antagonism. A heightened sense of class conflict 
can also be seen in the attacks of A.E. Armstrong on the city 
council' shigher paid office staff. 159 The same antagonism 
towards the white-collar class is to be seen in the angry 
suggestions at the Addington Railway Workshops that office 
staff and not workers should be retrenched. 160 It was also 
present in the tramway dispute, with the TEU taking strong 
exception to the cuts in its members' incomes being greater 
than those of the board's salaried staff. 161 It was evident 
again for a short period at the end of 1935, when news of 
157. ~, 21 July, 1934. 
158. 17 May, 1932. 
159. Armstrong drew his heaviest personal support in 1935 from'the "better" 
working-class areas. OVer the whole city some 28% of voters gave him 
their support. This ranged from 11% in wealthy Heaton Street to 27% 
in labouring Leyden Street to 33% at Woolston and 34% in Madras Street 
North, both "respectable" working-class booths. Christchurch city 
Council, Town Clerk's Report, 1936. 
160. A protest meeting of five hundred members of the New Zealand Railway 
Tradesmen's Association protested at 45 of their members being 
retrenched in 1930. They maintained that "clerical and non-productive" 
staff should go instead. Press, 27 June, 1930. The perspective of 
the class "below" the tradesmen is suggested by a protest from the 
Canterbury branch of the Locomotive Cleaners' Union when they opposed 
the creation of a single railway union. They argued that this would 
"stir up class hatred amongst the railway men themselves". Star-Sun 
6 July, 1936. 
161. Star, 2 May, 1932. 
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Labour's victory led large numbers of unemployed people - almost 
certainly members of the labouring class - to begin to issue 
threats and show insolence to the staff at the Labour Bureau}62 
Clearly for a moment they imagined that the "millennium" to 
which Labour leaders had often recently referred had actually 
arrived. 163 Evidently few had attended the WEA in order to 
be taught the proper meaning of freedom. 
The shifts in power and importance between classes can 
only be traced in a very general way through the numbers 
employed in different categories of occupations in censuses 
of 1926 and 1936. This method is particularly unsuitable for 
the numerically small dominant classes. The use of the term 
"professional" in the census does not match with its definition 
in this thesis. Any attempt to count professionals therefore 
cannot take account, for example, of the increasing profes-
sionalisation of the civil service. However, the rise in 
che numbers of doctors and university staff is 
suggestive. The increase in the latter group is particularly 
significant. On the one hand, it indicates that the demand 
for professional training was increasing. On the other hand, 
it meant that more respected, and often very publicly active, 
professionals were being introduced into the upper ranks of 
society. Similarly, little can be inferred from the small 
increase in the proportion of actively employed men giving 
164 their occupational status as Ilemployerll from 10.4% to 10.6%. 
162. The officer in charge at the Labour Department sent an urgent telegram 
to Sullivan regarding the 
very embarassing time at the Employment Bureau, St Asaph 
Street, on account of certain extremists, who under the 
cloak of the Labour Party being elected to office, were 
using the most insulting and threatening language. P. Broad to 
Sullivan, Christchurch City Council, Outward Correspondence, 3 December, 
1935'. 
163. Sun, 20 December, 1933. 
164. Census, 1926, vol. IX, p.9; 1936, vol.X, p.iv. 
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Most such individuals would have fitted into the independent 
working class. 
In that class there is a strong indication of decline. 
Despite the tendency of economic depression to encourage people 
to start their own businesses, the proportion of actively 
employed men working on their own account decreased from 13.5% 
to 12.7% between 1926 and 1936. Conversely, there are signs 
of the rise of white-collar employment. From 16.6% of the 
active male workforce in 1926, the proportion of wage and 
salary earners in commerce, finance, public administration and 
professional work increased to 17.8% in 1936. This represented 
a rise in the proportion of male salary and wage earners from 
28% to 30.5%. Moreover,. the rate of unemployment in th,ese 
white-collar categories was only 8.4%, compared with 13.4% for 
all wage and salary earners. 
The ,real revolutions in the relationships between classes 
had been developing for a long time before the depression, 
and owed most to changing technology. within the ruling classes 
- the capitalists and the professionals - authority was shift-
ing steadily towards the latter throughout the developed world. 
The value of professional knowledge and skills was becoming 
increasingly evident with the growing complexity of technology 
and social organisation. The Great War further emphasised 
their value. Within the British Empire, the failure of 
recovery in the 'twenties also contributed to a lack of confid-
ence in capitalism. Large sections of the capitalist class 
itself turned to restrictive arrangements such as agreements 
to limit production and the use of tariffs. Increasingly they 
required governments and their professional advisers to help 
make and police such arrangements. The depression confirmed 
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this direction apd spread the disillusionment with "pure" 
capitalism to the United States as well. In 1936 John Maynard 
Keynes provided a theoretical framework for the· future ·lImixed II 
economy where business would be effectively directed by the 
state. Significantly, he had developed and to a large extent 
published the basic principles of his theory during the 
'twenties. New Zealand showed a similar trend to the rest of 
the western world, partly because it absorbed so many of its 
ideas from overseas but largely because it shared the same 
experience of the limitations of capitalism and the promise 
of professionalism. 
Two decisive shifts were taking place by the 'twenties 
within those clases which could be described as "ruled" rather 
than "ruling". On the one hand, the white-collar class was 
expanding rapidly in size, absorbing the children of other 
classes. On the other hand, there was a growing convergence 
between the independent, largely skilled, working class and a 
large and increasing section of the labouring class. Motor 
and electrical machinery was rendering many trades redundant 
while tending to de-skill others. This led much of the 
independent working class to find its accustomed security and 
superior incomes in white-collar or semi-skilled but steady 
employment. The less fortunate members of the labouring class, 
who remained working on a casual basis, were increasingly 
likely to be beneficiaries of a widening range of state 
benefits. The depression appears to have speeded up rather 
than reversed these changes in class relationships. It gave a 
new emphasis on the need to find "safe" jobs at a time when 
such jobs were to be found increasingly in white-collar or 
semi-skilled occupations and in large organisations, government 
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or business. The depression also gave much of the independent 
working class and the labouring class a new awareness of the 
advantages of having a government favourable to their ipterest, 
and a strong trade union movement. However, the economic 
crisis was in these ways only an acceleration of existing 
trends, a turbulent episode in a period of social change 
largely created by changing technology. 
CONCLUSION 
The impact of technological change on economic and 
social developments in New Zealand between the wars at 
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least rivalled ,that of the depression. This is clear even 
when the period examined is limited largely to the depressed 
decade between 1926 and 1936, and the area concentrated upon 
is one unduly affected by the economic crisis. The develop-
ment of the international collapse itself was strongly 
influenced by the manner in which much of the new technology 
benefitted the united States more than Britain, previously 
the guarantor of stability in world finance and trade. 
Within New Zealand the new motor and electrical 
technology favoured the development of regions of the country 
outside Canterbury. Motor transport facilitated the continued 
growth of dairying and orcharding, forms of primary produc-
tion unsuited to the province's climate. It also led to 
stagnation in the important local oat-growing and chaff-
cutting industries. Simultaneously, the new electrical and 
motor industries tended to seek locations handy to the 
largest consumer markets, and these were now in the North 
Island. The harsh economic climate of the depression 
sharpened this trend and penalised a province heavily 
dependent on wool exports. Gold and government, two 
economic resources of particular value during the depression, 
were also concentrated elsewhere. 
Similarly, while the very high levels of unemployment 
during the early 'thirties can be largely attributed to the 
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economic crisis, there was a strong undercurrent of 
technological unemployment. In agriculture, industry, 
transport and construction, unskilled labour was being 
rapidly displaced by electrical and motor machinery. The 
depression in effect served as a forcing-ground for measures 
which coped more humanely with this growing underlying 
problem. The provision of emergency relief work for 
unemployed men of many classes became gradually transmuted 
into regular unemployment and sickness benefits from the 
State. 
Economic stringency caused by the depression restricted 
the recreational opportunities of many citizens. It led to 
Some decline in attendance at spectator sports such as rugby 
and horse-racing, although some, notably trotting, showed a 
strong resistance to this trend. However, the influence of 
new technology on leisure-time activities was simultaneously 
taking interest away from the traditional sports .. At the 
same time, there was continued growth in sports which 
increased private motor transport had nurtured during the 
'twenties. These included tennis and golf. The trend to 
motoring holidays also proceeded during the early 'thirties 
although the depression and the rise in the real price of 
petrol kept the growth of private motor vehicle ownership 
down. Cinema attendances were swelled by the "talkie" boom 
~rom 1929 onwards and were only briefly affected by the 
depression - operators were soon forced to cut their prices 
to meet their competitors and make good their very substantial 
recent investments. They resumed planning capital spending 
on a large-scale as early as 1933. But the success of the 
cinema paled beside the rapid growth of radio listening. 
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which grew rapidly from 1931, both nationally and in the 
hard-hit province of Canterbury. Arguably, the depression 
may have slowed the decline in interest and involvement in 
older recreational activities, particularly by limiting 
the spread of motor transport. 
Nevertheless, the economic deprivation and psychological 
pressure engendered by the crisis exacerbated a number of 
health problems. The rises in the incidence of mental 
illness, suicide, homicide and abortion are amongst the 
more dramatic of these problems, but some malnutrition, 
deterioration in ~ental health, and increases in goitre 
and peptic ulcer were very widespread. However, the harmful 
effects of the depression on health were disguised by other 
factors, including recent improvements in sanitation, water-
supply and health education, and the long-term decline in 
the birth-rate which has been linked to industrialisation. 
There were also cross-currents from climatic influences, 
the direct impact of the Great War on the health of many 
New Zealanders and the shorter term decline in the birth-
rate following the "baby boom" of the immediate post-war 
years. However, while the damage done by the depression 
was not immediately evident in the statistics of public 
health, the rise in mortality and morbidity from the disorders 
associated with affluence - heart disease and cancers -
continued to be clearly displayed. In at least one area, 
that of motor accidents, the economic crisis actually appears 
to have alleviated a major public health problem which new 
technology 'had created. The decline in sickness due to 
heavy alcohol consumption can also be regarded as a positive 
by-product of the depression. 
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There were comparatively few casualties as a result of 
disorder during this period - it certainly did not impinge 
to any significant degree on the public health statistics. 
Even so, contrary to the traditional view"there was a 
degree of disorder in Christchurch during the depression, 
with the level of violence clearly exceeding that in 
Dunedin and being comparable to that in Wellington. 
Arguably the focus of unrest in Christchurch in May, 1932, 
the tramway dispute, threatened to provoke a much wider 
section of the community than just the unemployed. However, 
the forces of the state were never seriously challenged by 
outbreaks which occurred. Although the unemployed provided 
most of the baton-fodder during the strike, the dispute' itself 
owed much to changes in technology, notably the inroads that 
motor transport was making into the revenue of the Tramways 
Board. 
Local government had extensive responsibilities in the 
area of maintaining public order, notably in the issue of 
permits for meetings and marches. In Christchurch the 
Labour-dominated city council had ideological difficulty in 
banning such gatherings outright, and therefore faced continu-
ing threats to order long after the trouble in other main 
centres had largely subsided. The Labour mayor, Dan Sullivan, 
was obliged to use a wide range of resources to head off 
dangerous situations. Throughout his years in office he 
worked hard to encourage the private charitable distribution 
of goods, partly as a means of forestalling outbreaks of 
anger from disappointed applicants and partly for humanitarian 
reasons. On the other hand, the Labour city council displayed 
a remarkably conservative attitude to its expenditure, 
including that on relief works. After a short initial period 
590 
of comparatively liberal spending in that area it returned 
to the parsimony which had become typical of Christchurch 
city councils. While stoutly maintaining old award rates, 
the council raised less new loan-money and attracted less 
in unemployment board funds than any of the other main 
cities. The reason for this conservatism lay primarily in 
the balance of classes in Christchurch. The Labour Party 
drew many of its leaders and a substantial element of its 
regular support from the independent working class, people 
who typically owned their own homes and sometimes their own 
businesses as well. They were therefore generally rate-
payers and expected Labour to hold the rates down, as indeed 
the party promised. The failure of the city council to 
reduce rates to the satisfaction of many of those working 
people contributed materially to its defeat in 1935. At the 
same time, its attempts to hold down spending encouraged 
criticism from other elements and led to a further, leakage 
of votes, particularly from the labouring class. The Labour 
council, like its conservative opponents, preferred to separate 
its responsibilities for the unemployed from those which had 
been swelled by technological change. For example, the vast 
profits from the sale of electricity were generally put into 
reserves on fixed deposit rather than being expended on 
unemployment relief. The council also found money for the 
expansion of its office staff and the purchase of large 
amounts of labour-saving machinery. 
Despite its influence on the fortunes of the Labour 
party on the Christchurch City Council, the independent working-
class was already facing a decline in its position vis-a-vis 
other classes due to changing technology. The depression 
merely served to confirm this decline. The same influence 
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was swelling the numbers and importance of the white-collar 
class even before the depression. The labouring class 
benefitted from the creation of many new semi-skilled jobs 
as a result of new technology. Less fortunate sections of 
the same class gained from the development of social security 
from attempts to provide relief work during the depression. 
Amongst the dominant classes, capitalists and professionals, 
the economic crisis merely reinforced the movement of 
authority away from the former and towards the latter, a 
movement which derived from the growing complexity of 
technology and the society it was shaping. Individual 
members of the professional class with little respect for 
capitalism enjoyed some authority prior to the end of 1935. 
However, the election of a Labour Government with a deter-
mination to assist working people gave such elements consid-
erable scope for social engineering and a substantial 
increase in their self-confidence. 
A study which concentrates deliberately on two particular 
influences inevitably tends to throw up others without pausing 
sufficiently to do justice to their importance. The impact. 
of the Great War is one such, surfacing repeatedly in these 
pages alongside those of depression and technological change. 
Clearly its shadow would have been cast even more darkly 
had the years under close examination been extended back into 
the early 'twenties. Nevertheless, the influence of the war 
was strongly evident during the period between 1926 and 1936. 
It was to be seen in the unduly small number of men in their 
thirties and forties, and the large proportion of them 
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suffering from physical and psychological disabilities. It 
was also a powerful accelerant in the development of new 
technology and its wider application through mass production. 
Similarly, it had enhanced the standing of professionals and 
had broadened the general appreciation of the state's 
potential to shape uhe economy and society. A full examina-
tion of the influence of "the great watershed" of New Zealand 
between the wars would be rewarding. 
It is impossible to study the period between the wars 
and fail to be struck by the similarities to contemporary 
developments. Once again there is high unemployment, special 
relief work schemes, large-scale government indebtedness in 
primary producing countries, and the resurgence of capitalist 
protest against "interference" by the state. More ominously, 
the world trading and financial system appears to have reached 
a situation reminiscent of that in the late 'twenties, with 
no single power being predominant enough to act as the final 
guarantor of stability. The most powerful nation in the 
system, the United States, is showing a strong tendency to 
safeguard and enhance its own position with little regard 
to the international consequences. So far this has been 
seen largely in the field of interest rates and foreign aid. 
The real danger may come if this attitude is extended to the 
handling of the large American trade deficit. Another 
Smoot-Hawley Tari 
national trade. 
could lead to another collapse of inter-
Again, there is the same coincidence of rapidly spreading 
technological change and an international economic crisis. 
The terms "second" and "third" industrial revolution are being 
applied to the adoption of new technologies in electronics 
and organic chemistry. The relationship between these factors 
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is complex. For example, the disproportionate application 
of electronic automation in Japan has undoubtedly helped to 
sustain that country's continuing high rate of growth. 
Similarly, the present high levels of unemployment almost 
certainly contain a substantial component due to changing 
technology. It is possible that this time there has been a 
much greater detrimental effect on the employment opportunities 
of white-collar workers. Already it seems possible that 
computer programmers may become the cruelly deceived victims 
of technological change in much the same manner as the hand-
loom weavers of the late eighteenth century - encouraged by 
the one innovation only to be rendered redundant soon after 
by another. 
As during the interwar period, large sections of the 
female population are moving into the paid workforce during 
depressed economic times. Then it was principally the 
unmarried who were moving out of the home to take up employ-
ment; and now it is the married. This may well be making 
the problem of economic and technological unemployment more 
difficult in the short-term. 
Similarly, Christchurch has suffered disproportionately 
from the latest depression. For half a century, import 
controls, tariffs, increasing government spending and 
generally favourable trading conditions for primary exports 
engendered a climate in which the long-established industries 
of the city could continue to develop. With international 
prices and markets deteriorating and a determination on the 
part of government to make the economy more competitive, the 
basic problem of Canterbury industry has become evident again~ 
To an even greater extent than in the 'thirties, the main 
consumer market is in the north of the North Island. 
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Furthermore, the booming new mineral and farm industries 
are generally far from this province. As yet there are 
few signs that Canterbury can benefit proportionately from 
the new emphasis on "resource-based industry". 
On the other hand, there are important differences in 
the situations during the 'thirties and the 'eighties. A 
wide range of social security benefits is now available to 
those disadvantaged. Even after tax, the unemployment benefit 
for a single male is twice as large a proportion of the 
average weekly income as that of the assistance provided to 
comparable persons by the North Canterbury Hospital Board 
during the 'thirties. Then there was virtually no benefit 
at all for single unemployed women. When the unemployed 
are given special work they receive remuneration which is 
much closer to the average wage than that paid in return for 
relief work during the 'thirties. 
However, the consumer society has continued to develop 
and its appeals have been given added power by television. 
Every night the unemployed can now be reminded of their 
comparative poverty in their own homes. Despite some job-
sharing and renewed talk of creative leisure for the unemployed, 
it seems that in the 'eighties, as in the 'thirties', great 
numbers of people are trapped between increasing material 
expectations and the crueller realities of a world in crisis 
and change. 
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APPENDIX A: PETROL PRICES, 1926-36 
Date 
27 February, 1926 
1 November, 1927 
9 January, 192B 
23 July, 1930 
2B August, 1930 
30 September, 1930 
23 May, 1931 
19 November, 1932 
9 February, 1933 
1 May, 1933 
2B Augu.st, 1933 
24 November, 1933 
23 December, 1933 
17 January, 1934 
" " " 
26 December, 1934 
5 March, 1936 
First 
Grade 
1/9 
1/6 
2/1 
2/1 
1/11 
2/-
1/9 
1/11 
2/3 
1/10 
1/8 
1/9 
1/9 
1/9 
1/11 
1/10 
1/11 
Second 
Grade 
1/4 
2/-
1/10 
1/11 
1/10 
1/7 
1/9 
l/B 
1/10 
1/10 
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Source 
Star 
II 
II 
" 
" 
II 
" 
Sun 
" 
" 
Star 
Sun 
Star 
II 
II 
II 
Star-Sun 
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APPENDIX B: RECOVERY IN NEW ZEALAND INDUSTRIES, 1931-34 
The purpose of this table is to demonstrate that signs 
of recovery were evident - particularly in manufacturing -
before devaluation. It is also intended to provide some 
more evidence that the change in the exchange rate may have 
set back that recovery in a number of largely urban-based 
industries. Each individua1,industry listed in the 
statistics of factory production gets at least one mention. 
But only one mention is made of industries where volume as 
well as value of output rose initially, or at a greater 
rate, in 1933-34. Volume is only used for major forms of 
production in the particular industry. 
There was a small lag between the devaluation and the 
end of the 1932-33 year. However, given that that ten weeks 
was filled with pronouncements of doom from most sections of 
manufacturing it seems most likely that this period tended 
to drag down the 1932-33 totals. 
(a) Cases where the value or volume of production increased 
in 1932-33 but fell in 1933-34. 
1931-32 1932-33 1933-34 
Aerated-water and Cordial 
factories 100 102 97 
Soap and Candle Making 100 105 100 
Woollen-mills (lbs.of yarn) 100 152 149 
Clothing Manufacture 
(trousers) 100 191 130 
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(b) Cases where a rise in the value or volume of production 
slowed in 1933-34. 
Boiling-down and 
Manure Works 
Cooperages and Packing-
Case Factories 
Electricity (value of 
sales) 
Electricity (current 
sold) 
Agricultural Implement 
and Dairying Machinery 
Manufacturing 
Tanning 
Boots and Shoes 
(numbers produced) 
Hosiery (number of 
pairs) 
Woollen Mills (yards 
of material) 
Clothing Manufacture 
(suits) 
1931-32 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
1932-33 1933-34 
109 116 
112 112 
103 103 
116 121 
118 121 
116 124 
114 118 
143 144 
120 124 
133 151 
(c) Cases where the rise in the value or volume of production 
continued in 1933-34 at roughly the same rate as 1932-33. 
1931-32 1932-33 1933-34 
Boot and Shoe Manufac-
turing (value) 100 102 105 
Woollen mills (value) 100 111 122 
Hosiery factories (value) 100 105 III 
Clothing Manufacture 
(value) 100 111 122 
Flax-milling 100 164 224 
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(d) Cases where an existing rise in the value or volume of 
production accelerated in 1933-34. 
1931-32 1932-33 1933-34 
Meat Freezing and 
Preserving 100 108 128 
Woolscouring and 
Fellmongering 100 121 245 
Rough-sawn Timber 
(volume) 100 108 128 
(e) Cases where the decline in value or volume of production 
continued in 1933-3A. 
1931-32 1932-33 1933-34 
Fish Curing and 
Preserving 100 67 60 
Ice-cream Making 100 99 86 
Fruit-preserving and 
Jam-making 100 91 84 
Sauce, Pickle and 
Vinegar Making 100 95 94 
Gasworks (value of sales) 100 95 93 
Gasworks (volume of gas) 100 97 94 
Furniture and Cabinet 
Making 100 84 71 
(f) Cases where the rise in value of production began in 
1933-34. 
Ham and Bacon Curing 
Butter, Cheese and 
Condensed-milk factories 
Grain-mills 
Biscuit, confectionery 
and sugar-boiling works 
Breweries and Malthouses 
1931-32 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
1032-33 
92 
96 
88 
94 
92 
1933-34 
99 
108 
89 
104 
93 
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Resawing and Planing 
Mills 100 99 110 
Other' Sawmilling and 
Sash and Door 
Manufacturing 100 98 116 
Lime Crushing or 
Burning and Cement-
making 100 80 93 
Brick, Tile and Pottery 
Works 100 71 88 
Iro.n and Brass 
Foundries 100 92 108 
Engineering - works 100 84 91 
Printing Establishments 100 92 93 
Coachbuilding and Motor 
and Cycle Engineering 100 94 97 
APPENDIX C: CHRISTCHURCH CITY COUNCIL TRAFFIC CENSUSES, 
1915-36. 
1915 1922 1926 1929 1932 
Bicycles 7778 8014 8843 9526 12259 
Trams 580 672 895 872 834 
Taxis 221 255 242 214 339 
Cars 297 932 1848 2184 2753 
Motor-cycles 503 384 476 405 567 
Light vans 200 232 330 341 587 
Heavy vans 96 71 218 53 136 
Horse and 
Trade Carts 443 339 326 252 128 
, 
614 
1936 
11355 
763 
446 
3450 
320 
565 
366 
57 
Source: Christchurch City Council, Chief Traffic Inspector's 
Report, 1932, p.13; 1936, p.22. 
Each "census" was taken at the same stations between 8 a.m. 
and 5.30 p.m. on a February weekday. However, the 1929 
figures for taxis, motor-cycles, and vans appear aberrant. 
There also seems to be some confusion between light and 
heavy vans. 
APPENDIX D VOTING PATTERNS IN MAYORAL ELECTIONS 
1927 1929 1931 1935 
(a) (b) (a) {b} (a) (b) (a) (b) 
Wealthy/Commercial/Professional 
Knox Church (north -west) 27 206 14 -40 -8 -41 3 10 
Merivale Lane (north-west) 12 233 15 -48 3 2 19 19 
Rugby Street {north-west} 17 212 19 -24 -10 -31 9 4~ 
Art Gallery (central-west) 20 169 -19 -48 -50 -44 22 14 
Orange Hall (central-east) 67 253 -46 -67 -47 -42 52 28 
Middling 
St. Albans Library 22 136 16 -27 -21 -15 -39 -39 
Spreydon Chambers 14 71 27 -27 0 27 22 3 
Woodham Road 46 205 0 -18 26 26 -42 -57 
St. Martins Library 28 126 -3 -22 7 8 1 -16 
Cranford Street 32 141 20 -11 6 -2 -1 -9 
Low income 
Lawson Street 32 93 -15 -32 0 13 -12 -20 
Salvation Army Hall 47 99 -11 -21 -14 -14 46 40 
Aldwins Road 26 77 -28 -40' 3 12 -69 -73 
Falsgrave Street 68 121 -26 -38 25 34 -28 -29 
St. Chads Hall 28 72 33 32 35 27 28 
(a) percentage movement in total vote 
(b) percentage movement in Labour vote 
Source: Press, 30 April, 1925i 28 April, 1927; 3 May, 1929; 7 May, 193 1 i 9 May, 1935. 
0"1 
I-' 
In 
APPENDIX D: (Continued) 
A crude method of determining the "swing" for or against Labour is to calculate the difference 
between the increase in the total vote and that for Labour. Thus the wrath of the North-west in 1929 
shown in a 54 "spread" at Knox and 63 at Merivale. The change was rather less at the central city 
booths and at most of the "middling" ones. There was little spread in the low income areas, but overall 
a marked fall in the total vote. Labour counted on building up large majorities in such areas in order 
to carry the city. 
The 1933 election has been excluded because of the one-sided nature of the mayoral contest, with 
no official or recognised Citizens' Association candidate. 
The introduction of new neighbouring booths results in sharp falls in total votes, particularly in 
1935 when the city's administrators clearly took note of the very large increase in enrolments. 
However, the "heartland" of each booth's catchment tends to remain the same and the spread between the 
movement in the Labour and total votes often retains some value. 
